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ABSTRACT.
Following the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), this thesis examines the 
concept of sustainable development in the light of laws and 
policies relating to the forest sector of Ghana. The goal is 
to consider how far the relevant laws and policies are 
compatible with the model of sustainable development 
propounded in the Report and whether, in reality, that model 
is a feasible one for developing countries such as Ghana. The 
study explores the law relating to the management, protection 
and exploitation of forests in Ghana. Anomalies in forest 
laws, problems of their enforcement and proposals for reform 
are discussed. The history of forest legislation is briefly 
considered but the emphasis is on recent developments in the 
forest sector, including the Forest Resource Management 
Project, Forest Inventory Project and the work of the National 
Investigations Sub-Committee on Timber. Detailed inquiries 
into problems of forest protection in the Western Region and 
rural forestry initiatives in Bongo, a district in the North- 
East of Ghana, are made. The findings from Ghana suggest that, 
although in many cases reforms corresponding to the 
recommendations of the WCED are desirable, a number of 
conflicting interests operate to frustrate their 
implementation.
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PART ONE. INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER ONE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DEBATE.
(i) Introduction.
Since the Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED) (the Brundtland Report) in 1987,1 the 
debate concerning the direction and interaction of development 
and environmental issues has focused on the concept of 
sustainable development. This thesis questions the practical 
feasibility - as opposed to the theoretical desirability - of 
that goal, in the light of efforts being made to conserve and 
develop forest resources in Ghana.
Detailed studies of the type attempted in this thesis 
provide much needed factual evidence and critical analysis of 
the legal, political and practical problems associated with 
the implementation of sustainable development policies. This 
level of detail was sadly but inevitably lacking in the Report 
of the WCED which aimed for a comprehensive overview of 
environmental and development issues. In view of the 
widespread support for the concept of sustainable development 
in official circles,2 it now seems particularly important to
1 WCED Our Common Future 1987, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp.400.
2 The need for sustainable development was recognised in 
Principle Four of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3- 
14/6/1992, (1992) 31 ILM 874. It was also recognised in
Principle One of the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative 
Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all 
Types of Forests, UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14/6/1992, (1992) 
ILM 882.
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consider the operational aspects of sustainable development 
and to question how far sustainable development is, in 
reality, a feasible goal for developing countries such as 
Ghana. Are the objectives of development and environmental 
protection so readily compatible as the Report would suggest, 
in the real world of poverty and economic crisis? Can the 
logic of sustainable development prevail in the debt saddled, 
economic chaos which seems to characterise developing 
countries? What are the political, legal and institutional 
obstacles to the achievement of sustainable development? These 
are some of the issues addressed in this analysis of Ghana's 
forest sector.
The forest resources of Ghana represent a valuable 
economic resource of national importance but they also 
provide, directly and indirectly, economic, environmental and 
aesthetic benefits for Ghanaians in their everyday lives.
A study of the forest sector in Ghana therefore provides 
opportunities to consider the relevance of sustainable 
development policies and laws both from the "top down" and the 
"bottom up". The chapters on the history of forest 
legislation,1 management institutions2 and the legal control 
of forest exploitation3 incorporate the former approach while 
the study of forest protection in the Western Region4 and
1 Infra Chp.4.
2 Infra Chp.6.
3 Infra Chp.8.
4 Infra Chp.7.
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rural forestry initiatives in Bongo1 incorporate aspects of a 
"bottom up" analysis.
Throughout the thesis, a careful effort has been made to 
identify the economic, political and social factors which 
influence the working of the relevant law. This in line with 
the call made in the Brundtland Report for a cross sectoral, 
multi-disciplinary and integrated approach to environment and 
development problems.2 The analysis reveals a number of 
political, economic, institutional and other factors which 
frustrate the successful implementation of the law.
These findings raise serious questions about the 
operational viability of the Brundtland proposals. If the 
recommendations of the Report are flawed at the operational 
level, then, it is submitted, the call for sustainable 
development is at risk of becoming mere rhetoric, or, worse 
still, a new kind of development morality, fuelling 
insensitive and unrealistic policies and programmes. If this 
is the case, politicians and development experts may do well 
to stop aiming for the remote ideal of sustainable 
development. They may be better advised to continue tackling 
the full range of development problems, recognising and 
confronting the intense social and economic conflicts which 
beset them, with due respect to all local circumstances and 
with greater emphasis on the achievement of more feasible and 
more diverse development goals. The task must then become a 
more realistic one, involving the practical reconciliation of
1 Infra Chp.9.
2 WCED op cit p.62.
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environmental concerns with existing policies and dilemmas. In 
this task, the very real possibility of conflicting 
environmental and development imperatives must be recognised 
and confronted. Some short or medium term environmental trade­
offs in developing countries must be accepted as inevitable. 
In addition, the significance of academic writing which has 
identified the "limits of law"1 and other structural
deficiencies in the "soft state"2 must be afforded greater 
weight. If these issues are swept under the carpet, as appears
to be the case in the Brundtland Report, then, it is
submitted, the concept of sustainable development may all too 
quickly join the list of failed development initiatives.
(ii) Evolution of the International Environment and
Development Debate.
Before proceeding to the study of Ghana, a preliminary 
task is to define and explain the concept of sustainable 
development. This is necessary in order to establish a 
framework for the systematic exploration of the wider issues 
raised by the study of forestry issues. In order to avoid a 
lengthy theoretical debate, the definition of sustainable 
development provided by the WCED has been adopted. The 
substance of this definition is open to many general
1 A . N . Allott, The Limits of Law 1980, Butterworths, 
London, pp.322.
2 G.Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty 1970, Penguin 
Press, London, pp.518.
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criticisms.1 Some of the criticisms most relevant to the 
discussion in this thesis are outlined below. In addition, as 
the philosophy of the Report cannot be fully appreciated 
without a brief description of the earlier debate, the history 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and 
the concept of ecodevelopment, are briefly reviewed. In 
subsequent chapters, the detailed inquiry into practical 
aspects of forest conservation in Ghana will serve to test the 
validity of these preliminary criticisms. It is these 
pragmatic findings which fuel the critique of the Brundtland 
Report offered in this thesis.
(A) The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
1972.
Prior to 1972, the views of developing and developed 
countries on environmental protection were in polar 
opposition. The subject was viewed critically by developing 
countries as a need arising out of the irresponsible policies 
of industrialised countries which created pollution and caused 
the rapid exploitation of natural resources. Developing 
country governments feared that environmental protection 
implied constraints on their own rapid economic growth. 
Meanwhile, developed countries viewed with growing alarm the 
extraordinary rate of population growth in developing 
countries which they saw as a threat both to global economic 
growth and environmental security.
1 See, for example, De la Court Beyond Brundtland: Green 
Development in the 1990s 1990, Zed Books, London, pp.139.
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The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(UNCHE), held in 1972 at Stockholm, forged a new consensus on
environmental and development issues. For the first time,
environmental protection and economic development were not
viewed as entirely incompatible objectives. The Conference
devoted particular attention to the environmental concerns of
developing countries:
"The solution to the environmental problems of poor 
societies is to be found in the process of 
development itself: development is a cure for most 
of these problems rather than their cause. Only the 
process of development can remove many of the 
factors which at present endanger not merely the 
quality of life but threaten life itself in many 
parts of the world."1
The Report to the Conference of a Panel of Experts on 
Environment and Development divided the environmental issues 
facing developing countries into two types - those arising out 
of poverty and those occurring as development proceeds. It 
argued that environmental problems in the first class could 
only be met by increasing the pace and broadening the scope of 
development objectives while environmental problems in the 
second category could be avoided or minimised by improving 
techniques of environmental impact assessment and by improving 
environmental management in developing countries. The Panel 
recognised that in some circumstances trade offs between 
environmental and development priorities would be inevitable 
but decisions on these matters could only be made by 
individual governments in the light of their own unique
1 Report by the Secretary General to the UNCHE 5- 
16/6/1972, Stockholm, A/CONF.48/10, pp.7, p.3.
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ci rcumstances.1
The UNCHE culminated in the Stockholm Declaration. This 
document reflects the new consensus on environment and 
development. Most emphatic is the assertion that rapid 
economic growth in developing countries is an essential pre­
requisite for environmental protection.2 Increased flows of 
foreign assistance, improved terms of trade and rational 
planning are among the measures recommended to enhance 
development and environmental protection in developing 
countries.3
The Stockholm Declaration won the support of developing 
countries for environmental protection but it did so by 
embracing their view of development priorities, by rejecting 
radical environmental policies and by allowing a large measure 
of discretion for individual states to adopt their own 
environmental and economic priorities.4 It affirmed the 
classical economic theories of development based on 
investment, industrialisation and growth and combined them 
with rhetorical calls for a new international economic order.
(B) Ecodevelopment.
During the 1970s, a growing body of opinion began to 
criticise conventional development economics. It was argued
1 UNCHE Development and Environment: Report By a Panel of 
Experts Convened By the Secretary General of the UNCHE Founex, 
Switzerland, 4-12/6/1971, A/CONF.48/10, pp.34, p.5.
2 Declaration of the UNCHE 1972, Chapter II, Principle 8.
3 ibid Principles 9,10,14.
4 See in particular Principles 17 and 21 ibid
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that the growth of a country's Gross National Product was an
inadequate measure of its development because it paid no
attention to the quality - economic, social and cultural - of
that development and because it gave no indication of the
distribution of benefits from economic growth. It was observed
that the standard agenda of enclave, infra structural projects
too often led to economically and environmentally
disappointing results while also failing to spread the
potential benefits of development widely among developing
country populations. It was argued that the time had come to
broaden the scope of conventional development economics:
"It is now time to turn towards Another Development, 
geared to the satisfaction of needs, relying fully 
on the energies of the people and making it possible 
for human societies to live in harmony with the 
environment."1
Environmental sustainability was one important component 
of this self reliant model of development which focused on the 
satisfaction of basic needs and improvements in the quality of 
life.2
With few refinements, the model of Another Development 
provided the essential ingredients for a philosophy of 
ecodevelopment which emerged at about the same time. 
Ecodevelopment, with its vision of self reliant and 
environmentally harmonious development, offered a new 
synthesis between environmental protection and development,
1 J. Nyere, "What Now?" A Report Prepared on the Occasion 
of the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, (1975) Development Dialogue 23-59, p.25.
2 See also, D.Seers, The New Meaning of Development, 
(1977) 3 International Development Review 2-7.
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one that contrasted sharply with the conventional economic
thinking of the Stockholm Declaration.1 It was ...
"An approach to development aimed at harmonizing 
social and economic objectives with ecologically 
sound management, in a spirit of solidarity with 
future generations; based on the principle of self 
reliance, satisfaction of basic needs, a new 
symbiosis of man and earth; another kind of 
qualitative growth, not zero growth, not negative 
growth. "2
In their purest and most radical forms, Another 
Development and ecodevelopment argue for political 
transformation empowering poor people in poor countries to 
take control of their own cultural, social, economic and 
environmental development. They look beyond the politics of 
nation states and they argue for the destruction of capitalist 
structures which create and perpetuate dependency within and 
between societies.3
Political agendas of this magnitude appeared ideological 
and impractical. A more operational formulation of 
ecodevelopment was provided by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP):
"Development at regional and local levels
1 The idea of economic self reliance was also embodied in 
the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of 
Africa, 1980-2000, adopted by the member states of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). See, OAU Lagos Plan of 
Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000 1982, 
International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, pp.130; D. 
Fashole-Luke, T. Shaw (Eds.) Continental Crisis: The Lagos 
Plan of Action and Africa's Future 1984, University Press of 
America, New York, pp.231.
2 Sachs quoted in Glaeser (Ed.) Ecodevelopment 
Concepts, Projects, Strategies 1984, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 
pp.2 4 7, p. 2 5 .
3 Redclift Sustainable Development: Exploring the
Contradictions 1987, Routledge, London, pp.221, p.36.
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consistent with the potentials of the area involved, 
with attention given to the adequate and rational 
use of natural resources and to applications of 
technological styles . . . and organizational forms 
that respect the natural ecosystems and local socio­
cultural patterns."1
In adopting a planning approach to ecodevelopment it was 
hoped to bring theory into operation. This approach, however, 
was technocratic, too easily tagged onto existing projects 
without altering their fundamental top down design. In this 
way, the ideology became diluted while the policy was 
overtaken by events such as the debt crisis which ushered in 
the era of structural adjustment, the policies of which can 
only be seen as the antithesis of a self reliant development 
model.
(iii) Sustainable Development.
By the early 1980s renewed concern for environmental 
issues and despair at the disappointing results of two 
development decades led to the establishment of the WCED 
which, after three years of travel and debate, produced its 
Report, Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report). This Report 
takes a fresh look at the environment and development debate 
and it attempts to remedy some of the short comings of the 
Stockholm Declaration and the ecodevelopment model. It looks 
at some controversial environmental issues, it examines in 
some depth the type of growth which is compatible with 
environmental sustainability and it makes specific
1 UNEP, Ecodevelopment, 1976, quoted in Bartelmus 
Environment and Development 1986, Allen and Unwin, Boston, 
pp.128, p.45; Sachs, The Strategies of Ecodevelopment, (1984) 
17(4) Ceres 17-21.
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recommendations for political, legal and institutional reform. 
The Report can be criticised, however, for failing to include 
a detailed agenda for practical action, for its confusing 
mixture of descriptive and prescriptive analysis and in its 
failure to make uncompromising recommendations on 
controversial issues.
The principal arguments of the Report and the substance 
of this definition are outlined below.
(A) The Definition of Sustainable Development.
"Sustainable development is development that meets 
the need of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs."1
This definition has both physical and political 
dimensions:
(a) Physical Sustainability: Physical sustainability or
'sustained yield management' is a concept already familiar to 
natural resource managers. It suggests that in the 
exploitation of a renewable natural resource, production 
should not exceed the incremental growth rate applicable for 
that resource. In addition, the Brundtland Report has pointed 
to the need to take into account the "system-wide effects" of 
exploitation which may impair the regenerative ability of 
whole ecosystems.2
The technical knowledge required for sustained yield 
management is not always readily available. In the context of
1 WCED op cit p.43.
2 ibid p.45.
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tropical forest management, for example, the method of 
calculating the Annual Allowable Cut, the degree of protection 
which should be afforded to young trees and other management 
techniques are matters of continuing debate.1 Applied as a 
general rule for the management of natural resources, the 
principle has some even more obvious drawbacks. How, for 
example, can a non-renewable resource be managed for a 
sustained yield? The Brundtland Report concedes this problem 
and suggests that such resources should be exploited at rates 
which take into account the criticality of any particular 
resource, the availability of technologies for minimizing 
depletion and the likelihood of substitutes becoming 
available.2 The concept of physical sustainability in the 
Brundtland Report is therefore larger and more sophisticated 
than in the traditional definition.
Despite the adoption of a broader vision of physical 
sustainability, the Report, it is submitted, does still not 
deal adequately with the argument raised by some economists 
that it is better for developing countries to fuel their 
initial stages of development by mining their natural 
resources even if this leads to degradation of the 
environmental resource base in the short term.3 It is the 
argument of these economists that once development "takes 
off", there will be more financial resources available to
1 The Timber Resource infra Chp.8.
2 WCED op cit p.46.
3 This argument is reviewed in Tisdell, Natural 
Resources, Growth and Development 1990, Praeger Publishers, 
New York, pp.186 at pp.1-4.
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rehabilitate and improve environmental quality. They point to 
the experience of the developed countries as the proof of 
their hypothesis.1 Why, then, should the present level of 
resources in developing countries be taken as the starting 
point for calculations of sustainability if more profitable 
alternatives present themselves?
(b) Political Sustainability: Physical sustainability is only 
one dimension of the call for sustainable development. Of 
equal, if not greater, concern to the Commissioners was the 
political dimension to sustainable development. In their view, 
it is only when the basic needs and legitimate aspirations of 
poor people are met that their recourse to environmentally 
destructive survival strategies will stop.2 If these needs are 
to be met, then equitable access to the resources necessary 
for development must be secured for all. Sustainable 
development implies a concern for social equity not only 
between generations but also within generations.
The emphasis placed in the Report on meeting basic needs 
is reminiscent of the philosophy of both Another Development 
and ecodevelopment. However, the methods advanced for its 
achievement are not compatible. Whereas proponents of 
ecodevelopment argued sometimes for radical political change 
and always for greater self reliance, the Commission's view is
1 "Global Warming and Developing World Priorities," A 
lecture given by Dr. Andrew Hurrell, Nuffield College, Oxford, 
at a Seminar on Law and Politics of Global Climate Change 
6/12/1991, South-North Centre for Environmental Policy in 
association with the British Branch of the International Law 
Association.
2 Infra p.33.
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that greater equity can be achieved essentially by 
redistributing the benefits of growth. The better use of 
institutional, educational and legal resources is canvassed as 
the appropriate method of securing this objective.1
Some social scientists argue that it is naive to rely on 
these methods because pressure groups which hold the balance 
of political power rarely act to their own detriment even if 
their prospects for long term gain are high.2 Where resources 
are scarce and competition is great, the likelihood of 
enlightened action actually occurring is even slimmer. It is 
possible to argue that without radical alterations in the 
power configuration of national and international societies, 
any attempt to redistribute scarce resources will be of only 
limited success.3
Is the Commission's call for existing institutions to act 
in a more enlightened fashion more or less realistic than the 
radicals' call for structural change? Will educational, legal 
and institutional changes be sufficient to meet the challenge 
of satisfying basic needs? In the discussion of rural forestry 
initiatives in chapter nine, this thesis looks at how far some 
local institutions and programmes have shown themselves 
capable of addressing the interlocking challenge of meeting
1 WCED op cit p.46.
2 De la Court op cit p. 118; M. Galanter, Why the Haves 
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
(1974), 9, Law and Society Review 95-160; F. Snyder, Law and 
Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, (1980), 14(3), 
Law and Society Review 723-804.
3 W .Adams, Green Development: Environment and 
Sustainability in the Third World 1990, Routledge, London, 
pp.257, pp.66-83.
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basic needs and protecting the environment.
The emphasis on inter-generational equity in the 
definition of sustainable development given in the Brundtland 
Report is equally vulnerable to these criticisms. The argument 
that the material needs of future generations may be better 
served by allowing resource depletion and environmental 
degradation in the short term has already been raised.1 In 
addition, the same doubts as to the likelihood of enlightened 
political actions actually occurring can be raised with 
respect to the interests of future generations. What weight 
are developing country governments in reality likely to give 
to the interests of future generations when the unsatisfied 
demands of the existing generation are so pressing? It is the 
present generation, after all, which determines the fate of 
its political leaders. With the population explosion in full 
swing, it appears simply naive to burden fragile governments 
with duties towards their future citizens which they cannot 
even secure for the present generation. The analysis in the 
Brundtland Report seems to ignore the very real possibility 
that meeting the most basic needs of the present generation 
may require short term policies which conflict with the less 
tangible needs of future generations. The problem of 
conflicting short term and long term interests is evident in 
the study of forest exploitation in chapter eight.
1 Supra p.29.
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(B) Poverty as Cause and Effect of Environmental Stress.
"Poverty itself pollutes the environment ... Those 
who are poor and hungry will often destroy their 
immediate environment in order to survive. They will 
cut down forests; their livestock will overgraze 
grasslands; they will over use marginal land; and in 
growing numbers they will crowd into congested 
cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is so 
far reaching as to make poverty itself a major 
global scourge ... A world in which poverty is 
endemic will always be prone to ecological and other 
catastrophes".1
The Stockholm Conference drew the world's attention to 
environmental problems which characterise poverty including 
poor sanitation, overcrowded cities and unclean water 
supplies. The lack of public money was identified as a 
principal cause of these circumstances. This reinforced the 
developing countries' calls for faster growth. The Brundtland 
Report adds a new dimension to this argument by drawing 
attention to situations in which poor people are forced, by 
their immediate need to survive, into adopting strategies 
which undermine the prospects for long term, sustainable 
growth. The impact of their activities is not only of local 
concern but also of national and even international concern. 
The destruction of tropical forests by landless farmers in 
Cote d'Ivoire is one example quoted by the WCED.2 These 
farmers, the majority of whom are themselves "environmental 
refugees" from neighbouring Sahelian countries, speed up the 
process of global warming by contributing to global
1 WCED op cit pp.28,44.
2 ibid p.291. These labourers may only be working the 
land on behalf of relatively wealthy, capitalist farmers who 
have bought the land and are reaping handsome profits as a 
result. See the discussion of forest encroachment in the 
Western Region infra Chp.7.
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deforestation. Thus, argues the Report, the survival of all 
rests on eradicating the poverty which drives the most 
vulnerable into ecologically destructive lifestyles.1
The view that poverty is a causal factor of environmental 
degradation is open to criticism. In many instances it is the 
expansion of commercial agriculture by relatively affluent 
capitalist entrepreneurs which degrades the environment, 
either directly, by expansion into forest land or indirectly, 
by driving poor people off their land and onto marginal land 
under the pressure of market forces. In both situations, the 
root of environmental destruction lies in the expansion of 
commercial agriculture and not simply in the phenomenon of 
poverty.2 The Commission's firm commitment to increasing the 
exports of developing countries3 is not easily reconcilable 
with this view.
The Brundtland Report does argue that greater support for 
small holder farming should be preferred to continuing 
assistance to large scale capitalist agriculture.4 This should 
help to counteract the process of environmental degradation 
which results from growing landlessness. However, the idea 
that meeting the basic needs of poor people, by increasing the 
productivity of their existing agricultural land in consonance
1 ibid p.44.
2 De la Court op cit pp.24-5; J. Browder, Development 
Alternatives for Tropical Rain Forests, in H.J. Leonard 
et.al., Environment and the Poor: Development Strategies for 
a Common Agenda 1989, Transaction Books, Oxford, pp.222, 
pp.111-133 at p.113.
3 WCED op cit p.52.
4 ibid p.143.
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with sound environmental practices, will reduce the threat to 
marginal and forest land fails to take into account the 
potentially unlimited desire of "poor" people to increase 
their wealth by expanding agricultural production to meet 
international market demands. Contrary to the argument of the 
Report, the threat to marginal and forest land may actually be 
increased if farmers, in meeting their basic needs, acguire 
the minimum security necessary to expand their farms. The 
Report was blind to this possibility in part because it failed 
to distinguish between poor but economically viable farmers 
and the plight of the poorest and most desperate people who 
have no resources with which to satisfy even their minimum 
needs, whether or not by environmentally harmful methods.1
The Brundtland Report raises the spectre of land reform 
as a possible solution to growing landlessness and to ensure 
that basic needs receive priority in agricultural production 
patterns.2 However, for these problems to be effectively 
tackled, not only land reform but radical changes in 
international market demand, which encourages cash crops to be 
grown at the expense of subsistence crops, and in the 
political power of capitalist entrepreneurs, who may undermine 
law reform, would seem to be reguired. These changes do not 
appear immediately feasible nor consistent with the vision of
1 The existence of economic differentiation in the rural 
societies of developing countries has been recognised by 
social scientists for a long time. See, for example, P.Hill, 
The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: A Northern Nigerian Case 
Study, (1968) 10(3) Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social 
Studies 2 39-260.
2 WCED op cit p.141.
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enlightened growth which pervades the Report. If the issue is 
fundamentally one of competition between the rich and the poor 
for scarce resources, there is no indication in the Report of 
the power base and method by which poor people can themselves 
radically improve their access to resources.1
There are other arguments which suggest that the 
Brundtland Report placed a disproportionate emphasis on the 
environmentally destructive role of poor people. Even where 
poor people are at the forefront of environmental degradation, 
the scale of their activities is relatively insignificant when 
compared to the impact of commercial or government sponsored 
developments.2 The flooding of tropical forests to build 
hydro-electric dams is a case in point.
It can also be argued that the Commission's negative 
portrayal of poor people does not do justice to their 
frequently environmentally benign cultures and lifestyles. 
These range from isolated communities' awareness of tropical 
forest ecosystems to the practical recycling of material goods 
by impoverished urban communities. Many environmentalists 
consider that governments and western societies have much to 
learn from these alternative lifestyles.3
1 The same weakness was evident in the model of 
ecodevelopment. See, Glaeser op cit p.36.
2 Browder op cit p.113.
3 Richards, Alternative Strategies for the African 
Environment, in International African Institute African 
Environment: Problems and Perspectives 1975, Oxford University 
Press, London, pp.117, at pp.102-114; de Klemm, Culture and 
Conservation: Some Thoughts for the Future, in McNeely and 
Pitt (Eds.) Culture and Conservation 1985, Croom Helm, London, 
pp.308, at pp.239-257.
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Whether poor people are an important cause of
environmental degradation and, if so, whether it is their 
absolute poverty or their desire for greater wealth which is 
the motivating factor for their actions are questions 
considered in this thesis. Clearly the evidence cannot speak 
for all situations but, at least in the example of forest
protection in the Western Region of Ghana,1 the evidence would 
seem to suggest that the view of the WCED on this point was 
too simplistic.
(C) Need for Renewed Growth.
"It is essential that global economic growth be
revitalized. In practical terms, this means more 
rapid economic growth in both industrial and 
developing countries, freer market access for the 
products of developing countries, lower interest 
rates, greater technology transfer and significantly 
larger capital flows, both concessional and 
commercial."2
The Commission argued that renewed global economic growth 
is essential in order to eradicate the poverty which, in the 
view of the Commission, causes environmental degradation.3 It 
firmly rejected the view that continued economic growth can 
only be bought at the expense of further environmental 
degradation. On the contrary, it argued that the current 
global recession has adverse impacts on the environment as 
conservation programmes take a low priority and as more people 
are forced into environmentally destructive survival
1 Infra Chp.7.
2 WCED op cit p.89.
! ibid p.50.
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strategies.1
The Report calls for economic growth in the order of at 
least 3% per anum in developing countries as a whole." In 
response to fears that growth of this magnitude will undermine 
the resource base and create pollution, the Report calls for 
greater use of environmentally clean and resource efficient 
technologies.3 These technologies must be openly shared with 
developing countries if their full impact is to be felt.4 
Technology must play a critical role in ensuring that 
continued growth does not destroy the environment to an extent 
which threatens mankind's prospects for sustained development 
in the future.
The Commission's support for economic growth rests on the
premise that this is necessary in order to eradicate the
threat to the environment caused by poverty. It is realistic
enough, however, to concede that growth will only achieve this
purpose when it is put on a sustainable development path.
"Growth by itself is not enough. High levels of 
productive activity and widespread poverty can co­
exist and endanger the environment. Hence 
sustainable development requires that societies meet 
human needs both by increasing productive potential 
and by ensuring equitable opportunities for all."5
Malthusian scenarios of economic growth in combination
1 ibid p.70.
2 ibid p.50.
3 ibid p.59.
4 ibid p.16.
5 ibid p.44.
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with increasing population leading to global catastrophe1 were 
clearly unacceptable to the Commission, if only for political 
reasons. On the contrary, it argued that only by improving the 
lot of the poorest will the rate of population growth be 
slowed to a sustainable level.2
The arguments of the Commission follow firmly in the 
tradition of the Stockholm Declaration. The principal tenets 
of conventional development economics are closely adhered to 
despite their mixed record of success. Progressive 
industrialisation3 in developing countries and increased 
levels of international trade4 are among the Commission's 
objectives for a world of ever increasing interdependence. 
This vision appears to contrast with the emphasis on self 
reliance in the ecodevelopment model. The Report can be 
criticised for adopting such a euro-centric view of 
development as well as for its firm belief in technological 
solutions.
Many environmentalists doubt the ability of global 
ecosystems to provide for and absorb the level of growth 
envisioned in the Report whether or not greater use is made of 
environmentally clean technologies.5 The slow uptake of
1 G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, ( 1968), 162, 
Science 1243-1248.
2 WCED op cit p.106.
3 ibid p.214.
4 ibid p.52.
5 Trainer,F. Abandon Affluencel 1985, Zed Books, London, 
pp.308, pp.2-3; G. Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, in G. Hardin 
and J. Baden (eds), Managing the Commons 1977, W.H. Freeman 
and Co., San Francisco, pp.294, pp.261-277; De la Court op cit
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renewable energy technology is just one of the factors giving 
credence to these doubts.
Perhaps an even greater flaw in the argument of the 
Commission is the reality of the economic situation faced by 
most developing countries. The record of the 1980s certainly 
gives no cause for optimism that the targeted growth can in 
fact be achieved. Without decisive action to cancel developing 
country debt and to enhance the terms of trade in their favour 
it is likely that growth will remain as elusive for developing 
countries in the 1990s as in the 1980s. Although the Report 
considers the need for more debt relief1 and improved 
international commodity prices,2 it is far from taking a firm 
stand on these pre-requisites to renewed growth.
In this thesis, the question whether recent economic 
development programmes have proved consistent with 
environmental objectives is raised. The impact of Ghana's 
Economic Recovery Programme on the forest sector is a 
particularly pertinent example of how structural adjustment 
programmes can force developing countries into environmentally 
disastrous policies.3 The question now is whether Ghana has 
the technological and managerial capacity to reverse that 
trend once growth is revived. What are the prospects for 
environmentally sustainable development if growth is attained 
within the existing structure of international economic
p. 15.
1 WCED op cit pp.73-5.
3 ibid p.71.
1 Infra Chp.8.
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relations? What is the likely impact of recent sector wide 
reforms? Can they be relied upon to secure Ghana's sustainable 
development in the future given the record of managerial and 
political problems to date?
(D) A Call for Action: The Need for Institutional and Legal 
Reform.
In addition to the major policy goals contained within 
the Report's proposals for sustainable development, there are 
general proposals for legal and institutional reform. These 
recommendations are geared towards effecting the integrated 
consideration of environmental and economic issues at the 
policy, planning and decision-making stages. In the view of 
the Commission, this is the most fundamental challenge for 
sustainable development in the 1990s.1
The Report favours strengthening the roles of existing 
national environmental and resource management agencies.2 
However, this action by itself will not suffice to meet the 
requirements of sustainable development. Environmental 
problems are too serious to be left to isolated environmental 
agencies acting retrospectively to minimise environmental 
damage. Neither can they be adequately tackled by traditional 
sector institutions which are rarely authorised to consider 
the cross sectoral challenge of sustainable development.3 The 
Report argues that the key policy and decision-making
1 WCED op cit p.313.
2 ibid p.319.
3 ibid p.310.
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institutions in each nation must take greater responsibility
for action to promote sustainable development. Only in this
way will complex, multi-dimensional environmental problems be
afforded the priority they deserve.1
In addition to institutional reform, the Report calls for
legal reform:
"Legal regimes are being rapidly outdistanced by the 
accelerating and expanding scale of impacts on the 
environmental base of development. Human laws must 
be reformulated to keep human activities in harmony 
with the unchanging and universal laws of nature.1'2
The Report considers that national laws should define the
reciprocal rights of government and individuals with respect
to sustainable development. These may, for example, cover the
right of public access to environmental information,
procedures for settling environmental disputes and rules
regarding liability and compensation in respect of
environmental damage. The Report outlines the principal
objectives of sustainable development legislation.3 These
range from maintaining essential ecosystems to enforcing the
principle of optimum sustainable yield in the exploitation of
renewable natural resources. Existing laws which are
compatible with these objectives should be strengthened and
improved. Conflicting or out of date laws should be
reformulated to promote sustainable development. Environmental
education and greater public participation in environmental
decision-making will enhance the effectiveness of the law. The
1 ibid p.314.
2 ibid p.330.
5 ibid p.331.
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Commission argued strongly for enhancing the role of Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the areas of public 
education and participation in decision-making as well as in 
the implementation of sustainable development programmes.1
Can legal devices be successfully employed to achieve 
these ambitious goals? The history of the law and development 
debate suggests that such programmatic goals may be beyond the 
scope of the law.2 It has been suggested that there are limits 
inherent in the nature of law which make it an imperfect 
instrument for effecting change.3 Developing country
governments often do not have the resources necessary to 
implement the most ambitious legislation in their statute 
books. Corruption and other institutional weaknesses 
characteristic of the "soft state" frequently undermine the 
efficacy of the law.4 The Brundtland Report seems to have 
remained aloof from these fundamental problems of development 
administration.
This thesis looks at the positive as well as negative 
contribution of the political, institutional and legal
mechanisms currently being employed in the conservation of 
some of Ghana's natural resources. In so doing, the pertinence 
and feasibility of the Commission's recommendations on
1 ibid p.326.
2 J. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the 
Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development 
Movement, (1977), 25, AJCL 457-491; A.N.A. Allott, The Past 
and Future Contribution of Law to Development in Africa, 
(1980), 1, Jahrbuch Fur Afrikanisches Recht 3-19.
J Allott, The Limits of Law, op cit p.287.
4 Myrdal op cit p.208.
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integrated decision-making, public participation and 
strengthened laws, will be assessed. How far has Ghana moved 
towards implementing these legal and institutional 
recommendations and what else needs to be done? What are the 
factors which constrain the policy and law-makers when they 
try to adopt reforms of the type recommended by the WCED 
Commissioners? What problems of implementation confront the 
laws and institutions responsible for effecting sustainable 
development policies in Ghana?
(iv) Mutual or Conflicting Interests? The Logic of Resource 
Development.
At the heart of the Commissioner's Report lies a firm 
belief in the ability of nation states to act in a rational, 
enlightened fashion in order to achieve sustainable 
development:
"This Commission believes that people can build a 
future that is more prosperous, more just and more 
secure ... We do not offer a detailed blueprint for 
action but instead a pathway by which the peoples of 
the world may enlarge their spheres of co­
operation . 1,1
The Commissioners believe that the logic of sustainable 
development, as the only guarantee of mutual security in an 
increasingly inter-dependent world, will be self evident to 
decision-makers in positions of authority. The need for 
responsible management and co-operation, they argue, has never 
been greater and never before have the incentives been so
1 WCED op cit pp.1-2.
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manifest.1 It is only logical, therefore, for the governments
of the world to take on board its recommendations for long
term planning, rational resource management and basic needs
development policies. Fundamentally, the Brundtland Report is
a rallying call for an international environmental consensus.
In this thesis, the basic assumption that effective
sustainable development policies can be brought about by
appealing to mutual interests is questioned. Environmental
resources are scarce commodities.2 This means that countries,
classes, communities and individuals may ultimately have to
compete for their control. In this situation, political
conflict is an outcome equally, if not more likely, than
mutual consensus. This possibility raises important questions
about the distribution and balance of political power in
developing countries and about the role of law in society.
The "conflict versus consensus" paradigm has a long
history in legal sociology. For analysts who favour a
consensus model of law, laws reconcile and represent the
interests of society at large3 but in conflict models of law,
analysts argue that laws favour and reflect the interests of
the most powerful interest groups in society:
"Society is characterized by diversity, conflict, 
coercion and change, rather than by consensus and 
stability . . . law is a result of the operation of 
interests, rather than an instrument that functions
1 ibid p.23.
2 Tisdell op cit p.l.
3 This view is reflected in the writings of Pound, 
Durkheim and Ehrlich. See, Lloyd and Freeman, Lloyd1s 
Introduction to Jurisprudence 1985, Stevens and Sons, London, 
pp.1257, pp.557-572.
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outside of particular interests. Though law may 
control interests, it is in the first place created 
by interests. Third, law incorporates the interests 
of specific persons or groups; it is seldom the 
produce of the whole society ... Unlike the 
pluralistic conception of politics, law does not 
represent a compromise of the diverse interests in 
society, but supports some interests at the expense 
of others."1
Whereas some analyses of the conflict model of law 
recognise the diffusion of power between various competing 
interest groups,2 a Marxist analysis of law holds that, in 
capitalist economies, the interests of the capitalist class 
dominate political and legal institutions.3 Law is then an 
instrument of control used by the capitalist class to promote 
its own economic interests at the expense of the proletariat.4 
If the vested interests of the ruling class in every new law 
are not always immediately self evident, it is nevertheless 
arguable ...
"Not that each legislative choice is directly 
motivated by the interests of the ruling class, but 
that the economic basis of class interests will 
filter out and render ineffective all laws which are
1 Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime, quoted in Lloyd, 
ibid p.620. For a fuller discussion of conflict models of law, 
see, W. Chambliss and R. Seidman, Law, Order and Power 1971, 
Addison-Wesley Press, Reading, Massachusetts, pp.533, pp.45- 
73. For a discussion of the applicability of the consensus 
model of law to Africa, see, R. Seidman, Law and Economic 
Development in Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, (1966) Wisconsin Law Review 999-1070.
2 R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law 1992, Butterworths, 
London, pp.398, p.113.
3 ibid pp.106-118; J. Harris, Legal Philosophies 1980, 
Butterworths, London, pp.282, pp.251-256. For a fuller 
discussion of Marxist theory and law see, H. Collins, Marxism 
and Law 1982, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.159.
4 Cotterrell op cit p.107; Harris op cit p.252; Collins 
op cit pp.2 7-8.
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The "conflict versus consensus" paradigm has been 
discussed in the context of the law and development debate. 
Seidman, for example, has ably argued that a conflict 
perspective on law is appropriate for African states as 
elsewhere:
"The state and the legal order can never be neutral 
... they reflect not consensus but conflict."2
Conflict over access to resources is a theme often raised
in political analysis.3 It is a hidden agenda in some of the
literature on basic needs and people's participatory
approaches to development.4 The impact of political and social
conflicts on environmental programmes within developing
countries is a theme which has entered some recent literature
1 Harris op cit p.253.
2 R. Seidman, The State. Law and Development 1978, Croom 
Helm, London, pp.483, p.93. See also, F. Snyder, Law and 
Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, (1980) 14(3) 
Law and Society Review 723-804.
3 See, for example, Marenin,0. The Managerial State in 
Africa: A Conflict Coalition Perspective, in Z. Ergas (Ed.) 
The African State in Transition 1987, Macmillan Press, London, 
pp.340 at pp.61-85; "Deep Politics: Political Response, 
Protest and Conflict" in N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill, 
D. Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa 
1992, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, pp.483, at pp.189- 
210.
4 G. Sen, C. Grown, Development Crises and Alternative 
Visions 1987, Monthly Review Press, New York, pp.116; I. 
Dankelman, J. Davidson, Women and Environment in the Third 
World 1988, Earthscan Publications, London, pp.210; R. 
Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First 1987, 
Longman, Harlow, pp.246; C. Blankson, The Food Crisis in West 
Africa: An Examination of Theoretical Approaches, (1987) 27, 
Rural Africana 1-17.
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on environment and development.1 The links between 
international relations of dependency and environmental 
degradation have been highlighted by some scholars2 and were 
tentatively acknowledged in the Brundtland Report.3
These theoretical analyses of legal structures, 
development and environmental processes are relevant to the 
debate in this thesis on the practical efficacy of the 
Brundtland recommendations. If the legal and administrative 
machinery of states are fora for competing interest groups of 
unequal political and economic power, or alternatively, if 
they are instruments of class rule serving prevailing economic 
interests, the faith of the Brundtland Commissioners in legal 
and institutional solutions to environmental problems may be 
misplaced because rational solutions based on mutual interests 
may be sacrificed to the more immediate concerns of dominant 
political and economic interests.
On the basis of the evidence presented in the following 
pages, the argument put forward in this thesis is that 
political, institutional and legal structures are vulnerable 
to the influence of competing interest groups and economic
1 T. O'Riordan and W. Derrick Sewell Project Appraisal 
and Policy Review 1981, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 
pp.302, p.288; Adams op cit pp.76-87; Redclift op cit pp.199. 
Links between environmental degradation and military conflicts 
are explored in, A. Hjort af Ornes, M. Salih (Eds.) Ecology 
and Politics: Environmental Stress and Security in Africa 
1989, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Motala, 
Sweden, pp.255.
2 Redclift op cit p.36; Blaikie, The Political Economy of 
Soil Erosion 1985, Longman, London, pp.182; De la Court op cit 
pp.24-25.
3 WCED op cit pp.67-90.
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forces which do not seek, first and foremost, to realise the 
objective of sustainable development. The ability of these 
structures to meet the challenge of sustainable development is 
therefore compromised to an extent not adequately realised in 
the Brundtland Report. This fundamentally weakens the force of 
the Report's recommendations. In failing to highlight these 
concerns, the Report falls short of providing concrete and 
realistic proposals for action at the national level.
Underlying this thesis is the contention that only when 
the nature and extent of conflicts which affect resource 
exploitation are fully exposed will a realistic debate on the 
prospects for environmental conservation in developing 
countries become possible. In highlighting the issues of 
competition and conflict, as opposed to mutuality of interests 
and consensus, the aim of this thesis is not to put forward a 
pessimistic, doomsday scenario. Rather, the hope is that by 
exposing these realities, more concrete, more pragmatic and 
less idealistic environmental programmes will be promoted. By 
attempting to foresee the potential conflicts and by drawing 
widely on the experience of development, it may be possible to 
overcome some of the obstacles to success which have 
frustrated earlier programmes. At the very least, a more open 
recognition of the magnitude of social problems which underlie 
environmental issues should inspire a more balanced assessment 
of the priority to be afforded to environmental protection in 
preference to other equally pressing and sometimes more urgent 
development goals.
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: PARAMETERS AND
CONSTRAINTS.
(i) Choice of Subject Matter.
The Brundtland Report argued for an holistic approach to 
environmental and development problems. In particular, it 
argued for an integrated, cross-sectoral and multi­
disciplinary analysis of problems and solutions:
"The objective of sustainable development and the 
integrated nature of the global environment 
/development challenges pose problems for 
institutions, national and international, that were 
established on the basis of narrow preoccupations 
and compartmentalized concerns . . . The challenges 
are both interdependent and integrated, requiring 
comprehensive approaches."1
Following the logic of the Brundtland Report, the initial 
objective of the writer was to consider development and 
environmental problems in as wide a context as possible using 
multi-disciplinary materials and employing the knowledge and 
insights into the working of the law in developing countries 
gathered, inter alia, from the law and development school and 
from legal sociology more generally.
It was initially thought that the demand for an 
integrated analysis of environment and development problems 
would best be served by an analysis of two contrasting case 
studies. The two case studies chosen were forestry and, in 
sharp contrast to a sector study, a district case study of a 
range of development and environmental problems in Bongo, a 
political district in the north-east savanna. This choice of 
studies was made purposely to allow a maximum number of the
1 WCED op cit p.9.
51
issues and recommendations made in the Report, from 
institutional strengthening to participatory, "bottom up" 
development projects, to be considered and assessed within the 
framework of one thesis.
It soon became clear, however, that stricter parameters 
were required in order to maintain the depth, compactness and 
consistency required of an academic thesis. It was therefore 
decided to concentrate on only one subject matter, that is, 
forestry, in all its legal, social, economic and environmental 
aspects. The concern of the Brundtland Report for an holistic 
appreciation of environmental issues has not been disregarded, 
however, and the goal throughout this thesis is to explore 
cross sectoral, multi-dimensional influences on the forestry 
sector. In particular, the opportunity to explore some broad 
issues of development and environmental inter-relationships as 
they relate to forestry issues was seized upon during the 
author's research in Bongo District. Parts of the discussion 
in that chapter particularly reflect this search for a more 
holistic, comprehensive view of forestry problems in their 
legal, social, economic, political and environmental setting. 
Overall, the objective has been to meet academic requirements 
while adhering to the call of the Brundtland Report for the 
closer integration of environmental and development affairs.
(ii) Research Materials.
The desire to consider forestry problems in as wide a 
context as possible encouraged the use of a wide range of 
sources and materials. Some of these are conventional legal
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sources - statutes, case law, books and journals. 
Jurisprudential, socio-legal and law and development 
literature has been employed to establish a theoretical 
framework which serves the research findings. In addition, 
archival materials at the Public Records Office in London and 
at the National Archives in Accra were searched for relevant 
information on historical aspects of forest conservation in 
Ghana. The goal here was not to make a comprehensive, detailed 
inquiry but to investigate problems and issues which seem to 
have a bearing on forestry issues in debate today.
A number of problems are associated with the use of 
historical and official sources of information. These include 
the problems of inaccurate statistics and information, 
official secrecy which attaches, for example, to the Report of 
the National Investigations Sub-Committee on Timber, and the 
non-availability of this and some historical material which 
has been lost, destroyed or is currently withheld from the 
public.
In addition to studying written sources of information in 
Britain, the author spent thirteen months in Ghana, from 
November 1989 to December, 1990 during which time oral 
evidence was gathered and materials locally available were 
studied. Extensive interviews were held with dozens of 
Ghanaians, officials and ordinary citizens, who provided the 
author with an enormous amount of valuable information. A list 
of interviewees is presented in Appendix Six and 
acknowledgements have already been made. The information so 
gained is used throughout this thesis.
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There are many methodological problems associated with 
the use of oral evidence. Although attempts were made to cross 
check and confirm evidence given during interviews and 
although repeat interviews were conducted with some officials 
throughout the whole thirteen months of the author's stay in 
Ghana, the inevitable risks of using first hand oral evidence 
include misinformation and misunderstandings which may have 
arisen from the enthusiasm of the author, the political 
judgement of the interviewee, cultural differences and 
constraints of time and formality, especially in the case of 
interviews with officials, although it is only fair to say 
that all interviewees were considerably more helpful and 
patient than even Ghanaian courtesy demands!
Two case studies of forestry issues at the district level 
are included in the thesis. The first concerns aspects of 
forest protection in the Western Region. Research towards this 
case study was undertaken at two district forestry offices, in 
Sefwi Wiawso and Juabeso-Bia, over a period of three months, 
from January-March, 1990. During this time, thanks to the co­
operation of the district forestry officers, the author 
scrutinised the locally available written materials including 
correspondence and district reports, notes and records of 
forest offences. In addition, in depth interviews were 
conducted with forestry staff. No opportunity was lost to quiz 
forestry staff, local farmers and traditional authorities on 
forestry issues. Unfortunately, the author's dependence on 
forestry and game and wildlife officers to act as interpreters 
and the general secrecy and suspicion regarding the issues in
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the Western Region, inevitably led to some slanted answers 
being given during interviews with local people. Only the very 
simplest method of counteracting this tendency could be 
employed in the time available. This "method" was for the 
author to ask as many people as possible as many questions as 
possible as informally as possible. Written sources and the 
opinions of officials outside the district helped to 
corroborate information gathered at the district level but, at 
the end of the day, a measure of academic sceptism on, for 
example, the views of local people on the desirability of 
forest conservation or statements about their activities with 
respect to forest reserves, remains justifiable.
The second case study was undertaken in Bongo District. 
The size and nature of the research challenge here deserves a 
separate consideration.
(iii) Research Conducted in Bongo District.
Separate visits were made by the author to Bongo District 
in early January 1990 and November 1990. In addition, during 
the period, March-July, 1990, the author was given residence 
in the District, firstly in the house of Mr. Jones Awuni, a 
local teacher, and later in separate accommodation provided by 
courtesy of the District Secretary, to both of whom the author 
is particularly thankful.
During her stay in Bongo, the author conducted interviews 
with many officials in Bongo and Bolgatanga, the regional 
capital. Non-Ghanaian project officers resident in the area 
were also quizzed in lengthy interviews. Records of law suits
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heard in the Magistrates Court and before the High Court at 
Bolgatanga were examined and a number of relevant district 
reports were also made available to the author.
All interviews were conducted as informally as possible 
with wide ranging issues explored and discussed. In every 
case, pre-determined questions were followed up with 
supplementary questions and free ranging discussion, the 
objective being to elicit as much interesting and pertinent 
information as possible. Attempts were made to cross check 
information and to further investigate interesting information 
in successive interviews. Notes were made at the time of the 
interview and immediately afterwards these were written up in 
more precise detail. In every case, informants were as wholly 
co-operative as their knowledge and their circumstances would 
permit but, as with the conduct of interviews elsewhere in 
Ghana, there are a number of limitations, of the type noted 
above, on the reliability of the oral evidence.
Traditional authorities in the area were also interviewed 
in depth. These interviews were conducted with the help of 
interpreters.1 It was unfortunate that the long reigning 
Paramount Chief of Bongo had recently died and so too had the 
Tindana of Bongo. The Regent of Bongo and his linguist, who 
had also served the Paramount Chief, did their utmost to 
answer the author's questions but as the new Tindana was still 
to be appointed, an important opportunity to cross check the
1 This was not only because of the language barrier but, 
in some cases, also to conform to custom. The Chief of Gowrie, 
for example, speaks English but answered all of the author's
questions in Fra Fra.
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information given by the Regent was missed. The Tindana of 
Adaboya, the Chief of Adaboya and the Chief/Tindana of Gowrie 
were also interviewed on the basis of very similar interview 
formats. The authorities were encouraged to expand and 
illustrate their answers whenever they wished. The author's 
common request for additional interviews was never refused. 
All the evidence given on the specific points covered in the 
main body of the thesis are presented to the reader in 
Appendix One.
Questions of reliability are particularly important in 
the case of interviews with traditional authorities. The 
language barrier inevitably meant that much information was 
lost to the author or easily misinterpreted.1 If traditional 
authorities are competing for political influence locally, as 
is quite probable, or if their concern is to provide the 
legally correct answer rather than to explain the actual 
practice, if memories are poor, questions too abstract or the 
interviewer's persistence too trying for the patience of the 
interviewee, then the answers will no doubt have been adjusted 
accordingly.2 The interpreters were always keen but not always 
as keen as the author. A far greater problem, however, was the
1 Pelto, Muessig, Charles The Study and Teaching of 
Anthropology 1980, Merrill Publishing Co., London, pp.124, 
p.39.
2 On these and other problems which bedevil interview 
techniques see, R. Mayntz, K. Holme, R. Huebner Introduction 
to Empirical Sociology 1976, Penguin Education, Harmondsworth, 
pp.240, pp.100-118; S. Roberts Order and Dispute - An 
Introduction to Legal Anthropology 1979, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, pp.216; M. Morison Methods in Sociology 1986, 
Longman Group, Harlow, pp.Ill, pp.43-73; M. Shipman The 
Limitations of Social Research 1988, Longman Group, Harlow, 
pp.196, pp.78-89, 161-176.
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inherent difficulty of finding the correct legal 
interpretation of the terms used locally by the traditional 
authorities and interpreters.1 This was probably the greatest 
obstacle. Concepts of land ownership are notoriously 
associated with linguistic problems.2 For this reason, a 
technical discussion of issues of land ownership has been 
avoided in this thesis in favour of a more limited 
investigation into the ways in which legal rights and 
obligations have an impact on the use of the environment.
Linguistic problems also help to account for the 
contradictions and uncertainties in the interviews, not only 
in the evidence of the Chief and the Tindana of Adaboya, for 
example, which to a certain extent was expected, but even in 
the evidence obtained during the same interview with one 
person!3 A plausible explanation for these apparent 
discrepancies lies in the error of thinking in terms of 
clearly defined legal norms. Customary law, here as elsewhere 
in Africa, may best be viewed as being in a state of flux with
1 Pelto op cit p.39.
2 For an interesting debate on the relevance and 
substance of the concept of ownership in African customary 
law, see, A. Allott, Towards A Definition of "Absolute 
Ownership", (1969) 2 JAL 99-102; S. Simpson, Towards A 
Definition of "Absolute Ownership", (1969) 3 JAL 145-150 and 
the reply by Allott at pp.148-150 of the same issue.
3 The Chief of Adaboya, for example, initially stated 
that the land was for the Tindana but later stated that the 
land was for the Chief infra Appendix One.
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uncertainties inherent in the system.1 It appears from much of 
the evidence presented to the author, that the administration 
and control of land is not solely the job of one clearly 
identifiable "owner".2 Instead there are procedures for 
obtaining a broad consensus among all the interested parties. 
This makes it foolish to attempt to think in terms of one 
clearly identifiable, legal, "owner". It should not surprise 
any student of Ghanaian customary law to read that more often 
rights are concurrent and overlapping, while decisions are 
made with the consent of the community and not just the 
individual.J
It is because of these many linguistic and conceptual 
obstacles that theoretical questions on very specific legal 
issues have so far as possible been avoided. Instead, an 
account of the relevant rights and obligations pertinent to an 
inquiry into environmental and forestry initiatives, has been 
offered in general terms which are, it is hoped, less likely 
to distort the substance of the information that was given to 
the author. Existing materials written in general terms or
1 A. Allott, The Changing Law in a Changing Africa, 
(1961) 11(2) Sociolocrus 115-131; L. Fortmann, J. Riddell Trees 
and Tenure: An Annotated Bibliography for Agroforesters and 
Others 1985, ICRAF/ Land Tenure Center, Nairobi/ Wisconsin, 
pp.135, p.x.
2 This would account for the frequent and sometimes 
conflicting use of the term "the land is for..." in answers to
the author's questions infra Appendix One. Without a more 
detailed knowledge of the language, an accurate legal analysis
of this statement seems impossible.
5 For a general, thematic discussion of African customary 
land law, see, Bentsi-Enchi11, The Traditional Legal Systems 
of Africa, 6, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
68 - 1 0 2 .
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with respect to neighbouring communities are also extensively 
referred to. A more specific legal inquiry must await the 
experienced and lengthy research methodology of a legal 
anthropologist or, at least, a lawyer conversant in the local 
language.
Attempts were made to cross check the information 
provided by the traditional authorities and Government 
officials in informal discussions with local people who could 
speak English. All manner of information on legal, 
environmental, agricultural, political and social issues was 
acquired in this way. In addition, three more specific methods 
were employed in an attempt to elicit information from local 
people.
Detailed interviews were conducted with a series of local 
families who were chosen for the author as reflecting a 
variety of social arrangements. As many family members as 
possible, alone or in groups, whichever the interviewees 
preferred, were interviewed on aspects of family life, 
farming, tree planting and conservation practices. The details 
given on social and farming arrangements in the family proved 
to be the most useful information. Summaries of this 
information are provided in Appendix Two and are incorporated 
into the discussion in chapter nine. The enthusiasm of the 
interviewees for tree planting and conservation activities 
cannot be taken as representative, however, because most of 
the families are known to be keen participants in development
activities of this type.1 Although the information gained in 
these interviews cannot in any sense be said to represent any 
quantitative findings, the amount of interesting facts, 
opinions and insights which these interviews revealed to the 
author was highly illuminating.
In order to meet and initiate discussions with a wide 
range of farmers, the author also drew up a short 
questionnaire on some farming and conservation issues. Fifty 
farmers, men and women, answered the questionnaire with a 
great deal of help from interpreters and one assistant. 
Although the farmers were chosen at random and no farmer 
refused to answer questions, there was no special sampling 
method employed and no particular attempt to verify factual 
evidence. The information gathered cannot, therefore, be 
presented in any quantifiable format but there is no doubt 
that a broader insight into the views of local people was 
gathered during this research. Some of this information is 
reflected in, for example, the discussion of environmental 
problems and priorities in Bongo.
The author was also invited to construct a quiz for use 
in a number of junior schools in the district. The results of 
the quiz, conducted in seven schools in the absence of the 
author, showed that many children were aware, probably through
1 Members of Adi'bono's House, Azure's House and 
Akiriba's house were active participants in Bongo Rural 
Development Project (BRDP) while Francis Ayalkoom, Ayalkoom's 
House, is a teacher of agricultural science infra Appendix 
Two. The author is cognisant of the possiblity that such 
families may not be wholly representative of family 
arrangements in less well motivated families and accordingly 
the information is used to illustrate and illuminate rather 
than to record quantifiable, representative data.
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lessons at school, of some topical environmental problems such 
as soil erosion. A large number of school children claimed to 
have planted trees, many as a result of initiatives at school. 
It was particularly encouraging to find so much evidence of 
environmental awareness among youths attending school.
The problems, inaccuracies, contradictions and obstacles 
to the conduct of research by a foreign student in Bongo 
cannot be over stated. Nevertheless, the co-operation and 
patience of local people was outstanding. Exhaustive debates, 
interviews and queries provided valuable insights into local 
life. English speaking informants of every status were 
particularly helpful. Many of the ideas, contributions and 
contradictions emanating from all informants are discussed in 
chapter nine. They will hopefully serve to illuminate the 
issues as much for the reader as they did for the author.
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PART TWO: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE FOREST SECTOR OF
GHANA.
CHAPTER THREE: INTRODUCTION.
"Conservation does not mean not using the 
forest but managing it to meet varied needs, 
including the provision of all kinds of forest 
products now and continuously into the future."1
The tropical forest in Ghana now covers approximately 
20,700 square kilometres (8,118 square miles), of which 
approximately 17,00 square kilometres (6,689 square miles) are 
contained in 252 forest reserves.2 In 1989, the value of 
Ghana's timber exports was $80.31 million, representing a 
volume of 375,769 cubic metres of wood. It is estimated that
70,000 people are engaged in the forest sector.3 Wood supplies 
75% of the country's energy requirements. The tropical forest 
yields various minor produce, provides homes for rare animals 
and plants and serves important environmental functions.
Several important programmes are currently affecting the 
forestry sector. The Economic Recovery Programme(ERP), 
particularly in its early stages, had a dramatic impact on the 
well being of the timber industry. The Programme involved 
capital investment in logging activities which led to a speedy 
recovery of timber exports but has since been criticised for 
encouraging uncontrolled over cutting and exports of logs at
1 TEDB, Ghana - Forests, Wood and People, 1990, TEDB, 
Takoradi, Ghana, pp.8, p.6.
2 ibid p.4.
3 Staff Appraisal Report, Ghana Forest Resource 
Management Project, 1988, Confidential Report no. 7295-GH, 
IBRD, West African Department, pp.119, p.l.
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the expense of higher value wood products.1 The Forest 
Inventory Project (FIP), started in 1980, has provided a 
wealth of information about the physical condition of Ghana's 
forests and its staff are now engaged in preparing new working 
plans for selected forest reserves. The Forest Resource 
Management Project (FRMP) is currently addressing a number of 
issues in the forestry sector with a view to placing forest 
exploitation on a sustainable basis, reducing waste and 
improving the performance of management institutions. The 
Project covers a five year period, 1990-1995. The National 
Investigations Sub-Committee on Timber (NIC) has made several 
recommendations as a result of its investigations into 
malpractice in the timber industry. Lastly, non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are now playing an important role in 
rural forestry programmes of all types.
In Ghana, forestry must compete with a number of 
alternative land-uses. Particularly threatening is the 
expansion of commercial agriculture, whether for cash crops or 
foodstuffs, in addition to the expansion of subsistence 
agriculture to feed a population which is estimated to be 
growing at a rate approximating to 3% per anum. In remote 
forest areas, it is the actions of farmers and traditional 
authorities which have the greatest impact on the well being 
of the forest. This has implications for the effectiveness of 
Government policies and for the Forestry Department's control 
of timber exploitation. While the timber industry relentlessly 
pursues the objective of profit maximisation, the Government,
1 The Timber Industry Since 1980 infra Chp.8.
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in practice, has not always acted so consistently when 
implementing forest conservation policies.
It is this fascinating complex of competing interests, 
private and public, long term and short term, which provides 
the setting for attempts to conserve and sustainably develop 
forest resources in Ghana. Can conservation and development 
objectives both be met? Is sustainable development a realistic 
policy for Ghana's forest sector? To what extent do existing 
laws and procedures incorporate the elements of a sustainable 
development policy? The purpose of this part is to examine the 
feasibility of sustainable development policies in the context 
of forest conservation in Ghana. Deviations from the types of 
laws, legal processes and policies favoured by the Brundtland 
Report will be noted and an attempt will be made to consider 
whether reforms in the direction of the Brundtland proposals 
are viable in practice. If the weight of evidence suggests 
that such reforms are neither likely nor practicable then the 
doubts raised in chapter one as to the practical feasibility 
of the Brundtland recommendations will be correspondingly 
st rengthened.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FOREST LEGISLATION IN THE COLONIAL ERA.
Forest legislation in Ghana has an exciting history 
closely associated with the controversial Public Lands Bills 
of the 1890s. This history has already been recorded in some 
detail1 and all that is required here is a brief outline of 
that history drawing attention to issues which seem 
particularly pertinent to the sustainable development debate 
of today. Three findings are of particular significance - (i) 
forest legislation, despite the views of officialdom, could 
not easily be separated from controversies relating to land 
tenure generally, (i i) the laudable goal of forest 
conservation had to compete with the not necessarily 
consistent objectives of different interest groups vying for 
influence in the national arena, and, (iii) the Colonial 
Government was forced to deal with these matters firstly by 
allowing major concessions to powerful interest groups in the 
legislation it enacted and, eventually, by using the threat of 
coercion to ensure that its targets were met. The unfortunate 
consequence of the first approach was that colonial forest 
legislation failed to confront some of the most contentious 
issues, resulting in only weak measures for controlling the 
forest sector as a whole. The inevitable consequence of using
1 See in particular, D. Kimble, A Political History of 
Ghana, 1850-1928 1963, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp.587,
Chps.9,10; L.K. Agbosu, Land Administration and Land Titles 
Registration in Ghana 1980, PhD Thesis, University of London, 
pp.494, Chps.3-6 and The Origins of Forest Law and Policy in 
Ghana During the Colonial Period (1983) 27(2) JAL 169-187; R. 
Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana 1978, Croom 
Helm, London, pp.244, pp.37-55.
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the threat of coercion was, in addition, the general 
unpopularity of any forest conservation measures. The 
tradition of antagonism which this created has persisted into 
the post colonial era.
The history of forest legislation in Ghana throws light 
on some of the difficulties which may frustrate the 
implementation of sustainable development policies in the 
forest sector today. Evidence of the role played by competing 
interest groups has particular relevance to the question of 
'consensus versus conflict' raised in the first chapter. Land 
and forest resources are now under great pressure to meet 
rising agricultural and economic demands. In this situation, 
the competition between rival interest groups is likely to be 
even more fierce. At the same time, the pressure from the 
outside world to be seen to be implementing a sustainable 
development strategy is growing. Can the administrative and 
legal framework be adequately strengthened without resort to 
an unacceptable degree of coercion? Can the objectives of 
competing interest groups be reconciled within that framework? 
It is these issues which in practice will determine the 
efficacy of the sustainable development model propounded by 
the WCED. They are considered in more detail in subsequent 
chapters.
(i) The Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897.
The rapid development of the Gold Coast mining and timber 
industries at the end of the 19th century involved a scramble 
for economic resources in which both Europeans and local
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people were engaged. The emphasis was no longer solely on 
trade but on the acquisition and development of grants of 
land. This situation encouraged the Colonial Government to 
show an interest in native land tenure.
For some colonial officials, the principles of native 
land tenure were too vague to form the basis for effective and 
orderly development of the natural resources of the Colony. It 
was believed that chiefs and elders were foolishly disposing 
of stool land with no regard for the future agricultural needs 
of their communities.1 Worse still, some of the grantees of 
concessions were taking no practical measures to develop their 
concessions. The land was being held merely as an item of 
speculation profiting a few individuals, native and European, 
to the detriment of the public good. Occasionally, idle land 
was granted away to more than one concessionaire, an act which 
increased the likelihood of future disputes. Timber was being 
cut, with or without licence, and then being left to rot in 
the forests or in the rivers when transport and export 
contracts dried up or the timber cutter went bankrupt. In 
their hunger for firewood, the mines were causing the 
wholesale destruction of forests. Valuable revenue was being 
lost to the Government in the waste of precious timber and in 
the unworked mineral deposits of idle concessions. All in all, 
members of the Colonial Government felt that, in the public 
interest, they were duty bound to take a more interventionist
1 See, for example, a dispatch from Governor Maxwell to 
the Marquess of Ripon, 9/5/1895, C0879/46 Encl. no.15.
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role in the running of the Gold Coast.1 The Public Lands Bills 
of the 1890s were introduced to address these problems.
In 1894, Sir William Brandford-Griffith, Governor of the 
Gold Coast, introduced a Bill entitled "An Ordinance to Vest 
Waste Lands, Forest Lands and Minerals in the Queen".2 
According to the terms of the Bill all waste land, all forest 
land and all minerals would be vested in the Queen for the use 
of the Government of the Colony.3 In future, all grants of 
rights over forest or waste land or grants of rights to 
minerals would be made by the Governor on whatever terms he 
saw fit.4 The Governor's grant would confer an absolute title 
to the interest granted.5 Any existing grants of rights to 
timber or minerals which were not being developed at the time 
the new law came into force would become void.6
The history of the downfall of the 1894 Bill has been 
recorded by Kimble and Agbosu. The radical proposals for 
governmental control of land grants were met with overwhelming 
opposition. Agbosu's analysis suggests that the most powerful 
opposition group was that comprising the European merchants 
and their trading associations in Liverpool, Manchester and
1 Dispatch from Sir William Brandford-Griffith to the 
Colonial Office, 8/7/1895, C0879/46 Enel. no.19. See also the 
Preamble to the 1897 Public Lands Bill, GN 10/3/1897, C099/10
2 C0879/46 Encl. no.19.
3 An Ordinance to Vest Waste Lands ...ibid Cl.3,6.
4 ibid Cl.12.
5 ibid Cl.12.
( ibid Cl.11.
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London.1 They wanted low taxation, freedom to negotiate for 
concessions on favourable terms and minimal governmental 
intervention.2 Their interests were championed by Sir 
Frederick Hodgson, the Colonial Secretary. He argued that an 
act of "confiscation and spoliation" such as this would drive 
future investment away from the Gold Coast.3
Kimble examines the opposition raised by members of the 
emergent African middle class.4 Many of them were heavily 
involved in speculative deals of the type the legislation 
hoped to stop. While the chiefs profited from the leasing of 
land to concessionaires, native lawyers were also making 
handsome profits out of the numerous cases of land litigation 
arising in customary law. Their opposition focused on the 
clause vesting waste and forest land in the Queen. This term 
was interpreted as an attempt to confiscate the lands of the 
natives. The lawyers argued that all land in the Colony, 
according to native custom, belonged to someone and unutilized 
land was held in trust for future generations. In addition, 
they argued that the sanctity of private property rights had 
been confirmed by the Public Lands Ordinance of 1876 so the 
British Government had no legal authority to alter that 
position now. They stirred up local opposition among the 
chiefs and in the newspapers where nationalist sentiments were
1 L.K. Agbosu, op cit p.120.
2 ibid p.163.
J Dispatch from the Colonial Secretary to the Governor,
8/7/1895 C0879/46 Encl. no. 19(2).
4 D. Kimble, op cit p.335.
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raised in response to the threat of land confiscation and to
this challenge to native custom.1
The principle of no ownerless lands had been accepted for
some time in the courts of the Colony although the accuracy of
that proposition with respect to all land in Ghana was not and
has still not been proven.2 Nevertheless, it was in the
interests of local speculators, traditional authorities and
native lawyers to uphold those tenets of customary law which
would maximise their opportunities for profit. This objective
was easily reconciled with nationalist sentiments:
"Simultaneously, Ghanaians were attempting to defend 
both their right to maintain traditional land tenure 
relationships and their right to evolve and change.
But overall, their objective was to avoid British 
control."3
On the question of the Lands Bill, the interests of 
European merchants coincided with those of the educated, 
professional and traditional authorities in Ghana.4 Together, 
the magnitude of the opposition was sufficient to persuade the 
new Governor, Sir William Maxwell, who, having been appointed 
in succession to Brandford-Griffith, inherited the Bill, to 
defer its enactment and to consider an alternative draft
1 R.Grove, Chiefs, Boundaries and Sacred Woodlands: Early 
Nationalism and the Defeat of Colonial Conservationism in the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria, 1870-1916 Paper presented at a 
Colloquium on Conservation and Indigenous Knowledge, Harare, 
Zimbabwe, 1-7 December, 1990, pp.21, p.12.
2 A.P. Kludze, The Ownerless Lands of Ghana, (1974), 11 
UGLJ 123-142.
3 Howard op cit p.41.
4 Agbosu op cit p.120.
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despite his own personal support for the Bill.1
In 1897, a new Bill entitled "An Ordinance to Regulate 
the Administration of Public Land and to Define Certain 
Interests Therein and to Constitute a Concessions Court",2 was 
presented to the Legislative Council. This Bill dropped the 
clause vesting unoccupied and forest land in the Queen. The 
relevant provision now provided that all public land in the 
Colony would be "administered" by the Government.3 "Public 
land" was defined as land over which no private or public 
grants existed.4 In future, any grant relating to public land 
made by a local landowner would be invalid without the prior 
written consent of the Governor.5 Licences to cut timber or 
extract minerals would be granted exclusively by the 
Governor.6 A Concessions Court would have power to inquire 
into the terms of existing concessions and to alter 
inequitable terms.7 The Governor would be able to reserve any 
public land for any public purpose, including the growth and 
preservation of timber.8
Agbosu claims that British business interests were once 
again primarily responsible for the downfall of this Bill as
1 C0879/46 op cit Encl. no.15.
2 GN 10/3/1897, CQ99/10
3 ibid Cl.4.
4 ibid Cl.2.
5 ibid Cl.10.
6 ibid Cl.26.
7 ibid Cl.37,57.
R ibid Cl.5.
72
with its predecessor.1 However, the views of British
entrepreneurs may not have been so wholly negative as he
portrays. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, for example, saw
fit to comment on the Bill in the following terms:
"The Board has arrived at the conclusion that the 
Bill appears on the whole to be well calculated to 
place the administration of public land in the 
Colony on a satisfactory basis and to secure as far 
as possible the effective occupation and utilisation 
of the natural resources of the Colony."2
For British merchants, so long as taxes remained low,
there could be advantages in government protection of
concessions, including greater security of tenure and simpler
acquisition procedures.3 Nevertheless, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, did not, as a
general policy, favour governmental intervention in land
matters.4 This policy of non intervention was reflected in his
decision not to proceed with the Bill.5
Kimble records the opposition activities of the African
middle classes to the new Bill. They by-passed the Governor
1 Agbosu op cit p.120.
2 Dispatch from the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to the 
Colonial Office, 25/10/1897, C0879/49 Encl. no.217.
3 Agbosu op cit p.159.
4 Grove op cit p.12; Howard op cit p.42.
5 Chamberlain was also instrumental in curtailing the 
powers of the Colonial Government with respect to forests in 
Lagos Colony and Protectorate at about this time. See, E. 
Egboh, British Colonial Administration and the Legal Control 
of the Forests of Lagos Colony and Protectorate, 1897-1902: An 
Example of Economic Control Under Colonial Regime, (1978) 9(3) 
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 70-90, p.87.
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and sent their petitions directly to the Colonial Office.1 
They claimed that the new Bill carried the same threat of 
confiscation as the Bill of 1894. Their strategy was further 
promoted when, in 1898, members of the newly formed Aboriginal 
Rights Protection Society (ARPS) arrived in London to 
represent the views of Africans to the Secretary of State in 
person. The Secretary of State, his own views not being 
favourable to the Bill, responded by assuring the Society that 
customary law would prevail in the matter of concessions and 
that any supervision would be by a judicial and not an 
administrative body.2 Meanwhile, after the death of Sir 
William Maxwell in 1897, Sir Francis Hodgson was appointed 
Governor. Hodgson had opposed the proposals to convert all 
land in the Colony into Crown land in 1894. His appointment 
was the final blow to the Public Lands Bill of 1897.
Kimble and Agbosu have ably demonstrated the importance 
of the role played by the various opposition groups in 
defeating the Lands Bills of the 1890s. Although the general 
desirability of forest conservation was not denied, more 
immediate economic issues took priority. The anxiety of some 
of the colonial officers was defeated by the over-riding 
capitalist concerns of the metropole, on the one hand, and by 
the speculative, capitalist and nationalist sentiments of the 
emerging middle classes in Ghana, on the other. The policy of 
non-intervention advocated by some officials in the Colonial
1 Dispatch from Governor Maxwell to Mr. Chamberlain ibid 
Enel. no.154.
2 Kimble op cit p.354.
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Office further strengthened the opposition case.
The evidence supports the contention made in chapter one 
that the rational use of natural resources is a policy which 
may easily fall prey to the competing economic objectives of 
powerful interest groups engaged in their exploitation for 
short term gain. The question remains as to how far the 
achievement of independence has altered the power 
configuration and the ordering of priorities in this respect.
In 1897, a draft new Bill was introduced which finally 
abandoned the idea of vesting control or ownership of public 
or waste lands in the Government and which in no way disturbed 
the title of the customary landowners. Its modest aim was to 
ensure that concessionaires purchased a secure title in 
exchange for a price fair to the landowners. In 1900, this 
Bill became the Concessions Ordinance.1
The Concessions Ordinance was a retreat from the earlier, 
radical proposals for government intervention. It exemplifies 
the unwillingness of the Colonial Government in Ghana to 
operate with a heavy hand and it is the epitome of the type of 
"faci1itative law" described by Seidman.2 Its restrained tone 
was a major concession to local and foreign business interests 
but its provisions excluded any measures for the control of 
forest exploitation. In 1907, it was reported that only two 
timber concessions had completed the statutory procedures of
1 Ordinance no.14/1900
2 R. Seidman, Contract Law, The Free Market and State 
Intervention (1973) 7(4) Journal of Economic Issues reprinted 
in Y. Ghai, R. Luckham and F. Snyder, The Political Economy of 
Law: A Third World Reader 1987, Delhi, Oxford University 
Press, pp.821, pp.438-449.
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the Concessions Ordinance despite brisk business in the timber 
trade.1
(ii) The Timber Protection Ordinance, 1907.
In 1899, Sir Frederick Hodgson, aware that forest 
conservation would not be adequately provided for in the 
Concessions Ordinance, transmitted a copy of a separate Bill 
entitled "An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Conservation 
of Woods and Forests in the Colony and the Protection of the 
Water Courses Thereof" to the Secretary of State.2
Although the main provisions of this Bill required all 
timber cutters and all brokers in timber to obtain licences 
from the Governor,3 it does not seem fair to conclude that the 
Bill was principally concerned with revenue raising.4 In 
addition, for example, the Bill prohibited the cutting of any 
timber below a girth limit of nine feet measured at ten feet 
from the ground.5 It empowered the Governor to declare any 
tree standing in any forest land to be a reserved tree.6 He
1 L.C. Minutes, 29/4/1907, C098/15 On the impact of the 
Concessions Ordinance more generally, see C.U. Illegbune, 
British Concessions Policy and Legislation in Southern Ghana, 
1874-1915 1974, PhD Thesis, University of London, pp.543.
2 Dispatch from Governor Hodgson to the Secretary of 
State CO 879/65 Encl. no.157(1).
3 An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Conservation of 
Woods ... ibid Cl.6.
4 This is the view taken by Agbosu in, The Origins of
Forest Law and Policy in Ghana ...op cit p.171.
5 An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Conservation of
Woods ... op cit Cl.9.
fc ibid Cl.10.
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would be able to constitute any land into a reserved forest 
"with the approbation of the head chief of a district".1 The 
cutting of any tree in a reserved forest would then be 
illegal.2 Regulations under the proposed Ordinance would 
require every person who cut a tree to plant another tree of 
a similar kind in a nearby location within seven days.3 Taken 
at face value, these clauses indicate a desire on the part of 
the Government to provide for the conservation of forest 
resources although, as the Director of Kew Gardens was quick 
to point out, the provision for re-afforestation was 
unrealistic.4
Nevertheless, whatever the real motives for the Bill, 
there was insufficient commitment to get the Forest Protection 
Bill before the Legislative Council for a first reading. 
Kimble argues that the Bill was dropped for fear of rekindling 
the sort of opposition raised against the Lands Bills.5
The problem of uncontrolled timber felling would not go 
away. In 1907, the Gold Coast Government commissioned two 
reports, one by Mr. Nigel Thompson, the Conservator of Forests 
in Southern Nigeria on the state of the Gold Coast forests6
1 ibid Cl.11.
2 ibid Cl.14.
3 Conservation of Woods and Forests and Watercourses 
(Protection) Regulations, 1889, C0879/65 Encl. no.157, Cl.5.
4 Dispatch from Mr. Thistleton-Dyer to the Colonial 
Office, 23/10/1900, C0879/65 Encl. no.182.
5 Kimble op cit p.362.
( H.N. Thompson, Gold Coast - Report on Forests 1910, 
Cd.4993, ZHC1/7434.
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and one on the conditions prevailing in the timber industry.1 
In the same year, the Timber Protection Ordinance was passed.
This Ordinance provided that no person without the 
written permission of the District Commissioner should cut or 
fell certain species of timber trees below specified minimum 
girths.2 It empowered the Governor-in-Council to add to or 
alter the list of species in the schedule and to make rules 
for the marking of timber trees which may be cut.3
The ease with which the Timber Protection Ordinance 
reached the statute books may be explained partly by the 
limited nature of the measures involved which in no way 
touched upon critical issues of land tenure, and partly by the 
divided and therefore weaker nature of the opposition which 
met the Bill. Firstly, there was the view of some mining 
concessionaires that timber cutters should in practice and not 
just in theory, be subject to the same regulatory measures of 
the Concessions Ordinance as they were. This was not just a 
matter of principle but more importantly it was due to the 
invasion of mining concessionaires' land by timber cutters 
acting either without authority or under a timber licence 
granted by chiefs. The timber supplies of the mines were 
threatened by these activities. The mining concessionaires 
were concerned that whatever legislation was introduced did
1 Report of the Pennington Commission Appointed to
Inauire into the Manner in Which the Timber Industry is
Conducted in the Colony,the Provisions of the Concessions
Ordinance and the Ordinances Amending the Same. 1908, C0879/99 
Enel. no.47(2).
2 Timber Protection Ordinance no.20/1907, s.3.
ibid s . 5 .
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not restrict their right to cut timber for use in the mines 
but did restrict the activities of trespassers.1 Secondly, 
there were the European timber merchants who were not opposed 
to measures to control timber cutting because they were 
confident that any such measures would give them the advantage 
over African cutters, the people responsible for the cutting 
of immature timber (in their view).2 On the other hand, 
Africans were opposed to any interference in their rights to 
cut timber for domestic purposes and to the imposition of 
penal provisions for offences under the Act.3 Thus, there was 
not the same coalition of interests opposing the Timber 
Protection Ordinance as there had been the Public Lands Bills 
of the 1890s.
If the Timber Protection Ordinance was not defeated in 
the Legislature it was nevertheless undermined by practical 
problems of administration. There were no forestry officers in 
the Colony to help enforce its provisions until 1909 but even 
then the number of prosecutions remained small.4 It was not 
until 1921 that regulations under the Ordinance for the 
marking of timber were made.5 This was despite the 
recommendation of the Pennington Commission that a system of
1 L.C. Minutes 29/4/1907, C098/15 Evidence of Mr. Hunt at
p.6.
2 ibid Evidence of Mr. Nicholas at p.34.
3 ibid Evidence of Mr. Sarbah at p.40.
4 For example, in 1915, six offences against the 
Ordinance were prosecuted. Forestry Department, Annual Report 
1915, p.5.
5 Timber Protection Rules no.13/1921.
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property marks should be introduced as soon as possible.1 The 
Commission had also recommended the compulsory registration of 
timber cutters, middlemen and exporters but this advice was 
also ignored, quite possibly due to the same sort of 
administrative constraints that characterised the 
implementation of the Timber Protection Ordinance. In failing 
to provide adequate logistical support for law enforcement, 
the Government itself undermined the effectiveness of its own 
conservation policies.
(iii) The Forests Ordinance, 1911.
Instead of enforcing simple measures to control the 
cutting of timber, the Colonial Government was now showing 
more interest in the idea of forest reservation as recommended 
by Thompson.
Thompson's Report on Gold Coast Forests was the first
scientific appraisal of the forests of the Colony. In it, he
emphasised the role of tropical forests in protecting the
soil, water supplies and micro-climate of tropical countries:
"The preservation of the water supply and the 
climatic factors of the country must always claim 
first attention in any rational scheme of forest 
administration."2
The dangers of uncontrolled deforestation had for long 
been recognised in other parts of the Empire.3 Thompson
1 Pennington Report op cit p.l.
2 Report on Gold Coast Forests, op cit p.98.
3 R. Grove, Conservation and Colonialism; the Evolution 
of Environmental Attitudes and Conservation Policies on St.
Helena, Mauritius and in Western India, 1990, Unpublished
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collected evidence from Aburi that rainfall there was 
decreasing at an average of three quarters of an inch per 
annum.1 His principal recommendation was that forty per cent 
of the forest estate should be reserved for special 
protection:
"Long experience has shown that in accordance with 
the local conditions usually existing in the 
tropics, it is far better to adopt intensive 
protection in certain selected areas and to 
introduce only the very lightest restrictions to the 
bulk of the remaining forests."2
Thompson gave detailed proposals for the enactment of a 
forest law, rules and regulations and the establishment of a 
Forestry Department.
Following Thompson's advice, a Forests Bill3 which was 
almost the exact replica of the old Southern Nigerian Forest 
Ordinance,4 was introduced in 1910. Its provisions empowered 
the Governor to acquire by agreement with the native 
landowners any forest land for the purpose of constituting it 
a "native forest reserve".5In addition, the Governor could 
declare any "waste lands" to be a native forest reserve. 
"Waste lands" were defined as unoccupied and uncultivated
paper, pp.30.
1 Report on Gold Coast Forests op cit p.12.
2 Dispatch from Mr.Thompson to the Governor, 3/4/1908, 
C0879/99 Encl.no.38
3 A Bill entitled "An Ordinance to make Provision for the 
Establishment of Forest Reserves and their Conservation and 
Management", GN 16/10/1910, C099/22
4 Forestry Ordinance no.14/1902, Southern Nigeria.
"An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Establishment 
of Forest Reserves ..." op cit Cl.4,5.
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land. Native forest reserves were to be managed by the 
Government and the Governor would be able to make any rules 
for that purpose. Theoretically, the ownership rights of 
native communities would not be affected by the reservation of 
the land,1 but any concessions granted by landowners over 
reserved land would have to be executed by the Colonial 
Secretary.2 Landowners' rights to grant concessions could be 
abrogated by order of the Governor-in-Council3 and any 
admitted rights4 could be compulsorily acquired under the 
provisions of the Public Lands Ordinance.5
The provisions of this Bill reversed the policy of 
minimum government intervention in land administration 
enshrined in the Concessions Ordinance. It was a blue print 
brought from other colonies without regard to the history of 
the Gold Coast. The first person to realise the naivety of 
this action was Sir William Brandford-Griffith (junior), now 
the Chief Justice. His criticisms caused the Bill to be 
withdrawn in favour of a more appropriately termed draft. The 
episode serves to illustrate the rule of the "non­
transferability of law" suggested by Seidman.6
Unfortunately for the Government, this action was not
1 ibid Cl.4.
2 ibid Cl.17.
3 ibid Cl.18(3).
4 The Bill provided for existing customary rights to be 
recognised as "admitted rights" ibid Cl.10.
5 ibid Cl.14.
" Seidman, The State, Law and Development, op cit p.29.
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quick enough to prevent the ARPS getting hold of a copy. The 
nationalist sentiments of the Society were once again aroused1 
and in September 1911, its views were presented to the 
Legislative Council.2 It applied the same arguments against 
the Forest Bill as it had to the Public Lands Bills without 
distinguishing forest conservation as a cause in its own 
right. It took the view that all matters with respect to land 
administration had been finally settled by the decision of Mr. 
Chamberlain in 1899.
In the new Forests Bill the explicit reference to the 
power of compulsory acquisition under the Public Lands 
Ordinance was dropped.3 However, the Bill retained a provision 
empowering the Governor-in-Council to declare any unoccupied 
land a forest reserve4 and it left the Governor's consent to 
concessions in any forest or native forest reserve a necessary 
requirement for their validity.5 It clearly stated that the 
ownership of land in a forest reserve would not be affected by 
its constitution as a reserve.6 The landowners would be able
1 The views of the ARPS are well represented in a book 
written by its President, J. Casely-Hayford. See, J. Casely- 
Hayford The Truth About the West African Lands Question Second 
Edition, 1971, Frank Cass and Co., London, pp.203, pp.47-50.
2 L.C. Minutes, 13/9/1911 C098/19
3 This did not, of course, mean that the Public Lands 
Ordinance would not be used for the compulsory acquisition of 
admitted rights.
4 A Bill entitled "An Ordinance to Make Provision for the 
Establishment of Forest Reserves and their Conservation and 
Management," G.N. 20/5/1911, C099/23 Cl.4.
5 ibid Cl.17(1) .
ibid Cl.14(3) .
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to opt whether reserved land should be managed by themselves 
under the direction of the Forestry Department, by the 
Government for the benefit of the landowners or by the 
Government under lease from the landowners, provided that if 
the landowners did not opt for any method the Government would 
intervene and make the choice.1
In November 1911, the amended version of the Bill was 
passed by the Legislative Council.2 At this time, printed 
copies of the Bill had not yet been made available to the 
public.3 Consequently, the ARPS was not able to register a 
formal protest to its terms. The likely opposition of the 
Society and other interest groups was not debated.4
To be brought into effect, the Ordinance required the 
approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. However, 
in England, the West African Lands Committee (WALC) had 
recently begun its deliberations. The Secretary of State 
decided to await the conclusion of this inquiry before finally 
approving of the new Forests Ordinance. He therefore wrote 
advising local officers that the chiefs should simply be told 
to stop the indiscriminate felling of trees.5 At about the
1 ibid Cl.4.
2 Forests Ordinance no.15 of 1911.
3 Kimble op cit p.366.
4 The Government had an official majority in the 
Legislative Council at this time so the chances of the ARPS 
being able to stall the Government once again were anyway now 
slim.
5 Dispatch from the Secretary of State to Governor Bryan, 
30/11/1912, Kimble, op cit p.370.
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same time, he appointed Conway Bel field to make an independent 
inquiry into legislation governing the alienation of land and 
forest conservation in the Gold Coast.
Belfield approved generally of the new law but he 
proposed several amendments including, in a concession to the 
ARPS, a recommendation that Government should abrogate the 
power to grant concessions in forest reserves.1 He took a 
critical view, however, of the destructive propaganda of the 
"educated natives" as represented by the ARPS and he found 
little interest generally in forest conservation among local 
people.2
The WALC eventually made a draft report in 1916. The 
Report was heavily in favour of governmental regulation of 
forest exploitation much in the same way as Belfield had been 
four years earlier.3 It recommended that the Government should 
have power to control the exploitation of forests anywhere in 
the Gold Coast, not just in forest reserves. In addition, 
concessions should be replaced by a system of short term 
licences still granted by the native landowners but under the 
strictest supervision of the Forestry Department.4
The general recommendations of the reports by Belfied and 
the WALC reflect a contemporary concern to protect the
1 H.C. Belfield Report on the Legislation Governing the 
Alienation of Native Lands in the Gold Coast and Ashanti 1912, 
London, Cd.6278, pp.41, pp.22-27.
2 ibid p.41.
3 Draft Report on the Committee on the Tenure of Land in 
West African Colonies and Protectorates 1916, C0879/117 
pp.165, p.94.
4 ibid pp.94-5.
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"natives" from the activities of irresponsible chiefs and the
educated elites:
"Notwithstanding the communal principles on which 
the native system of land tenure was based ... the 
result of the administration of the (not yet 
allocated) land by the chiefs and headmen has been 
that they have by degrees arrogated to themselves 
the profits arising from such administration, until 
at the present time the mass of the people derives 
from it no advantage other than the privilege of 
cultivating allotted portions."1
The Report of the WALC came too late to save the Forests 
Ordinance. By 1916, the delays and deliberations had rendered 
the Forests Ordinance effectively dead. A new Governor, Sir 
Hugh Clifford, had arrived in the Colony bringing with him a 
firm commitment to the policy of indirect rule. This policy 
frowned upon any intervention in the administration of land by 
the Colonial Government, including rights over forest 
resources.2 The laudable goal of forest conservation was 
forced to give way to changing political dogma. The views of 
the technical experts went unheard and right from the start, 
the 1911 Forests Ordinance was a dead letter.
These findings are pertinent to the ongoing debate on 
forest conservation. The question which they prompt is whether 
the conservation movement and the scientific lobby are any 
less vulnerable to fluctuating political support in the modern 
world.
1 Belfield op cit p.7.
2 Dispatch from Governor Clifford to the Colonial Office, 
1916 C096/583 pp.36-37.
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(iv) The Forests Ordinance, 1927,
If forest conservation was to progress, then a policy 
appropriate to the dictates of indirect rule was now required. 
The thrust of this policy was that forest officers should act 
as advisors to the chiefs who would be encouraged to pass bye- 
laws for the protection of the forests within their respective 
jurisdictions under the provisions of the Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance of 1883.1
In 1920, a special forestry conference was convened for 
the chiefs. At the conference the Conservator of Forests 
stressed that, in view of the rapid expansion of cocoa 
cultivation and the vital importance of cocoa revenue in the 
economy, there was an urgent need to reserve areas of forest 
land to shelter and protect cocoa and to ensure the 
continuation of the humid climatic conditions essential to the 
growth of the crop.2 For the first time, this made the old
fear of denudation seem particularly relevant to the
circumstances of the Gold Coast. At the forestry conference 
the Conservator of Forests introduced a set of standard bye- 
laws which, after some modifications, met with the apparent 
approval of the chiefs. These prohibited the future extension 
of shifting cultivation and cocoa plantations inside forest 
reserves. Despite the chiefs' apparent enthusiasm, it was not
until 1924, after further amendments, that the first
1 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance no.5/1883, s.5.
2 Address on Forestry in Connection with the Cocoa 
Industry of the Gold Coast, M.C. Mcleod, Accra, 1920, reported 
in Forestry Department Annual Report 1920, p.6.
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standardised bye-laws were issued by a chief.1 Where older 
bye-laws had been issued in Ashanti no action had been taken 
to implement the law.2 In the Central Province, where the risk 
to the production of cocoa from deforestation was greatest, 
the chiefs remained as recalcitrant as ever.3
The chiefs' ambivalence to forest conservation revolved 
around two opposing objectives. On the one hand, they needed 
to co-operate with the Colonial Government because the latter 
was willing to protect and enhance their political authority 
in accordance with the policy of indirect rule. On the other 
hand, many chiefs were reluctant to lose opportunities to 
profit from the grant of concessions and the sale of land to 
cocoa farmers.4 Consequently, while they agreed in principle 
to forest conservation measures, the implementation of such 
measures was easily defeated by their actual neglect. The 
Forestry Department did not have enough staff present in the 
districts to keep the issue alive.5
In 1919, a new Governor arrived on the scene. Sir Gordon 
Guggisberg took active measures to promote the development of
1 Forestry Department Annual Report, 1924-5, p. 3.
2 Forestry Department Annual Report, 1923-4, p.6.
3 Governor's Annual Address to the Legislative Council, 
3/2/1925, Guggisberg, The Gold Coast 1924-6 1926, Government 
Printer, Accra.
4 On the dilemmas of chiefs under colonial rule, see, 
K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political 
System of Ashanti 1951, Oxford University Press, London, 
pp.229.
5 In 1920, there were only four European staff in the 
Department. Forestry Department, Annual Report 1920, p.3.
the Colony.1 The Governor had served in the Gold Coast as a 
surveyor ten years earlier and he was shocked by the scale of 
deforestation which had occurred since then.2 Although at 
first he fully endorsed the policy of persuading the chiefs to 
pass bye-laws to deal with this problem, by 1924 he was deeply 
concerned at the lack of positive results.3 By 1926, only 307 
square miles of forest reserves, out of an estimated need for
6,000 square miles, had been created.4 To put an end to this 
deadlock, the Governor authorised the presentation of a draft 
new Forests Ordinance to the Legislative Council in August 
1926. At its first reading, the draft was withdrawn to allow 
time for a further consideration of its terms.5
In December 1926, a forestry conference was called to 
give chiefs and "educated Africans" the opportunity of 
criticising the first draft of the Forests Ordinance. Some 
amendments were made to satisfy those chiefs who were 
interested in co-operation. Only the Central Province Council 
objected altogether to the Bill on account of its resemblance
1 Guggisberg was the first Governor to make and implement 
an ambitious ten year plan which included, among other things, 
the building of Takoradi Harbour, 233 miles of new railway and 
3,388 miles of new roads. F.M. Bourret, Ghana-The Road to 
Independence 1919-1957, 1960, Oxford University Press, London, 
pp.246, p.30.
2 Opening Address by the Governor to the Legislative 
Council, L.C. Minutes, 22/2/1926, C098/47
3 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, 1924-5 
Government Printer, Accra, p.56.
4 G. Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events 
of 1920-1926 and the Prospects of 1927-1928, 1927, Government 
Publisher, Accra, pp.347, p.61.
5 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1926-1927, 
30/8/1926, C098/47 p.28.
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to the Public Lands Bills of the 1890s. Having thus obtained 
the submission of a majority of chiefs, the Legislative 
Council speedily enacted an appropriately revised version of 
the Bill in March 1927.1
The new Forests Ordinance empowered the Governor to
constitute any private or stool land a forest reserve at the 
request of the landowner, but, so that the Government would 
ultimately have its way, the Ordinance also enabled the 
Governor to declare any land a forest reserve if the Governor- 
in-Council on the advice of the Chief Conservator was 
satisfied that it was essential to protect that land in order 
to safeguard water supplies or the well-being of agricultural 
crops or supplies of forest produce in the vicinity of the 
reserve.2 The Ordinance clearly stated that the ownership of
land within a forest reserve would not be altered by
reservation3 but rights in a forest reserve were not to be 
alienated unless and until written notification had been given 
to the Conservator of Forests.4 Reserves could be managed by 
the landowners under the direction of the Forestry Department 
or by the Government for the benefit of the landowners.5 The 
Ordinance provided that before any proceedings to constitute
1 Forests Ordinance no.13/1927. See also, Minutes of the 
Legislative Council, 1927-1928, 3/3/1927 C098/49 p.5.
2 Ordinance no.13/1927 s.4.
3 ibid s.16(1) .
4 ibid s.17.
ibid s .16(2 ) .
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a forest reserve under the Ordinance could be initiated, six 
months notice would be given to the affected landowners. If 
the landowners acted within the next six months to create a 
forest reserve over the land by passing bye-laws under the 
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, no further action would be 
taken by the Government unless and until the administration of 
the reserve was seen to be ineffective.1 The provisions of the 
Ordinance were not to be applied in any reserve constituted 
under bye-laws.2
Although the Ordinance included measures to tackle two of 
the most contentious issues - the reservation of forest land 
and the administrative supervision of concessions therein - 
the provision allowing chiefs to create reserves under local 
bye-laws was a major loophole in the law because these 
reserves were wholly exempt from the regulatory stipulations 
of the statute. Thus, the efficacy of the statute in providing 
a comprehensive regime for the protection of the forest estate 
was somewhat illusory.
The enactment of the 1927 Ordinance partly reflects a 
diminished level of effective political opposition towards the 
Colonial Government. Kimble has ably traced the decline of the 
ARPS in the years after 1911.3 By 1927, its influence was only 
felt in the disregarded contentions of the Central Provincial 
Council. By the 1920s, due to the anomalies of indirect rule, 
the chiefs were more or less dependent on the constitutional
1 ibid s .32(1).
2 ibid s .32(3).
3 A Political History of Ghana ... op cit pp.371-374.
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support of the Colonial Government, a support which they could 
not afford to jeopardise. To some extent, their interests were 
safeguarded in the option to make bye-law reserves,1 an option 
which gave chiefs a continuing say in the administration of 
forest land. This was consistent with the general policy of 
indirect rule. At the same time, European concessionaires were 
not so agitated because, with the exception of the provision 
requiring notification of any grants to be made to the 
Conservator,2 their rights would be largely unaffected by the 
new law. The provisions of the Concessions Ordinance were more 
pertinent to their activities. With the decline of opposition 
forces, the Government was in a correspondingly stronger 
position to impose its own legislative programme. Despite its 
interventionist appearance, the Ordinance, by virtue of 
section 32, was carefully framed so as to be consistent with 
the dominant political philosophy of indirect rule. The 
enthusiasm of the Governor further ensured the successful 
enactment of the law.
The provisions of section 32 were the keystone of future 
policy in the Gold Coast. Chiefs were still going to be 
encouraged to create reserves under bye-laws but if they 
failed to do so then Government would act. In the years to 
come, by far the greatest number of forest reserves were 
constituted under bye-laws. At the end of the day, the threat 
of a statutory constitution was used to secure native forest 
reserves. Chiefs could not effectively oppose the threat
1 Ordinance no.13/1927 s.32(1).
2 ibid s .17.
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because, under the policy of indirect rule, their own 
interests were increasingly intertwined with the Government's. 
It was this threat of coercion, coupled with the weakness of 
the opposition, that finally gave effect to a policy of forest 
conservation. By the start of the Second World War the 
reservation programme of the Forestry Department in the High 
Forest Zone was practically complete.
(v) Conclusion.
"Fortunately, the dedication of our predecessors 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s to the slow and
patient process of negotiations with local chiefs
and communities and in accordance with customary law
and protection of community rights, led to the
setting up of forest reserves."1
The reservation of over 11,000 square miles of forest 
reserves by 1940 is evidence of a belated but considerable 
effort to conserve the forests of the Gold Coast for the 
benefit of posterity. Reservation by itself, however, is not 
adequate proof of the success of the colonial programme. The 
problem of protection was inadequately dealt with by the bye- 
law system under which the vast majority of reserves were 
constituted so the existence of demarcated forest reserves in 
no way meant that a comprehensive policy of forest 
conservation was in force. Fortunately for the Colonial 
Government, some remote areas of dense tropical forest were 
still available for reservation. For the time being, the 
remoteness of these reserves was their best guarantee of 
protection from farmers. The advance of cocoa farming would
1 TEDB, Ghana - Forests, Wood and People, op cit p.4.
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eventually disturb this status quo.1
Meanwhile, the price of meeting official targets was the 
use of coercive threats to secure the reservation of land. 
Although the chiefs’ appeared to be acting voluntarily to 
declare forest reserves under local bye-laws, they did so in 
the knowledge that, should they refuse to act, the Government 
could opt for a statutory reservation of their forests. This 
policy of subtle coercion, a policy in line with the dictates 
of indirect rule, did little to popularise forest conservation 
in Ghana. In this respect, the colonial era left an 
unfortunate legacy for modern governments. The Colonial 
Government did not, however, survive to deal with the impact 
of its policy in the long term. Instead, it departed leaving 
a mixed record of achievements in the matter of forest 
conservation.
The historical record provides a precautionary warning 
about problems which may confront conservation and sustainable 
development policies today. The Public Lands Bills of the 
1890s, for example, demonstrate the role which opposition 
groups representing specific economic interests may play in 
defeating conservation objectives. The Timber Protection 
Ordinance and the Forests Ordinance of 1911 illustrate some of 
the ways in which administrative under funding and fluctuating 
political support may undermine the implementation of forest 
legislation. The Forests Ordinance of 1927 provides one 
example of how the Colonial Government resorted to the use of
1 See the discussion of Forest Protection in the Western 
Region, infra Chp.7.
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coercive techniques in order to implement a forest policy. 
Nevertheless, the threat of local opposition, the dominant 
political ideology of indirect rule and the perennial 
constraints of administrative under funding forced the 
Government to adopt compromise measures which fundamentally 
weakened the efficacy of the law.
These findings raise questions which are pertinent to the 
sustainable development debate of today. To what extent, for 
example, do the activities of interest groups with economic 
motives which conflict with the demands of sustainable 
development thwart the efforts of policy and law makers today? 
Is the Government willing to put up the money necessary to 
implement a sustainable development strategy in the forest 
sector? Is there any evidence of a long term, consistent, 
political commitment to forest conservation? Are coercive 
techniques still being resorted to? Is it ever justifiable 
that they should be? Will the adoption of compromises 
fundamentally weaken the efficacy of the law? It is to these 
and to other questions concerning the feasibility of 
sustainable development in the modern forest sector that the 
discussion in the remainder of this thesis is directed.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE 1962 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS.
In the previous chapter, the political obstacles to 
forest legislation in the colonial era and some of the 
limitations in the programme adopted by the Colonial 
Government were reviewed. The remainder of this study is 
concerned with modern developments in the forest sector. These 
begin with the 1962 legislative reforms which are briefly 
described in this chapter. In this introductory account, some 
minor points of academic interest are raised and the 
fundamental question of ownership is explored. The latter is 
a particularly significant question in view of the problems 
evident in the Western Region.1 The extent to which the laws 
and institutions set up in 1962 embody the recommendations on 
environmental legislation made in the more recent Brundtland 
Report is also briefly considered. This institutional critique 
is developed in chapter six.
The 1962 reforms were primarily concerned to define the 
role of the national government in the ownership and control 
of forest resources but they also laid the foundation for a 
comprehensive framework for the exploitation of forest 
resources. In chapter eight, the efficacy of this legal and 
administrative framework set up to control the exploitation of 
timber resources will be assessed in greater detail.
1 Infra Chp.7.
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(i) Rights to Land, Trees and Timber in Customary Law.
Before passing to a discussion of the 1962 legislation, 
it may be useful to summarise aspects of customary land law in 
Ghana generally and the customary law relating to trees and 
timber in force prior to 1962, in particular.
(a) Customary Land Law: Although there are differences of
detail between the various communities, it is possible to 
briefly describe the principal interests in land which are 
found throughout Ghana.1 These are the allodial interest (or 
paramount interest) of a stool or skin or family; the 
customary freehold interest (or usufruct or determinable 
interest) and a variety of tenancies of both long and short 
duration.
In Ghana, the allodial title is invariably vested in a
1 Land law in Ghana is governed principally by customary 
law. A distinction can be drawn however, between the "law in 
the books" and the law as daily practised in various 
communities. For detailed accounts of the general scheme of 
customary land tenure in Ghana, including thorough analyses of 
the relevant case law, the reader is referred to N.Ollennu, G. 
Woodman, Ollennu's Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana 
Second Edition, 1985, CAL Press, Birmingham, pp.184; K. 
Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law 1964, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, pp.399; S. Asante Property Law and Social Goals in 
Ghana, 1844-1966 1975, Ghana Universities Press, Accra,
pp.303; R. Pogucki, A Survey of Land Tenure in the Customary 
Law of the Protectorate of the Northern Territories 1955, 
Lands Department, Accra, pp.60; G. Woodman, The Allodial Title 
to Land, (1968) 5 UGLJ 79-114, G. Woodman, The Scheme of
Subordinate Tenures of Land in Ghana, (1967) 15 American
Journal of Comparative Law 457-477. For examples of more 
descriptive, anthropological studies of customary law in 
particular communities, the reader is referred to studies of 
communities in northern Ghana cited in chapter 10 infra
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community1 which may be represented by a stool,2 skin,2 
tindana1 or family head. Whatever his title, the 
representative is a customary law trustee, holding the land 
for and on behalf of the community.5 Essentially, therefore, 
the allodial interest is the indivisible interest of each 
community in all the land which its members occupy or which is 
held in trust for their future needs. Land which has not been 
allocated for farming is administered directly by the stool 
representative who is sometimes misleadingly called the 
"landowner". Ollennu states that all land in Ghana is held 
subject to the allodial interest of a community6 but Woodman 
has recently suggested that where land is held subject to a 
customary freehold interest the latter interest effectively 
supersedes the allodial interest in that land.7 Woodman's 
suggestion is more consistent with the description of the 
allodial interest given in the Land Title Registration Law, as 
a right of user subject to no restrictions or obligations
1 Ollennu op cit p.8.
2 The term "stool" is used variously in southern Ghana to 
describe the community, the office of chieftaincy or the 
official seat of the chief.
3 This term describes the stool equivalent in parts of 
northern Ghana.
4 This term refers to the Earth Priest who is sometimes 
regarded as the "landowner" in northern Ghana. See infra 
p.365.
15 Ollennu op cit p. 8.
fa ibid p.11.
7 G. Woodman Other Interests in Land 1991, Unpublished 
Paper, pp.63-98, p.63.
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other than those imposed by the law of Ghana generally.1 
Whether or not the allodial interest may be co-existent with 
a customary freehold interest in the same land, it is clear 
that, where the latter type of interest is in existence, the 
rights of the allodial community are very few indeed. In 
practical terms, the allodial interest is of importance mainly 
with respect to unoccupied land2 and land held by tenants who 
may be required to pay a customary fee to the stool for the 
privilege of farming the land.3 Communal rights to exploit the 
natural products of the land have been cited as another 
incident of the allodial interest.4
The customary freehold interest is a potentially 
perpetual right of user which may vest in an individual or, 
more commonly, a family.5 Its origins lie in the right of each 
community member to bring into cultivation unoccupied land.6 
Once cultivated, the interest of the person(s) holding the 
rights of the customary freehold to that land only determine 
upon a clear abandonment of the land.7 The interest is
1 PNDCL 152/1986 s.l9(l)(a).
2 The stool representative may make allocations of this
land.
3 Ollennu op cit p.54.
4 ibid p.50; Woodman, the Allodial Title to Land ... op 
cit p.98.
5 Ollennu op cit p.64.
fa Woodman op cit p.65.
7 ibid p.91. What exactly constitutes a clear abandonment 
has been a contentious issue, however, and may vary from case 
to case. Contrast, Konkomlemle Consolidated Cases (1951) DC 
(Land) ('48 —’51) 312 at p.353 and Asem v Bosuo (1951) DC
(Land) ('48-r 51) 311.
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inheritable and in many communities it is also alienable.1
A tenancy is the right which a stranger to the community 
is usually granted either by the representative of the stool 
over land not already allocated or by the family head or 
individual in possession of land subject to a customary 
freehold.2 In the case of long term tenancies, the interest is 
inheritable but not alienable.3 Short term tenancies, such as 
the annual tenancy described by Sarbah, run from year to 
year.4 They are exclusive to the individual tenant and are a 
particularly convenient arrangement for the cultivation of 
annual crops.5
Various types of licence6 and pledges7 are among the 
other types of legal interest known to customary law.
1 Woodman op cit p.81; Ollennu op cit p.62. Bongo appears 
to offer one example of a community in which the outright 
alienation of the customary freehold interest is prohibited 
infra p. 370. This is one illustration of the difference 
between the "law in the books" and the "law in action" supra 
p.96, Fn.l.
2 Ollennu op cit pp.87-100; Woodman op cit p .98; Woodman, 
The Scheme of Subordinate Tenures ... op cit p.461. 
Alternatively, a stranger may purchase a customary freehold 
from a member of the community in possession of that interest. 
In addition, a member of the allodial community may be granted 
a tenancy over land held subject to a customary freehold 
interest by other members of the community.
3 Ollennu op cit p.88.
4 J.Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws 1968, Frank Cass and 
Co., London, pp .317, p .68; Ollennu o p  cit p.95.
5 Sarbah op cit p.69.
b Woodman, Other Interest in Land op cit p.100.
7 Ollennu op cit pp.101-115; G. Woodman, Developments in 
Pledges of Land in Ghanaian Customary Law, (1967) 11(1) JAL 8- 
26.
100
(b) Customary Law Relating to Trees and Timber in Force Prior 
to 1962: The customary law relating to trees and timber in 
operation prior to 1962 recognised co-existent rights vesting 
in different persons. In general, members of the landowning 
community were entitled to collect minor forest produce for 
personal consumption on any land whether farmed or not. Stool 
authorities reserved the right to dispose of timber to 
concessionaires and licensees. Individual members of the 
community, and strangers when licensed by the stool, could 
make farms on any unoccupied forest land. The rights of the 
individual farmer over timber on his farm have been summarised 
thus:
"He may fell and burn timber trees standing on the 
land; but if he wishes to utilise timber after 
conversion in a saw pit, he is traditionally 
required to surrender to the stool one third of the 
boards produced. Meanwhile, the sale of a tree from 
the farm to a merchant is usually the prerogative of 
the stool, though the merchant may find that first 
he must purchase the right to the tree from the 
chief and then pay the farmer for permission to 
exercise the right."1
The right of a landowner to a one third share of natural 
produce accruing from farm land is confirmed by Sarbah2 and 
the right of the stool to dispose of timber on farm land is 
confirmed by Danquah3 and the decision in Fynn v Lartey.4
1 H.A. Douglas, Gold Coast, in Gordon, The Law of 
Forestry 1955, London, HMSO, pp.574, pp.433-446, p.434.
2 J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws 1968, Third Edition, 
London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., pp.317, p.74.
3 Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs 1928, London, Routledge, 
pp.272, p.221.
4 (1947) DC (Land) ('38-147) 280.
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Allott found that, in practice, farmers could sell individual 
timber trees on their farms provided one third of the proceeds 
was paid to the stool.1 In Kwame v Ghana and Enimil, it was 
held that even when stool land appears to have been sold 
outright, a one third share in the profit from a sale of 
timber was reserved to the vendor stool.2 In Ghana, the sale 
of rights to rural land confers either agricultural, timber or 
mineral rights and the assumption is that a grant for one of 
these purposes does not pass any rights for the remaining two 
purposes.3 Strictly speaking therefore, the vendor stool in 
Kwame v Ghana and Eminil should have been awarded all the 
profit accruing from the sale of timber but in this case, 
Coussey J. employed the custom of allowing a farmer to retain 
two thirds of the profit from natural produce to award to the 
grantee of land for agricultural purposes a two thirds share 
of the profits from a subsequent grant of timber. The reason 
for the award to the purchaser was to compensate for the 
damage to his land that would be caused by timber operations.4 
In effect, the award was the equivalent of that sum demanded 
by farmers for permission to exercise the right to fell timber 
on their farm land. A contrasting decision is that in Gliksten 
(West Africa) Ltd. v Appiah, where it was held that general 
compensation is not awardable if a concessionaire lawfully
1 A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property 1954, PhD. 
Thesis, London University, pp.807, p.160.
2 (1947) DC (Land) (,38-,47) 275.
3 Danquah, op cit p.222.
4 Kwame v Ghana and Enimil, op cit at p.278.
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enters upon land in the exercise of his right to fell timber.1 
The decision in this case, however, turned on the 
interpretation of the Concessions Ordinance and not customary 
law.
In some communities there were specific rules about the 
sharing between sub-stools and paramount stools of the 
proceeds accruing to stools from timber grants, usually on a 
ratio of two to one.2 The division of proceeds from the 
exploitation of natural resources is as characteristic of 
customary law as the co-existence of separate rights in the 
same land. Both principles maximised the number of 
beneficiaries to profit from the use of land.
It will be recalled that the Concessions Ordinance 
reaffirmed the right of traditional landowners to hold and 
dispose of rights to timber in accordance with customary law.2 
The simple objective of the Concessions Ordinance was to 
secure for concessionaires a secure title in exchange for a 
fair reward to the landowners. A judicial inquiry into the 
terms of every concession was the method for achieving this 
result.4 The Court had to ensure that a number of conditions 
were met before granting a certificate of validity which
1 GLR (1967) 447. See also the decision in Sono v Kwadwo 
(1982-1983) GLRD 103.
2 P. Hill, The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer 1956, London, 
Oxford University Press, pp.139, p.10.
3 Supra p.74.
1 Concessions Ordinance Cap 136 (1954 Revised Edition),
s . 6 .
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conferred a title good against the whole world.1 Among the 
conditions which had to be satisfied, a concessionaire had to 
show that the proper persons under customary law had made the 
grant and that customary rights were protected in so far as 
they were consistent with the concession.2 The Court was 
empowered to vary the terms of the concession and to impose 
equitable conditions.3 No proceedings to enforce any 
concession could be taken unless that concession had been 
certified as valid by the Court.4
The customary rules governing the ownership and sale of 
timber rights, as preserved by the Concessions Ordinance, were 
swept away by the reforms of 1962. Only those rights which are 
consistent with the powers assumed by Government can still be 
exercised.5 The sale of timber rights and distribution of 
revenue from timber grants are rights now solely the 
prerogative of Government and the award of compensation, which 
is the only fee concessionaires are liable to pay to farmers 
who have their tree crops destroyed as a result of timber 
operations, is governed solely by the provisions of timber 
grants.6 Nevertheless, it is believed that many timber 
operators still approach either the local chief or a local
1 ibid s.32.
2 ibid s.13.
3 ibid s.15(1) .
4 ibid s.7.
5 Hyeaman v Osei (1982-1983) GLRD 127.
0 Cl.2(h) of the standard timber lease and C1.2(i) of the 
standard timber licence.
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farmer prior to the start of felling operations.1
(ii) The 1962 Legislation.
In 1961, the newly independent Government commissioned an 
inquiry into the existing system of concessions. The Report of 
the Commission stated that the Concessions Ordinance had 
become obsolete.2 The terms of concession agreements were 
frequently oppressive to the grantors. There was no rational 
method employed in determining rents and royalties which 
frequently failed to reflect true economic values. Delays in 
the procedure for validating concessions were frequent and yet 
many concessionaires worked their concessions whether or not 
they had been validated. In these circumstances, the Ordinance 
failed to cater for the interests of the grantors and the 
nation.3 The Commission recommended the amendment of the 
Ordinance to enable the review of existing agreements to 
procure more equitable terms in response to changing economic 
circumstances. In future, the Government should be responsible 
for issuing concessions on behalf of the traditional grantors. 
The most appropriate course of action would be the vesting of 
all minerals and possibly all timber in the Government.4
"We hold the view that the main reason for public
ownership of these rights is that chiefs and
1 This view was expressed to the author by several forest 
officers during interviews. See also, Agbosu, The Origins of 
Forest Law and Policy in Ghana ... op cit p.187.
2 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Concessions, 
1961, Government Printer, Accra, pp.87, p.4.
3 ibid p.5.
4 ibid p.7.
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landowners out of their ignorance and improvidence 
have failed to protect themselves and their subjects 
against entrepreneurs. Government is thus the only 
authority to afford such protection by vesting in 
itself all minerals and possibly all timber in the 
country. We firmly believe that such a course of 
action would ensure fair agreements and would bring 
about an equitable distribution of all proceeds 
accruing from concessions."1
The Commission visualised a divorce between rights to 
trees and rights to the land on which they grow. The 
possibility of such a distinction was well recognised in 
customary law.2 The Commission made other recommendations as 
to the duration and terms of concessions.
(A) The Concessions Act.
The 1962 Concessions Act was the Government's response to 
the Report of the Commission. The Act deals, inter alia, with 
the ownership of forest resources and the grant and review of 
timber concessions.
(a) Ownership. The Act vests "all rights with respect to 
timber or trees on any land...in the President in trust for 
the stools concerned".3 It vests all land which has been or 
subsequently becomes constituted as a forest reserve in the 
President in trust for the stools concerned.4 This includes 
land constituted as a forest reserve under any local 
government bye-laws.5 The Act preserves all pre-existing
1 ibid p.11.
2 ibid p.8.
3 Concessions Act no.124/1962, s.16(4).
1 ibid s.16(1),(2).
■ ibid s.16(7) .
106
rights in such land in so far as they are consistent with the 
Act and any other enactments in force.1
The Act further provides that all stool land which lies 
outside forest reserves and which was or is subject to a 
concession granted before 1962 is also vested in the President 
in trust for the stools concerned.2
(b) The grant of timber concessions. The Act empowered 
the President to execute any deed or do any act with respect 
to all land and all rights vested in him as trustee under 
section 16.3 Regulations made under the Act specified the 
procedure to be followed for the issue of leases and licences 
over trees and timber.4 The Minister responsible for lands was 
designated the responsible authority for the issue of leases 
and licences with respect to timber. Grants were to be made 
after consultation with a Board established by the Minister.5
(c) The review of existing concessions. The Act 
established an administrative tribunal to inquire into the 
terms of existing concessions.6 The Minister was empowered to 
apply to this tribunal for a modification of boundaries or the 
determination of any concession valid in 1962 which exceeded 
the appropriate limitations of area specified in current
1 ibid s.16(1).
2 ibid s.16(3).
3 ibid s.16(5) .
A Timber Leases and Licences Regulations LI 229/1962.
5 ibid Para.3.
‘ Act 124/1962 s.8.
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legislation.1 The Minister was further empowered to apply to 
the tribunal for the determination of grants which exceeded 
the limitations of area specified by legislation in force at 
the time the grant was made; or if any concession holder 
unreasonably withheld consent to a variation of a term which 
the Minister considered to have become oppressive because of 
a change in economic circumstances; or if any concession 
holder was unable to develop or use the land in the manner 
intended by the concession.2
The tribunal was to submit to the Minister its 
recommendations concerning the modification or determination 
of any concession referred to it3 and those recommendations 
were forwarded to the President who, by order, could confirm 
or vary the terms of the recommendation.4 The President could 
determine any concession held by a foreign national or company 
if he considered that the concession was or might prove 
prejudicial to public safety or interests.5
(B) The Administration of Lands Act, State Lands Act and 
Minerals Act.
Another significant enactment in 1962 was the 
Administration of Lands Act which aimed to end the 
mismanagement of stool lands by traditional authorities. It
1 ibid ss.3(1),4(1).
2 ibid s.3.
3 ibid ss.3(2),4(6).
4 ibid s.6(1) .
' ibid s .5(1).
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provided for the management of stool lands by the Minister and 
it empowered the President to settle any disputes concerning 
stool land.1 If it appeared to be in the public interest so to 
do, the President could declare any stool land to be vested in 
him in trust.2 Any disposal of land outside the landowning 
community became subject to the concurrence of the Minister.3 
The President was empowered to authorise the occupation and 
use of any stool land. The Act limited the grant of any timber 
rights over stool land to a period not exceeding thirty years 
and to a size per person not exceeding forty square miles or 
two hundred and forty square miles in the aggregate.4 An 
amendment to the Act empowered the Government to allow these 
statutory limitations to be exceeded if it appeared to be in 
the national interest or in the interest of the relevant stool 
so to do.sRevenue from stool lands was to be collected by the 
Minister for distribution to local and traditional 
authorities.0
In addition to these statutes, the State Lands Act 
simplified the procedure for the acquisition of land in the 
national interest7 and the Minerals Act vested the ownership
1 Administration of Stool Lands Act no.123/1964, ss.1,2.
2 ibid s.7(1).
3 ibid s.8.
4 ibid s.12.
6 Administration of Lands Act (Amendment) Decree NLCD 
233/1968.
6 ibid ss.17-20.
State Lands Act no.125/1962.
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and control of minerals in the President in trust for the 
people of Ghana.1
The reforms of 1962 set the scene for the post 
independence management of timber exploitation. Clearly a more 
interventionist role was envisaged. The provisions of the 
Concessions Act which remain operative are those dealing with 
the power of the Head of State to terminate foreign owned 
concessions,2 the legal representation of foreign owned 
companies,3 the prohibition on sub-assignments of concessions 
without the prior written consent of the Minister,4 the power 
of the Minister to make appropriate regulations5 and section 
16. Substantial parts of the Administration of Lands Act are 
no longer in force.6
(iii) Comments on the 1962 Legislation.
A few preliminary points concerning the interpretation of 
the 1962 legislation can be made before turning to the central 
question of ownership:
1 Minerals Act no.126/1962.
2 Act 124/1962 s.5.
3 ibid s.9.
4 ibid s.13.
5 ibid s.14.
1 Lands Commission Act 401/1980 s.25, repealed s.l of 
this Act and PNDCL 42/1982 s.65, repealed ss.18-25. The latter 
were replaced with similar provisions, however. See ss.48 of 
PNDCL 42/1982.
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(A) "Trees and Timber."
"Timber" defines primarily felled wood and cut wood.1 
"Tree" has a much wider definition which includes palms, 
bamboos and canes.2 The Concessions Act states that all rights 
to all timber and all trees are vested in the Government but 
it seems most unlikely that it was the intention of Government 
to take control of palms, bamboos, brushwood and canes, let 
alone the vast estates of private cocoa, oil palm and other 
economic trees. Probably the Government did not even intend to 
acquire an interest in trees cut for the important firewood 
and charcoal trade unless those trees happened to fall within 
a forest reserve. Therefore, a more restricted term could 
usefully have been employed in section 16 with greater
accuracy as to the intention of Government to acquire an
interest specifically in timber trees. For example, the
provision could have read, "all rights to all timber trees,
whether standing, felled or cut...". Care would have to be 
taken to ensure that all species not at present but which may 
in future years become commercially valuable, were included in 
the definition of a timber tree and this could be achieved by 
providing that all species which grow to a specified girth 
limit constitute timber trees whether or not individual trees
1 Forests Ordinance Cap 157 s. 2. Although the definitions 
given in Cap 157 were not expressly stated to apply to the 
Concessions Act, the same definitions are employed in later
legislation such as the Forest Protection Decree NRCD 
243/1974, s.10.
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have yet or ever reach that girth limit.1 On the otherhand, it 
is possible to argue that the Government deliberately aimed to 
keep the ambit of the legislation vague so as not to prejudice 
its options in the future, in which case a more restrictive 
definition would have been inappropriate.2
(B) Customary Rights to Timber or Trees.
The rights of the community to use minor forest produce 
were not expressly saved in the 1962 legislation except in the 
case of forest reserves.3 The law states that the Government 
acquired "all rights" with respect to timber or trees on any 
land not within a forest reserve.4 Does this phrase include 
customary rights to gather minor forest produce? On a strict 
interpretation of the law, it would appear that all customary 
rights to gather minor forest produce outside forest reserves 
were extinguished in 1962.
The abrogation of customary rights, a step which the 
Colonial Government always feared to take, appears both 
unreasonable and unnecessary. One possible explanation for 
such a sweeping and radical reform lies in the Government’s 
desire to extinguish the customary right of farmers to fell or
1 The Forest Inventory Project has recently estimated 
that approximately 126 tree species have commercial potential 
but currently only about 40 are regularly exploited for 
timber. See further, The Timber Resource, infra Chp.8.
2 The same argument applies with respect to the 
abrogation of customary rights to timber or trees made in 
equally sweeping terms as discussed below.
3 Act 124/1962 s.16(1).
4 ibid s.16(4).
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burn timber trees as part of farming operations, a right which 
easily leads to the waste of valuable timber. In forest 
reserves this is generally not a problem because all farming 
is prohibited except within clearly defined village 
boundaries.1 It seems anomalous however, that rights to 
collect minor forest produce may, with the requisite 
permission, be exercised inside forest reserves but not, 
according to a strict interpretation of the law, outside them. 
Despite the phrasing of the law, there is no indication that 
rights of community user have in practice been destroyed and 
it is a matter of concern to officials that the traditional 
right to burn or fell timber during farming operations is 
still being exercised.
Alternative policies which address this problem deserve 
serious consideration. On the one hand, the law could more 
clearly prohibit this particular activity specifying tough 
penalties for the illegal felling of timber trees on any land. 
The problem with this method lies in the difficulty of 
enforcing the law, particularly outside concession areas. 
Generous compensation payments to farmers who suffer damages 
to their crops as a result of timber concessionaires’ 
activities might be a more effective measure to dissuade 
farmers from needlessly destroying timber trees during farming 
operations.
An alternative, more radical policy would be to divest 
the state of its poorly enforced, legal interest in timber 
trees on farmland. By vesting complete ownership rights in the
1 Cap 157 s .11.
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farmer on the spot - a departure even from earlier customary 
law - farmers would gain a valuable interest in preserving, or 
at least rationally exploiting, valuable timber trees on their 
land. Research has shown that farmers are not incapable of 
taking a long term view of how to safeguard such valuable 
assets.1 If farmers were entitled to receive a greater share 
in the profit to be made from felling timber trees it is 
likely that fewer trees would be needlessly destroyed. Farmers 
might even take to the much vaunted ideas of agroforestry and 
begin planting timber trees voluntarily on their land with the 
technical assistance of forestry officers.
A radical reform of this type would best be implemented 
over a three year period during which time all timber grants 
outside forest reserves would have to be phased out. Felling 
licences could be phased out almost immediately.2 Timber 
licences, which are granted for a maximum of three years, 
could be phased out over a three year period during which time 
the exploitation of long term leases could be speeded up 
before their premature termination at the end of that time. 
The Government would then be free to vest title to timber on 
all land outside forest reserves in farmers where the land is 
allocated and in stools where it is not. In future, all 
operators would have to bargain for the right to fell timber 
from individual farmers on farmland outside forest reserves.
1 R. Chambers, Trees to Meet Contingencies: Savings and 
Security for the Rural Poor 1987, IDS Discussion Paper no.228, 
Sussex, pp.22.
2 For a full explanation of the various types of timber 
grant, see, The Grant, Review and Determination of Timber 
Concessions infra Chp.8.
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In order for the Government still to earn some revenue, all 
chain saw operators and loggers would have to be more 
effectively registered and taxed automatically.
There are several obstacles preventing the uptake of this 
more radical proposal. It is likely that stools would claim a 
good proportion of the revenue from the sale of timber by 
farmers on the basis of their pre-existing rights under 
customary law.1 This would nullify the main benefit of the 
proposal, that is, the creation of a real financial incentive 
for farmers not to destroy timber trees on their farms. This 
makes the simpler proposal for increasing the compensation 
paid for damage to agricultural crops look like a more 
feasible option. In addition, lessees of well stocked, long 
term leases would probably oppose the premature termination 
of their grants but, the rate of illegal exploitation is, in 
many cases, now so rapid that opposition may be less than 
anticipated.2 The prospect of the Government losing large 
amounts of revenue is also tenuous for the same reason. The 
more effective registration and automatic taxation of chain 
saw operators is a proposal which counteracts this argument.
An alternative proposal, and one more likely to find 
official favour, is for the management of all timber resources
1 Supra p.102. Other complications may arise in 
determining what proportion of revenue should be awarded to 
tenants in occupation of the land or to the nuclear as opposed 
to the extended family where the land is held subject to a 
customary freehold interest.
2 The Forestry Commission has estimated that 
deforestation outside forest reserves may account for up to 
30% of timber industry production, W. Keeling, Forests Pay as 
Ghana Loses Out Financial Times 8/2/1989.
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outside forest reserves to be handed over to the relevant 
district assemblies. This proposal is consistent with a 
recommendation in the Draft Forest Policy favouring the 
participation of local government in concession procedures.1 
It is doubtful, however, whether district assemblies have the 
resources to manage the problem of illegal timber felling any 
more effectively than central government. It is argued 
elsewhere in this thesis that decentralising resources to 
local government bodies is a move which does not necessarily 
lead to a more participatory and democratic involvement of 
local people in their own affairs.2
At a very minimum, the problem of illegal and wasteful 
destruction of timber on farmland suggests that a review of 
the amount of compensation paid to farmers who suffer damage 
to their crops as a result of timber activities should be 
considered. Governments and conservationists cannot have their 
cake and eat it. If they want to encourage forest conservation 
and the rational exploitation of timber on agricultural land, 
they must be prepared to pay for the incentives which can 
facilitate it. Conservation, like everything else, has a 
price, but who is willing to pay it?
(C) "Stool Land".
The general scheme of interests in land in Ghana has been
1 Forestry Commission Proposals for the Revision of the 
National Forest Policy of Ghana 1989, Forestry Commission, 
Accra, pp.17, p.12. See also infra chapter ten.
2 See the evidence from the Western Region infra Chp.7 
and Bongo infra Chp.9.
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widely discussed elsewhere and only one point of interest will 
be discussed here.1 Some legal authorities have suggested that 
all land in Ghana is stool land.2 This is possible because the 
allodial interest, the name most frequently given to the 
interest of the stool in stool land, is capable of co-existing 
with other interests in land.3 In this scheme it is important 
to distinguish the different nature of the rights exercised by 
a stool over unoccupied stool land and occupied stool land. In 
the latter, the rights of the stool are practically nominal, 
especially if the land is subject to a customary freehold 
interest.4
The Administration of Lands Act provided a statutory
definition of stool land which included:
"Land controlled by any person for the benefit of 
the subjects or members of a stool, clan, company or 
community..."5
In 1982, PNDCL 42 included a reference to "a family as 
known to customary law" within the definition of stool land.c 
This brought unoccupied land in communities where the stool is 
not a landowning entity clearly within the ambit of the law
1 See references at supra p.96, Fn.l.
2 Ollennu op cit p.11; Bentsi-Enchill, The Traditional 
Legal Systems of Africa op cit p.75.
3 Ollennu op cit p.11; Bentsi-Enchill op cit p.75.
4 One interpretation suggests that the incidents of the 
customary freehold interest are so substantial that they 
effectively extinguish the allodial interest in that land. 
Woodman, Other Interests in Land, op cit p.63. Supra p.97.
5 Act 123/1962 s.31.
b PNDCL 42/1982 s.63.
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relating to stool land.
Although these statutory definitions of stool land do not 
expressly confine themselves to the interest of a stool in 
unoccupied stool land, there are good reasons for thinking 
that this was the true purport of the 1962 legislation and 
succeeding legislation. Firstly, the policy behind the 1962 
legislation was for the Government to control the activities 
of irresponsible stool authorities who, for example, appeared 
willing to alienate unoccupied stool land in total disregard 
for the agricultural requirements of other members of the 
stool.1 It was not the intention of Government to take control 
of all agricultural land in Ghana, a move which would have led 
to the virtual eclipse of customary land law and the interests 
it defines. Secondly, the reference made to "any land" in 
section 8 of the Act as opposed to the term "stool land" 
employed throughout the rest of Act 123 indicates that the 
legislators believed that not all land was stool land. This 
interpretation is consistent with the phrasing of section 1 of 
the Concessions Act which provided that the Concessions 
Ordinance should only cease to apply to stool lands, thereby 
implying that land which is not stool land exists in Ghana.2 
It further accounts for the enactment in 1962 of two different 
procedures for the compulsory acquisition of land by the 
Government, one for stool land1 and one for other land.4
1 Evidence of this policy is reflected in the Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry Into Concessions, o p  cit p.2.
2 Act 124/1964 s.l.
; Act 123/1962 s.7.
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The definitions of stool land in the 1962 Act and the 
1982 Law failed to recognise and exclude the possibility that 
all land in Ghana is stool land. However, the 1986 Land 
Registration Law provides a new statutory classification of 
interests in land which greatly helps to clarify the matter. 
The Law refers to a number of registrable interests, among 
which is the allodial interest. This is defined as a right of 
user subject to no restrictions or obligations other than 
those imposed by the law of Ghana generally.1 According to 
this definition, the interest of a stool, community or family 
in all its unoccupied land is that of an allodial interest but 
any land which is encumbered by any other type of legal 
interest cannot fall within the category of the allodial 
interest. This definition clearly restricts the ambit of the 
allodial interest to unoccupied land in contrast to the 
description given by some legal authorities.2 It is submitted 
that the term "stool land" in the earlier legislation 
approximates closely, if not entirely, to the definition of 
the allodial interest in PNDCL 152 and not to the definition 
of the allodial interest as one which exists over all land in 
Ghana. This view is the only one which gives coherence to all 
the provisions of the 1962 legislation.
4 Act 125/1962 s.l.
1 Land Title Registration Law PNDCL 152/1986, s,19(l)(a). 
See further, G. Woodman, Land Title Registration Without 
Prejudice: The Ghana Land Title Registration Law, 1986, (1987) 
31 JAL 119-135.
2 Supra p.116.
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(D) The Future Application of the Concessions Ordinance.
At first sight, it appears anomalous that all the 
provisions of the Concessions Ordinance were continued in 
force by Act 123 with respect to land held subject to family 
and individual rights of ownership. However, the overall 
objective of the 1962 legislation appears to have been that in 
future all concessions would be dealt with under the 
Administration of Lands Act whenever stool land was involved, 
under the provisions of section 16 of the Concessions Act 
where timber resources outside stool land were concerned or 
under the Minerals Act whenever minerals were at issue.1 In 
the meantime, all grants existing in 1962 would be preserved, 
modified or determined as the justice of the case demanded 
under the provisions of the Concessions Act. While the 
Concessions Ordinance therefore remained theoretically in 
force over land held by families and individuals, in reality 
the Ordinance was rendered superfluous by the new legislation.
(E) Stool Lands Subject to a Timber Concession in 1962.
Stool lands subject to timber concessions in 1962 were 
vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned by 
the Concessions Act.2 Stool land made subject to a concession 
after 1962 does not vest in the Government but there is no 
apparent reason for distinguishing pre-1962 and post-1962
1 Act 123/1962 also required, in s.8, ministerial 
concurrence to disposals of any land involving the payment of 
valuable consideration made by a stool or any person in 
possession of any land acquired without payment of valuable
consideration.
2 Act 124/1962 s.16(3)
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concessions in this way.1 The management of all stool lands 
was anyway vested in the Government by virtue of the 
Administration of Lands Act2 and all trees and timber on any 
land vest in the public trust by virtue of the Concessions 
Act.3
(F) The Limitations on Size and Duration of Timber 
Concessions.
The limitations of size and duration stipulated in Act 
123 apply to "grants" of mining or timber rights. The use of 
this term raised speculation as to whether existing 
concessions were covered as well as future grants. By 
contrasting the use of the term "grant" with the term "hold" 
which was used in the equivalent section of the Concessions 
Ordinance, it was deduced that the limitations were only 
operative over any new grants made.4 This restrictive 
interpretation accords with the overall objective of the 
Concessions Act which was to continue existing grants on the 
same terms in so far as they were considered to be fair to all 
parties. The Minister's power to apply to the tribunal for a
1 A uniform status for all stool land subject to 
concessions after 1962 could be achieved by employing s.7 of 
Act 123/1962. This enables the President to declare any stool 
land to be vested in him in trust whenever it appears to be in 
the public interest so to do.
2 Act 123/1962 s.l.
3 Act 124/1962 s.16(4).
4 Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire Into the 
Affairs of the Ghana Timber Marketing Board and the Ghana
Timber Cooperative Union 1968, Government Printer, Accra, ADM 
5/3/159, pp.150, p.19.
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modification or determination of concessions which exceeded in 
area the current statutory limitations appropriate to that 
concession1 further suggests that differential limits might 
apply to concessions depending, inter alia, on the date they 
were granted. Alternatively, these concessions were to be 
dealt with on a case by case basis.
(iv) The Nationalisation of Forest Resources ?
The 1962 legislation created a public trust over all 
forest resources in Ghana including land inside forest 
reserves and stool land subject to timber concessions in 
1962.2 Was this the acquisition by Government of national 
assets or a more limited measure preserving at least some of 
the legal interests of local communities in their land and 
forests?
In 1961, the Commission of Inquiry into Concessions 
recommended that all rights to timber and trees in forest 
reserves should be vested in the Government but the land 
itself should remain the property of the traditional 
landowners.3 This recommendation was cautiously endorsed by 
the subsequent Government White Paper4 but in the final Act 
the ownership of all natural resources in a forest reserve, as 
well as the ownership of stool land subject to timber
1 Act 124/1962 ss.3(l)(f),4(l).
2 ibid s .16.
3 Report of the Commission of Inquiry ... op cit p.12.
4 White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Concessions no.4/1961 pp.6, p.l.
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concessions in 1962, was dealt with by the same legal 
terminology, that is, the trees, timber and land were all 
vested in the President in trust for the stools concerned.1 
Thus, in forest reserves and specified stool land, the land 
and trees are not subject to different legal regimes.
The Forests Ordinance expressly provides that the 
ownership of land in a forest reserve is not altered by its 
constitution into a forest reserve.2 That provision of the 
Ordinance was not expressly repealed by Act 124 but the Act 
did stipulate that all rights to land in a forest reserve are 
preserved only to the extent to which they are consistent with 
the terms of the Act.3 The provisions of the Forests Ordinance 
must therefore be read with extreme caution as there was 
clearly an intention in Act 124 for the President to acquire 
some legal interest in specified land.
Little light is thrown on the nature of the public trust 
created by Act 124 by applying the equitable principles of 
trust law. Unlike the beneficiaries of a trust recognised in 
equity, stools do not appear to have any enforceable rights 
against the Government and they receive only a specified share 
of the revenue accruing from trust property. It has been held 
that "trust" is not a legal term of art in public law.4 The 
rights of beneficiaries need not be substantial because 
equitable principles and remedies do not apply. Indeed, the
1 Act 124/1962 s.16.
2 Cap 157 s.18.
3 Act 124/1962 s.16(1).
4 Tito v Waddell (no.2)(1977) 3 All ER (ChD) 129.
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limitations on the rights of the traditional landowners are 
now so cumbersome that it could be concluded that the 
situation is, in a sense, the reverse of the position in 
equity - the stools are nominal owners only, their right to a 
share of the revenue being ex gratia the Government.
It is often said that in Ghanaian customary law a stool
occupant holds stool land "in trust" for the stool community. 
The incidents of the customary law trust are different to 
trusts as known to equity.1 In customary law, "trust" denotes 
the corporate, indivisible and perpetual ownership of the 
community in communal land. The trustee is merely the 
representative of the landowning community empowered to do 
various acts on behalf of and in the interests of that 
community.2 The trustee cannot be sued by the members of the 
landowning community in respect of trust property because, in 
the eyes of the law, the trustee and the community are one.3 
An analogy to the concept of the customary law trust is a 
romantic one but it is fundamentally flawed because the rights 
of the Government over timber resources are practically 
complete and the source of its authority resides in the
compulsory acquisition of national assets and not in the
voluntary mandate of local communities.
Trusteeship was a dominant theme in the colonial era. In 
ideological terms, the concept implied that European rulers 
were responsible for "developing" the African continent on
1 Gyamfi v Owusu ( 1982-3) GLRD 165, at 168.
2 Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, op cit pp.41-44.
1 ibid
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behalf of the "natives".1 The concept could therefore be used 
to justify the essentially racist, elitist and authoritarian 
nature of colonial government.2 In practical terms, it meant 
that the role of the Colonial Government was to provide a 
facilitative legal framework for English entrepreneurs who 
wished to exploit the natural resources of the Colony.3 While 
it is clear that on independence, developing country 
governments inherited and to some extent perpetuated elitist 
and authoritarian styles of government in practice,4 the new 
governments were generally much more anxious to play a leading 
role in economic development than their predecessors. 
Facilitative laws were generally replaced by more ambitious 
programmatic laws in consonance with this political 
philosophy.5 In view of this, it would be a mistake to 
identify the public trust created in the Concessions Act too 
closely with the concept of trusteeship inherited from the 
colonial era.
The decision in Gyamfi v Owusu may throw more light on 
the real nature of the trust created by Act 124.6 In this
1 S. Merry, Law and Colonialism, (1991) 25(4), Law and 
Society Review 889-922, p.896.
2 Seidman, The State, Law and Development, op cit pp.108-
1 1 1 .
3 ibid p .108.
4 D. Fashole-Luke, Trends in Development Administration: 
The Continuing Challenge to the Efficacy of the Post Colonial 
State in the Third World, (1986) 6(1) Public Administration 
and Development 73-85, p.75; Seidman op cit p.111.
5 Allott, The Limits of Law, op cit pp.174-236.
fc GLRD (1982-3) 165, at p.166.
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case, it was stated that whenever the Government acts to vest 
stool land in the President in trust under section 7 of Act 
123, it is in effect compulsorily acquiring land. This 
statement concerned the vesting of stool land under Act 123 
but parallels could be drawn with the provisions of section 16 
of Act 124.
Compensation is payable for the compulsory acquisition of 
land under the State Lands Act.1 Although compensation has not 
been made or required for the acquisition of rights by 
Government in forest resources or stool land, it is arguable 
that the allocation of a part of the revenue accruing from 
stool land generally and from forest exploitation in 
particular, to local stools amounts to the same thing.2 On the 
other hand, it could equally well be argued that the provision 
for ongoing payments in this way, is evidence that stools 
continue to hold a definite legal interest in stool land and 
forest resources.
It is noteworthy that section 16 of Act 124 does not 
appear in the original Concessions Bill. A possible 
explanation for this is that it was the intention of the 
Government to deal entirely with forest resources in the 
provisions of the Administration of Lands Act which vested the 
management of stool lands in the Minister but made no change 
in their ownership. The insertion of section 16 suggests that 
the Government finally opted for a more radical degree of
1 Act 125/1962 s.4.
2 Act 123/1962 ss.17-23, now replaced by PNDCL 42/1982 
s.48 and Act 124/1962 s.16(6).
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control with respect to forest resources. National ownership 
of key economic assets was a policy endorsed by the Convention 
People's Party (CPP).1
In view of this general policy, it may seem surprising 
that the legislation of 1962 dealt with minerals by a 
different, albeit similar, legal terminology. The Minerals Act 
declares that, "the entire property in and control of all 
minerals in Ghana" are vested in the President, "on behalf of 
the Republic of Ghana in trust for the people of Ghana".2 
Interests in land were not affected by this measure.3 Although 
provision is made for the payment of revenue from the 
exploitation of minerals into the Stool Lands Account for 
disbursement to traditional landowners, as is the case with 
timber revenue,4 the language employed in Act 126, vesting all 
title to minerals in the President, seems more explicit than 
the language used in Act 124 with respect to forest reserves. 
A plausible explanation for this lies in the vulnerability of 
the newly independent Government to the old controversy 
concerning forest and land ownership. Although the government 
was keen to take control of forest resources, a cautious 
approach was called for in order to avoid antagonising chiefs 
and local communities. This was achieved by employing more
1 T. Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of 
Economic Policies in Ghana 1978, Heinemann, London, pp.392, 
p. 39; K. Osei-Hwedie, Y. Agyeman-Badu, Essays on the Political 
Economy of Ghana 1987, Brunswick, Lawrencevi1le, U.S.A., 
pp.66, p .17.
2 Act 126/1962 s.l.
: ibid s.2.
1 Act 124/1962 s.16(6). Also, PNDCL 42/1982 s.48.
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ambiguous terminology than in the Minerals Act and by 
including a reference to the interests of local communities in 
section 16 of Act 124.
Looking at all the evidence, it is not possible to make 
a decisive interpretation of the nature of the public trust 
created by Act 124. Clearly the intention of the Government in 
1962 was to take control of the management of forest resources 
for the benefit of the nation, but the terminology employed in 
section 16 of Act 124 suggests that questions relating to the 
ownership of forest resources were of some sensitivity. The 
historical antagonisms surrounding the ownership of forest 
resources offer the most plausible explanation for this.
In 1982, the PNDC (Establishment) Proclamation 
(Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, vested all 
public lands in Ghana in the Council, " on behalf of and in 
trust for the people of Ghana and their communities".1 "Public 
lands" include any land in which the Government participates 
in its disposition.
Two points arise out of the change of legal terminology 
employed in PNDCL 42. Firstly, the term "public lands" is 
misleading. Where trees and timber have been vested in the 
Government but the land on which they stand has not, the 
clause at first sight looks inapplicable. However, the 
Interpretation Act defines land as including any estate, 
interest or right in, to or over land2 and this may suffice to 
bring all trees and timber within the ambit of "public lands"
1 PNDC 42/1982 s.45(1).
2 CA no.6/1962 s. 32(1).
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despite the well recognised principle of customary law that 
land and trees may be subject to separate ownership.1 
Nevertheless, would it not have been clearer if the provision 
in PNDCL 42 had expressly stated that "all public lands and 
all public natural resources" should vest in the Council in 
trust?
Secondly, the beneficiaries of the Council's trust appear 
to constitute a larger group, that is to say, all the people 
of Ghana and all Ghanaian communities, than the original 
public trust created for the benefit of the appropriate local 
stools. This is consistent with the policy of national 
integration enunciated in section 1(d) of PNDCL 42.
Questions of ownership are not merely academic ones of 
interest only to lawyers. In chapter seven, the ways in which 
the ambiguities and traditional antagonisms surrounding issues 
of ownership contribute to illegal and destructive activities 
in the Western Region are discussed.2 In chapter eight, 
attention is drawn to the role which chiefs have played in 
speeding up the exploitation of forest resources in order to 
maximise their own sources of revenue.3 The evidence presented 
in those chapters suggests that the time may now be ripe to
[
I
1 Ollennu op cit p.l. This supposition raises the 
question whether the land on which those trees stand has 
become vested in the Government under PNDCL 42/1982, s.45. The 
position would appear to be that the land itself is not 
"public land" because the Council does not participate in its 
disposition. The customary regime of separate ownership for 
trees and land appears to have been retained in this case.
2 Infra p.196.
J Infra p.301.
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specify more precisely the rights and duties of local 
communities with respect to forest resources.
Local communities should not be wholly excluded from the 
forest sector but the law should aim to reconcile their needs 
with the requirements of forest conservation. This implies a 
need to differentiate between theoretical ownership rights 
which, it is submitted, are a hangover from colonial days, and 
the need to integrate the local economy with the forest 
sector. Only the latter method can ensure that the benefits of 
rational forest exploitation are widely spread and popularly 
supported by local people.1 The distribution of a proportion 
of forest revenues to local government and traditional 
authorities does not directly and effectively compensate local 
farmers for the lost opportunity to expand their farming 
activities.2 At the same time, the receipt of a proportion of 
forest revenues by traditional authorities has not prevented 
the unscrupulous sale of interests in land by some 
individuals.3 Their record does not commend the policy of 
ambiguity and compromise which appears to underlie the 
creation of the public trust in the 1962 legislation. A 
definite and final settlement of the issues might help to show
1 C. Du Saussey, The Evolution of Forestry Legislation 
for the Development of Rural Communities, (1983) 35(142) 
Unasylva pp.14-23; E. Eckholm, Planting For the Future: 
Forestry for Human Needs 1979, World Watch Paper no.26, World 
Watch Institute, Washington, pp.56, p.34.
2 The same problem is evident in Kenya where the law 
gives revenue from game reserves to the local county councils. 
See, P. Omara-Ojungu, Resource Management in Developing 
Countries 1992, Longman, Harlow, pp.213, p.12.
Forest Protection in the Western Region infra Chp.7.
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that the Government is wholly committed to stamping out 
illegal practices once and for all.
(v) The Issue and Review of Timber Concessions After 1962.
The Concessions Act and the Timber Leases and Licences 
Regulations stipulated specific administrative procedures for 
the issue and review of concessions. Between 1962 and 1966 
many concessions were recalled and new grants made but, 
unfortunately, the proper procedures were not adhered to. It 
appears that the Concessions Tribunal was never formally 
constituted and, in the absence of other controls, the whole 
procedure became subject to ministerial abuse. The 1968 Report 
of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Affairs of the 
Ghana Timber Marketing Board and the Ghana Timber Co-operative 
Union (Blay Report) revealed the extent of this abuse.1 
Concessions had been recalled for no lawful reason without 
recourse to any tribunal. They had been re-allocated to 
political allies without any regard to the ability of those 
persons to exploit the concessions. Often the new grantees had 
assigned their rights to legitimate timber operators who were 
being held to ransom by the increasingly corrupt 
administration.2 Foreign owned companies had been the object
1 Access no.157/76, 1968, Government Printer, Accra, ADM 
5/3/159 pp.150.
2 For example, as a result of complaints concerning 
trespassers on one concession held by Gliksten (West Africa) 
Ltd. three of that company's concessions were recalled and 
reallocated to nineteen grantees some of whom were in no way 
related to the timber industry, ibid pp.4-7. On the question 
of corruption generally during the Nkrumah era, see, M. Owusu, 
Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity
and Change in the Politics of Ghana 1970, Chicago University
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of greatest discrimination. The uncertainty in the industry 
which these arbitrary proceedings caused has been partly 
blamed for the decline in timber exports after I960.'
It has been argued that decolonization encouraged a 
decline into a political spoils system in many developing 
countries because newly emergent political leaders had to 
reward their political supporters and satisfy the high 
expectations aroused at independence with whatever means 
available to them.2 Evidence presented by Levine shows that 
there is also force in the argument that underlying kinship 
and ethnic loyalties were a factor contributing to widespread 
corruption in Ghana.3 Whatever the underlying causes, it is 
clear that the 1962 legislation provided a framework conducive 
to corruption. The laws hinged on the centralisation of 
administrative control, giving wide discretionary powers to 
political ministers. The concession allocation system took 
what should have been pragmatic, objective decisions away from 
sectoral institutions which could have been authorised to
Press, Chicago, pp.364; H. Werlin, The Roots of Corruption - 
The Ghanaian Inquiry, (1972), 10(2), Journal of Modern African 
Studies 247-266.
1 A.C.K. Dua-Anto, Ghana's Timber Trade 1957-1965, 1971, 
Unpublished MSc Dissertation (Econ), University of Ghana, 
Legon, pp.70, p.47.
2 B. Garvey, Patrimonial Economics and Informal 
Bureaucracies: Public Administration and Social Reality in the 
Least Developed Countries of the 1990s: A Review Article,
(1991) 11 Public Administration and Development 591-600,
p.594; Fashole-Luke, op cit p.75.
3 Levine, Supportive Values of the Culture of Corruption 
in Ghana, in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, V.Levine,V. (Eds.) 
Political Corruption: A Handbook 1989, Transaction Publishers, 
Oxford, pp.1017, at pp.363-373.
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allocate concessions according to fixed criteria enforcing 
strict impartiality. The law failed to provide for 
administrative accountability, to the judiciary, to 
independent watchdog institutions, or to the public at large. 
It allowed decisions on concession allocations to be made in 
a secretive and arbitrary fashion instead of demanding openess 
and conformity to criteria fixed in advance. These features of 
the law encouraged the rapid emergence of a political spoils 
system.1
The Blay Report recommended that the allocation of timber 
concessions should be returned to a judicial body or else 
assigned to a special concessions tribunal which would be 
assisted by independent forestry and industrial experts 
removed from direct political interference.2 The solution 
adopted in the 1969 Constitution was the establishment of the 
Lands Commission which remains statutorily responsible for 
timber grants and which is not directly answerable to any 
Ministry.3
The Blay Report demonstrates the need for political and 
administrative accountability in concession procedures. At a 
minimum, this requires a clear demarcation of management 
responsibilities and procedures for the review of
1 For a further discussion of types of laws which may 
encourage corruption, see Seidman, The State, Law and 
Development, op cit pp.167-188.
2 Blay Report, op cit p.20.
3 1969 Constitution op cit Art.163; PNDCL 42/1982 s.36. 
See further, The Lands Commission infra Chp.6, and The Grant, 
Review and Determination of Timber Concessions infra Chp.8.
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administrative actions.1 Clearly articulated goals and fixed 
criteria for decision-making are also desirable.2 The 
retrenchment of state bureaucracies and a greater role for 
free market forces are among the more radical recommendations 
which have been put forward to address the problem of 
corruption in developing countries generally.3
(vi) Sustainable Development and the 1962 Legislation.
Little mention has been made in this chapter of the 
concept of sustainable development. The reason for this lies 
principally in the failure of the 1962 legislation to address 
this issue which has only received widespread attention in 
recent years. In 1962, the priority of the newly independent 
Government, in keeping with its time, was rapid economic 
development.4 The emphasisin the legislation on the ownership 
and exploitation of forest resources reflects the economic and 
political priorities of the new Government as well as its 
comparative disregard for environmental issues. Nevertheless,
i
! in providing measures for the control of forest exploitation,
i
j the legislation inevitably created institutions and procedures
!
which would determine whether or not forest resources would in 
future be exploited in a rational and sustainable fashion.
1 Werlin op cit p.264.
2 P. Blunt, Strategies for Enhancing Organizational 
Effectiveness in the Third World, (1990) 10 Public 
Administration and Development 299-313.
3 D. Fashole-Luke op cit p.76; IBRD World Development 
Report, 1983 1983, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.213, 
pp.115-124. Note the present reforms considered in Chp.8 infra
1 T. Killick op cit pp.33-59.
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On a general level, the assumption of control by the 
central government, under the ambiguous concept of 
trusteeship, provided an opportunity to establish a 
comprehensive framework for the conservation and exploitation 
of forest resources in accordance with sustainable development 
policies. The evidence of the Blay Report, however, shows 
clearly that, at least in the matter of concession 
allocations, responsible management decisions designed to 
promote the most efficient use of forest resources were not 
made. The evidence of corruption and mismanagement produced in 
the Blay Report may have been truly shocking in 1966 but 
twenty-six years later experience invites a more cynical 
response. The analysis of the "soft state",1 the evidence of 
massive corruption and maladministration in developing 
countries generally2 and the criticisms of the law and 
development cynics3 combine to suggest that the public 
administration of national assets in developing countries does 
not necessarily lead to effective and rational policies 
controlling the exploitation of natural resources. In view of
1 Myrdal op cit p.208.
2 Heidenheimer, Johnston, Levine (Eds.), op cit; D. 
Gould, J. Amaro-Reyes, The Effect of Corruption on 
Administrative Performance 1983, World Bank Staff Working 
Papers no.580, Management and Development Series no.7, IBRD, 
Washington, pp.41; J. Mooij, Private Pockets and Public 
Policies, in F. Von Benda-Beckman, M. Van der Velde, Law As A 
Resource in Agrarian Struggles 1992, Wageningen Agricultural 
University, Wageningen, The Netherlands, pp.319, pp. 219-239.
3 Allott, The Limits of Law op cit pp.287-290; Snyder, 
Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory op cit 
pp.723-804; F. Von Benda-Beckman, Scape-Goat and Magic Charm: 
Law in Development Theory and Practice, (1989) 28 Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 129-145.
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these dilemmas, it has to be asked whether the Brundtland 
Report was justified in placing so much faith in the 
willingness of government administrations to implement 
sustainable development policies.
It is difficult to fault the detailed recommendations on 
institutional and legal strengthening made in the Brundtland 
Report on the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter 
because, in many respects, the 1962 legislation did not and 
could not be expected to conform to the Brundtland ideals 
formulated twenty-five years later. Two points can be made, 
however. The first is a warning on the dangers inherent in 
high level political involvement in resource management.1 Far 
from leading to integrated, cross-sectoral and rational 
decision-making procedures of the type advocated by the WCED, 
evidence from the Blay Report suggests that, without proper 
safeguards against abuse of power, short term, arbitrary 
decisions may result from the concentration of decision-making 
power in political institutions at this level. Secondly, the 
fact that some desirable features of environmental legislation 
accountability, public participation, and procedures 
guaranteeing substantial rights of compensation2 - were 
neglected in the 1962 legislation is not, it is submitted, an 
unfortunate mishap. Rather, it is evidence that the government 
of the day preferred to adopt a legal regime which maximised 
the opportunities for centralised, political control of timber
‘.This recommendation is made in the Brundtland Report op
cit p.314 .
2 Recommended in the Brundtland Report ibid p.330.
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exploitation. It is possible that the 1962 legislators did not 
model their laws along more open, participatory lines because 
provisions of this type could weaken the Government's powers. 
It is submitted that economic constraints, underlying fears of 
political disintegration and the professional elitism of 
administrators are factors which may continue to make 
centralised governmental control of forest exploitation 
attractive to the Government today.1 In these circumstances, 
despite the rhetoric of the Brundtland Report and the 
decentralisation ethos of the PNDC2, the Government is likely 
to remain reluctant to implement more open and participatory 
laws for fear that they will constrain government powers over 
a key economic resource. Although this in no way diminishes 
the desirability of the Brundtland recommendations on these 
matters, it does suggest that there are serious obstacles 
which may preclude the adoption of the reforms recommended in 
that Report. This confirms the argument put forward in chapter 
one that the recommendations of the Brundtland Report may not 
be easily implemented in the political and economic 
circumstances of today.3
f
i
1 See, for example, the evidence produced in chapter 
seven to show that Operation Halt has been engineered from the 
top echelons of Government infra Chp.7.
2 J. Haynes, The PNDC and Political Decentralisation in 
Ghana,. 1981-1991, (1991) 29(3) Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics 283-307.
! Supra p .20.
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CHAPTER SIX: MANAGEMENT INSTITUTI0N5.
"Governments' general response to the speed and 
scale of global changes has been a reluctance to 
recognize sufficiently the need to change 
themselves. The challenges are both interdependent 
and integrated, requiring comprehensive approaches 
and popular participation. Yet most of the 
institutions facing those challenges tend to be 
independent, fragmented, working to relatively 
narrow mandates with closed decision processes."1
The Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development envisaged a central role for national and 
international management institutions in implementing 
sustainable development policies.2 It stressed that the 
capacities of national resource management agencies must be 
strengthened if the need for sustainable development was to be 
met. This was a particularly urgent requirement in developing 
countries.3 At the same time, opportunities for integrated, 
cross-sectoral, environmental decision-making at the highest 
political levels should be enhanced.4 The rights of citizens 
to information and participation in decision-making procedures 
should not be sacrificed in implementing these reforms. On the 
contrary, these rights should figure prominently in 
environmental legislation.5 Taken together, the 
recommendations of the WCED Commissioners add up to an
1 WCED op cit p.9.
2 ibid p.46.
3 ibid p.20.
1 ibid p .313.
ibid p.330.
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ambitious, three pronged programme for institutional reform 
embodying the basic principles of institutional strengthening, 
integrated decision-making and participatory procedures which 
will improve institutional accountability and enhance 
decision-making generally.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the
institutional framework of forest management in Ghana in the
light of the Brundtland recommendations. The analysis is a two 
way one which discusses, firstly, the extent to which the 
existing institutional framework is consistent with the 
Brundtland recommendations for management structures. 
Particular attention is paid to the adequacy of the legal 
powers vested in each institution and to the overall co­
ordination and integration of statutory decision-making 
powers. The recommendations of the Forest Resource Management 
Project (FRMP), which has been concerned to improve the
efficiency of sector institutions, are taken into account and 
considered. Secondly, where the Brundtland principles are not 
being followed, the analysis attempts to identify some of the 
underlying reasons which may account for their absence and 
which may deleteriously affect the chances of Brundtland style 
reforms being adopted. General comments on the feasibility and 
desirability of the Brundtland proposals for institutional 
reform flow from this analysis. Comments on the more 
fundamental question of whether existing institutions can be 
relied upon to implement sustainable development policies are 
reserved for later chapters where the practical achievements 
of the relevant institutions are discussed in greater detail.
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(i) The Forestry Commission.
The Forestry Commission first came into existence in 
1980.1 Initially, the Commission exercised comprehensive 
powers in the forestry and wildlife sectors.2 The Forestry 
Department, the Game and Wildlife Department, the Ghana Timber 
Marketing Board and the Forest Products Research Institute 
were all placed under the control and supervision of the 
Commission.3
The original Forestry Commission appeared to satisfy the 
Brundtland recommendations for institution building in a 
number of respects. It was given wide powers consonant with 
the Brundtland Report's plea for strengthened sectoral 
institutions,4 and among its functions it was instructed to 
correlate forestry policy with land-use policy generally." The 
law did not, however, make any provision for public 
participation in policy formulation. Administrative 
accountability of any type did not figure prominently in the 
law because the fundamental policy underlying the creation of 
the Commission was a recognition of the need for autonomous 
institutions which would not be vulnerable to political 
maladministration of the type evidenced in the Blay Report.6
1 Ghana Forestry Commission Act no.405 of 1980.
2 ibid s.7.
3 ibid s.27(1).
1 WCED op cit p.20.
Act 405/1980 s . 7 ( f ) .
‘ The Issue and Review of Timber Concessions After 1962
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However, this large measure of autonomy isolated forestry 
policy from the key political and economic institutions, 
contrary to the recommendations of the Brundtland Report.
The 1980 Act was repealed in 19821 and the Commission now 
functions according to the provisions of PNDCL 42. That 
enactment returned the over all control and supervision of the 
Departments of Forestry and Game and Wildlife to the Ministry 
of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR), it reconstituted the 
Ghana Timber Marketing Board (GTMB) as an independent 
statutory board and left only the Forest Products Research 
Institute (FPRI) as a sub-division of the Commission.2 The 
GTMB has since been abolished.3
The principal role of the Commission now is to formulate 
policy on all matters relating to forestry, to advise the 
relevant institutions and to monitor their activities.4 Other 
duties of the Commission include - a duty to ensure that 
needless waste and destruction of forest resources is avoided; 
the collection of data on forests, forest exploitation and 
regeneration; liaison with national and international forestry 
organisations; and advising on game and wildlife resources.5
supra Chp.5.
1 PNDCL 42/1982 s.65.
2 ibid s.65(3)-(5).
3 Timber Export Development Board Law PNDCL 123/1985 
s.23. It has been replaced by the Timber Export Development 
Board (TEDB) and the Forest Products Inspection Bureau infra 
p.167.
4 PNDC (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and
Consequential Provisions) Law PNDCL 42/1982, s.34(1).
5 ibid
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The Commission is empowered to advise the Lands Commission on 
grants of public land which affect forest resources.1 It is 
responsible for reporting to and advising the Council and the 
latter may assign other functions to the Commission as 
appropriate.2
The rationale for the fundamental changes made in 1982 
appears to lie in the anxiety of the PNDC to exercise greater 
control over the machinery of government in order to ensure 
greater accountability in all spheres of government." The 
powers of the relatively autonomous Commissions provided for 
in the 1979 Constitution were therefore reduced in favour of 
concentrating power in the Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources.
In practice, the Forestry Commission can boast only a 
limited record of achievements. Even after the radical reforms 
of 1982, there seems to have been a further space of time 
before the Forestry Commission found a constructive role to 
play. Today, its functions can be assessed under two heads -
(a) policy and advisory functions and (b) monitoring 
functions. In addition, the problem of duplication merits 
consideration.
(a) Policy and Advisory Functions: Prior to 1988, the
Commission advised the Lands Commission on all applications 
for timber grants, a useful function in view of the lack of 
specialized forestry personnel in the Lands Commission.
1 ibid s.34(1)(h).
' ibid s.34(l)(e,j). 
ibid S.1(c).
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However, the isolation of the Commission from other sector 
institutions and its own lack of resources meant that the 
Commission was not always able to give reliable information 
particularly about the suitability of concession applicants. 
Pursuant to the work of the National Investigations Committee 
(NIC) the power to grant new concessions was suspended in 1989 
and the authority to issue temporary permits was vested in the 
Ministry, which acts independently of the Commission's advice 
on this matter.1
In 1990, the Commission was engaged on the final drafting 
of the new Forest Policy. The substance of the Policy is 
discussed in chapter ten. The argument in this chapter is that 
the formal structure of the Commission makes it poorly 
equipped for this important task. The recommendations in the 
Brundtland Report concerning the need for integrated policy­
making and participatory procedures constitute the basis for 
this view. The advice of the Commission is of a distinctly 
technical type.2 Contrary to the recommendations of the 
Brundtland Report, there is no provision for public 
participation in policy formulation. There is not even much 
opportunity for involvement by regional and district forestry 
institutions or commercial timber interests in part because of 
the very limited presence of the Commission outside Accra.3
1 See further, The Grant, Review and Determination of 
Timber Concessions infra Chp.8.
2 The Commissioners are recruited from among highly 
trained forestry experts.
J In 1990, the Commission was due to establish its first 
regional office in Kumasi.
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The Forestry Commission represents a top-down approach to
policy formulation emphasizing the technical and scientific
approach to environmental management. The weakness inherent in
this approach lies in the cross-sectoral and frequently
political character of the environmental challenge:
"Many LDC governments prefer to regard the 
environmental issue as a physical one requiring soil 
conservation, legislation and lots of technical 
assistance. Frequently the problem is much deeper, 
and concerns access to resources, the uneven 
distribution of wealth and power, and 
hopelessness."1
The structure and mandate of the Commission does not, it
is submitted, satisfy the Brundtland proposal that . . .
"The ecological dimensions of policy be considered 
at the same time as the economic, trade, energy, 
agricultural, industrial and other dimensions - on 
the same agendas and in the same national and 
international institutions."2
The Commission is one more example of the centralising 
and elitist tendencies of public administration evident in 
many developing countries.3
(b) Monitoring Functions: The monitoring activities of the 
Commission have not yet been substantial. In 1990, the 
principal evidence that its monitoring functions were being 
implemented at all lay in its regular review of the accounts
1 R. Baker, Institutional Innovation, Development and 
Environmental Management: An 'Administrative Trap' Revisited, 
(1989) 9 Public Administration and Development 29-47 and 159- 
167, p.161.
2 WCED op cit p.313.
3 J. Wunsch, D. Oluwu, The Failure of the Centralized 
African State 1990, Westview Press, Boulder, pp.334, pp.18,31; 
Seidman, The State, Law and Development, op cit p.197.
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of the Forestry Department.1
The Forestry Commission continues to operate as a 
relatively independent, technical institution. Complete 
autonomy is considered essential for the performance of its 
monitoring functions but the history of the Commission 
suggests that the corollary of autonomy is isolation from or 
indifferent reception by older and more powerful, pre-existing 
institutions. These sort of problems frustrated the work of 
the executive style Commission first established in 1980. With 
the removal of executive powers, the Commission must now 
depend on the voluntary co-operation of the other sector 
agencies or the influence which it derives from its close 
association with the Council (PNDC) and, more recently, from 
the political support of the MLNR.
(c) Duplication of Functions: It seems likely that the 
functions of the Commission will be substantially reduced once 
the Forest Resource Management Project (FRMP) comes fully into 
effect. One of the recommendations of the FRMP is the 
establishment of a Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Unit (PPMEU) within the Ministry which will have overall 
responsibility for formulating and implementing policy.2 There 
is a strong possibility that duplication of functions between 
the PPMEU and the Commission will occur once the PPMEU is 
fully in place.
1 The author would like to thank Professor Twufour and 
his colleagues for the provision of information on the work of 
the Forestry Commission during interviews in August 1990.
2 IBRD Staff Appraisal Report, Ghana Forest Resource 
Management Project 1988, Report no.7295-GH, pp.119, p.31.
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The Commission holds statutory responsibility for the 
FPRI1 which conducts research into forest management, 
production and utilization but the FRMP Report has now 
recommended that the FPRI should become a semi-autonomous 
institution under the auspices of the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR).2 This will further reduce the 
responsibilities of the Commission. The Report further 
recommended the strengthening of research and training 
facilities in the FPRI and IRNR.3 This may create competition 
in the area of high level technical advice. In addition, the 
Forestry Department has its own Planning Branch in Kumasi (now 
the Working Plans Branch).
If duplication of functions or /and the further 
marginalisation of the Commission is to be prevented, there 
remain three possible options for the development of the 
Commission -
(a) The Commission could be disbanded or assimilated into 
the PPMEU of the Ministry. Close co-operation between the 
Commission and the Ministry has characterised recent 
developments. There is certainly a need for the Ministry to 
use the expertise of the Commission.
(b) The monitoring function of the Commission could be 
strengthened with the Commission continuing to report directly 
to the Council. This would help to encourage accountability 
throughout the forestry sector. The insufficiency of the
1 PNDCL 42/1982 s.34(l)(3).
2 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit, p.36.
; ibid p .35.
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resources and powers assigned to monitoring agencies has been 
identified as an important factor contributing to the poor 
record of plan implementation in developing countries.1 In 
order to strengthen its monitoring functions, the Commission's 
powers of investigation would therefore have to be enlarged. 
At the moment, the success of any monitoring activities 
depends on voluntary co-operation which has not always been 
forthcoming. In the future, the Commission could operate more 
on the lines of the NIC Sub-Committee on Timber,2 but on a 
permanent basis. However, the view is tenable that part of the 
success of the NIC relates to the fact that it is not a 
permanent institution itself subject to corruption or inertia. 
The need for vigilance may not be best tackled through 
permanently institutionalising the system of review.
(c) The Commission could be assigned new powers to co­
ordinate all other forest sector institutions. Improved co­
ordination could increase the opportunities for integrated 
decision-making as recommended by the WCED Commissioners, if 
only within the forest sector as a whole. A mechanism for 
achieving co-ordination could lie in the establishment of a 
committee or an executive board representing all forestry and 
timber interests, similar perhaps to the Board of 
Commissioners established under the 1980 Forestry Commission
1 0. Saasa, Public Policy-Making in Developing Countries: 
The Utility of Contemporary Decision-Making Models, (1985) 
5(4) Public Administration and Development 309-321, p.318.
2 This is a Committee set up under the National 
Investigations Law, PNDCL 2/1982, to investigate malpractice 
in the timber industry. See further, The NIC Sub-Committee on 
Timber infra Chp.8.
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Act. To judge that system a failure after only two years was 
perhaps premature but the lesson which should have been learnt 
is that the heads of all relevant agencies should have equal 
status on an executive board for the sector. Perhaps the power 
to over-ride administrative officers at this level should be 
reserved for the highest political officers.
The statutory functions and powers of the Commission will 
need to be reviewed if the Commission is to move effectively 
in any of these directions. In the absence of reform or 
assimilation into the Ministry, duplication of functions or 
marginalisation of the Commission seem to be the most likely 
consequences of the FRMP reforms. The vision of strengthened 
institutions and integrated decision-making contained in the 
Brundtland Report would not be achieved in either case.
(ii) The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR).
The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) is the 
executive organ of Government in all matters relating to 
forestry. It is politically responsible to the Council for the 
implementation of national forestry policy. It exercises 
overall political, administrative and financial control and 
supervision of the Forestry Department and the Game and 
Wildlife Department.2 In the exercise of its functions it 
receives the advice and guidance of the Forestry Commission 
but it is not obliged to follow that advice.3
1 Act 405/1980 s.2.
2 PNDCL 42/1982 s.34(4).
ibid s.34(1)(i).
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The Secretary of the MLNR sits on the national Committee 
of Secretaries which considers all aspects of national policy. 
He is responsible for the grant, revocation and renewal of 
petroleum and minerals licences.1
The Secretary is vested with a wide range of statutory 
powers in the forestry sector. He may make any regulations for 
the full implementation of the provisions and purposes of the 
Forests Ordinance. He may prescribe fees and fines for any 
matter covered by the Ordinance and he may define the powers 
and duties of forest officers. Regulations may also provide 
for the protection, management and utilisation of forest 
reserves including the conditions under which admitted rights 
may be exercised.2
The Secretary may terminate any timber concession if 
the holder of the concession commits an offence against 
section 30(4) of the Concessions Ordinance.3 Only the written 
consent of the Secretary will render valid an assignment, sub­
demise, mortgage or surrender of any rights granted by a 
concession.4
The Secretary is responsible for the Forest Improvement 
Fund into which all revenues from forest reserves are paid. He 
may make regulations prescribing the manner in which revenue
i
\
1 ibid s.40.
2 Forests Ordinance Cap 157 (1954 Revised Edition) 
s.35(1).
3 Act 124/1962 s.16(10).
' ibid s.13(1).
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is collected and distributed from the Fund.1
Under the Trees and Timber Decree, the Secretary has 
power to constitute and abolish Protected Areas,' to grant 
licences for farming and other activities in Protected Areas' 
and to make regulations concerning the duties of and fees to 
be paid by concession holders, permitting farming and 
appointing forest guards in Protected Areas.4
Upon the application of an aggrieved person, the 
Secretary has the final power to review a refusal by the Chief 
Conservator of Forests (CCF) to register a property mark.5
The Secretary is empowered to make regulations 
prescribing and enforcing minimum girth limits; controlling 
the marking, transport and export of timber; prescribing 
uniform methods for calculating the volume of any tree or 
timber; controlling or prohibiting the purchase, sale, export 
or possession of timber illegally cut, felled or moved, for 
the imposition of fees and the protection of trees and timber, 
and generally for better effectuating the provisions and 
principles of the Trees and Timber Decree.6
Under the Forest Protection Decree, the Secretary has the 
power to dismiss any forest officer if he is satisfied that 
the officer in any way aided or abetted the commission of a
1 Forest Improvement Fund Act, no.12/1960, ss.3(l),10.
2 NRCD 273/1974 s.12.
3 ibid ss.13,14.
4 ibid s.15.
5 ibid s.5(2).
! ibid s .17.
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forest offence.1
By virtue of PNDCL 42, the Secretary is entitled to 
receive the recommendations of the Lands Commission on 
national land-use policy;2 to be notified of all grants of 
public land3 and certain grants of stool land/ He determines 
the distribution of funds from the Stool Lands Account5 and he 
makes biannual reports to the Council reporting and advising 
on grants of public land.6
With respect to the Forest Products Inspection Bureau, 
the Secretary authorises the levy of appropriate charges7 by 
the Bureau and he is empowered to make regulations governing 
the measurement, grading, marking and tagging of forest 
products.8
Similarly, the Secretary may issue bye-laws for giving 
effect to the provisions of the Timber Export Development 
Board Law,9 he may authorise the levy of fees by the TEDB10 
and he may also give general policy directions binding on the
1 NRCD 243/1974 s.4(2).
2 PNDCL 42/1982 s.36(4).
3 ibid s.36(7).
4 ibid s.47(1)(2).
5 ibid s.48(2).
6 ibid s.36(10).
7 Forest Products Inspection Bureau Law, PNDCL 117/1985 
s.7(1) .
8 ibid s.9.
9 Timber Export Development Board Law, PNDCL 123/1985
s.22(1) .
10 ibid s. 14( 1) .
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Board of Directors.1 The Secretary may transfer or second to 
the Bureau or the TEDB such officers as he deems fit.2
The Secretary was made responsible for the full 
implementation of the Government's decision to acquire an 
equity participation in certain timber firms under the Timber 
Operations (Government Participation) Decree.3
On the face of it, the MLNR appears to be the dominant 
institution in the forestry sector holding considerable 
statutory powers. This appears to correspond with the 
Brundtland model of strong sector institutions capable of co­
ordinating and integrating land-use decisions. Because the 
Secretary participates in the formulation of national economic 
policy, forestry interests should be represented at the 
highest political levels as recommended by the Brundtland 
Report. However, in practice, the exercise of executive 
functions by the Ministry is constrained by a number of 
factors -
(a) The tendency of Government to set up autonomous or 
semi-autonomous institutions to deal with specific aspects of 
forest sector management. Some of these institutions report 
directly to the Council and others are only bound to consult 
the Ministry on specific issues. While the Ministry remains 
accountable to the Council generally for the well being of the 
sector, the autonomy of sector institutions undermines its 
authority in practice and makes the task of co-ordination more
1 ibid s .21.
PNDCL 117/1985 s . 5 ( 4 ) and PNDCL 123/1985 s . 11 ( 3) .
NRCD 139/1972 s.7.
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difficult.
The principal reason for the creation of separate 
institutions has been the desire to combat political 
corruption.1 Transferring the power to make timber grants from 
the Ministry to the Lands Commission is the most obvious 
example of this.2 The tendency towards institutional 
fragmentation was decried in the Brundtland Report3 but that 
Report failed to provide alternative policy advice on how to 
combat corruption, a pervasive and inescapable problem in the 
bureaucracies of most developing countries.
(b) The inadequate number of forestry personnel in the 
MLNR. Until recently the Ministry has not had the manpower or 
the resources to effectively supervise forest sector 
activities.4
The principal measure advocated in the FRMP Report to 
improve the supervision of forestry affairs by the MLNR was 
the establishment of the Policy, Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Unit (PPMEU) within the Ministry.5 When 
established, the PPMEU will formulate forest and land-use
1 Evidence of political corruption is considered at 
supra p.130. On alternative recommendations for safeguarding 
against corruption in concession allocation procedures, see, 
The Grant, Review and Determination of Timber Concessions 
infra Chp.8.
2 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1969, Art.163(5).
3 WCED op cit p.8.
4 The author would like to thank Dr. Chatchu of the MLNR 
for the provision of information about the MLNR in interview 
on 5/10/1990.
5 In 1990, the establishment of the PPMEU was said to be 
imminent. Interview with Dr. Chatchu, 5/10/1990, Accra.
153
policies; it will ensure the implementation of concession 
allocation procedures; it will keep under regular review the 
state of the industry and it will co-ordinate research on 
minor forest produce.1 The need to clarify the respective 
roles of the PPMEU and the Forestry Commission has already 
been commented upon.
(c) The Ministry is too large and too centralized to give 
adequate attention to the decentralized activities of forest 
sector institutions. It is based in Accra and has
responsibility for minerals and wildlife affairs in addition 
to forestry affairs. Its duties in respect of the exploitation 
of minerals seem to overshadow forestry matters.2 Although the 
Secretary's leadership provides a link with national economic 
decision-making, as canvassed in the Brundtland Report, here 
again, forestry issues may be overshadowed by the economic 
importance attached to minerals for which the Secretary is 
also responsible. The neglect of forestry issues leads to 
irregular review of statutory instruments and protracted 
delays in their amendment. Fines, fees and technical
specifications quickly become outdated in the absence of 
regular review. This renders the law ineffective. It is also 
a cause of lost revenue where, for example, royalties and 
rents can only be updated with the consent of the Secretary 
acting on the advice of the Council. The FRMP has proposed 
switching to a simpler procedure for administrative review of
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit, p.31.
' Before the FRMP was initiated there were no staff
solely responsible for forestry affairs in the MLNR. Interview
with Dr. Chatchu, 5/10/1990, Accra.
154
royalties and rents allowing them to be regularly revised 
according to fixed criteria.1
(d) In practice it is the Forestry Department which has 
the greatest impact in the forest sector. Only the Department 
has regional and district offices throughout the country. Many 
executive functions and decisions, especially those of a 
technical nature, are exercised and reviewed by the Forestry 
Department acting under explicit or implied delegation from 
the Ministry or according to its own statutory powers. For 
example, the recent decision to lengthen the felling cycle was 
made by the Chief Conservator of Forests (CCF) acting after 
seeking the advice of the Department’s Working Plans Branch 
(formerly the Planning Branch). Changes in the minimum girth 
requirements were also made by the CCF as an exercise of his 
power to control exploitation.2 One anomalous result is that 
although minimum girth requirements have changed the fine for 
breaching them remains at the 1958 level.3
The Brundtland Report recommended institutional 
strengthening and integrated decision-making. Attempts to 
strengthen the Ministry should address not only its staffing 
and resource problems but also the absence or inadequacy of 
real executive powers to monitor and co-ordinate all 
institutions working in the forest sector. In the long term, 
statutory powers to bring to account forest sector agencies
1 See further, Financial Controls, infra Chp.8.
2 Cap 136 s.30.
3 The Trees and Timber (Control of Cutting) Regulations 
LN 368/1958 Para.4.
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may be more important than the Secretary's powers to make 
regulations of a purely technical nature. Responsibility for 
the latter may be more suitably left with the Department 
subject only to the need for a regular review of forest fines 
by the Ministry. When the proposals of the FRMP are fully 
implemented, the division of powers between the Ministry and 
the Commission may need to be more clearly spelt out.
(iii) The Forestry Department.
The Forestry Department is charged with the practical 
management, protection and conservation of forest resources, 
particularly in forest reserves.1
The Chief Conservator of Forests (CCF) advises Government 
on whether it is necessary to constitute any land a forest 
reserve.2 A senior forest officer advises the Reserve 
Settlement Commissioner (RSC) on the need to reject any rights 
claimed in a proposed forest reserve.3
Timber concessions are held subject to any conditions or 
restrictions imposed by the CCF, or a competent representative 
of the CCF, to ensure the requisite protection, conservation 
and management of the forest resources situated in the 
concession area.4 Special permission to fell trees below the 
minimum girth can only be given by a forest officer of a rank
1 Cap 157 s.18.
2 ibid s.4.
3 ibid s.11.
4 Concessions Ordinance Cap 136, s. 30 and Order no.55 of
1939 .
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equivalent to that of an Assistant Conservator.1
Under the Forest Improvement Fund Act, the CCF is
responsible for the collection of all rents and revenues in 
respect of forest produce within forest reserves.2 With the 
prior approval of the Secretary of the MLNR, the CCF is
empowered to withdraw funds from the Forests Improvement Fund 
in connection with exploitation and silvicultural work.3
The CCF is responsible for designating locality marks for 
the areas of Ghana4 and for approving and registering property 
marks for all persons engaged in the timber industry.5 He has 
a discretionary power to refuse to register or to cancel 
property marks.6 Any forest officer may arrest a person 
suspected of committing an offence relating to property marks 
if that person fails to co-operate.7
In protected areas8 the CCF issues licences for farming
and appoints forest guards to patrol them.9 Any forest officer
is empowered to arrest a person reasonably suspected of 
committing a forest offence in a forest reserve or a protected
1 LN 368/1958 Para.2.
2 Forest Improvement Fund Act no.12/1960, s.4.
3 Forests Improvement Fund (Amendment) Act 144/1962 s.2.
4 Trees and Timber Decree, NRCD 273/1974 s.l.
5 ibid s.2.
6 ibid s.5.
ibid s.16(1).
8 See further, Protected Areas, infra Chp.7.
The Timber Lands (Protected Areas) Regulations, LN
311/1959, Paras. 4,5,7.
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area if that person gives false information or is likely to 
abscond.1 District forest officers issue licences for the 
exercise of rights in forest reserves.'
In 1990, under the existing Forest Policy, the aims of 
the Department included sustained yield management of forest 
reserves, facilitating the most profitable utilisation of 
forest resources outside reserves, liaison with organisations 
interested in conservation, land-use planning and tree 
planting.3
The Forestry Department is essentially a decentralised 
department with many powers of the CCF being exercised by 
regional and district forestry officers. Its presence in the 
districts coupled with the broad powers of the CCF to control 
exploitation under any concession inside and outside reserves 
constitute the basis of practical forest management in Ghana. 
The realisation of the Brundtland Report's recommendations on 
strengthened sector institutions therefore offers the best 
opportunity for practical results at the field level if 
applied to the Department.
However, in recent years the Department has suffered from 
under staffing and inadequate logistical support. During the 
economic decline of the 1970s the budget of the Department 
fell in real terms and many Ghanaian foresters were attracted 
out of the country. In 1988 the Department had 57 vacancies in
1 NRCD 243/1974 s.5(1), NRCD 273/1974 s.16(1).
7 Forest Protection (Amendment) Law PNDCL 142/1986 s.l.
Forest Policy, 1948, Cl.2,4,5,8. See, Forestry 
Department Annual Report 1949, Government Printer, Accra, p.l.
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the professional grades, 51 in the semi professional grades 
and 257 in the technical grades.1 Low salaries and restricted 
opportunities for training in Ghana have been blamed. It was 
not until the establishment of the Institute of Renewable
Natural Resources (IRNR) in 1982 that regular graduate level 
forestry training was available in Ghana.
In line with the Brundtland recommendations in favour of
institutional strengthening, the FRMP is now improving 
manpower, training and logistical support for the Department.2 
In addition, the Forest Inventory Project (FIP) is 
contributing technical assistance to the Department. However, 
the designs of both these projects seem to imply a 
concentration of inputs at the regional not district level.3 
The danger is that not enough will be done to seriously
address the problems faced by district offices which 
necessarily are at the forefront of routine management and 
protection activities. On the contrary, regional strengthening 
may further undermine district level morale and thus reduce 
the long term effectiveness of these projects. The need for 
greater decentralisation in development administration has 
been widely recognised4 and has previously been endorsed by
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.98.
2 ibid p.32.
3 The FIP has concentrated its resource input at the
level of the Working Plans Branch of the Department in Kumasi. 
The FRMP Report states that institutional strengthening will 
be directed at the regional level ibid p.27.
4 D. Conyers, Decentralization: The latest Fashion in
Development Administration? (1983) 3 Public Administration and 
Development 97-109; Wunsch op cit pp.293-313; Fashole-Luke, 
Trends in Development Administration (1986) 6(1) Public
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the World Bank itself.1
Institutional strengthening is always dependent on a 
sound financial basis in the long term. The FRMP envisages a 
self financing Department on the basis of greater revenue 
accruing from increased forest fees.2 The Forest Improvement 
Fund,3 into which forest fees accruing from forest reserves 
are paid, provides an independent income to finance the
activities of the Department but the Fund will only be 
adequate if rents and royalties are regularly updated and 
efficiently collected.4 Until 1991, forest fees outside 
reserves were collected by the Lands Department and paid into 
the Stool Lands Account5 but this system caused loss of
revenue to the Government because of irregular collections. 
The Secretary of the MLNR has now directed the Department to 
collect all royalties due from the exploitation of timber
outside reserves.6 This revenue should also be deposited in 
the Fund in order to improve the financial status of the 
Department.7
The FRMP Report recommended that a Planning and
Administration and Development 73-85, p.78.
1 IBRD, World Development Report, 1983, op cit p.120.
2 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.69.
3 Act no.12/1960 s.4.
4 See further, Financial Controls infra Chp.8.
5 PNDCL 42/1982 s.48.
b Circular from the PNDC Secretary of the MLNR, 4/4/1991, 
Ref no.LNR.12/4 Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
See further, Financial Controls infra Chp.8.
Monitoring Unit (PMU) be established under the CCF1 and that 
responsibility for the grant of all timber rights should be 
transferred to a Concessions Unit to be established within the 
Department, subject only to the monitoring of the PPMEU of the 
Ministry.2 The Department has never had responsibility for the 
grant of timber rights so this reform implies a need for 
suitably trained staff. The danger is that staff will be 
diverted from the ordinary work of the Department thereby 
intensifying staff shortages.3
Administrative malpractice is a risk in any system of 
concession allocations. In order to minimise the opportunities 
for malpractice, fixed criteria should be employed, situations 
calling for discretionary judgements should so far as possible 
be eliminated and administrative procedures should be 
formalised and non-secretive.4 Administrators should be 
required to give written reasons for their decisions to all 
applicants. A provision for appeal to the Secretary of the 
MLNR, or to a court if there is a suspicion of malpractice, 
should be written into the law so that concession applicants
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.32.
2 ibid p.68.
3 The poor record of the institutions previously 
responsible for concession allocations makes the recruitment 
of these experienced personnel undesirable. On the other hand, 
the MLNR now has a considerable amount of relevant information 
gathered by the NIC Sub-Committee on Timber which should be 
made available to the Concessions Unit of the Department. On 
concession allocation procedures, see infra p.276. On the work 
of the NIC Sub-Committee on Timber, see infra p.259.
4 These recommendations are in line with suggestions made 
in IBRD ibid p.117; Seidman op cit p.245; Myrdal op cit p.247. 
See further, The Grant, Review and Determination of Timber 
Concessions infra Chp.8.
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are in a better position to ensure for themselves that 
fairness and accountability prevail. The Secretary should 
regularly review the decisions which have been made but he 
should not be allowed to arbitrarily intervene in concession 
allocations. Although the opportunity for administrative abuse 
can never be wholly eliminated, these measures might help to 
ensure accountability throughout the system both 'upwards' to 
the highest political bodies and 'downwards' to concession 
applicants.1
Recommendations were made in the FRMP Report for the 
establishment of a Rural Forestry Division within the 
Department to co-ordinate rural forestry activities at the 
national level.2 Additional training for district forest 
officers and agricultural extension staff of the Ministry of 
Agriculture was also envisaged. The objective is to achieve a 
unified extension service on rural forestry initiatives at the 
district level.3
The FRMP Report suggested that the Department should be 
represented in an advisory role in other forestry institutions 
in order to facilitate policy - research - management 
linkages.4 This recommendation is commendable in view of the
1 This would be in line with the recommendations made by 
the World Bank on improving the responsiveness of bureaucracy, 
IBRD op cit p.117.
2 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.90.
3 At the time of research, these proposals were still at 
a very early stage of development. For a discussion of rural 
forestry initiatives ongoing in 1990 the reader is referred to 
chapter nine.
4 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.36.
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decentralised and practical experience of the Department, 
provided such measures are not allowed to waste valuable staff 
time. It is consistent with the recommendations on integrated 
decision-making made in the Brundtland Report.
(iv) The Lands Commission.
The Lands Commission is responsible for grants of public 
land made on behalf of the Council, including grants of all 
leases and licences relating to timber as well as felling 
licences1 but not grants of stool land. The Lands Department 
is the implementing Secretariat for the Lands Commission.2 The 
Commission is also responsible for formulating and monitoring 
national land-use policies.3
Grants of stool land to persons not entitled to the free 
use of that land under customary law are valid in accordance 
with statute only when the concurrence of the Lands Commission 
has been given.4
The Administrator of Stool Lands is a post within the 
Lands Commission.5 He holds statutory responsibility for the 
collection of all rents, royalties and revenues due in respect 
of stool land, including all revenues accruing from 
concessions outside forest reserves. Actual collections are
1 PNDCL 42/1982 s.36(3).
2 ibid s.36(1).
3 ibid s.36(4)(5).
4 ibid s.47(1).
ibid s.48(1).
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now made by the Department on his behalf.1 He is also 
responsible for the management and disbursement of all these 
funds which must be paid into the Stool Lands Account. He has 
power to withhold payments due to any stool if he believes 
that the payments will be "frivolously dissipated".2
The involvement of the Lands Commission in timber 
concessions dates back to the 1969 Constitution. The rationale 
behind the law is that timber concessions should be free from 
political interference. However, without proper safeguards of 
the type outlined above,3 administrative malpractice is just 
as likely as the abuse of political office. In practice the 
result of this institutional division between the management 
and exploitation of forest resources has been protracted 
delays in concession procedures because the co-ordination of 
so many institutions is required. The Lands Commission itself 
has no forestry experts but is dependent on the advice of the 
Forestry Commission and the special sub-committee which sits 
to decide on the most important applications.4
The role of the Lands Commission in making grants for the 
exploitation of timber was suspended in 1989 while the NIC 
Sub-Committee on Timber continued its investigations. The FRMP 
Report recommended that its powers should be transferred to
1 Circular from the PNDC Secretary of the MLNR, 4/4/1991, 
Ref no.LNR.12/4 Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
2 ibid s.48(3).
1 Supra p.160.
4 The Grant, Review and Determination of Timber 
Concessions infra Chp.8.
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the Forestry Department.1 If this recommendation is 
implemented, then the statutory responsibility of the 
Administrator of Stool Lands for the collection and 
disbursement of forest revenues2 should be transferred to the 
Department as well. Subsequently, all forest fees accruing 
from land inside and outside forest reserves should be dealt 
with in the same way, both being paid into the Forest 
Improvement Fund primarily to meet the expenses of the 
Department.
Although the Brundtland Report recommended that decisions 
in natural resource management should not be made in isolation 
from broader environmental considerations, the Lands 
Commission, in practice, did little to incorporate land-use 
policy or industrial and economic policy into concessions 
policy. In the absence of a national land-use policy and with 
no experts on the timber industry employed by the Lands 
Commission, the involvement of the Lands Commission was 
basically administrative. Obviously, co-ordination with land- 
use planning is desirable in the case of timber grants outside 
forest reserves but in the absence of a national land-use 
policy or plan this has not in practice been achieved.
This evidence suggests that before the recommendations of 
the Brundtland Report on integrated, system-wide decision­
making are adopted wholeheartedly in any particular situation, 
a careful analysis of the capacities of all the relevant 
institutions should be made. In many circumstances, the
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.68.
2 PNDCL 42/1982 s.48.
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manpower and resources of bureaucracies in developing 
countries may not be readily able to adapt to the Brundtland 
recommendations. A more immediate goal may lie in the 
rationalisation and simplification of administrative 
procedures so that malpractice, inertia and inefficiency are 
minimised. In these circumstances, the reform and 
modernisation of sector institutions should, it is submitted, 
receive priority. Compartmentalism at this level of resource 
management is acceptable if efficiency is thereby enhanced.
(v) The District Assemblies.
District Assemblies are the principal political fora in 
the 110 districts of Ghana, composed of elected and appointed 
representatives of the people.1 The Assemblies are charged 
with development planning, programming and mobilization of the 
people in their districts.2 They are responsible for the 
development, improvement and management of the environment in 
their districts.3
District Assemblies should have a useful role to play at 
the local level,4 particularly in promoting rural forestry and 
re-afforestation. Rehabilitation and management of degraded 
communal lands is another possible assignment where these 
lands exist. Given the time constraints of forestry officers
1 Local Government Law PNDCL 207/1988.
2 ibid s.6(3).
3 ibid s.6(3)(e).
4 The contribution of District Assemblies to local 
environmental campaigns is discussed in more depth in chapters 
seven and nine.
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and their professionalism and remoteness from local people, 
the District Assemblies could take a leading role here, 
employing the technical and managerial advice of the Forestry 
Department. The FRMP is attempting to retrain forestry staff 
for a massive expansion into rural forestry, in liaison with 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and NGOs,1 but the Forestry 
Department is not yet represented in all 110 political 
districts and nor is there financial provision in the FRMP for 
establishing forestry offices in every district although this 
is a long term national goal.2
District Assemblies and revolutionary organs such as the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) have 
played an important role in the re-afforestation of forest 
reserves which have been destroyed by illegal farming.3 
District Assemblies may also be instrumental in the settlement 
of local disputes concerning compensation for damage to crops 
arising out of timber operations and certainly in bringing to 
account the local institutions for the speedy discharge of 
this function.
The District Assemblies seem to offer an ideal 
opportunity for more public participation in environmental 
activities in line with the recommendations of the Brundtland 
Report.4 However, there is a danger that their role will be
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit, p.84.
2 PNDCL 207/1988 First Schedule.
3 See further, Forest Protection in the Western Region, 
infra Chp.7.
4 WCED op cit p.330.
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limited to mobilising local people for tree planting 
activities or to making bye-laws to supplement existing forest 
offences.1 In order to really satisfy the Brundtland model of 
participation, district assemblies should be encouraged to act 
as two way media, representing the views of local people to 
national institutions and not simply implementing nationally 
determined policy. The evidence presented in chapters seven 
and nine suggests that there is still a long way to go towards 
achieving this style of participation.
(vi) The Forest Products Inspection Bureau (FPIB) and the 
Timber Export Development Board (TEDB).
The FPIB is responsible for the grading, stamping, 
tagging and marking of logs and timber products.2 It may make 
recommendations to the Secretary as to the appropriate rules 
and procedures to be followed on these matters.3 It grades and 
values all timber products which are to be exported so as to 
prevent fraud.4 All contracts for the export of logs and 
timber products are examined and registered by the FPIB.5 The 
FPIB also registers all enterprises engaged in the timber and
1 Newspaper reports show that some district assemblies 
have been active in making bye-laws attempting to control 
local forest exploitation. See, for example, "Tree Felling 
Banned in Twifu District" People's Daily Graphic 16/11/1989, 
p. 3; "Assembly Will Not Lift Ban" People's Daily Graphic 
23/11/1989, p.3.
2 Forest Products Inspection Bureau Law PNDCL 117/1985, 
s.2(c,e).
3 ibid s.2(a,d).
1 ibid s.2(g).
ibid s .2(h).
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wood processing industries.1
The FPIB is charged with the training and licensing of 
timber graders.2 It is empowered to do all things reasonably 
incidental to its specified functions, including the levying 
of fees subject to the prior approval of the Secretary.3 
Officers of the FPIB may detain and inspect any vehicle 
believed to be carrying timber or wood products.4
The TEDB is responsible for promoting the export of 
timber products and for compiling and publishing statistical 
information concerning timber exports.5 It is charged with 
developing markets for secondary species and making 
projections of market demand trends.6 It is expected to liaise 
closely with timber marketing associations and the main timber 
producers.7
The Board of Directors of the TEDB is appointed by the 
Council.8The Secretary may give binding policy directions to 
the Board of Directors.9 The TEDB is run on a commercial basis 
and it may levy reasonable charges with the prior approval of
1 ibid s.2(f).
2 ibid s.2(k).
3 ibid s.7(1).
4 ibid s.10.
5 Timber Export Development Board Law PNDCL 123/1985 
s.2(a),(e),(g).
b ibid s.2(b),(d).
7 ibid s.2(f).
8 ibid s.4 .
9 ibid s.21.
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the Secretary.1 It is a body corporate capable of entering 
into contracts and acquiring and disposing of movable and 
immovable property for the purpose of carrying out its 
objectives.2
The FPIB and TEDB replaced the Timber Marketing Board 
(TMB) . The TMB had had a chequered history.3 It was originally 
created in 1960 to put an end to the exploitation and 
inefficiencies prevalent in the marketing of Ghanaian timber. 
From 1961-63, it was made the sole buyer and seller of logs 
for export4 thus eliminating the role of expatriate middlemen 
engaged in the purchase and shipping of logs. The corruption 
and incompetence of the TMB were exposed in 1968.5 There had 
been too much political interference in its activities. The 
Blay Report recommended that an organisation based on business 
lines be established to regulate the industry in place of the 
TMB.6 The TMB was reconstituted in 1970 and given wide powers 
to promote "the most favourable arrangements for the purchase, 
grading, export and selling of timber".7 It was specifically 
authorised inter alia, to stabilise the prices of wood
1 ibid s.3 and s.14(1).
2 ibid s.l.
3 See also, The Issue and Review of Concessions After 
1962, supra Chp.5.
4 Trees and Timber (Control of Export of Logs) 
Regulations LI no.130/1961, Para.l.
5 Blay Report, op cit pp.21-30.
6 ibid p.28.
7 Ghana Timber Marketing Board Instrument, LI 660/1970, 
Para.3(1).
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products, to control the number of timber mills and to require 
all timber exporters to register with the Board.1 The members 
of the Board continued to be political appointees. In 1977, 
another attempt was made to vest the sole right to export 
timber in the Board.2 This action once again coincided with a 
period of rapid decline for the industry.3
The TMB was disbanded in 1985. It had been criticised for 
fixing prices while neglecting other marketing problems. Its 
functions were split between the FPIB and TEDB but the two 
organisations continue to liaise closely.
The FPIB employs approximately 250 field staff at 
strategic road and rail checkpoints throughout Ghana. It also 
has officers stationed inside the major timber enterprises. 
This represents a considerably improved coverage on previous 
years but the task of detecting and stopping those engaged in 
the illegal timber trade4 is a major one for which existing 
coverage is still inadequate.
The FPIB's responsibilities for registering all timber 
enterprises and all export contracts may be beyond its scope. 
The registration of timber enterprises requires a full 
investigation into the assets and capabilities of applicants 
so that only reputable firms will be awarded concessions
1 ibid Para 3(2),(3).
2 Timber Industry and Timber Marketing Board (Amendment) 
Decree, SMCD 128/1977, ss.1,2,7.
3 See further, Wide Fluctuations in Exports and 
Performance infra Chp.8.
4 In accordance with PNDCL 117/1985 s.10. See also, 
Administrative and Quality Controls on Exploitation infra 
Chp.8.
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and/or export contracts. To scrutinize all export contracts 
requires a sound knowledge of the market and also full
knowledge of the supply situation for specific species. These
tasks compete for manpower and resources with the
decentralised and basically technical task of inspection. The 
investigations of the NIC Sub-Committee revealed that 
disreputable persons had been able to register as timber 
enterprises and also that some people had been able to 
register twice under different names.1 In view of the wealth 
of information about the industry gathered by the NIC Sub­
committee which is now in the hands of the MLNR, a more
appropriate agency for the registration of enterprises may be 
the Ministry. All exporters are anyway required to register 
with the Export Promotion Council (GEPC). If, in addition, the 
task of scrutinising export contracts was transferred to the 
TEDB acting in conjunction with the Ministry or the 
Department, then the FPIB would be able to concentrate on the 
important task of inspection.
The TEDB employs approximately 120 staff and it has an 
overseas office in London. It represents Ghana in the 
International Timber Trade Organisation (ITTO) and has 
sponsored Ghana's presence at international timber 
exhibitions. In negotiation with Ghanaian producers it sets 
minimum acceptable selling prices which exporters are expected 
to meet. It sponsors a 12 month guaranteed price to bulk 
purchasers of secondary species and has made proposals for 
promotional discounts on some species. The task of analyzing
1 The NIC Sub-Committee on Timber infra Chp.8.
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and exploiting the international timber market is not an easy 
one however and in practice the measures which the TEDB can 
take to promote, for example, secondary species, are few. The 
timber market is highly competitive and purchasers are 
notoriously particular in their choice of species.1
The principal functions of the TEDB are the collation and 
dissemination of market intelligence.2 There should be 
guaranteed adequate representation of the industry on the 
Board of Directors in view of the TEDB' s powers to impose 
levies on the trade,3 and in order for it to provide a useful 
and relevant service. This would ensure participation in line 
with the Brundtland recommendations.
The fact that the TEDB is bound to follow the policy 
directives of the Secretary and that the members of the Board 
are appointed by the Council disregards the old, yet still 
untried, advice of the Blay Report that a market oriented 
institution should be so far as possible independent of 
political control. This advice seems even more pertinent in 
the market oriented policy climate of today.
The FRMP Report identified the need to improve staff 
training and management in both the FPIB and the TEDB.4 
Technical assistance in the order of 120 staff months has been
1 Interview with Mr. Attah of the TEDB, 14/11/1990, 
Accra.
2 PNDCL 123/1985 s.2.
3 ibid s.7. For example, a number of business people 
could be nominated as directors by industrialists from the 
logging, milling and processing sub-sectors of the industry.
4 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit, p.34.
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allocated to the two institutions under the Project. This 
should contribute to sector institutional strengthening as 
recommended in the Brundtland Report.1
The recommendation here is that, in order to make the 
most of these reforms, the duties and powers of the two 
institutions should be rationalised. The FPIB should be 
responsible only for inspection while the TEDB should 
concentrate on the dissemination of market intelligence and 
the representation of industrial interests to government and 
international fora.
(vii) Training Institutions.
The Institute of Renewable Natural Resources (IRNR) 
attached to the University of Science and Technology provides 
higher education for forestry personnel. The Sunyani Forestry 
School (SFS) provides original training for forest officers.
The FRMP includes financial support for the IRNR and the 
SFS.2 The curriculum of the former is to be made the subject 
of advice from a Board of Directors representing all forestry 
agencies and the timber industry.3 A similar Board or 
Committee could have great potential in advising more 
generally on matters pertaining to the forest sector. This 
would be consistent with the recommendations in the Brundtland 
Report on integrated and co-ordinated decision-making.
1 WCED op cit p.20.
2 ibid p.35.
3 ibid p.100.
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(viii) Accountability or Autonomy? An Assessment of the 
Overall Picture.
The forestry sector is characterised by a number of 
autonomous or semi-autonomous management institutions. 
Clearly, the Government has attempted to foster a separation 
of powers which will prevent abuse of office while at the same 
time providing in the law for a number of checks and balances 
to ensure accountability and some measure of co-ordination. 
However, the dangers of this system are -
(a) the potential for duplication of functions when many 
separate institutions are engaged in one sector. Possible 
sources of duplication lie in the future functions of the 
Commission and the PPMEU and PMU; between the IRNR and FPRI on 
advanced research; between the Commission and the TEDB on data 
collection; and between the Lands Department, the Forestry 
Department and the District Assemblies on controlling 
exploitation outside forest reserves;
(b) problems of enforcing political accountability where 
institutions function autonomously or semi-autonomously and 
problems of asserting a clear leadership role for any one 
institution. The relative autonomy of forestry institutions 
hampers the ability of the Ministry to exercise supervision, 
control and co-ordination in the forestry sector;
(c) the potential for dissipation of functions and 
manpower with unnecessary bureaucratization. Dissipation of 
functions may lead to unproductive isolation, and also rivalry 
and animosity between agencies whose respective duties are not 
clearly defined. It may slow down those processes which
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necessarily require inputs from more than one institution, a 
notable example of this being the statutory procedure for 
allocating concessions. It may lead to the neglect of new 
issues, for example agroforestry, which do not clearly fall 
within the ambit of any one institution.
Duplication or dissipation of functions and problems of 
leadership, accountability and co-ordination can be avoided by 
a precise allocation of functions, frequently operating and 
effective co-ordinating mechanisms, a clear provision for 
effective leadership, and generally, whatever the legal 
provisions, by the willing cooperation of all agencies 
concerned. While the law does provide for a fairly clear 
demarcation of functions, it is weak on the issues of strong 
leadership, accountability and regular and effective co­
ordination .
(ix) Lessons for the Brundtland Model of Institutional 
Development.
The Brundtland Report posited three goals for 
institutional reform in support of sustainable development. 
Firstly, it highlighted the need for integrated, cross- 
sectoral decision-making at the highest political levels so 
that environmental issues would be considered on the same
i
[
! agendas as economic and development policy.1 The law in Ghana
provides for this sort of integration because the Secretary of 
the MLNR who represents the forest sector is a member of the 
policy making Committee of Secretaries. However, it was noted
1 WCED op cit p.313.
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that, at least within the MLNR, issues relating to minerals 
have sometimes overshadowed forestry issues.1 Both the Lands 
Commission and Forestry Commission have wide objectives which 
cover aspects of land-use policy but here again it was noted 
that in the absence of a national land-use policy, the 
harmonisation of forestry and land-use policies was more 
theoretical than actual. Compartmentalism is a pervasive 
characteristic of developing country bureaucracies2 but the 
evidence from Ghana suggests that it will take more than a re­
definition of statutory duties to ensure the kind of 
integrated decision-making called for by the WCED 
Commissioners. The complexity of development problems, the 
urgency of economic crises and the shortage of professionals 
are formidable obstacles to integrated decision-making:
"Maximum integration could mean all departments 
doing everything with all other departments at all 
levels; and maximum co-ordination could mean 
everyone meeting everyone else and discussing 
everything. Both integration and co-ordination have 
high costs. Both involve choices by default 
choices not to use funds, administrative capacity 
and staff time in other ways. Both can blunt action 
and demoralise. There may be a law that the chances 
of a memorandum or report being implemented vary 
inversely with the frequency with which the words 
integration and co-ordination are used, for they 
evade the hard detailed choices of who should do 
what, when and how, which are needed to make things 
happen."3
These findings suggest the importance which should be 
attached to strengthening traditional institutions, such as
i
i
1 Supra p.153.
2 Seidman op cit p.290; Baker op cit pp.29-47, p.29.
3 Chambers, Rural Development ... op cit p.154. Also, 
Baker op cit p.33.
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the Forestry Department, with their clearly defined roles and 
more practical orientation. The evidence suggests that, at 
least in the short term, the best chance of improving 
management effectiveness lies in strengthening these 
institutions.1
In the FRMP, Ghana has embarked on a programme to 
strengthen the principal institutions in the forest sector. A 
limitation of the FRMP, however, is its failure to concentrate 
on district level support where day to day management is so 
crucial for the effective protection of the forest estate. 
Centralised administration has been criticised generally for 
its inability to adapt to complex development problems.2 In 
many respects it is the antithesis of participatory models of 
development.3 It is surprising, therefore, that the Brundtland 
Report failed to criticise this style of management. Indeed, 
its recommendations on integrated decision-making at the 
highest levels can be criticised for encouraging more 
centralisation in policy making generally.
The Brundtland Report gives few detailed recommendations 
for institutional strengthening. In addition to man power and 
logistical support, the analysis in this chapter highlights 
the need to ensure accountability and efficiency in 
administrative procedures. Unnecessary red tape resulting from 
bureaucratic procedures involving too many institutions too 
easily leads to inertia, institutional rivalry and protracted
1 Baker ibid pp.159-167, p.167.
■ Seidman op cit p.244.
; Wunsch op cit p.18; Seidman op cit p.321.
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delays in procedures. Accountability both 'upwards' to 
political institutions and 'downwards' to the people who will 
be affected by the administrators' decisions can help to 
minimise malpractice.1 If accountability and efficiency can be 
enhanced throughout the system, the prospects for effective 
methods of integrated decision-making will be greatly 
improved. Without these reforms, however, integrated decision­
making may lead only to more inertia and more red tape. It is 
a weakness of the Brundtland Report that it fails to recognise 
the importance which should be attached to these sort of 
reforms.
Although the Brundtland Report failed to recognise the 
importance of institutional accountability generally, its 
recommendations on greater public participation in policy and 
decision-making fora2 are consistent with the concern 
expressed in this chapter for greater accountability. In 
reality, public participation has not been a feature of forest 
administration. Developing country bureaucracies have been 
described as centralising, secretive and elitist.3 They 
reflect and protect the interests of the ruling elites who are 
reluctant to allow reforms which may jeopardise their 
position.4 These factors may frustrate reforms which are 
designed to promote greater participation in policy and 
decision-making.
1 IBRD op cit p.117.
2 WCED op cit p.330.
; Seidman op cit p.240; Wunsch op cit p.18.
1 Seidman op cit p.354; IBRD op cit p.126.
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The District Assemblies are the best example of a 
participatory approach to decision-making at the local level. 
They should allow for forestry issues to be considered in 
conjunction with local economic, environmental and political 
problems. However, unless the assemblies act effectively as a 
two way means of communication, they risk losing the support 
of local people. Authentic participation can and may be 
sacrificed in the energy expended on mobilisation to achieve 
national policy goals.1
The Brundtland Report identified some of the reforms 
which could enhance institutional effectiveness but it did not 
consider the detailed implications or practical feasibility of 
its recommendations. The analysis made in this chapter 
suggests a number of modifications to the Brundtland strategy. 
In particular, institutional strengthening should be directed 
towards practical orientated institutions with greater 
emphasis on support for decentralised offices. Co-ordinatory 
mechanisms should be simple and not too time consuming. In 
addition, the need to improve accountability and efficiency 
has been highlighted.
The Brundtland Report failed to address the problems 
which may frustrate the implementation of its proposals for 
institutional reform. Inertia, corruption and bureaucratic 
self interest were among the problems identified in this 
chapter. The pervasive character of these problems seriously 
undermines the efficacy of government institutions and their
1 See further, the evidence from the Western Region and 
Bongo District infra Chps.7,9.
ability to adopt Brundtland style institutional reforms. The 
failure of the Report to address these problems was a serious 
f law.
The Brundtland Report showed great confidence in the 
role which institutions can play in implementing sustainable 
development policies. This chapter has focused on the 
strengths and shortcomings of the Report's specific 
recommendations for institutional strengthening without 
seriously questioning the validity of that presumption. It is 
to aspects of this fundamental question of institutional 
effectiveness that the discussion now turns.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FOREST PROTECTION.
The successful protection of forest resources is an 
essential pre-requisite to their sustainable development in 
the long term. In this chapter, problems associated with the 
protection of forest resources, particularly those in forest 
reserves, are discussed.1 Firstly, some comments are made on 
the legal framework of protection. Secondly, the chapter moves 
on to discuss some problems of law enforcement. The experience 
of the Western Region demonstrates the magnitude of the 
problems associated with forest protection, particularly for 
the Forestry Department.
The discussion in this chapter raises several issues 
relevant to the analysis made in the Brundtland Report and 
discussed in chapter one. The illegal intrusion of farmers 
into forest reserves raises the question whether poverty is 
the driving force for environmentally destructive activities 
as suggested in the Brundtland Report. The activities of the 
Forestry Department and other institutions raise important 
questions about institutional effectiveness which have a 
bearing on the Report's faith in institutional strengthening. 
Above all, events in the Western Region provide a valuable 
insight into the consensus versus conflict paradigm raised in 
chapter one.
1 On measures which are being taken to improve the long 
term supply of forest resources outside forest reserves, see, 
Minor Forest Produce and Rural Forestry infra Chp.8 and the 
review of NGO activities in Bongo infra Chp.9.
182
(i) Relevant Law.
(A) Forest Reserves.
The principal method of protecting and establishing 
forest resources is by the constitution of forest reserves.
A forest reserve is a reserve so constituted under s.17 
of the Forests Ordinance or under any law relating to local 
government.1 The Forests Ordinance and the Forests Protection 
Decree are the principal enactments dealing with the
establishment and protection of forest reserves.
(a) Constitution of Forest Reserves: Any land may be
constituted into a forest reserve in order to achieve any of 
the following purposes - to safeguard local water supplies; to 
assist in the well being of forest and agricultural crops 
grown in the vicinity; to secure the supply of forest produce 
to local people. The Chief Conservator of Forests (CCF)
advises Government whether the public interest requires that 
forest resources should be protected or established by the 
constitution of reserves in order to meet these objectives.2
A proposal to constitute a forest reserve must be 
published in the Gazette3 and publicized in the local district 
| concerned.4 By the same Gazette notice, a Reserve Settlement
f
; Commissioner (RSC) is appointed whose duty it is to inquire
into and determine the existence, nature and extent of all
1 Cap 157 s.2 and Act 124/1962 s.16(7).
: Cap 157 s.4.
; ibid s.5.
' ibid s .7.
183
rights claimed in or over the land and trees concerned.1 A 
dispute involving a question of land ownership may be settled 
by the RSC or transferred to a civil court at the discretion 
of the RSC.2 If the appointed court or an appeal court fails 
to give judgement within three months of being seized of the 
dispute, the RSC may decide to settle the dispute himself.' 
The RSC is empowered to admit or reject any rights being 
claimed4 or, in consultation with a senior forest officer, to 
exclude any land from a proposed reserve5 or to commute into 
a lump sum any rights inconsistent with the nature of the 
proposed reserve.6 Compensation is not due if the communal or 
allodial rights of a stool are to be restricted.7 When the 
final judgement of the RSC - dealing with all these 
particulars - is published in the Gazette, the land becomes a 
forest reserve.8
An appeal to the Supreme Court (now the High Court) may 
be made by any person whose rights have been affected by the 
judgement of the RSC or by the CCF within six months of the 
judgement9 and any alteration made by the court is deemed to
1 ibid ss.5(1),9(1).
2 Forests (Amendment) Ordinance no.45/1954 s.3.
i
3 ibid s.3.
4 Cap 157 s.15(1)(e).
5 ibid s.11.
6 ibid s.12.
7 ibid s.13.
c ibid s s .15,17.
ibid s .16.
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be an alteration of the Order constituting the reserve.1 A 
subsequent Order published in the Gazette may revoke the Order 
constituting the reserve, freeing the land from all controls 
associated with reservation.2
(b) Protection: From the date of notification of the
proposal to constitute a forest reserve no rights to, in or 
over stool land or produce within the proposed reserve may be 
alienated.3 No clearing, cutting or burning in the area is 
allowed without the consent of the senior forest officer.4 
Rights in or over land held by families or individuals can 
only be transferred by succession or with the written consent 
of the RSC.5
Upon the constitution of the forest reserve, admitted 
rights within the reserve cannot be sold, leased, mortgaged, 
charged or transferred without notification being given to the 
CCF.c
The written consent of a competent forest officer is a 
precondition for the lawful exercise of any of the following: 
rights to fell, uproot, lop, girdle, tap, injure by fire or 
otherwise damage any tree or timber; rights to farm or build; 
to cause any negligent damage when felling, cutting or 
removing timber; to obstruct water courses; to hunt, shoot,
1 ibid s.17(2).
2 ibid s.20.
3 ibid s.6(a).
4 ibid s.6(c).
5 ibid s.6(b).
' ibid s .19.
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set traps, fish or poison water; to process, convey or remove 
any forest produce; to pasture cattle or permit any cattle to 
trespass into the reserve.1 All these acts are liable to a 
maximum fine of 10,000 cedis and/or a maximum of five years 
imprisonment (in the first instance) if committed without the 
requisite permission of a competent forest officer.2 An 
offender against this law may be required to pay twice the 
commercial value of the trees, timber or forest produce 
involved to the MLNR and compensation to any person whose 
lawful rights he infringed.3 Forest reserve boundary marks are 
protected from any interference by the same legal penalties.4 
The burden of proof that any forest produce has not been 
illegally taken lies with the person found in possession of 
it.5
The Forest Protection Decree imposes a duty on forest 
officers, the holders of admitted rights and other persons 
working in forest reserves to help prevent forest offences.0 
These people are also under a duty to assist in the prevention 
and control of fire in or near to reserves.7 They may be fined
1 Forest Protection Decree NRCD 243/1974 s.1 as amended 
by Forest Protection (Amendment) Law PNDCL 142/1986.
2 ibid s.1.
3 ibid s.1(2),(3).
4 ibid s.2.
5 ibid s.7.
n ibid s .8(1).
7 ibid s .8(2).
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for failing to perform this duty.1
From an historical view point, the outstanding features 
of the Forests Ordinance are the provisions declaring the 
ownership of land in a forest reserve to be unaffected by its 
constitution as a reserve;1 the requirement of exclusively 
environmental reasons for constituting any land into a forest 
reserve;3 and the comprehensive, if not unwieldy, procedures 
for a settlement of all rights relating to land or produce in 
a proposed forest reserve.4
The term "private lands", defined as "land alienated from 
tribal or stool lands and owned or held by any individual or 
group of individuals,"5 as employed in section 4 of the 
Ordinance, is of passing interest. Some authorities deny that 
stools can alienate their allodial title to land to 
individuals,6 in which case the term may be read to imply a 
reference to land over which a determinable or lesser interest 
co-exists with the allodial interest of the stool.
Other obscure terms in section 4 are the reference to 
"the public interest" and "forest crops". "Public interest" 
was broadly defined in the 1979 Constitution as including "any 
right or advantage which ensures or is intended to ensure for
1 ibid s.8(2).
2 Cap 157 s.18.
J ibid s . 4(4) .
1 ibid ss.5-17. 
ibid s.2.
' Ollennu, Oliennu's Principles of Customary Land Law ...
op cit p.58.
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the benefit generally of the whole of the people of Ghana,"1 
but in the Ordinance the term seems to be attached to the 
environmental conditions required in paragraphs (a)-(c) and 
therefore does not provide broader grounds for justifying 
forest reservation. "Forest crop" is nowhere legally defined. 
Does this term include forest produce or is the meaning of the 
term restricted to agricultural crops of the high forest zone 
-cocoa, plantain etc.? If the latter meaning is implied, then 
the law does not allow the Government to constitute a forest 
reserve solely for the purpose of protecting timber supplies. 
However, there is nothing to prevent this last objective being 
an additional consideration and, for example, the boundaries 
of a forest reserve ostensibly constituted to protect a water 
source may in reality have be drawn much larger than is 
strictly necessary to meet that objective, the remainder of 
the land being used to meet commercial timber demands. The 
last purpose given for reservation - to secure the supply of 
forest produce to nearby villages2 - misconceives the 
commercial and urban orientation of much minor forest produce 
exploitation.
It is unfortunate that lengthy land ownership disputes 
have almost always resulted in long delays in procuring the 
judgement of the RSC even when, before 1962, ownership was to 
be wholly unaffected by the constitution of the reserve! 
Sadly, traditional landowners are still disputing issues of 
land ownership within forest reserves. The most obvious
1 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1979, Art.213.
; Cap 157 s.4(4)(c).
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explanation for this lies in the distribution of revenue from 
forest exploitation to traditional authorities on the basis of 
their territorial claims to reserved land. Doubts were raised 
in chapter five about the substance of the legal interest held 
by traditional authorities after 1962.1 It was argued that the 
payment of a proportion of revenue to stools and local 
district assemblies was not an adequate or effective method of 
compensating local communities for the reservation of their 
land.2 If, nevertheless, traditional authorities are to 
continue to be entitled to a share of the income from forest 
revenue, an alternative basis to this territorial assessment 
of rights to revenue should be sought. For example, a fixed, 
annual rent could be paid to every stool living in the 
affected local districts, whose boundaries are now politically 
demarcated, regardless of their territorial claims and graded 
only on recognised political differentials.3 Alternatively, a 
one-off, compensatory payment could be made to stools which 
would extinguish once and for all their claim to a continuing 
legal interest to land in forest reserves.4 Rights could be
1 Supra p.121.
2 Supra p.129.
3 For example, paramount stools could receive a one third 
share and sub-stools a two thirds share of the total allocated 
revenue in accordance with customary practice supra p.102. 
These shares could then be divided equally among the members 
of each category regardless of their territorial claims.
4 A risk associated with abandoning altogether the system 
of making payments to traditional authorities is that the 
latter may consequently act irresponsibly to alienate what 
they still regard as stool land. An alternative proposal is 
suggested at infra p.225 for linking the payment of revenue to 
the contribution made by traditional authorities to the 
protection of forest reserves in their districts.
assessed on the basis of RSC's judgements with an opportunity 
for judicial review in contentious cases.
The commutation of lump sum payments in respect of 
extinguished rights1 is not governed by any statutory 
principles for assessing the quantum of the award. The need to 
ascertain admitted rights2 is now superfluous despite the 
provision for preserving customary rights in forest reserves 
made in the Concessions Act.3 This is because the provision in 
the original Ordinance allowing admitted rights to be 
exercised without charge or licence4 has been repealed and the 
Forest Protection Decree makes it an offence for anyone to 
exercise communal or individual rights of exploitation in a 
forest reserve without the prior consent of a competent forest 
officer.5 Charges are made for licences to any person who 
wishes to take produce on a commercial scale, whether or not 
he is a local person. The provision for excluding farmland and 
villages located within forest reserves in many cases may not 
be sufficient to cater for present day demands for land which 
are influenced by the commercialisation of agriculture, 
population growth and emerging land scarcity.
Opinion in the Forestry Department is that maximum 
statutory penalties for forest offences are too low and that 
courts or tribunals have, until recently, shown reluctance to
1 Cap 157 s.12.
2 ibid s.15.
J Act 124/1962 s.16(1).
4 Cap 157 s.23.
“ NRCD 243/1974 s.l.
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impose stiff penalties. For example, fines based on the 
"commercial value" of trees are usually calculated by 
reference to royalty rates whereas the actual market value of 
the trees is very much greater than this. It is important that 
penalties for forest offences are kept under regular review. 
Some forestry personnel favour a return to the system of 
compounding of fines so that most forest offences could be 
dealt with administratively in the Department, but when tried 
in the past the system led to abuse." Despite the burden of 
proof in favour of the Department,2 it is difficult to get 
satisfactory evidence of forest offences before a court or 
tribunal. Forest guards may make arrests without a warrant" 
but where the situation has become particularly acrimonious, 
unarmed forestry officers already find it necessary to call 
upon the escort of armed police officers in order to make 
arrests. This raises the question whether forest officers 
should be armed in the same way as officers of the Game and 
Wildlife Department. The work of forest officers is 
distinguishable from that of game officers however, because 
the latter's principal opponents inside game reserves are 
hunters who are always armed.
(B) Protected Areas.
The Trees and Timber Decree, the successor to the
1 Forest Offences (Compounding of Fines) Act, no.83/1959.
‘ NRCD 243/1974 s.7.
ibid s .5(1) .
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Protected Timber Lands Act,1 now governs the constitution and 
protection of "protected areas".2
(a) Constitution of Protected Areas: In order to prevent 
the waste of trees or timber the Secretary may declare any 
well stocked timber land lying outside a forest reserve to be 
a protected area.3 The executive instrument so issued becomes 
effective four weeks after its publication. The Secretary may 
revoke the instrument at any time when it appears convenient 
to withdraw the associated controls. This latter instrument 
takes effect immediately.4
(b) Protection: Within any protected area it is an
offence, when committed without the prior written consent of 
the Secretary, to fell or damage any tree or timber, to farm 
or build, to set fires or to kindle a fire without taking 
precautions to prevent its spread.5 Any person who offends 
against these provisions is liable to a maximum fine of only 
1000 cedis and/or imprisonment not exceeding five years.6
Farming in a protected area may only be carried on 
subject to a licence issued by a regional forest officer on 
behalf of the CCF which may impose any conditions necessary to
1 Act no.34/1959
2 Trees and Timber Decree NRCD 273/1974
3 ibid s.12(1).
4 ibid s.12(2).
5 ibid s.14.
b In 1990, the rate of exchange was approximately 600 
cedis to one English pound.
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safeguard the protected area.1 This requirement applies to 
farms made in the area prior to its constitution as a 
protected area and to all subsequent extensions of farming.2 
Any applicant for a licence, if refused, has a right of final 
appeal to the Secretary.3
Forest guards may be appointed by the CCF to control 
protected areas4 and concessionaires working in the protected 
area must observe the prescriptions of the CCF.5 Furthermore, 
any land in a protected area over which a grant of timber or 
trees has been made is subject to all the protective 
provisions of the Forests Ordinance.6
The procedure for establishing protected areas, in marked 
contrast to forest reservation, is entirely administrative and 
can be completed in four weeks.7 Within the limits of the 
general objectives of protection, the Secretary is free to 
draw any boundaries or require any conditions when granting 
licences.8 There is no procedure for determining the legal 
validity of rights claimed in a protected area and no 
possibility for judicial review of refused licence
1 NRCD 273/1974 s.13 and Timber Lands (Protected Areas)
Regulations LN 311/1959 s.4,
2 ibid 311/1959 Para.5.
3 ibid Para.5.
4 ibid Para.7.
5 ibid Para.3.
6 Act 124/1962 s.16(8).
7 NRCD 273/1974 s.12.
'■ ibid ss.12,13.
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applications.1 It is never easy to strike a balance between 
administrative efficiency and legal accountability but the 
Forests Ordinance and the Trees and Timber Decree seem to 
represent two opposite extremes.
Any land in a protected area which is subject to a timber 
grant is protected by the relevant provisions of the 
Ordinance.2 The penal provisions of the Ordinance were, 
however, repealed by the Forest Protection Decree so that in 
actual fact, few of the provisions of the Ordinance are 
applicable. Perhaps the Government in 1974 unintentionally 
neglected to stipulate that the penalties for forest offences 
contained in the Decree should also apply to land subject to 
timber grants outside reserves or perhaps it was simply 
recognising the fact that the Ordinance was never effectively 
enforced outside forest reserves. All timber grants are anyway 
held subject to the management stipulations of the CCF.3
(C) Other Land.
All land outside forest reserves or public lands, is held 
subject to the principles of customary law as modified by 
statute. All trees and timber are however vested in the 
Council in trust for the people and communities of Ghana,4 and 
rights to trees and rights to trees or timber are granted by
1 LN 311/1959 Para.6.
2 Act 124/1962 s.16(8).
3 Cap 136 s.30.
4 Act 124/1962 s.16(4) and PNDCL 42/1982 s.45(l). See 
above supra p.121.
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the Lands Commission, or, in 1990, the MLNR.1
Wherever rights to trees or timber have been made the 
subject of a grant, land and produce lying within the area of 
the grant are subject to the protective provisions of the 
Forests Ordinance.2 Outside areas subject to grants of timber 
or trees there are no specific, nationally determined 
penalties for cutting, felling, damaging or in any way 
exploiting any trees or timber.3 However, a person who cuts 
timber, except under the appropriate licence, could be 
prosecuted for committing an economic crime against the 
State.4 Grants of stool land in certain cases must be notified 
to the Lands Commission.5
The land in a protected area is subject to the principles 
of customary land law as is all land other than public land. 
Customary law recognises few rules for the protection and 
management of forest resources although closed hunting seasons 
and other restrictions on rights of community user are known 
to some communities.6 Generally, customary law permits free
1 PNDCL 42/1982 s.36(3).
2 Act 124/1962 s.16(8).
3 Some District Assemblies have made bye-laws to control 
the activities of chain saw operators on any land. See, for 
example, "Tree-Felling Banned in Twifu District" People1s 
Daily Graphic 16/11/1989, p.3.
4 Public Tribunals Law PNDCL 78/1984, s.9. This Law has 
been used in cases involving industrial malpractice in the 
timber industry infra p.261 and illegal selling of land in 
forest reserves infra p.212.
5 PNDCL 42/1982 s.47(1) and Administration of Lands Act 
123/1962 s.8.
6 G. Woodman, The Allodial Title to Land op cit p.91.
195
exploitation of forest resources by members of the allodial 
community in unoccupied stool land.1 In most cases, it vests 
rights to exploit or control exploitation of economic trees, 
except timber trees, on farmed or fallow land in the holder of 
the determinable estate.2
When the Concessions Act vested all rights to all trees 
or timber in the President in trust for the stools concerned,3 
it failed to preserve customary rights to forest produce 
except in the case of forest reserves.4 However, the Act 
failed to provide any stiff penalties for the cutting of 
mature timber during farming operations which take place 
outside forest reserves or land subject to a timber grant.3
The actual effect of the statutory provision applying the 
Ordinance to all land subject to a grant of timber or trees, 
whether or not the grant is over public land, has already been 
commented upon.6
1 Ollennu, Ollennu's Principles of Customary Law ... op 
cit p.50. See further, Minor Forest Produce and Rural Forestry 
infra Chp.8.
2 Ollennu op cit p.66.
J Act 124/1962 s.16(4).
4 ibid s.16(1).
5 See also, Customary Rights to Timber or Trees supra
Chp.5.
D supra p .193.
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(ii) Forest Protection in the Western Region.
Although the law is in place to protect forest resources, 
especially in forest reserves, the effectiveness of the law is 
always dependent on the ability of the Forestry Department to 
enforce it. The shortage of manpower and essential equipment 
in the district offices has hampered the protective duties of 
the Department. The FRMP is addressing the manpower and 
logistical needs of the Department although, it has been 
suggested, not adequately at the district level.1 An
investigation into the scale and the causes of illegal forest 
encroachment in the Western Region reveals that the root of 
the problem lies more deeply than in the adequacy of
Departmental resources alone. The FRMP does not even attempt 
to address these fundamental problems which are now being
tackled under the auspices of Operation Halt.2
The Western Region is the best stocked timber producing 
area of Ghana with a total of fifty one forest reserves. The 
region is home to several of the country's largest timber 
firms. It is also a major cocoa producing area. In 1959, a 
report of a soil survey officer pointed out that the Western 
Region was then the last remaining uncultivated land suitable 
for cocoa cultivation in Ghana.3 In the Sefwi-Wiawso and 
Juabeso-Bia districts, where the soils and climate were most
1 Supra p.158.
2 Infra p.218.
* P.M. Ahn, The Principal Areas of Remaining Original 
Forest in Western Ghana and Their Agricultural Potential 1959, 
Department of Agriculture, ADM 5/4/164, pp.12, p.l.
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suited to the cultivation of cocoa, forest clearing was 
already proceeding at 3-5% of the area per annum.1 The 
indications were that the Juabeso-Bia district would be mostly 
cleared of forest within 15-20 years. Today, the Western 
Region produces more cocoa than any other region.
Throughout Ghana the expansion of cocoa cultivation has 
been at the expense of the tropical forest and the Western 
Region is no exception.2 Today there are no longer vast areas 
of uncultivated forest except in the forest reserves.3 This 
has caused some farmers to encroach into some forest reserves 
to an extent which, due to the remoteness of the area, would 
have been unimaginable in the colonial era. Today, some forest 
reserves in the region have been destroyed to the extent of 
50-70% of their total area as the following figures show: 
Estimated Scale of Farming in Certain Forest Reserves.4
Reserve % Illegally Farmed 
Farmed
Admitted Farms Total
Bodi
Tano-Ehuro
Manzan
Sukusuku
Bia-Tawya
76.50 
57.67 
59.11
74.50 
57.76
6.20
1.80
32.19
11.37
18.47
82.70
59.29
91.30 
85.87 
76.23
1 ibid pp.8,9.
2 ibid p.10.
J See Appendix Three for a map of forest reserves in the 
Western Region as a whole.
1 Letter from the RAO, Western Region, to the MLNR, 
12/1/1990 Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
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There are special reasons why the Western Region has been 
the most seriously affected region and why some reserves have 
been more seriously affected than others.
In 1959, the Protected Timber Lands Act was passed. This 
was the predecessor and model for parts of the Trees and 
Timber Decree which is currently in force.1 It enabled the 
Minister to declare any land which was primarily forest land 
but which was not a forest reserve, to be a protected area.' 
In order to prevent the waste of timber, farming in a 
protected area would be strictly controlled.3 Immediately 
after the passing of this Act, the following areas of forest 
land in the Sefwi Wiawso district were declared to be 
protected areas - Bia-Tawya, Bodi, Manzan, Sukusuku and Tano- 
Ehuro .
The protection afforded by the Act was designed simply to 
ensure that timber would be efficiently felled prior to the 
destruction of the forest by farming activities. The intention 
of the Act was that after salvage felling, all protection 
would be removed and farming would be allowed to take over. 
However, forest officers inventorying the protected timber 
lands realised that these remote forest areas constituted the 
richest remaining timber areas in the country. It was 
therefore decided to constitute the protected areas into 
permanent forest reserves. In 1965, notice of the Government's
1 Supra p.190.
2 Act no.34/1959 s.3.
ibid ss.4,5.
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decision was published in the Gazette.1 In 1967, the judgement 
of the RSC was given in respect of the Bodi and Tano-Ehuro 
forest reserves 2 but it was not until 1972 that judgements in 
respect of Manzan and Sukusuku forest reserves were given.' 
The reason for the delay in the case of the last two reserves 
was confusion over the international boundary with Cote 
d'Ivoire along which parts of the boundaries of the two 
reserves ran. The border dispute held up the Forestry 
Department's attempts to accurately survey the area. Judgement 
in respect of the proposed Bia-Tawya Forest Reserve is yet to 
be given.
The elaborate procedures for constituting forest reserves 
were identified as another cause of the long delays. In 1974, 
the Secretary called for the simplification of the forest 
reservation procedure. A draft new Lands Decree provided that 
forest reserves could be constituted by the same procedure as 
for the acquisition of public lands whenever it was in the 
public interest to conserve forests. In this scheme, an 
executive instrument would suffice, upon publication, to 
immediately vest any forest land in the Government in trust
for the people of Ghana free from any encumbrance whatsoever.
Claims for compensation would be dealt with afterwards. Any
1 Land and Concessions Bulletin 12/3/1965.
2 Record of Proceedings and Judgement in the Proposed
Bodi Forest Reserve 15/12/1967, Dunkwa High Court; Record of 
Proceedings and Judgement in the Proposed Tano-Ehuro Forest 
Reserve 15/12/1967, Dunkwa High Court.
3 Record of Proceedings and Judgement in the Proposed
Manzan Forest Reserve 18/12/1972, Dunkwa High Court; Record of 
Proceedings and Judgement in the Proposed Sukusuku Forest 
Reserve 14/3/1972, Dunkwa High Court.
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public officer would be authorised to enter the land and 
trespassers could be rapidly evicted.1 The fact that this 
proposal never got to the statute book suggests that 
opposition to forest reservation was still intense and that 
issues of land ownership in forest reserves were still 
fiercely contested.
During the 1965-72 interlude, mass incursions into the 
proposed forest reserves appear to have been made by illegal 
farmers who purchased rights to the land from local stools and 
sub-stools. Many of these farmers were immigrants from other 
parts of the country who had already established cocoa farms 
elsewhere and who had the money and experience to make further 
investments in the land. Contrary to the ideas contained in 
the Brundtland Report, it was not poverty which drove these 
entrepreneurs on but the drive to expand commercial 
enterprises. It was a general belief that if the land could in 
fact be converted into cocoa farms then the Government would 
default on its decision to reserve the land. After all, it was 
in accordance with the objectives of the original protection 
orders under the Protected Timber Lands Act, that the land 
should eventually be given over to farming and, at least in 
the case of some reserves, soil surveys had shown the 
conditions to be ideal for cocoa cultivation.
In 1972, farmers in the proposed Sukusuku Forest Reserve 
petitioned the Regional Commissioner to have the land released
1 Circular from the Ministry of Justice, 29/3/1974, LRC 
Ref L.8/74, s.13 of the third draft Lands Decree.
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for cocoa farming.1 In view of the magnitude of these 
complaints (the petition was said to represent the views of 
3,500 farmers), it would have been reasonable to have given 
their views a hearing at the inquiries of the RSC but this did 
not occur.2 The judgements were given in Dunkwa and the 
records show that none of the highly contentious issues were 
considered or debated.3 Although the fundamental concern of 
the Forestry Department was to preserve the supply of 
commercial timber, the reasons given in the judgement of the 
RSC for the constitution of the reserves were exclusively 
environmental as required by the Forests Ordinance. The 
ownership rights of the Paramount Stools were acknowledged but 
no attempt was made to demarcate territorial boundaries or to 
define the interests of the sub-stools in the land. In each 
case only one or two farms were recognised as admitted farms 
which had been in existence prior to 1965. No recommendations 
were made with respect to the massive influx of farmers since 
then. No consideration was given to the feasibility of 
reservation in such an acrimonious situation. No attempt was 
made to reconcile or balance environmental and agricultural 
needs. It may be argued that it was not within the ambit of 
the RSC's statutory duties to consider what the proper balance
1 Petition from Farmers in Sukusuku Proposed Forest 
Reserve to the Regional Commissioner, 14/6/1972, Departmental 
Records Juabeso-Bia.
2 The RSC is under a statutory duty to consider all 
claims presented to him as to rights in proposed forest 
reserves Cap 157 s.9.. It is submitted that the issues raised 
by local farmers were so closely related to this duty that 
they should also have been considered.
3 Supra p.199, Fn.2 and 3.
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between forestry and agriculture should be. It is true that 
this is a political issue ultimately requiring a political 
determination but the official inquiry presents an ideal 
opportunity for public grievances to be fully and openly 
aired. This would be consistent with the two way,
participatory style of decision-making favoured by the WCED 
Commissioners.1 If a fair hearing had been given to all the 
issues and if practical compromises had been made at this
time, then a more realistic reservation programme may have 
been adopted thereby preventing the conflict which surrounds 
the whole issue today.
The sale or acquisition of rights to land in a proposed 
forest reserve is illegal as is any farming activity which has 
not been sanctioned by a senior forest officer.2 It was not 
necessary, therefore, to speed up the reservation process in
order to check the upsurge of illegal activities.
Nevertheless, no attempts were made to enforce the law prior 
to 1973. This was a vital error because it gave chiefs and 
immigrant farmers the opportunity to pursue their illegal 
activities on a massive scale.
In 1973, attempts were begun to expel illegal farmers 
from Sukusuku Forest Reserve. A total of fifty two arrests 
were made by the Department but great difficulty was 
experienced in persuading the local police to commence
1 WCED op cit p.331.
' Cap 157 s .6.
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investigations for prosecuting the offenders.1 Two months 
later, the Assistant Commissioner of Police in Tarkwa ordered 
the suspension of all investigations into forest offences, 
much to the disappointment of the Department.2
In 1974, the Government passed the Forest Protection 
Decree3 and the Public Lands (Protection) Decree.4 The former 
raised penalties for forest offences5 while the latter 
provided a simple procedure for evicting trespassers from 
public land without prior recourse to a court of law.6 These 
enactments would have considerably strengthened the hand of 
the Department but for the fact that all Departmental 
investigations were suspended pending the recommendations of 
a committee established to inquire into the circumstances 
surrounding the illegal alienation of land in forest reserves 
in the Western Region (the Nyinaku Committee).
The timing of the Committee's establishment is more than 
coincidental. It is evidence of the ability, noted in chapter 
one, of vested interests to render nugatory the impact of laws 
which may go against their own concerns.7 In the situation
1 Letter from the ACF, Sefwi Wiawso, to the Deputy CCF, 
Western Region, 7/5/1973, Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
2 Letter from the DCF to CCF, 31/5/1973, Departmental 
Records Juabeso-Bia.
3 NRCD 243/1974
4 NRCD 240/1974
5 NRCD 243/1974 s.l.
6 NRCD 240/1974 s.3. The 1969 Constitution defined 
"public lands" as including land vested in the Government in 
trust. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1962, Art.162.
7 Supra p.46.
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under review, traditional authorities and wealthy farmers were 
profiting from the sale and acquisition of farming rights in 
forest reserves. A Committee of Inquiry would delay decision­
making still longer allowing rampant illegal farming to 
continue unabated.
The Nyinaku Committee published its report in 1975. It 
found that the decision of the Government in 1965 had been 
made sufficiently well known to the chiefs and people 
concerned. Alienation of land and incursions into the reserves 
were made wilfully to undermine the intentions of the 
Government. The Omanhene of Sefwi Wiawso was a principal actor 
in the alienation of land, especially in the Bia-Tawya and 
Tano-Ehuro forest reserves where he was anxious to assert his 
title to the land against the stools of Aowin and Suaman. His 
sub-chiefs were also active in alienating land. Local 
customary law was unclear as to whether the sub-chiefs were 
entitled to act independently of the Omanhene in the grant of 
land. This encouraged powerful sub-chiefs to make alienations 
in order to undermine the authority of the Omanhene. The 
chiefs had encouraged tenant farmers in the belief that final 
reservation orders would not in fact be made. Farmers took 
advantage of the remoteness of the reserves, the delays in 
reservation and the leniency of court fines to encroach into 
the reserves.1
The Committee recommended that since the farmers knew 
they were trespassers, they should immediately be ejected
! Report of the Committee Appointed Under El 70, 
24/6/1974, as Amended by El 11, 5/11/1974, 1975, Government
Printer, Accra, pp.61, at pp.30-32.
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from the reserves, their farms should be destroyed and the 
land reafforested. The military should be called in to prevent 
any further encroachments. The Department should be better 
equipped as a matter of priority. Although the farmers would 
not be entitled to any compensation they should be refunded 
the fees paid to the local chiefs for permission to farm the 
land. The relevant Traditional Councils were to be held liable 
for making these refunds. The chiefs and their agents who had 
alienated the land should face criminal prosecution.1
The Committee further recommended that the constitution 
of a forest reserve should take effect immediately upon the 
publication of a single notice in the Gazette which should be 
widely publicised using all forms of media. All farmers in 
forest reserves should thereupon be ejected and compensation 
paid for this and the loss of other lawful rights after the 
constitution of the reserve. The right of chiefs to alienate 
stool land generally should be vested in the State in order to 
prevent the abuse of this power.2
The Government endorsed all the recommendations of the 
Committee concerning the illegal farming but it did not agree 
that there was a need to change the law relating to stool 
land.3 Neither did it agree that the RSC should sit after the 
constitution of a reserve on the ground that the main purpose
1 ibid p.35.
2 ibid pp.35-37.
3 White Paper on the Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Grievances of Farmers Being Ejected From Certain 
Forest Reserves in the Western Region, White Paper no.2/1976, 
Paras.6,12,13.
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of the RSC's inquiry was to determine whether a given area 
should be reserved at all.1 It is submitted, however, that 
although it is desirable that the inquiry of the RSC should 
consider this question, the judgements of the RSC in 1967 and 
1972, in no way attempted to tackle this fundamental issue.2 
The position in law is that this decision is taken by the CCF 
and the Government before an inquiry is begun.3
In accordance with the recommendations of the Nyinaku 
Committee, the army was mobilised to support the Department's 
activities in the Western Region. Bonsu-Nkwanta, a market 
village within the proposed Bia-Tawya Forest Reserve was burnt 
to the ground as part of these operations. However, in 1977 
efforts to recover the forest reserves suffered another major 
setback. In a letter to the CCF the Secretary of the MLNR 
directed that illegal farms should not be destroyed and 
farmers should be allowed to continue cultivating land in the 
reserves.4 Within months, Bonsu-Nkwanta was completely 
restored. In 1980, Gliksten gave notice of the widespread 
belief that illegal farming was endorsed by the MLNR.5
The advice of the Secretary was wholly irrational. It 
clearly demonstrates the ability of vested interests to 
influence the highest levels of decision-making in order to
1 ibid Para.19.
2 Supra p.199, Fn.2 and 3.
3 Cap 157 ss.4,9.
4 Letter no.SCR/G1-SF2, 23/5/1977 Departmental Records 
Juabeso-Bia.
5 Letter from Gliksten to Sefwi-Bibiani District Council, 
15/3/1980, Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
frustrate the impact of laws unfavourable to them. It has 
always been rumoured that important political persons own vast 
cocoa farms within the affected reserves1 but records of land 
transactions are shrouded in secrecy. When public grievances 
were formally ignored, private interests found more covert 
ways of reaching decision-makers.
The self contradictory nature of the Government's actions 
illustrates the vulnerability of developing country 
governments to pressure from influential interest groups whose 
interests do not always coincide immediately with those of the 
political leadership. In this case, the government's interest 
lay in preserving timber resources which could provide 
valuable foreign exchange irrespective of fluctuations in the 
cocoa trade, a cash crop on which the economy was already too 
heavily dependent. Government also had stakes in the major 
timber companies by virtue of the 1972 Timber Operations 
(Government Participation) Decree.2 The fact that the Minister 
gave in to the manipulations of influential farmers and 
traditional authorities suggests firstly that the exercise of 
ministerial discretion was still not free from unscrupulous 
influences.3 More generally, it suggests that the military 
government simply could not afford to lose the support or 
acquiescence of powerful interest groups without risking its
1 "Operation Halt Launched at Bibiani to Reclaim Forest 
Reserve" People's Daily Graphic 20/8/90, p.16.
2 NRCD 139/1972 s.7.
3 Comparisons can be drawn with the Blay Report supra 
Chp.5.
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own political survival. This is consistent with the argument 
of political scientists that not even a military regime can 
remain in power without fostering its own political legitimacy 
at least by pacifying vociferous elites.1
The ambivalence of Government policies serves to 
demonstrate that the state is not solely the apparatus of a 
single, united ruling class whose interest lies in the 
maintenance of capitalism.2 It confirms the more complex 
analysis which suggests that powerful interest groups, whose 
most immediate economic interests may not always coincide with 
those of its political leaders, play a central role in 
determining the effectiveness of government policy.3 In this 
sense, the state and its legal machinery are fora for the 
rivalry of competing interest groups, reflecting and 
responding to their influence.4 The indecisiveness of the 
Government demonstrates that law and policy-making result from 
social conflict not consensus. Where there is no consensus, or 
where the rivalry is between opposing interest groups each 
with political influence, then the most likely result is 
political schizophrenia of the type exhibited by the 
Government in 1977. Parallels can usefully be drawn with 
forest conservation in the colonial era.5
1 C. Clapham, Third World Politics 1985, Croom Helm, 
London, pp.197, pp.39-44.
2 This Marxist analysis of law was discussed at supra
p.46.
3 Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, op cit p.105.
4 Quinney, quoted in Lloyd, op cit p.620.
5 Supra Chp.4.
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Efforts to reclaim the forest reserves were not revived 
until after the change of Government in 1979. In that year the 
services of the army were once again sought by the Department 
but the influx of illegal farmers showed no respite.1 The Bia- 
Tawya and Tano-Ehuro reserves were now the focus of attention. 
A few arrests were made in the proposed Bia-Tawya Forest 
Reserve. By 1980, forestry officers and Gliksten were 
appealing for a clear policy statement from the MLNR 
condemning the illegal farmers2 but no such statement was 
forthcoming. In 1984, the Forestry Department took the 
initiative in establishing a task force comprised of forestry 
officers, Gliksten employees and members of local security 
services. This was after the nationwide drought in 1983. The 
Government was showing a renewed commitment to forest 
protection in the aftermath of the horrific bush fires which 
had swept the country destroying crops even in the forest 
zone. Twelve arrests were made in the proposed Bia-Tawya 
Forest Reserve. The farmers were charged with making illegal 
cultivations, illegal erections and illegally felling timber3 
but after eighteen months prosecutions had still not been
1 Letter from the ACF, Sefwi Wiawso, to the Omanhene of 
Sefwi Wiawso Traditional Area, 16/5/1979 Departmental Records 
Juabeso-Bia.
2 Draft letter from the RAO to the District Chief 
Executive, April 1980 Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
3 Particulars of 12 persons to be prosecuted at the Sefwi 
Wiawso Grade One District Court, 8/1/1985, Departmental 
Records Juabeso-Bia.
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made.1 The delay encouraged other farmers to intensify farming 
activities. Timber was now being deliberately destroyed and it 
was reported that the Chief of Boinzan had even sold land 
under plantation management by the Department.2 From 1982 
onwards serious attempts were made to prosecute illegal 
farmers in Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve. Between 10-20 farmers 
per year were arrested and charged.
Curiously enough, action by the Department was welcomed 
by the Omanhene of Sefwi Wiawso who was no doubt angry with 
his sub-chiefs for making unauthorised alienations without his 
knowledge.3 In 1986, the Department was also scolded by the 
Omanhene of Aowin Traditional Area for failing to protect the 
Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve from destruction. He claimed that 
the Traditional Council should be compensated for the loss of 
revenue which the destruction of valuable timber implied.4 The 
district forestry officer interpreted this allegation as "an 
attempt to hoodwink the public".5 He suspected that the 
Omanhene had been selling land in the reserve claimed by the 
Sefwi Wiawso stool:
"The illegal farming activities in the Tano-Ehuro
1 Letter from the Principal to the Assistant 
Superintendent of Police, Asawinso, 18/7/85 Departmental 
Records Juabeso-Bia.
2 Letter from the TO, Bia-Tawya, to the ACF, Sefwi 
Wiawso, 28/5/1989, Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
3 Letter from the Omanhene to the CF, Sefwi Wiawso, 
25/5/1979 Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
4 Letter from the Omanhene of Aowin Traditional Area to 
the CCF, 30/11986, Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
5 Letter from the DFO to the CCF, 8/4/1986 Departmental 
Records Sefwi Wiawso.
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Forest Reserve have political implications ... A 
case in point is the border dispute of the 
landowning Aowin and Sefwi Wiawso stools. Proper 
settlement of the case is a necessity. It will solve 
the problem of the refusal of arrest from farmers 
who claim to be in the Aowin portion of the reserve 
by Wiawso police and vice versa."1
The Paramount Stools themselves had irreconcilable 
personal interests to take into account in deciding upon their 
political support. They knew they were entitled to a 
proportion of forest revenues accruing from timber 
exploitation.2 If more timber was legally exploited, their 
revenue from this source would be correspondingly greater. The 
clearest evidence of the extent of their territorial 
boundaries in customary law, however, lay in the extent to 
which farmers authorised by them or their sub-stools occupied 
the land. If, in addition, they were to receive any direct 
share in the profit from the sale of farming rights to land 
they had to prevent their sub-stools acting secretly without 
their authority. Nevertheless, unauthorised alienations were 
at least preferable to the sale of those farming rights by 
rival stools owing allegiance to another paramount stool. In 
view of these irreconcilable interests, it is not altogether 
surprising that the Paramount Stools were discovered selling 
farmland, agreeing to reservation and urging the Department to 
act punitively against their own sub-stools. They were hedging 
their bets, trying to secure a personal benefit to themselves 
whatever the outcome of events.
1 Letter from the DFO to the RFO, 23/4/1986 Departmental
Records Sefwi Wiawso.
2 PNDCL 42/1982 s.48(1).
212
Another Departmental anti illegal farming squad was
formed in 1987. Investigations by the Department revealed that
alienations of land in Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve were
primarily attributable to the activities of the Bopa, Chori
Chori and Asantekrom sub-chiefs of the Sefwi Wiawso stool. At
the end of 1986 the Chori Chori and Asantekrom chiefs were
arrested and charged with doing acts with intent to sabotage
the economy of Ghana1 and fraud. They confessed that they had
sold the land in order to prevent the Omanhene of Aowin
selling Sefwi Wiawso stool land. Before the Western Regional
Public Tribunal both chiefs were fined 58,000 cedis each. The
PNDC had directed that prosecutions should be made through the
tribunal system because tribunals would be faster and more
severe but the fine of 58,000 cedis does not compare well with
the estimated selling price of 48,000 cedis per one 2.3
hectare farm. At the same time, farmers were being fined
between 10,000 and 30,000 cedis in the District Magistrates
Court but even these fines were far below the real value of
the timber they had destroyed.2 The view of the Department's
officers after these experiences was summed up in the 1987
Field Inspection Report;
"A truly revolutionary action is needed to end once 
and for all the illegal activities in the reserves 
of the Western District. The courts and even the 
tribunals have been surprisingly ineffective over 
the years."3
1 Public Tribunals Law PNDCL 78/1984 s.9(f).
2 Diary of Illegal Farming in Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve 
Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
3 Field Inspection Report, Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve, 
16/11/1987 Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
By 1986, it was apparent that the piecemeal and modest 
efforts of the Department were proving totally ineffective in 
the fight to stem the tide of illegal farming. On the 
contrary, a new and alarming dimension to the problem had 
arisen:
"It is apparent that the farmers having exhausted 
the Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve now intend extending 
their activities into the Santomang Forest Reserve 
... the Department will have to take some stringent 
measures to stop the farmers from destroying the 
Santomang Forest Reserve also."1
The Santomang Forest Reserve is one of the much older 
established reserves, of which there are several in the area, 
which up until the 1980s had not been seriously threatened by 
illegal farming. Respect for the boundaries of the long 
established and undisputed reserves has generally been in 
marked contrast to the widespread disregard for those reserves 
which were proposed after independence and after affording 
them only temporary protection under the Protected Timber 
Lands Act. A reasonable explanation for this contrast lies in 
the Government's failure to keep to the policy of the Act 
which was to release the land for farming in the long term. 
Opposition to forest reservation was directed at the most 
recently constituted reserves because, in addition to the 
economic incentives to continually expand farming activities, 
farmers and traditional authorities felt that they had been 
cheated of their legitimate rights to farm the land after 
salvage felling had occurred. It was hoped that the Government
1 Letter from the TO, Sui Range, to the DFO, 31/1/1986 
Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
would change its mind again and abandon its enforcement
programme once the scale of illegal farming was realised.
The realism of the farmers was not matched by Government.
The call for a more radical approach was not lost on the PNDC,
a Government noted for its revolutionary ideals. In 1989, the
PNDC ordered that all farmers occupying land illegally should
lose it to the State.1 Illegal farmers were given a deadline
to quit the reserves by May 1989. Before the deadline
materialised farmers in the Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve
petitioned the MLNR, their old champion. They claimed that
they had lawfully purchased the land in the 1950s, that they
were permanent residents in the area, that they had built
three schools within the reserve, that they produced 1,398.59
tons of cocoa from their farms for the benefit of the national
economy and that in view of all this their old established
farms in the reserve should be allowed to remain.
"If the Government deprives us of our landed 
properties which by our sweat and dint of hard 
labour have been in our possession for a 
considerable length of time now then we are damned 
for ever since we cannot possibly lay hands on any 
alternative farm lands to cultivate cocoa farms 
thereon to sustain us and our dependents."2
This time, however, the view of the PNDC prevailed. In
November 1989 ,a letter from the MLNR over turned the decision
made by the Secretary in 1977 and restored official approval
for the recommendations of the Nyinaku Committee.
1 Letter for circulation from the DFO, Sefwi Wiawso, 
10/2/1989, Departmental Records Sefwi Wiawso.
2 Petition to the MLNR re Cocoa Farms in Tano-Ehuro 
Forest Reserve near Asantekrom, 19/5/1989 Departmental Records 
Sefwi Wiawso.
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"Since the reserves were constituted to serve a 
particular purpose, both ecological and 
environmental and since the continued destruction of 
forests is detrimental to the ecological balance 
which is so much the concern of all Ghanaians at 
this time, Government has decided that ... the main 
recommendations of the Nyinaku Committee ... should 
be carried out."1
It seems likely that the PNDC really was primarily 
motivated by fears of environmental degradation. The horrors 
of the 1982 drought and the growing international concern for 
the protection of tropical forests fostered its anxiety. In 
addition, the slump in world cocoa prices confirmed the 
futility of increasing cocoa production at the expense of 
alternative exports.
There are several reasons why, for once, the Government 
could not be diverted from its goal. The PNDC has been 
outspoken in its opposition to corruption at every level of 
Government.2 It came to power in opposition to the established 
interests of the wealthy, some of whom are rumoured to have 
interests in illegal cocoa farms in the Western Region. 
Instead, it looked to the common man for its support base and 
it created grass roots political organisations to penetrate 
the rural areas.3 In the absence of a political support base 
incorporating the most influential interest groups in Ghanaian
1 Letter from the MLNR to the CCF, 6/10/1989 Departmental 
Records Juabeso-Bia.
2 Policy Guidelines of the PNDC 1982, Ghana Information 
Services Department, Accra.
3 G. Mikell, Peasant Politicisation and Economic 
Recuperation in Ghana: Local and National Dilemmas, (1989)
27(3) Journal of Modern African Studies 455-478; Y. Graham, 
The Politics of Crisis in Ghana: Class Struggles and
Organisation, 1981-1984, (1985) 34 Review of African Political 
Economy 54-68.
society, it has been prepared to use authoritarian and 
coercive methods to stem political dissent and to achieve its 
policy objectives.1 In recent years, it has fostered but not 
depended on the political support of traditional authorities. 
Consequently, the Government could not be side tracked because 
it was not sympathetic to the leading opposition interests and 
it did not consider itself to be dependent on their political 
support.2
At a meeting of regional political officers and
representatives of forest sector agencies in 1990 the details
of the Government's current strategy were worked out. It was
decided that:
"In view of the large scale dimension of farming 
activities and the resultant large settlements and 
infra structural developments, the destruction of 
the illegal farms with undue haste would result in 
serious social and economic dislocations the 
consequences of which would not be in the national 
interest ... In the attempt to restore and secure 
the forest reserves, care should be taken not to 
alienate the people from Government."3
The policy decided at that meeting was that all young 
farms in the reserves not yet bearing fruit should be 
completely destroyed as should illegal extensions to admitted
1 R. Jeffries, Leadership Commitment and Political 
Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana, in D. Rothchild 
(Ed.) Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery 1991, Rienner, 
Boulder,pp.285, p.165; E. Rado, Notes Towards A Political 
Economy of Ghana Today, (1986) 85(341) African Affairs 563- 
572, p .569.
2 Rado identifies the principal elements on which the 
PNDC relies for its support as consisting of the military, a 
proportion of the professional and managerial class and the 
Western donor community, Rado ibid p.569.
3 Letter from the RAO, Western Region, to the MLNR, 
12/1/1990 Departmental Records Juabeso-Bia.
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farms. All persons farming illegally in the reserves and all 
chiefs who illegally sold land in the reserves should be 
prosecuted. The services of the police, CDOs, CDRs and the 
District Assemblies should be called upon to provide security 
cover for the operations of the Department. Older farms should 
be phased out over a period of five years during which time 
the land should be planted up with timber species by means of
intercropping with the mature cocoa trees. Farmers should be
made responsible for the well being of the young trees. Unco­
operative farmers should be immediately dispossessed. An 
intensive educational programme was planned to encourage 
farmers to accept this modified taungya/agroforestry system. 
At the meeting attention was also drawn to the resource 
requirements of the Department. The Department did not escape 
criticism for failing to enforce regulations for the 
protection of reserves in the past.1
The details of the policy reveal an attempt to combine 
pragmatism and coercion. The decision not to destroy mature 
cocoa farms meant that the current crop would not be wasted. 
It was also an inducement to encourage established farmers to 
co-operate in the planting of timber trees which often require 
shade for their early growth. The destruction of younger farms 
would put a halt to the further colonisation of the reserves. 
Here, no mercy was to be shown whether or not farmers were 
prepared to assist in taungya operations.
The destruction of young cocoa farms but not old ones is
not an equitable measure, however. The young farms which have
ibid
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not yet given fruit are those from which no return on 
investment has been made and therefore their destruction 
represents a loss to the owners which cannot be offset by past 
profits. The new generation of cocoa farms may include smaller 
farms of young farmers who have no other independent source of 
income whereas the older farms in some cases belong to vast 
estates held by stranger farmers who, having made their money 
elsewhere in Ghana, profited greatly from an early arrival on 
the scene. According to the findings of the Nyinaku Committee, 
such farmers were not unaware that the land they purchased was 
in the process of being reserved by the Government but 
nevertheless they were prepared to gamble on their ability to 
destroy the forest more rapidly than the Government’s ability 
to protect it.1 It is these people who have already gained the 
most at the expense of the country. Young farmers today have 
simply followed their example after observing for themselves 
the dithering political support for forest reservation.
A District Assembly task force was established in Sefwi 
Wiawso at the initiative of the District Assembly in 1989 to 
implement this policy, known as "Operation Halt". The District 
forest officer was made Secretary to the task force. In 
January 1990, after the regional officers’ meeting, two trips 
were made to Tano-Ehuro Forest Reserve. Illegal farmers gave 
statements and information was taken about the persons from 
whom they acquired the land. In February 1991, a task force 
set up in Juabeso-Bia District began to implement Operation 
Halt in the proposed Bia-Tawya forest reserve.
1 Nyinaku Report op cit p.31.
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Up to November 1990, by far the most dramatic action was 
that which occurred in the neighbouring district of Bibiani. 
On August 17, 1990, the local District Secretary led a task
force comprising representatives of the Traditional Council, 
District Administration, District Assembly, Settler Farmers’ 
Association, youth associations, police, militia, CDRs, 
Department of Agriculture and Department of Forestry and other 
volunteers into the Tanosro Extension Forest Reserve to 
destroy all non fruiting cocoa trees therein. Efforts to 
reafforest the reserve with timber species were begun at the 
same time. Meetings were held with 2,000 farmers to discuss 
the care of newly planted seedlings.1 A few weeks after the 
episode complaints were voiced by farmers of mature 
plantations that their trees were also destroyed in the 
operation. It was reported that the local school was pulled 
down and that local militia had been harassing farmers to 
prevent them from going to their farms.2
Before the Bibiani episode, doubts were voiced as to 
whether local support would be forthcoming because so many 
people are involved directly or indirectly in the illegal 
farming. The establishment of markets, roads and even banks 
and Cocobod stores has given the settlements in the reserves 
an air of permanency and legitimacy. The rallying of grass 
roots support for Operation Halt in these circumstances is 
therefore quite remarkable. Two questions need to be asked - 
(a) how was support for the operation won at the local level,
1 People's Daily Graphic 20/8/1990, p.16.
; People’s Daily Graphic 11/10/1990, p.l.
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and (b) will it be possible to sustain the momentum of the 
campaign and to reafforest the reserves?
The factors which prevented the subversion of PNDC policy 
in the highest echelons of government indicate reasons for the 
initial success of Operation Halt. The PNDC has a reputation 
for authoritarian action in the face of dissent. In the 
"culture of silence" which has characterised politics in Ghana 
for the past decade, opposition to policy initiatives has been 
far from encouraged.1 While the powerful interest groups which 
dominated politics prior to 1982 have been rebuffed, the PNDC 
has established a network of "revolutionary" organisations to 
further its objectives even in the rural areas. These have 
absorbed the young unemployed and landless farmers as well as 
some civil servants who earn an income independently of 
agriculture.2 The Mobi-Squads, for example, recruited 
returning migrants from Nigeria after the massive expulsions 
of Ghanaians in 1982. Initially, these volunteers were 
employed in anti-smuggling activities which earned them a 
small income.3 At the same time, it won for the PNDC a loyal 
support base which was not wholly dependent on existing social 
networks. More than ever, it created political divisions in
1 B. Agyeman-Duah, Ghana, 1982-86: The Politics of the 
PNDC, (1987) 25(4) Journal of Modern African Studies 613-642,
p.625; Jeffries op cit p.165.
2 A. Bing, Popular Participation Versus People's Power: 
Notes on Politics and Power Struggles in Ghana, (1982) 31
Review of African Political Economy 44-57; Z. Yeebo, Ghana:
Defence Committees and the Class Struggle, (1985) 32 Review of 
African Political Economy 64-72; Graham op cit pp.54-68.
3 G. Mikell, Equity Issues in Ghana's Rural Development, 
in Rothchild op cit pp.88-100.
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rural societies.1 With the establishment of the district 
assemblies, the indications are that the PNDC has consolidated 
its penetration into rural areas. This is because, although 
the assemblies include elected representatives, each Assembly 
is headed by a District Secretary who is a political 
appointee. This is in addition to the one third maximum of 
representatives who are chosen by the PNDC.2 The evidence that 
the district assemblies have acted to implement Operation Halt 
without encouraging a full and open debate in a democratic 
fashion, despite the probability that many elected 
representatives are related to illegal farmers, is a good 
indication of the extent to which the assemblies are 
influenced by the directions of the PNDC as channelled through 
the district secretaries. The ideal of democratic and local 
participatory decision-making embodied in the Brundtland 
Report,3 is seriously modified in practice in the present 
political system because district assemblies and other grass 
roots organisations have not been used as vehicles for two way 
processes of communication.4 In reality, it is submitted, they 
have acted more like the machinery of central government 
transposed to the rural areas encompassing and sustaining a
top-down style of government.5 This accounts for their role in
1 ibid p.90.
2 Local Government Law PNDCL 207/1988, s.3, s.21.
3 WCED op cit p.331.
4 Rado op cit p.571; Yeebo op cit p.71.
5 "Verdict on Assemblies" West Africa 3-9/2/1992, 
no.3881, pp.181-182, p.182; "Transition and Its Meaning" West 
Africa no.3920, 2-8/11/1992, pp.1864-1865, p.1865.
pioneering the implementation of Operation Halt.
Several factors combine to suggest that in the long term 
the latest campaign will be no more effective than its 
predecessors. The policy is not comprehensive. For example, 
there has been no clear policy statement on what action should 
be taken with respect to the towns along with their banks, 
schools and other institutions, sited in reserves. Massive 
evictions in the past have failed to achieve any lasting 
impact and such measures only serve to further alienate the 
Government from local people but so long as these towns exist, 
there will continue to be a demand for farmland. Another 
loophole in the policy lies in allowing the mature farms to 
continue in existence for the time being. This encourages 
farmers to remain in the area and gives them more time to 
thwart the Government’s plans for their eventual eviction. The 
imminent change to a democratic form of government suggests 
that new opportunities for bureaucratic delays may present 
themselves and that the policy, unpopular locally, may not 
survive long into the future.
The plans for re-afforestation hang on whether the co­
operation of local farmers can be obtained by using the threat 
of immediate eviction. If the reward for co-operation is the 
immediate destruction of some cocoa trees and the eventual 
eviction of farmers from their land, the effort may simply not 
be worth making. In the past, taungya operations in fully 
established forest reserves have not worked well in this 
region because timber seedlings were simply neglected. The 
Department does not have the manpower to closely monitor and
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supervise replanting activities at the farm level. The threat 
of eviction, if implemented, will only be effective if non co- 
operators are in a minority because, in reality, the 
Department is dependent on farmers for the replanting and 
husbandry of timber seedlings. Relations between the 
Department and illegal farmers are fraught with suspicion, to 
say the least, so there is every reason to believe that a 
majority of illegal farmers may continue to undermine the 
efforts of the Department in any way they can. If non co­
operation is the norm, there is no reason to think that the 
prosecution or eviction of a dozen farmers a year, especially 
if fines imposed on those convicted are not sufficiently 
punitive, will serve to deter illegal farming activities any 
better than in the past. The large scale burning of cocoa 
farms is not a viable option because of the fear of bush fires 
and because timber trees do not grow well in an environment 
denuded of vegetation.
The future after the transition to democratic government 
of the revolutionary organisations which have been at the 
forefront of the campaign is not clear. In a truly democratic 
environment, it seems unlikely that locally unpopular measures 
will be pursued with the same vigour as the 1990 campaign, yet 
at the first sign of relaxation, it is not unlikely that the 
illegal occupants will rapidly return to the land which they 
have paid to farm.
Fundamentally, the policy does nothing to address the 
structural, society wide problems which the policy implies. 
This is its most serious weakness. If farmers are not
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effectively compensated for the time and money which they have 
invested in the land, if there is no public sympathy for the 
forestry cause and, most importantly, if there is no 
alternative employment available for the farmers who do not 
have farms in other parts of the country, then farmers will 
not readily co-operate in the destruction of their means of 
livelihood. Without their co-operation, massive re­
afforestation is unlikely to be realised but if the land is 
not quickly replanted, it will not be many years before local 
farmers once again encroach into the dormant and useless 
reserves and the whole saga begins again.
Operation Halt, it is submitted, adopts a strategy which 
has implications for law enforcement and re-afforestation, 
which, on the basis of past experience, seem beyond the 
capacity of local organisations to effectively implement over 
the long term. The strategy was determined in Accra and 
sanctioned by a non democratic, hierarchical government which 
has been able to mobilise its political supporters at the 
local level in the short term. It does not take into account 
the long term and quite drastic social problems which it may 
cause and because it does not offer jobs, rewards or 
compensation for local people it is a policy initiative which 
invites reversal once democratic government is restored.
If the Government wants to find a successful policy which 
will not waste its time and resources while further 
antagonising local people, then it should take a more 
realistic view of this complicated affair. It should admit the 
magnitude of its mistakes and consider what it really has the
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resources to achieve. Fundamentally, its greatest mistake has 
been continual indecisiveness over the past thirty years. This 
has led to long spells of inaction punctuated by radical 
outbursts which have provided no long term solution in the 
face of steady and intense opposition from illegal farmers. If 
whole reserves have been converted to farmland and settlements 
then, it is submitted, it is now too late to salvage this 
land. A more feasible strategy is to strengthen the capacities 
of the local district forestry departments which should now 
concentrate on protecting the existing, long established 
forest reserves which remain mostly intact. This job by itself 
is enough to stretch the resources of the Department. 
International funding should be allocated to this end and the 
maintenance of long term, logistical support for district 
forestry offices should be made a priority.
Areas of reserved land which have been seriously 
encroached upon by illegal farmers should be de-reserved in 
return for a guarantee by traditional and district authorities 
that they accept some responsibility for helping to prevent 
any future encroachments into forest reserves. The payment to 
them of a proportion of forest revenue could be made dependent 
on their success in implementing this policy. In the future, 
farmers who encroach illegally into forest reserves should 
have all their farmland, wherever located, confiscated as a 
matter of course. However, in view of the secrecy surrounding 
matters of land ownership in this region, it has to be 
admitted that the task of identifying the real farm owners and 
of ascertaining the extent of their other property would be
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formidable. The compulsory registration of titles in this area 
under the Land Titled Registration Law1 could facilitate the 
implementation of this proposal but there would be very little 
incentive for farmers to obey the law in this case.
Sanction orientated strategies of this type, it is 
submitted, would be more effective if, at the same time, more 
positive measures were introduced as part of a package to 
induce greater conformity to the law.2 Their continuation 
could, for example, be made dependent on local co-operation in 
protecting the remaining forest reserves from illegal 
encroachments.
Prevention is always better than cure. A measure in line 
with this strategy would be more official support for the 
rehabilitation of mature cocoa farms because this would help 
to side track the desire for continual expansion into virgin 
forest. The high cost of agro-chemicals is of relevance here. 
If their cost continues to increase, it will frustrate efforts 
to improve productivity on existing farms, a goal which, if 
put into effect, could help to discourage expansion into 
virgin forest.
New investment opportunities should be promoted so that 
land acquisition is not the only avenue for profitable 
investments. For example, opportunities in the marketing of 
cocoa and supply of agro-chemicals may arise pursuant to the 
Government's liberalisation policies.
In addition, agricultural and forestry departments should
1 PNDCL 152/1986
Seidman, The State, Law and Development op cit p.102.
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liaise closely at the local level to introduce agroforestry 
techniques1 and to win support for the environmental 
objectives of forest reservation. Their policies should be re­
assessed so as to better complement each other. For example, 
the new varieties of cocoa seed being promoted by the Ministry 
of Agriculture require little shade, an attribute not entirely 
conducive to agroforestry.
Fundamentally, there is a long term need to integrate 
the local economy much more closely with forest exploitation.' 
Only in this way will the logic of sustainable development 
really appeal to local people who must forego the immediate 
opportunity to expand their farming activities. This goal 
would require, at a minimum, the adoption of a long term, 
comprehensive plan which would take into account the economic, 
land-use and environmental inter-linkages which lie at the 
heart of this issue. This would end the history of piecemeal 
confrontation which has served only to foster bitterness and 
resentment for the work of the Forestry Department. Government 
should finally abandon the use of coercive techniques 
reminiscent of the authoritarian, colonial strategy and move 
gradually towards the implementation of a more holistic 
development programme very much in line with the philosophy of 
the Brundtland Report.
When the analysis is enlarged in this way to take into
1 This was also a recommendation of the FRMP Report, 
supra p .161.
2 The opportunities for small scale producers in some 
aspects of timber processing and in the exploitation of minor 
forest produce in forest reserves are discussed in chapter 
eight infra
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account the underlying, cross sectoral issues, many 
opportunities for international environmental support, 
directly and indirectly, present themselves. Many of the 
policy recommendations just made could, for example, be 
implemented initially with the help of international aid.
(iii) Conclusion.
The multitude of problems facing the Department in the 
performance of its protective functions has been made clear in 
this account. The manpower and resources of local district 
offices have never been sufficient to cope with large scale 
intrusions into forest reserves. The ability of the Department 
to rehabilitate deforested areas has not been proven. 
Political support from the Government has been inconsistent or 
even blatantly obstructive at times. The courts, tribunals and 
police have given little assistance to the Department. This 
has left the latter completely isolated and in an impossible 
position for the greater part of the period since 1965. Delays 
in official procedures have encouraged farmers to pursue their 
illegal activities. Uncertainties as to land ownership by 
stools and tenant farmers, boundary disputes and the lack of 
written evidence of land transactions available to the 
Department have enabled secrecy and lies to confound the 
investigations of the Department. The legal fiction that land 
in a forest reserve vests in the traditional landowners and 
their acknowledged right to revenue arising out of that title 
are factors which have encouraged stools to grossly abuse 
their position by competing with each other in the sale of
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land to tenant farmers. Evidence of land ownership and 
alienation by specific persons has been hard to amass. In 
these circumstances, the real culprits who purchased the land 
can often not be traced. The chiefs' stranglehold on land 
ownership and political society at the local level keeps 
strangers and officials anxious not to offend them. Their 
influence and that of the wealthy and influential tenant 
farmers has been instrumental in diverting and postponing 
policy implementation. There is a not unreasonable fear of 
violent repercussions on forestry officers who try to destroy 
the status quo.
Underlying all these issues is the fact that cocoa is a 
lucrative crop for individuals as well as Government. The 
soils and climate in this area are well suited to the 
cultivation of this crop. In recent years the region has 
become more commercialised and more heavily populated than was 
the case when the earlier forest reserves were established in 
the colonial age. In these circumstances, it seems likely that 
it will never be possible to constitute those former protected 
areas which are now heavily farmed, into productive forest 
reserves.
The account in this chapter suggests that poverty is not 
the only motivating factor behind environmentally destructive 
activities. Where low income labourers are working the land, 
they are frequently acting merely as caretakers for absentee 
farm owners. On the contrary, it is because the interests of 
the wealthy are affected that the matter has been allowed to 
drag on for so long. They have fostered delays and U-turns
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which have rendered nugatory the impact of government 
policies. This confirms the view that law and policy are fora 
in which competing interest groups fight to protect and 
promote their own interests sometimes at the expense of 
environmental protection.
The result of these political manoeuvrings is that the 
opportunity to preserve the original forest in some reserves 
has now been lost for ever. Government should therefore 
reassess its strategy and adopt a more pragmatic policy which, 
so far as possible, takes into account the complex, underlying 
factors affecting the situation. This is consistent with the 
Brundtland approach.1 It requires, however, a radical 
reorientation of policy towards a long term view taking into 
account the whole development of this region. There has been 
no indication to date that Government has, in actual fact, 
moved any closer to this view.
Development bureaucracies have been noted for their 
compartmentalism, incremental decision-making and short term 
strategies.2 These problems were identified in the Brundtland 
Report3 and are clearly in evidence in this affair. The 
evidence in this chapter suggests that although Brundtland 
style reforms are clearly desirable in this case, there are 
formidable problems impeding them both at the policy and 
implementation stages.
1 WCED op cit pp.62-65.
2 Seidman op cit p.240.
J WCED op cit p.9.
231
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF FOREST EXPLOITATION.
"Individual governments can better use renewable 
resources such as forests and fisheries to ensure 
that exploitation rates stay within the limits of 
sustainable yields and that finances are available 
to regenerate resources and deal with all linked 
environmental effects ... 1,1
One of the principal contributions of the sustainable 
development debate to theories of environmental protection is 
its emphasis on the controlled exploitation of natural 
resources. Where the resource is potentially renewable, the 
Brundtland Report argued in favour of responsible management 
to secure a perpetual supply of the resource so that, at a 
minimum, basic needs can be met indefinitely.2
Sustained yield management is a principal objective of 
the science of forestry. It is a goal which has been formally 
incorporated into Ghanaian forestry policy since 1949.3 The 
objective of this chapter is to consider the extent to which 
the relevant laws and policies relating to forest exploitation 
serve to implement the goal of sustainable development.
This discussion relates well to a number of issues raised 
in chapter one. In particular, the question whether economic 
growth in the 1980s led in practice to a real concern for the 
environment is pertinent to the Brundtland premise that 
economic growth is one essential pre-requisite for sustainable
1 WCED op cit p.82.
2 ibid p.45.
2 Forestry Department Annual Report 1949, Government 
Printer, Accra, p.l.
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development.1 The discussion in chapter one on the role of 
conflicting interest groups in law reform and law 
implementation is also relevant.2 The conflict model of law in 
society suggests that if the concerns of relevant interest 
groups are not consistent with the requirements of sustainable 
development, they will attempt to prevent the enactment, or 
alternatively to frustrate the implementation, of laws and 
policies which embody the principles of sustainable 
development. Has this been the case with forest exploitation 
in Ghana? If so, what can be done to interest these groups in 
sustainable exploitation? What are the underlying constraints 
which may frustrate sustainable development even when the 
correct laws and policies are in place? Will improvements in 
management suffice to implement a sustainable development 
strategy? If not, what recommendations can be made to help 
improve conformity to the law and to enhance the long term 
prospects for sustainability?
Because sustainability implies exploitation as well as 
protection, the strategy of this chapter is unashamedly to 
ground legal analysis in the realities of the economic world 
in which timber exploitation is pursued. In so doing, the 
intention is to expand upon questions of legal and scientific 
technicalities in order to identify the underlying factors 
which may promote or frustrate sustainable development 
policies. Fundamental to a structural analysis of this type, 
is not only an assessment of the laws for managing the forest
1 WCED op cit p.51.
2 Supra p.44.
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estate but also an inquiry into the composition and 
performance of the local timber industry whose activities may 
fundamentally affect the success or failure of sustainable 
management strategies. This requires an assessment of the 
whole range of problems which face the industry and those who 
try to control it.
In the first part of this chapter, the constitution of 
the forest from a commercial viewpoint is introduced. The 
principal features of the timber industry in Ghana and the 
most topical problems which presently confront it are then 
discussed. An assessment of the relevant legal measures is 
then made incorporating aspects of the preceding discussion. 
The exploitation of minor forest produce is also briefly 
discussed, followed by a summary of the principal conclusions 
drawn in this chapter.
Official statistics are incorporated into the discussion. 
In many cases, the Forest Inventory Project has improved data 
collection making these statistics quite reliable but, 
throughout the discussion, special mention will be made in 
those cases where the element of doubt remains great.
In practice, there are many obstacles to the sustainable 
exploitation of the forest estate. Economic realities all too 
often lead to the adoption of short term, unsustainable 
policies while private interests undermine official management 
strategies. Rationalisation of the industry as well as more 
effective enforcement of forest regulations appear to be pre­
requisites to sustainable forest exploitation but unfavourable 
international and national economic circumstances seem to
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prevent industrial restructuring. These factors also undermine 
attempts being made to improve domestic management.
(i) The Timber Resource.
Ghana now has approximately 17,000 km2 of forest reserves 
and 3,700 km2 of unreserved forest in the High Forest Zone.1 
These forests contain at least 680 tree species of which 126 
species are currently or potentially of commercial value. 
However, the major part of the timber exploited at the present 
time consists of only 40 species.2 The extent to which the 
most popular export species are being over cut is demonstrated 
in the following figures:
Estimated Resource Life For Some Commercial Species.3 
Species Girth Resource > Annual Rate of Resource
Limit Girth Limit Growth Extraction Li:
m3 m3/yr m3/yr yrs
Odum lift 1 408 000 28 650 172 983 10
Edinam 468 000 7 155 33 167 18
Sapele 702 000 13 496 41 135 25
Utile 465 000 8 081 31 891 20
Mahogany 692 000 31 488 66 877 20
Wawa 7ft 26 356 000 135 779 366 064 114
Dahoma 5 254 000 75 569 14 915 **
Kyenkyen 3 726 000 33 331 14 801 **
Mansonia 695 000 2 753 5 830 226
** Growth exceeds felling rate.
1 TEDB, Ghana: Forests, Wood and People op cit p.6.
2 TEDB Status Report on the Ghana Timber Industry 1990, 
Unpublished Brief, Takoradi, pp.12, p.2.
2 D. Alder, Natural Forest Increment, Growth and Yield, 
in Ghana Forest Inventory Project: Proceedings of a Seminar in
Accra, 29-30/3/1989 1989, Accra, pp.90, pp.47-58, p.49.
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The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is self 
evident. The exploitation of some popular redwoods such as 
Odum, Sapele and Mahogany must be drastically curtailed if 
they are not to become extinct in the near future while 
exploitation of other commercial yet not so popular species 
should be increased in order to take advantage of the 
resources available. The problem for Ghana is that the 
international timber market is a buyer's market, traditionally 
very selective in its choice of species.1 The present 
Government has demonstrated its commitment to encouraging the 
export of secondary species which are relatively abundant in 
Ghana in the establishment of the TEDB2 but the institution is 
constrained by the dictates of the international market.3
The Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) is the amount of timber 
which can be harvested each year from a forest without 
depleting the growing stock. It is calculated from the annual 
incremental growth of a variety of commercial species and the 
estimated total volume of those species. The accuracy of the 
AAC is reduced if the range of species actually exported is 
less than the range included in the calculation of the AAC. 
The AAC for Ghana has recently been estimated at 1.25 cubic 
metres per hectare per annum which means that an estimated
1 P. Hurst Rainforest Politics: Ecological Destruction in 
South-East Asia 1990, Zed Books, London, pp.303, p.264; J. 
Wyatt-Smith The Manaqment of Tropical Moist Forest for the 
Sustained Production of Timber: Some Issues 1987, 
IUCN/IIED/WWFN Tropical Forest Policy Paper no.4, IUCN 
Publications Service, Cambridge, pp.19, p.9.
2 PNDCL 123/1985 s.2(b).
Interview with Mr. Attah, TEDB, 14/11/1990.
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1.45 million cubic metres of timber can be cut from Ghana's 
forests each year without depleting the resource base.1
Production in 1988 was 1.137 million cubic metres.2 Although
this figure falls within the AAC, it fails to take into 
account timber felled or damaged but never removed from the
forest. It has been estimated that the actual cut approximates
more closely to 2.7 million cubic metres, a figure clearly in 
excess of the AAC.3
The limited nature of the resource base in Ghana will not 
allow the indefinite growth of the timber industry. If the 
policy of sustained yield production is to prevail, and this 
is the main objective of the FRMP, then the timber industry 
must be rationalised so that demand for raw materials does not 
outstrip available supplies. In future, the industry will have 
to utilise more secondary species, increase secondary
processing and improve efficiency in order to reduce waste and 
maximise returns from the limited resource base.
(ii) The Timber Industry: Characteristics and Performance.
The timber industry is a major earner of foreign exchange 
in Ghana. In 1988, 536,213 cubic metres of wood products were 
exported earning for the country US$ 97 million. Another 
242,000 cubic metres of timber were consumed locally. The
1 Alder op cit p.55.
2 Status Report on Ghana Timber Industry op cit Appendix
One.
3 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.68.
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sector accounts for approximately 5-6% of GDP.1 At the present 
time, there are 200 companies engaged in logging activities, 
100 companies engaged in saw milling, 9 companies engaged in 
plywood production and 13 companies engaged in veneer 
production. There is only one chipboard manufacturer.2 Some of 
the distinguishing characteristics of the industry are 
summarised below.
(A) The Separate Ownership of Logging and Processing 
Enterprises.
Since the earliest days, timber exploitation has been 
characterised by the presence of well capitalised, European 
concessionaires and under capitalised, local operators usually 
working on a much smaller scale. Differentiation increased 
when European firms began to invest in capital intensive 
processing mills after the Second World War. After 
independence, discrimination in the award of concessions 
compelled foreign owned companies to concentrate on further 
processing while purchasing raw materials from concession 
holding Ghanaians.3 Further processing by local operators 
usually consisted of pitsawing4 (now replaced by chain saw 
operators) or furniture production for the local market.
1 ibid p.1.
2 TEDB op cit p.4.
3 Evidence of discrimination was produced in the Blay 
Report. See supra p.130.
4 Pitsawing involves digging a pit in the forest beside 
the tree to be felled and immediately sawing the tree into 
lumber once felled.
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The result of this history is still evident today. The 
industry is clearly differentiated between logging, processing 
and furniture-making enterprises. Thus, the preponderance of 
furniture manufacturers are local companies employing less 
than 20 persons. Meanwhile, in the milling sub-sector, 
although there is a greater distribution between small and 
large companies,1 the largest private companies continue to be 
foreign owned. In these large, foreign owned companies the 
dominance of a small number of persons related by family and 
business links is striking. However, some of the largest 
processing enterprises are now owned by the State.2
The logging sub-sector is further differentiated between 
legal and illegal operators. The former include the large, 
nationalised companies and private Ghanaian concessionaires 
who either export their logs or sell directly to processing 
companies, including those foreign owned companies which do 
not have their own concessions. The latter are Ghanaian 
operators working outside the formal concession procedure, 
feeding local markets with timber which has been chain sawn in 
the forest. Trespass by chain saw operators into concessions 
outside forest reserves is common. Chain saw operations are 
only legal when a felling licence has been granted by the
1 Department of Statistical Services, Ghana Directory of 
Industrial Establishments, 1988 1989, Accra, pp.306, pp.60-90.
2 These include Gliksten (West Africa) Ltd., Takoradi 
Veneer and Lumber Ltd.and African Timber and Plywood (Ghana) 
Ltd., Subin Timbers Ltd. and Central Logging and Sawmills 
Ltd.. See Timber Operations (Government Participation) Decree 
NRCD 139/1972, s.1.; Forfeiture of Assets and Transfer of 
Shares and Other Proprietary Interests (Subin Timbers Ltd. and
Central Logging and Sawmills Ltd.) Law PNDCL 31/1982, s.1,2.
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Lands Department. These are occasionally awarded for the 
felling of a specified number of trees on land not falling 
within a concession but the majority of chain saw operations 
have not been authorised under this procedure. In addition, a 
number of District Assemblies now require the registration of 
local chain saw operators. This is in addition to the 
requirement that chain saw operators should register with 
their local branch of the FPIB.1
The differentiated structure of the industry has 
facilitated a situation in which it is difficult for 
processing mills which do not hold concessions to secure
regular supplies of wood from their frequently less well
organised counterparts in the logging sub-sector.
(B) Structural Inefficiencies.
In 1934, it was reported that the timber industry was
full of insecurity and badly organised. The trade was mostly 
in the hands of under capitalized Africans who were not able 
to compete effectively on the world market. African timber 
cutters received cash advances from European middlemen engaged 
in the shipment of logs mainly to Britain. Whether the logs 
cut would be of an acceptable quality to the purchaser,
whether timely shipment would be available and whether the 
local timber cutters would ever get their full payment were 
all matters of chance. These circumstances did not encourage 
skilled workmen to enter the business and the end result was 
the flooding of the market with low grade timber, poorly sawn
PNDCL 117/1985 s.2(j).
240
if at all and never fully seasoned.1
It was these kind of problems which prompted the 
establishment of the Timber Marketing Board after 
independence.2 Although the performance of the industry has 
since improved, the industry remains badly organised in 
respects not always too dissimilar to the past. Many companies 
continue to be under capitalised; the industry has a poor loan 
recovery record and there is still a shortage of skilled 
labour.
The most obvious structural inefficiency is the excess 
capacity in the saw milling and logging sub-sectors. Many 
mills are estimated to be running at between 40-50% of 
capacity.3 The Economic Recovery Programme was partly 
responsible for the revival of small scale logging companies.4 
The shrinking resource base and the more stringent application 
of silvicultural controls suggest that restructuring of the 
industry is now inevitable with the least efficient firms 
being liable to collapse.
The presence of widespread malpractice in the industry5 
perpetuates structural inefficiencies. The poor loan recovery 
record has made finance for investment in improved technology
1 F.M. Oliphant, Report on the Commercial Possibilities 
and Development of the Forests of the Gold Coast, 
1934,Government Printer, Accra, pp.13.
2 Supra Chp.5., p.169.
3 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.6. Correspondence with 
some timber firms in 1990 indicated that this estimate (made 
in 1988) was improving.
4 Infra p.248.
5 Infra p .260.
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scarce. The industry therefore exhibits excess capacity in the 
logging and milling sub-sectors but a lack of investment in 
more sophisticated types of further processing.
(C) Wasteful Technologies.
The industry has always been accused of wastefulness in 
its use of timber resources. In 1951, a Fact Finding Committee 
on the Timber Industry in the Western Region reported that 
waste of timber often resulted from the activities of 
incompetent operators working on a minimum of capital. Further 
waste resulted from delays in the movement of timber due to 
the lack of suitable transport and the inadequate facilities 
at Takoradi Harbour. There were further inefficiencies in 
building work and furniture manufacture.1
More recently, it has been estimated that 25-50% of all 
timber cut is left on the forest floor while as much as 40-60% 
of the timber that reaches the factory floor may also be 
wasted.2 Sources of waste in the forest lie in the failure to 
utilise big branches, the practice of burning the base of 
trees before cutting, the practice of only cutting above 
breast height and leaving large top off-cuts and the practice 
of leaving wood split in felling on the forest floor.3 Often
1 Report of the Fact Finding Committee on the Timber 
Industry in the Western Province of the Gold Coast 1951, 
Government Printer, Accra, pp.viii-xii.
2 R. Chatchu, Allowable Cut From the Forest, in Ghana 
Forest Inventory Project ... op cit pp.63-71, p.64.
3 C.Y.Faakye, Survey into Logging Waste in a Selected 
Forest Reserve of Ghana 1988, Dissertation submitted for the 
Diploma in Natural Resource Management, UST, Kumasi, pp.56,
p.2.
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the principal reason why this timber is left in the forest is 
the lack of machinery able to process it.
Inefficient and out of date machinery is also the 
principal reason for the level of wastage reported in 
processing. While many operators do not consider as waste that 
which can be sold or used as firewood or offcuts and that 
which they do not have the capacity to process, more 
sophisticated machinery could undoubtedly convert the timber 
into higher value products.1
Some foresters believe that small logging and saw milling 
enterprises are less efficient than their larger 
counterparts.2 Small operators cannot afford to employ 
efficient machinery and skilled manpower. They are likely to 
be under capitalised and less co-operative with the regulatory 
agencies. Their overhead costs are likely to be 
proportionately greater. However, large scale loggers and 
millers also work inefficiently if their sole concern is to 
take only the best quality timber of a few select species in 
order to meet specific export contracts.3 Only a small number 
of the very largest firms are able to process all grades of 
timber using the most efficient machinery. In fact, both large 
and small scale operators employ wasteful techniques and many 
foresters argue that the size of the enterprise need not be
1 See also, D.Otoo, Logging Waste on a Felling Area of a 
Small Scale Logger in Ghana 1978, BSc Dissertation, UST, 
Kumasi, pp.29; O.Attah, Utilisation of Mill Residues in Ghana: 
A Case Study in Kumasi 1987, BSc Dissertation, UST, Kumasi, 
pp.33.
2 Otoo, op cit p.3.
3 Faakye op cit p.7.
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the principal factor determining efficiency.1 However, large 
concessionaires do have a reputation for more closely 
following silvicultural requirements and for more reliable 
payment of forest fees. On this basis alone, it can be argued 
that, in future, priority in the award of concessions should 
go to larger operators who have proved themselves reliable.
It seems likely that under the current pressure to 
improve efficiency, larger concessionaires will be in a better 
position to upgrade their technology and to improve manpower 
training. This seems to be the assumption made in the FRMP 
Report which recommends the regrouping and enlargement of 
concessions so that larger concessionaires will be able to 
take full advantage of economies of scale.2 However, more 
investment in the necessary technology and training is an 
essential pre-requisite to increased efficiency by larger 
concessionaires. The FRMP does not include measures to address 
this long term, structural need. The high interest rates 
charged locally make it difficult to forsee an early 
investment in new technology of this type.
The need for efficiency generating investments is also 
evident in milling enterprises. If the necessary investment is 
forthcoming there are many opportunities for increasing the 
value added to mill residues, among other things. For example, 
briquettes can be produced from sawdust. The manufacture of 
chip board and high value curls are also areas deserving
1 This view was put to the writer by members of several 
forest sector institutions.
2 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.16.
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attention. A great opportunity for investment in this type of 
equipment was lost in the early stages of the Economic 
Recovery Programme.1 Smaller milling enterprises are less 
likely to be able to raise the capital for investment in 
efficiency improving technologies. One possible development is 
for these companies to concentrate on milling secondary 
species which can be economically worked despite 
inefficiencies in milling procedures. Primary species would 
then be reserved for those companies which can most 
efficiently process the timber. In addition to this limited 
presence in the saw mill sub-sector, there should continue to 
be a role for the small scale operator who is able to utilise 
off-cuts and wood residues in a more profitable fashion. 
Labour intensive uses of offcuts and mill residues, such as 
furniture manufacture, may be the most promising field of 
enterprise but it must be remembered that while the local 
market for charcoal and firewood is guaranteed, the ability to 
market higher value goods both locally or regionally is 
dependent on good marketing facilities and increased 
purchasing power.
The drive for greater efficiency suggests that a 
rationalisation of the industry is now inevitable. Although 
the value of generalising about the relative efficiencies of 
large and small scale operators is limited, there are good 
reasons for thinking that a reduction in the number of small 
scale loggers and millers is overdue. The future for small 
scale operators appears to be more promising in the areas of
1 Infra pp.248-254.
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labour intensive further processing and in the manufacture of 
secondary species for domestic and regional markets.
(D) Wide Fluctuations in Exports and Performance.
The Ghanaian timber industry has always been subject to 
large fluctuations in performance. This is best seen in the 
record of timber exports during this century. For example, the 
volume of gross timber exports in 1911 was approximately 31.1 
thousand cubic metres but two years later, timber exports of 
84.96 thousand cubic metres were recorded. During the 1920s 
and 1930s, timber exports slumped reaching a nadir point of 
6.8 thousand cubic metres in 1933.1
Export trends have been dominated by international market 
conditions. For example, buoyant international demand during 
and immediately after the Second World War led to an 
unprecedented timber export boom during these years. In 1950, 
the volume of logs and lumber being exported was 294.24 
thousand cubic metres and 58.9 thousand cubic metres 
respectively. Led by strong international demand, the timber 
industry continued to grow at an incredible rate after 1950. 
By 1960, the volume of logs and lumber being exported was now 
818.73 thousand cubic metres and 236.19 thousand cubic metres 
respectively. After 1960, however, fluctuations once again 
became more prominent. Domestic factors were now more 
significant than the vagaries of international demand.
1 Statistics compiled from Dua-Anto, Ghana's Timber 
Trade, 1957-1958, 1971, Msc (Econ) Dissertation, University of 
Ghana, Legon, pp.70.
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Log and Sawn Timber Exports 1960-1966.1
Year Log Exports Sawn Timber Exports
(000m3) (000m3)
1960 1 084.7 273.9
1961 955.6 366.6
1962 589.4 350.8
1963 796.2 323.6
1964 706.2 354.1
1965 669.4 283.4
1966 523.7 254.4
The principal reasons for the decline in log exports 
after 1960 were analysed in the Blay Report. The chaos created 
by the corrupt allocation of concessions and the unhealthy 
interference in the affairs of the industry by the GTMB and 
the Timber Co-operative Union were not the only pertinent 
factors.2 The high rate of taxes, the steep rise in royalties 
and the inadequate port and harbour facilities were also 
blamed.3
With the institutional changes made after 1968 and high 
world demand, conditions in the industry once again improved. 
Log production reached an all time high in 1973. In that year, 
2.1 million cubic metres of timber were exported of which 1.08 
million cubic metres constituted log exports and 290,000 cubic 
metres constituted lumber exports. The world recession 
contributed to a downfall in exports thereafter from which the
1 Report of the Fact Finding Committee on the Timber 
Industry ... op cit Table 1.
2 See also, The Issue and Review of Concessions After
1962 Supra Chp.5.
5 Okona Ewool op cit pp.49-52.
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timber industry has never fully recovered. The deteriorating 
economic situation in Ghana in the late 1970s saw the further 
decline of the industry. By 1982, timber production had 
reached its nadir point. In that year, log exports were down 
to 53,000 cubic metres and lumber exports were 47,000 cubic 
metres.1 Factors contributing to this slump included the 
deteriorating state of logging and processing equipment for 
which spare parts were unavailable, poor road, rail and 
harbour infra structure and the over valued cedi.
The performance of the industry in the 1980s has been 
marked by a dramatic recovery from this position. In 1988, 
239,000 cubic metres of logs and 197,000 cubic metres of 
lumber were exported. The success of the Economic Recovery 
Programme, which is discussed below, is the main reason 
accounting for this dramatic recovery.
Logging activities require little starting up capital so 
it is an activity which often figures prominently in the early 
stages of economic recovery but, of course, these same 
enterprises are susceptible to economic downturns. In short, 
the industry is a highly vulnerable one, sensitive to both the 
international and domestic economic situation.
1 TEDB, Status Report on Ghana Timber Industry op cit 
Appendix One.
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(E) The Timber Industry Since 1980.
In 1983, the present Government started its Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP). A series of macro economic reforms 
were instituted.' The cedi was devalued and exporting 
industries were permitted to retain a proportion of their 
foreign exchange earnings for the purchase of spare parts. A 
new Investment Code was enacted in 1985 which provided that 
the timber industry was one of the sectors prioritised for 
investment.2 Timber companies were exempted from the payment 
of import duties on equipment imported exclusively for use in 
the company.3 Under the first phase of the ERP (1983-86), 
US$128 million was made available as loans to the industry on 
preferential exchange rates. The greater part of the finance 
(54.4%) contributed to the purchase of logging equipment.4 
These measures resulted in a dramatic recovery in the sector.
1 There is a considerable literature on the impact of 
structural adjustment lending in Ghana. See, for example, K. 
Ewusi, Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Policies in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study of Ghana's Experience in 
1983-1986 1987, Ghana Publishing Corporation, Tema, Ghana,
pp.91; J. Toye, "Ghana" in P. Mosley, J. Harrigan, J. Toye, 
Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending (Volume 
Two) 1989, Routledge, London, at pp.443, pp.150-200; K.Newman, 
Ghana: Can the Adjustment Reforms be Sustained? (1991) 16(3-4) 
Africa Development 183-205.
2 Investment Code PNDCL 116/1985, s.12.
; ibid s.12(i).
4 TEDB op cit p.5.
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Timber Exports 1982-1990 (OOOm3).1
However, this dramatic 
recovery has not been 
trouble free. The principal 
implementing agency, 
Silviconsult,2 has been 
criticised for the criteria 
which it used to recommend 
companies for loans. The 
Investment Centre has been 
found responsible for
Year Logs Lumber
1982 53 47
1983 61 56
1984 70 72
1985 130 96
1986 196 117
1987 298 188
1988 239 197
1989* 202 176
1990* 500 200
* Projected
granting tax concessions meant for large scale processing 
industries to small scale loggers and saw mills. The TEDB and 
the FPIB have been charged with perpetuating the entrenched 
malpractice which pervades the industry. It has been estimated 
that between 1985 and 1987 the number of independent logging 
companies rose from 90 to over 300 so that paper companies 
could take advantage of the loans.3 The NIC has now revealed 
something of the scale of illegal practices in the timber 
industry and the loss of revenue to Government in consequence 
thereof.4 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the
1 ibid Appendix One.
2 This was the consultancy firm appointed by the IBRD to 
recommend loans to forest industries. W. Keeling, Forests Pay 
as Ghana Loses Out Financial Times 8/2/1989.
3 "Timber Scandals", West Africa no.3733, 6-12/3/1989, 
p.345.
' The NIC Sub-Committee on Timber infra p.259.
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rehabilitation programme was the emphasis placed on logging
investments without any corresponding investment in the type
of further processing facilities which the country so badly
lacks and is so keen to encourage. The above figures
demonstrate quite clearly that log exports were the mainstay
of the recovery, particularly in its early stages.
These findings raise important questions about the
motives of international multilateral development banks:
"Aiming investment at maintaining the international 
status quo and supporting donor nations' domestic 
industries cannot be ruled out as a major objective 
of (World) Bank policy."1
Under the ERP, funding was provided in order to speed up 
forest exploitation so as to maximise short term foreign 
exchange earnings without any regard to the deleterious 
environmental consequences of a shrinking resource base. The 
programme failed in every respect to meet the national policy 
goal of increased domestic wood processing but without lending 
to support this sort of fundamental restructuring the economy 
will continue to be highly vulnerable to fluctuating demand 
and falling international commodity prices. It will be no 
threat, however, to the wood processing industries of donor 
countries.
An important opportunity for increasing the value of the 
country's exports has been lost. Unless further processing is 
encouraged and the level of wastage is reduced, foreign 
exchange earnings will fall as production is reduced to a 
level compatible with the AAC. In the long term, the failure
1 P. Hurst op cit p.254.
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to support industrial restructuring will intensify the supply 
crisis which the declining stock of primary species threatens 
to create.
The World Bank has been criticised for neglecting the 
environmental consequences associated with project lending but 
the analysis here shows that policy based lending may have 
equally serious environmental consequences.1 The Brundtland 
Report was correct, therefore, to draw attention to the need 
to take into account the possible environmental impacts of 
policy based lending.2
Evidence relating to the role played by Silviconsult, the 
World Bank appointed implementing agency, suggests that 
credits were liberally provided but poorly supervised with the 
result that funds disappeared into private pockets while 
Government lost vital revenue:
"It is unreasonable to expect the (World) Bank or
any other development agency to end corruption ...
but they could stop funding it."3
The Brundtland Report called for more aid and for more 
responsible aid.4 The recent history of the ERP in Ghana 
exemplifies this need.
It is ironic that the Government has now embarked on a 
World Bank sponsored Forest Resource Management Project the 
principal objective of which is to ensure that Ghana's forests
1 ibid p.262.
2 WCED op cit p.78.
3 Hurst op cit p.255.
1 WCED op cit p.77.
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are managed on a sustained yield basis.1 The main components 
of the Project include reforms in the system of allocating 
concessions2 and in the method of calculating forest fees,3 
measures for strengthening forest sector institutions and the 
management of forest resources4 as well as measures to support 
rural forestry.5 The major impact of the Project on the timber 
industry is expected to lie in the increased efficiency which 
will become necessary due to higher forest fees.6 It is no 
credit to the World Bank, however, that the FRMP excludes a 
more positive component designed to encourage industrial 
restructuring in the timber sector.
It is naive to assume that sustainability will be 
attained without directly addressing the fundamental 
structural imbalances in the timber industry. The evidence of 
malpractice in the disbursement of recent loans shows how 
private interests in short term gains can distort the impact 
of aid programmes. The fact that 54.4% of the finance was 
spent on logging equipment suggests that there is now an even 
stonger lobby whose interest lies in the immediate 
exploitation of precious timber resources. This lobby must be 
squarely confronted in order to prevent it undermining the
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.l.
2 See further, The Grant, Review and Determination of 
Concessions infra p.276.
3 Financial Controls infra p.293.
4 Management Institutions supra Chp.6.
r’ Minor Forest Produce and Rural Forestry infra p. 303.
* Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.24.
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attempt to enforce sustainable exploitation policies. Measures 
to assist in the upgrading of competent production outfits may 
help to win over the more capable and serious entrepreneurs to 
the aims of long term, sustainable exploitation. Such measures 
will reduce the vulnerability of the Government to 
international and local pressures favouring excessive 
exploitation.
The experience of the 1980s offers a graphic example of 
how revived economic growth can have detrimental implications 
for the environmental resource base unless and until 
appropriate planning and environmental safeguards are built 
into economic decision-making. This finding is consistent with 
the Brundtland proposals for changing the quality of growth1 
and on co-ordinating economic and environmental decision­
making.2 It provides a graphic warning, however, of the danger 
inherent in a reading of the Brundtland Report's emphasis on 
the importance of revivng economic growth3 in isolation to its 
recommendations on changing the quality of that growth.4 In 
addition, it adds weight to the argument raised in chapter one 
that, contrary to the view of the WCED Commissioners, poverty 
is not the sole or necessarily the principal agent of 
environmentally destructive activities in many situations.5
1 WCED op cit p.52.
2 ibid p.313.
3 ibid p.51.
4 ibid p.52.
5 Supra p.34.
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(F)The Ban on the Export of Primary Species in Log Form.
In 1978, the Government banned the export of fourteen 
primary species in log form. This was in order to encourage 
the export of timber in higher value products. The ban has 
continued in force and a total of nineteen primary species now 
fall within its ambit.
It is difficult to measure the impact of the ban. It 
preceded the biggest slump in the history of the industry but 
this decline is usually attributed to the economic situation 
in Ghana generally at this time. Before the introduction of 
the ban, it was believed that one of its positive results 
would be the greater supply of logs to the sawmills. They were 
suffering from a shortage of raw materials even though Ghana 
was exporting unprocessed logs. However, it has been reported 
that in the absence of reforms in the system of concession 
allocations the expected improvement in supply did not 
materialise. Many logging companies simply went bust because
they could no longer get financial advances from exporters of
/
unprocessed logs.1
When the industry began to pick up after the injection of 
new investment, log exports predominated in spite of the ban. 
Investment was prejudiced towards logging equipment despite 
the Government's policy of encouraging further processing. 
Exporters had their options limited on both sides. They were 
entreated to export processed timber but they were provided 
with equipment to produce only logs. Not too surprisingly
1 E.G. Foli, The Relationship Between Concession Holdings 
and Processing Capacity in the Sunyani Area 1986, BSc 
Dissertation, UST, Kumasi, pp.70, p.48.
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therefore, the export of wawa logs, a species which because of 
its abundance in Ghana was not included in the ban, figured 
prominently in the early stages of the recovery. Thus, in 
1984, wawa constituted 63% of all logs exported; in 1985, it 
constituted 54.5% of all log exports; in 1986, it constituted 
50% of all log exports and in 1987, it constituted 42% of all 
log exports.1
Nevertheless, statistics on the exports of logs and 
lumber show that there has been an increase in the export of 
sawn lumber during the 1980s even though this has not been 
paralleled by a corresponding decrease in log exports overall. 
The value of sawn lumber exports now approximates to the value 
of log exports.2 This suggests that log exports of secondary 
species are increasing rapidly while stricter conservation of 
primary species need not result in diminished returns to 
timber companies.
Many companies have been able to adapt to the requirement 
that primary species must at least be sawn before export. The 
larger companies with integrated wood processing facilities 
have clearly had the advantage here. Representatives of some 
companies have expressed their personal support for the ban.3 
The ban is widely supported by public officials.
The thrust of the Government's policy is now being
1 Forestry Department, Annual Reports 1985-1988, Standard 
Form B. The reliability of these statistics is open to doubt, 
however, as false returns have been made.
2 Infra p.256.
3 A.G. Timbers Ltd., African Timber and Plywood Ltd. and 
Naja David Veneer and Plywood Ltd. (in written 
correspondence).
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directed towards encouraging more remunerative types of 
further processing. The wisdom of this policy and the 
significance of higher value exports at the present time can 
be seen in the following figures:
Type and Value of Timber Exports in 1988.1
Product Volume Value Average Value
000m3 £ 000s £ per 000m3
Logs 340.15 26 051 76.6
Sawn Timber 169.64 25 643 151.2
Veneer 20.91 4 985 237.5
Plywood 1.01 166 157.0
Machined Timber 4.46 1 842 412.6
Note.
Logs include boules and curls
Veneer includes rotary, sliced and reconstitued veneer 
Machine timber includes mouldings, door panels and lipping, 
flooring, toys and furniture parts
From January 1994, it is intended that exports of green
or air dried sawn timber will no longer be permitted.2
Arguments against the ban on unprocessed primary species
often refer to the high level of waste recorded in Ghanaian
saw mills. This can be up to twice the amount wasted in
sophisticated saw mills in developed countries.3 International
demand is persistently for logs which can be processed
according to specific designs in the country of purchase. The
solution to the former problem must lie in improving the
efficiency of Ghanaian saw mills. One solution to the second
1 Ghana: Forests, Wood and People, op cit p.2.
2 Government Circular August 1990.
' R. Chatchu, Allowable Cut From the Forest, Ghana Forest 
Inventory Project ... op cit pp.63-71, p.67.
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problem is to encourage greater liaison with purchasers. For 
example, representatives of a British firm are stationed at 
Mim Scanstyle to ensure that their design specifications are 
met.
The FRMP Report proposed that instead of the absolute 
ban, a series of high taxes could be imposed on exporters of 
logs of primary species.1 This would increase revenue to the 
Government and may be effective to curb exports in log form. 
However, the most important objective of the ban is to 
increase the value of exports by domestic processing which, if 
effective, will add dramatically to Government revenue and at 
the same time provide jobs for Ghanaians. In view of the 
multiple economic advantages of further processing, it is 
submitted, the Government should not risk losing the 
opportunity of achieving this objective by allowing the export 
of primary species on payment of high taxes. The following 
statistics suggest that there is no foundation for the 
assumption made by the Report that the ban has been 
ineffective:
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.18
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% Contribution of Certain Species to Log Exports.
Species* % Contribution to Log Exports.
1975 1980 1984
African Mahogany 8.2 0 . 5 4
0 . 3 8
0 .0 4
0 . 3 1
0.68
Makore
Edinam
Sapele
Utile
5 . 8
6.1
7 . 7
15.3
* These species are included in the ban.
However, the reliability of these figures is particularly 
suspect. It is known, for example, that shipments of primary 
species have been made under false labels.2 The evidence that 
only very limited supplies of some primary species now remain 
standing in the forest3 suggests that illegal practices may 
have been common.
In view of the critical shortage of some primary species, 
maintaining the ban can be recommended but, at the same time, 
enforcement must be improved. Measures to strengthen the FPIB 
should help to curtail illegal practices in the future but an 
equally important long term measure should be support for 
industrial restructuring. Additional processing and greater 
use of secondary species would reduce the pressure on primary
1 Forestry Department Annual Reports 1976-1984.
2 C. Martin The Rain Forests of West Africa: Ecology, 
Threats, Conservation 1990, Birhauser Verlag, Berlin, pp.235,
p.40.
3 Supra p .234.
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species but the industry needs financial inducements to 
encourage investment in the appropriate technology.
The international market is obstructive to the goal of 
industrial restructuring. The market's choice of species is 
selective and, in addition, developed countries maintain 
tariff barriers on processed timber in order to protect their 
own industries.1 National and regional West African markets 
offer potential for Ghanaian products so the TEDB should step 
up its efforts to facilitate trade links within West Africa in 
addition to participating in multi-party negotiations to 
reduce tariff barriers and encourage fairer international 
trade.2
(G) The NIC Sub-Committee on Timber.
The National Investigations Committee (NIC) was 
established in 1982, after the overthrow of the civilian 
government, to inquire into allegations of corruption and 
abuse of office.3 The Public Tribunals Law created a number of 
special offences relevant to the type of economic crimes which 
the NIC investigates.4 Any person under investigation by the 
NIC or any person who is being prosecuted under the Public 
Tribunals Law may confess to the alleged crime and offer to 
make restitution to the State in lieu of further investigation
1 Hurst op cit p.266.
2 See further infra pp.265-270.
3 National Investigations Committee Law PNDCL 2/1982, 
ss.1,3.
4 Public Tribunals Law PNDCL 78/1984, s.9.
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or prosecution.' The Council may arrest any person or freeze 
the assets of any person if it will facilitate the work of the 
NIC.2
In 1988, a Sub-Committee of the NIC began investigations 
into fraudulent and corrupt practices in the timber industry. 
Its discoveries have shown that malpractice is widespread and 
that the resultant financial loss to the State has been very 
great. The resemblance which some of the identified abuses 
bear to the sort of malpractice identified by the Blay 
Report,3 with the exception of ministerial abuse of
discretion, is striking. For example, one of the most frequent
abuses discovered by the NIC was the illegal sub-letting of 
concessions.4 Another common abuse was the under-invoicing of 
timber exports while imports of essential machinery were over­
invoiced in order to take advantage of foreign exchange 
retention accounts. Another abuse occurs when Ghanaian 
companies set up phoney purchasing companies abroad. Tax 
obligations are avoided by selling timber to these companies 
at reduced prices which quickly rise when the timber is 
immediately resold.5
Efforts are now being made to crush malpractice in the 
industry pursuant to the findings of the NIC. In 1989, the 
work of the NIC bore fruition in the conviction of members of
1 ibid s.13(a) and PNDCL 2/1982 s.8.
2 ibid s.4.
3 Supra p.130.
4 Infra p.279.
5 "Timber Scandals" op cit p.344.
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the Bitar family on various counts including doing acts with 
intent to sabotage the economy of Ghana.1 In this case, it was 
shown that the accused had failed to declare the true length 
and value of numerous shipments of sliced veneer made by Logs 
and Lumber Ltd. The resultant loss of revenue to the State was 
estimated at approximately £298,251 and DM216,965.12.2 The 
accused were further charged with acts of forgery3 by which 
they had been able to hoodwink the FPIB and illegal
acquisition of property.4 Crane Bouquet Ltd., an accredited 
agent of the TEDB, had participated in contracts in an 
unauthorised fashion taking advantage of laxity on the part of 
the TEDB.
"There can be no doubt on the evidence that the FPIB 
and the TEDB appeared to be lame and permissive 
bodies and their rules and regulations were not made 
or adhered to with any degree of confidence or
authority or vigilance."5
The accused were fined various amounts and ordered to 
restore to the State amounts up to £2.5 million. The first two 
accused were also sentenced to three years and eighteen months 
imprisonment respectively.6 In 1989, the State filed notice of 
its attention to appeal on the sentences imposed because they
1 The People v W.Bitar, N.Bitar, G.Bitar, J.Bitar,
K.Obenq, Logs and Lumber Ltd., Crane Bouquet Ltd., Timber and 
Trading Agency (International) Ltd. Case no.42/1989, National 
Public Tribunal, Accra, 23/8/1989.
2 ibid p.2.
3 Contrary to s.20(1) and s.158 of the Criminal Code, Act 
29/1960 and s.16 of PNDCL 78/1984
4 Contrary to s.9(l)(k) and s.16 of PNDCL 78/1984
5 Case no.42/1989 op cit p.29.
1 ibid p .80.
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were considered to be too lenient.1 Another eight persons, 
including four lawyers acting for the accused in this case, 
were immediately taken into custody after the judgement was 
delivered for their role in offering bribes to members of the 
tribunal in connection with the case.2
Other cases investigated by the NIC have culminated in 
various, substantial sums of money being returned to the State 
as reparation in lieu of prosecution. In November 1989, Nana 
Woode of Holex Products Ltd. and Priorities Ghana Ltd., was 
ordered by a National Public Tribunal to refund DM 6.5 million 
and US$300,000 to the State within 30 days. Nana Woode had 
pleaded guilty on a charge of economic sabotage.3
These examples show how private interests, whose profit 
maximising motives conflict with the long term rationality of 
sustainable development, have easily and effectively 
undermined government regulations and procedures. The work of 
the NIC Sub-Committee and the publicity afforded to the Bitar 
case are examples of the radical action which is required in 
order to stamp out extensive malpractice.
In addition to the efforts of the NIC, the need for 
institutional strengthening of the FPIB cannot be over stated. 
It is important now to fully expose the activities of illegal 
enterprises and to take action to prevent their future
1 "Appeal Against Sentences" West Africa no.3761, 18- 
24/9/1989, p.1577.
2 "Timber Trial Verdict", West Africa no.3759, 4- 
10/9/1989, p.1488.
3 People's Daily Graphic 13/11/1989, p.9, Ghanaian Times 
4/11/1989, p.3.
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participation in the industry.
Officialdom has a number of legal and administrative 
penalties which should be used to clean up the industry. 
According to the severity of their crimes, entrepreneurs who 
have acted illegally could be struck off the register of 
timber operators,1 or their property marks could be withdrawn2 
or their export contracts could be cancelled.3 Their right to 
re-register in future years could be circumscribed. The 
industry is already over-subscribed so preferential treatment 
should be afforded to lawful and co-operative industrialists. 
Administrative malpractice and incompetence must be eradicated 
in order to make the market for concessions and export 
contracts a fair and competetive one.4 More open and less 
discretionary procedures will also be necessary and are 
likely, at least with respect to concession allocations.5
However, a sanction orientated strategy is rarely 
effective by itself. Such a strategy fails to address the 
underlying need to co-opt powerful interest groups into the 
system of lawful, rational, forest exploitation. If, in
1 PNDCL 117/1985 s.2(j).
2 NRCD 273/1974 s.5.
3 PNDCL 117/1985 s.2(h).
4 The Bitar Case offers one example of how private 
interests have previously been able to distort the functioning 
of the market. This does not mean, however, that market 
mechanisms are themselves undesirable but that those private 
interests which have the potential to distort the market 
should be regulated and controlled by well disciplined and 
accountable administrative institutions.
5 The Grant, Review and Determination of Concessions 
infra p .276.
264
addition, the Government shows itself keen to co-operate with
lawful operators, listening to their views and facilitating
their enterprise, then these operators will provide a powerful
support base for measures to clean up the industry and set
exploitation more firmly on a sustainable path. Lawful
operators should, for example, be encouraged to upgrade their
technologies using investment opportunities as a "carrot" to
encourage good behaviour. In the long term, working with these
industrialists to enhance government-business relations and to
improve their economic performance may prove to be the most
enduring method of eradicating unlawful business practices,
provided always that communication links are not dishonestly
exploited for private ends.1
Extensive consultation with private businesses has not
been a charateristic of the PNDC era:
"If the private sector is to play a greater role in 
Ghana's economic recovery it must become an integral 
part of the decision-making process . . . The business 
community has no direct voice in the leadership of 
the PNDC, is not adequately represented on important 
boards and committees and does not feel 'respected' 
let alone 'courted'."2
Greater involvement by the industry in the marketing and 
advisory work of the TEDB would be a first step towards 
improving government-business relations in the timber sector. 
Administrative malpractice must be guarded against by, inter 
alia, improving the accountability of the Board and the FPIB.
1 Measures to improve the openess and accountability of 
government procedures, especially in concession procedures, 
should help to forestall this development. See infra p.281.
2 R. Tangri, The Politics of Government-Business 
Relations in Ghana, (1992) 30(1) Journal of Modern African 
Studies 97-111, p.107.
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Moves to improve the accountability of institutions throughout 
the sector should help to enhance government-business 
relations.
(H) Problems in the International Timber Trade.
A number of the characteristics of the international 
tropical timber trade frustrate Ghana's objectives of 
increasing the export of processed timber and secondary 
species.
At the present time, because the world production of 
timber is high, trading prices have been falling.1 Market 
prices are determined by short term considerations of supply 
and demand without regard to the real cost of sustained 
production in the long term. Developed countries shop for the 
cheapest tropical timber without regard to the real cost of 
sustainable production. This makes it economically impossible 
for supplier countries, acting individually, to implement 
sustainable development policies because of the risk that, in 
so doing, the cost of their products will cease to be 
attractive on the world market.
One solution lies in mutual action being taken by all 
supplier countries acting together. The International Tropical 
Timber Agreement provides a framework for discussion among 
producer and consumer countries including Ghana.2 It should 
immediately address this challenge by working to harmonise
1 Hurst op cit p.264.
2 International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983 
18/11/1983, UNCTAD Doc. TD/Timber/11 Misc.11, 1984.
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production policies and to fix international prices at a level 
consistent with sustainable production. Multilateral trade 
agreements are, however, notoriously difficult to negotiate.
An additional strategy lies in the campaign recently 
initiated by environmental lobbies in some developed countries 
to persuade their governments and industries to shop 
selectively for tropical timber which is produced on a 
sustainable basis.1 This campaign seeks to persuade consumers 
not to buy timber which has been cut from forests which are 
being exploited in an unsustainable fashion. In the long term, 
the campaign should help to create a market for timber which 
is more realistically priced to take into account the costs of 
sustainable production.
In the short to medium term, however, the campaign 
involves a number of uncertainties and contradictions. It is 
unclear, for example, what exactly constitutes 'sustainable 
exploitation' for the purposes of the ban. Bearing in mind the 
slow growth of tropical timber, over what time scale should a 
country's observance of sustainable forestry be assessed and 
using what statistics, the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) as 
estimated in 1980 or in 1990 ? Such statistics are inherently 
misguiding because they may cover more or fewer species than 
will actually be exploited and they may not allow for the 
waste of timber and the destruction of growing trees which 
occurs during exploitation. A low level of production may hide 
the existence of very wasteful production practices. Does the
1 Friends of the Earth, Rainforest 1989, Campaign 
Pamphlet, Friends of the Earth, London.
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requirement of sustainable exploitation extend to forests 
outside the permanent forest reserves which, if not salvage 
felled may be altogether lost due to farming activities ? If 
so, how is a country supposed to balance its agricultural and 
forestry requirements ? If silvicultural requirements exist on 
paper what is the test of their effectiveness ? Clearly it is 
desirable that working plans should be in place before the 
exploitation of any reserved forest begins but if some forests 
are being exploited in accordance with working plans while 
others in the same country are awaiting this complicated, 
technical guide, should all forest exports consequently be 
included in the ban ? Will minimum girth requirements and 
satisfactory felling cycles suffice in the absence of working 
plans which may be beyond the ability of some countries to 
keep up to date ?
Ghana is included as one of the countries whose exports 
are subject to the operation of the ban but it is difficult to 
see how the line is to be drawn between the sustainable and 
non sustainable exploitation of its forest resources. Although 
it is clear that over exploitation has occurred in the past, 
strident efforts are now being made to redress the balance. 
Stringent measures are being implemented to guarantee the 
sustainable exploitation of the permanent forest estate. The 
view was expressed to this writer that any hindrance to the 
export of timber is a threat to the continued existence of 
forest reserves because the revenue obtained from timber 
exploitation is one of the more direct returns on the nation's
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investment.1 Without some direct financial returns from forest 
reserves, the environmental reasons for reservation may not 
suffice to persuade decision-makers of the value of retaining 
this protection during times of economic crisis and recession. 
Removals by the timber industry amount to only 0.4% of the 
total biomass produced in a forest reserve.2
The environmental lobby is urged to campaign for 
international funding for measures to promote the sustainable 
development of the tropical forest in Ghana instead of simply 
condemning the efforts of the nation to reap some financial 
benefit from its commitment to forest conservation. Such 
measures could include long term financial and technical 
assistance, particularly in support of district level forestry 
departments; aid for industrial restructuring so as to 
encourage further processing in producer countries and 
programmes in support of rural forestry and agroforestry.' 
Debt-for-nature swaps are another promising type of assistance 
if fears of "environmental colonialism" can be assuaged.4 NGOs 
have a reputation for being more responsive and more flexible
1 Interview with Mr. Francois, CCF, September 1990, 
Accra.
2 Ghana: Forests, Wood and People, op cit p.7.
3 See infra chapter nine for examples of NGO activities. 
In view of the inter-related nature of development and 
environmental problems, recommendations are made in that 
chapter to the effect that NGOs should support all round 
development activities in addition to specifically 
environmental projects.
4 H.Bedarff, B.Holznagel, C.Jakobeit, Debt for Nature 
Swaps: Environmental Colonialism or a Way Out from the Debt 
Crisis that Makes Sense?, (1989) 22(4) Verfassung Und Recht in 
Ubersee 445-459.
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in their development assistance than multilateral development 
banks. Environmental programmes require an equally co­
operative policy based on two way communication processes and 
sufficient flexibility to meet the specific needs of 
individual countries.
Financial assistance is not the only, nor perhaps the 
principal, type of support which the environmental lobby can 
provide. Environmental groups must actively support developing 
countries in their endeavour to secure a realistic price for 
their timber which takes into account the long term costs of 
sustainable production. Otherwise, the tropical timber boycott 
will continue to be seen in purely negative terms by 
developing countries who are constrained in their ability to 
supply sustainably produced timber because of its higher cost.
The obstacles to industrial restructuring created by 
developed countries' tariff barriers and the limited demand 
for secondary species in developed countries are problems 
close to home for many environmental NGOs. They can assist 
developing countries by lobbying their own governments to 
reduce tariff barriers on processed tropical timber and to 
increase support for industrial restructuring in producer 
countries by the provision of appropriate equipment and 
expertise. This could provide a market for developed country 
technology.1 At the same time, it will encourage further 
processing, reduce levels of waste, create jobs and improve
1 It is acknowledged that 'tied aid' has disadvantages 
for developing countries but in the present economic climate 
it seems to be an inescapable condition, at least for 
bilateral assistance.
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financial returns to developing countries. These measures will 
give developing country governments the necessary leeway to 
implement responsible sustainable development policies.
None of these challenges are simple ones. They will 
require an increasingly sophisticated campaigning strategy on 
the part of environmental pressure groups. The Brundtland 
Report correctly identified the important impact that trading 
relationships may have on the environment.1 It recommended a 
greater role for NGOs.2 The problem now lies in implementing 
an effective campaign which will reap changes in developing 
and developed country policies without endangering the infant 
timber industry in developing countries and the long term 
viability of forest reservation and management.
(I) A Summary of Problems in the Timber Industry Today.
An inquiry into the constitution of the Ghanaian tropical 
forest has revealed that the most immediate problem for Ghana
is its rapidly diminishing supplies of primary species.3 This 
has deleterious implications for the environment and the 
timber industry. Immediate priorities should be to protect the 
resource base and to encourage the replanting of indigenous, 
primary species as well as the greater exploitation of 
secondary species instead of primary species. Incentives and 
not just prohibitions are urgently required in order to 
address these issues.
1 WCED op cit p.80.
2 ibid p .326.
i Supra p .234.
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A comparison of the most recent estimation of the Annual 
Allowable Cut and figures showing the actual annual cut, 
taking the level of wastage at source into account, suggests 
that Ghana will have to reduce its rate of timber cutting 
overall if it is to put production on a sustainable path.1 
Some secondary species, however, could be more intensively 
exploited. These findings confirm the importance which should 
be attached to increasing the exploitation of secondary 
species. More fundamentally, the industrial base must be 
restructured so that, through technological improvements, the 
level of waste will be reduced and increased revenue will 
accrue from further processing as opposed to resource mining.
The principal characteristics of the timber industry have 
been discussed in some depth so as to reveal the structural, 
social and economic problems which affect the legal control of 
timber exploitation.
The separate ownership of logging and processing 
facilities was found, in some cases, to hinder access to raw 
materials by milling companies.2 The logging sub-sector is 
over-subscribed in part because small logging companies have 
been able to obtain finance and concessions by influencing 
official procedures.
Excess capacity in the logging and milling sub-sectors 
are structural inefficiencies in the industry.3 The 
speculative character of many small logging firms has given
1 Supra p.236.
2 Supra p .239.
3 Supra p .240.
272
the industry a poor reputation for loan recovery with the 
consequence that few facilities are available to genuine 
companies who wish to upgrade their logging, milling and 
processing equipment in order to reduce waste and increase the 
production of higher value timber goods.1
The use of wasteful technologies throughout the industry 
must be phased out in order to reduce the waste of valuable 
timber resources.2 Increased forest fees under the FRMP should 
encourage a drive for greater efficiency. Larger and longer 
concessions should advantage the larger production outfits but 
they will need credit facilities in order to make the 
necessary technological improvements.3 Small scale operators 
could be encouraged to invest in further processing activities 
to meet the needs of the local market.4 The FRMP was 
criticised for its failure to include more direct measures to 
assist the necessary industrial restructuring.5
Wide fluctuations in the performance of the industry were 
seen as a long standing characteristic. The industry is 
sensitive both to the vagaries of the local economy and to 
fluctuations in international demand.6 In view of these 
factors, decision-makers should accept that adequate financial 
provision for sustainable management must be made
1 Supra p.240.
2 Supra p.242.
3 Supra p.243.
4 Supra p.244.
5 Supra p.243.
*’ Supra p . 2 45 .
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independently of whether or not forest exploitation meets 
short term targets for productivity and revenue contribution.
The ability of the industry to make a rapid recovery in 
production was proven during the 1980s.1 The deleterious 
consequences of such a rapid upturn in production were 
numerous, however, and were closely related to aspects of the 
ERP which promoted foreign exchange earnings while neglecting 
the need to ensure responsible lending, accountability, 
sustainable management of the forest estate and long term 
investment in industrial restructuring.2 Support for logging 
enterprises served to strengthen the hand of loggers engaged 
in short term, resource mining instead of promoting industrial 
restructuring. The interests of these concessionaires lie in 
quick profits, whatever the cost to environmental 
sustainability. It is the presence of conflicting interests, 
between quick financial profits and sustainability, which lies 
at the heart of many of the problems in the forest sector 
today. This threat to the environment does not correspond with 
the poverty led analysis of environmental degradation 
contained in the Brundtland Report.
The FRMP is attempting to remedy the management crisis 
which the exploitation of the 1980s highlighted but it was 
criticised for failing to provide long term financial support 
for industrial restructuring.3 The whole saga of the 1980s 
demonstrates that economic growth can be environmentally
1 Supra p.247.
2 Supra p.249.
3 Supra p.251.
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destructive unless adequate safeguards against over 
exploitation are in force at the same time.1
The ban on exports of primary species in log form was 
seen as commendable but attention was drawn to the need for 
much better enforcement of the ban.2 In the long term, 
industrial restructuring to encourage further processing and 
the greater use of secondary species are the most promising 
methods of reducing pressure on primary species but, in 
addition to the paucity of credit facilities available to 
facilitate this progression, international market conditions 
limit the options open to local producers. The regional West 
African market could prove to be a good market for secondary 
species and finished goods from small Ghanaian outfits.'
The NIC Sub-Committe on Timber has exposed the extent of 
malpractice throughout the industry.4 The activities of 
irresponsible timber operators demonstrate how easily well 
intentioned laws enacted to implement sustainable development 
policies can be undermined. Continuing efforts must now be 
made to enforce the law, to clean up the industry and to 
afford preference to law abiding entrepreneurs. It is 
important to improve government-business relations so that an 
important interest group may emerge whose concern is to 
support a strategy of sustainable exploitation free from 
corruption. Otherwise, the activities of irresponsible
1 Supra p.253.
2 Supra p.258.
' Supra p.2 59.
1 Supra p .259.
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operators, whose motives are simply to maximise quick profits, 
are likely to continue to frustrate attempts to impose 
sustainable management policies.1
A number of constraints in the international market were 
briefly discussed. Low commodity prices, selective demand and 
tariff barriers were the principal factors identified which 
frustrate Ghana's attempts to put exploitation on a 
sustainable footing, to sell more secondary species and to 
increase revenue from further processing.2 The tropical timber 
boycott could improve the market for higher priced, 
sustainably produced timber in the long term but NGOs were 
alerted to the need for positive measures in support of 
sustainable management, higher prices and improved marketing 
opportunities for processed timber from developing countries.3
It is within this framework, characterised by numerous 
constraints, that the legal control of exploitation must 
operate. The next task is to consider the substance of the 
legal framework and the ways in which the problems identified 
in the industry frustrate a smooth implementation of the law.
1 Supra p.264.
2 Supra pp.265-270.
3 Supra p.268.
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(iii) The Legal Framework of Control.
(A) The Grant, Review and Determination of Timber Concessions.
The history of forest legislation in Ghana shows that 
governmental control over the grant of timber concessions has 
always been a controversial subject.1 The Concessions 
Ordinance was the main instrument of control introduced by the 
Colonial Government but that Ordinance contained so many 
exclusions and provisos that it was easily avoided or simply 
contravened. The reforms of 1962 were designed to remove the 
cumbersome procedures of the Ordinance and to remedy its 
ineffective and unjust results but the Report of the Blay 
Commission exposed how the new legislation was abused.2 
Therefore, in the 1969 Constitution, the procedure for the 
grant and control of concessions was transferred to an 
autonomous institution, the Lands Commission, in the hope that 
public grants would henceforth be free from political 
interference.3 In 1990, the Lands Commission continued to hold 
statutory responsibility for the grant of timber concessions4 
subject to the operation, instituted in 1989, of a temporary 
ban on the issue and renewal of concessions.
According to statute, all applications for grants of 
rights to timber should be submitted to regional sub­
1 Supra Chp.4.
2 The Issue and Review of Timber Concessions After 1962 
supra Chp.5.
3 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1969, Art.163.
1 PNDCL 42/1982 s.36.
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committees of the Lands Commission.1 Because the regional sub­
committees have not yet been established applications, before 
the ban, were being submitted through the regional branches of 
the Lands Department which acts as the Secretariat to the 
Lands Commission.2 Thereafter the application before the Lands 
Commission was dealt with entirely in Accra. The Forestry 
Commission,3 the Forestry Department and the FPIB were 
consulted. The role of the Forestry Department was to report 
on the stocking of the concession and the feasibility of 
exploitation with due regard to such factors as the likely 
disturbance to farming activities in the area. The role of the 
FPIB was to check the business credentials of the applicant 
and the role of the Forestry Commission was to give 
independent advice on the basis of all the relevant 
information. A special sub-committee sat to decide finally on 
the award of any major concession. Although fixed criteria 
were not employed by the committee when making its decision, 
the previous concession holder was assured of priority 
consideration in an application to renew a concession. 
Generally, the advice of the Forestry Commission seems to have 
prevailed.
All grants had to be notified to the Council and to the 
Secretary.4 The Council was at liberty to disallow any grant
1 ibid s.36(8).
2 ibid s.36(2).
3 ibid s.34(1)(h).
4 ibid s.36(7).
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within one month of receiving notice of it.1 Any person 
aggrieved by a decision of the Council could apply to the 
tribunal established under the State Lands Act for an advisory 
opinion which would be forwarded to the Council.2 No grants 
were disallowed using this procedure.
Timber grants took the form of either a lease or licence.
A timber lease is valid for a maximum of 25 years and it
confers rights to land and the timber thereon. A timber
licence is valid for three years, covers an area not usually 
greater than 8 square kilometres and confers only rights to 
trees. Both leases and licences provide for the determination 
of the grant in the event of a breach of their terms3 or the 
breach of statutory requirements4 including a failure to 
observe silvicultural conditions imposed by the CCF.5
A third type of timber grant is the felling licence
granted by the local Lands Departments to small scale 
operators who wish to cut a certain number of trees on a piece 
of land outside forest reserves and not being land subject to 
a lease or licence.
The concession allocation procedure defined in PNDCL 42 
required the co-operation of many agencies. The objective of 
this arrangement was to minimise the opportunities for
1 ibid s.36(11).
2 ibid s.36(12).
3 Clause 4(a) of the standard lease or licence.
4 Clause 4(e) of the standard lease and clause 4(d) of 
the standard licence.
5 Clause 2(d) of the standard lease or licence.
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corruption but the result was long delays in the award of 
concessions. Periods of up to two years have been quoted.1 
Furthermore, despite these delays, allocations were not always 
made on the basis of accurate information. None of the 
agencies concerned had adequate resources to effectively 
assess the credentials of applicants. Concessions were awarded 
to incompetent concessionaires who sub-let their concessions 
unlawfully while legitimate timber operators, particularly 
non-Ghanaians, were denied concessions.2
Despite the prohibition on sub-letting without the 
consent of the Secretary,3 as many as sixty four concessions 
were found by the NIC to have been sub-let.4 Fifteen 
concessionaires had obtained a total of 302,240,784 cedis from 
sub-letting their concessions. Out of an assessable tax of 166 
million cedis only 5.41 million cedis had been paid by these 
concessionaires.5 Forty three reputable saw mills who did not 
have their own concessions purchased concessions under illegal 
sub-letting agreements. Logging entrepreneurs who purchased 
their concessions at below market rates made fantastic profits 
by selling to processing outfits starved of raw materials.6 
The underlying factors which cause sub-letting are - the long 
established division in the industry between predominantly
1 E. Foli, op cit p.46.
2 The NIC Sub-Committee on Timber supra p.259.
3 Act 124/1962 s.13.
4 Peoples Daily Graphic 6/10/90 p.7.
5 People's Daily Graphic 27/9/1990, pp.1,8.
*’ ibid
280
Ghanaian concessionaires and saw mill and processing 
enterprises, some of the largest of which are foreign owned; 
the discrimination in the award of concessions in favour of 
Ghanaian enterprises which are not always better equipped to 
do the job than their foreign counterparts in the saw milling 
and processing industry; and the inability of the FPIB to 
accurately assess the competence of applicants for 
registration as timber operators and the inability of the 
Commission to accurately assess the competence of concession 
applicants.
In December 1988, a PNDC directive forfeited to the State 
all concessions which had been illegally sub-let. In January 
1989, the grant of new concessions was suspended and timber 
operations in concessions which had been sub-let were halted. 
At the same time,the assets of nine companies were frozen and 
six other companies were closed down while the NIC continued 
its investigations.1 All other concession holders were 
required to present documents to the NIC. Subsequently, 
temporary felling permits were issued to legitimate companies 
who had been left without access to sufficient raw materials 
to satisfy contracts which had been awarded to them.2 In 1990, 
the Ministry was responsible for the issue of all permits and 
it performed this function in consultation with the NIC Sub­
committee on Timber.
The allocation of concessions to disreputable enterprises
1 "Timber Regulations Clarified" African Economic Digest 
10(5), 6-12/2/1989, p.6.
2 People's Daily Graphic 6/10/1990,p.7.
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and the numerous cases of sub-letting indicate the extent to 
which speculative entrepreneurs have been able to use official 
procedures to pursue their personal ambitions for profit to 
the financial and environmental detriment of the country. 
Access to concessions is the foothold which allows 
speculative entrepreneurs to enter the industry. Subsequently, 
they are able to manipulate the system to entrench their 
interests and to reap massive personal profits in some cases. 
The pervasive extent of industrial malpractice makes it 
absolutely essential that the threat from disreputable 
entrepreneurs is fought at source. This highlights the need 
for fundamental reform of concession procedures.
In 1990, the concession allocation system was under 
review by the Law Reform Commission. In the FRMP Report, 
proposals were made for the establishment of a Concessions 
Unit in the Forestry Department to be responsible for the 
allocation and review of concessions.1 Proposals were also 
made for the reform of concession procedures. The Report 
favoured the greater use of market mechanisms so that, among 
the criteria used to choose between concession applicants, the 
applicant offering the highest concession rent would be 
afforded a preferential weighting of not less than 50%. Other 
criteria to be taken into account included technical capacity 
and financial standing but ownership of existing processing 
capacity was not considered to be essential.2
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.16. See also, The 
Forestry Department supra Chp.6.
2 Staff Appraisal Report op cit pp.15-16.
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The move to a market oriented allocation of concessions 
should simplify procedures, reduce delays, restrict the 
exercise of discretion and curtail opportunities for 
corruption. The measure is in line with the general policy of 
the structural adjustment era which is to reduce state 
intervention and to rely more heavily on market mechanisms. 
However, efforts to clean up the industry and to prevent 
maladministration must at the same time be sustained so that 
it will not be possible for unscrupulous interests to distort 
the efficacy of market mechanisms.1 In order to prevent an 
industrial cartel emerging, the Department should regularly 
review the level of rents being offered, setting and upgrading 
minimum acceptable rents on the basis of the various costs of 
production.2
Despite the evidence of malpractice in the procedures 
employed in the early 1960s to review concessions, the recent 
work of the NIC Sub-Committee on Timber3 has demonstrated the 
continuing need for an active procedure whereby timber grants 
can be modified or terminated if their terms are breached or 
whenever evidence of illegal business practices is discovered. 
The terms of timber grants already permit this so the need is 
clearly for a more effective implementation of their terms.4 
Thought should be given to establishing a regular procedure
1 Supra pp.160,263, infra p.290.
2 The FRMP Report envisaged regular reviews of concession 
rents every five years. Staff Appraisal Report o p  cit p.16.
3 Supra p.259.
4 Clause 4(a) of the standard timber lease or licence.
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for reviewing the capacities and activities of concession 
holders once the Sub-Committee on Timber ceases to function. 
Any procedure must safeguard against administrative abuse by 
requiring clear evidence of specified abuses or failings on 
the part of the grantee, with the opportunity for judicial 
review on the application of the affected concessionaire.
The Law Reform Commission may also wish to consider a 
rationalisation of the types of concession available. It was 
suggested in chapter five that the Government's claim to 
ownership of timber resources outside forest reserves could be 
renounced over a period of time and title vested in farmers.1 
Whether or not this proposal is taken up, it is likely that 
the number of timber and felling licences outside reserves 
will decline drastically in the next few years as less timber 
remains standing outside forest reserves. Over time, it should 
therefore be possible to rationalise the concession procedure 
so that there is only one type of timber grant, that is, the 
long term lease. This is in line with the policy of the FRMP 
which is to encourage larger and longer concessions.2 In view 
of the current excess capacity in the logging sub-sector of 
the industry,3 the failure of uncompetitive and unreliable 
logging companies, a likely result of this rationalisation, 
does not represent an unacceptable loss to the national 
economy.
1 Supra p .112.
2 Infra p.285.
3 Supra p.240.
284
(B) Limitations on the Size and Duration of Concessions.
The Administration of Lands Act requires that timber 
grants on stool land must not exceed thirty years in duration 
or a maximum area of forty square miles or two hundred and 
forty square miles in the aggregate when granted to one person 
or company.1 Larger concessions can be granted if the normal 
limits appear to be prejudicial to the public interest or to 
the interest of any stool.2
Limitations on the size of concessions were first 
stipulated in the Concessions Ordinance in 1939 .3 The concern 
of the Government at that time was to prevent monopolistic 
tendencies by speculators and concessionaires. Size 
limitations indirectly encouraged the greater participation of 
small and medium size concessionaires but they were criticised 
by the bigger firms whose advantage lay in economies of scale. 
With the greater participation of larger, capital intensive, 
European firms during and after the Second World War, the 
Government was persuaded to waive these limitations on a case 
by case basis so that timber concessions could be profitably 
worked using new technologies. Act 123, as amended, has 
continued this state of affairs.
The limitations on size of concession holdings, as
1 Act 123/1962 s.12.
7 Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Amendment) Decree 
NLCD 233/1968.
3 Concessions (Amendment) Ordinance no.19/1939, s.22(1).
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specified in the Administration of Lands Act,1 have been 
contravened. The NIC Sub-Committee discovered that certain 
persons have used several trade names in order to obtain 
concession holdings larger than statute permits.2
The FRMP Report has now recommended that concessions 
should be awarded for periods of up to fifty years and 
individual concessions should be for not less than 10,000 
hectares (38.61 square miles).3 The rationale for these 
proposals is that concessionaires will be more interested in 
good management and re-afforestation if they have a longer 
title to the same piece of land which can be continually 
worked in rotation, but the shift to a forty year felling 
cycle means that only a small part of a fifty year concession 
may be worked twice by the concessionaire. Hence the incentive 
for good management remains minimal. Leases for an even longer 
duration could therefore be considered. Effective measures for 
regular reviews would be essential, however, because, in an 
industry so vulnerable to market fluctuations, concessions of 
longer duration are not a sufficient guarantee that long term 
planning and responsible exploitation will prevail.
An alternative proposal under consideration in 1990, was 
for the normal period of a lease to be reduced to ten years 
while the procedure for renewal would be simplified. This 
would ensure a regular review of the performance of 
concessionaires but it is not clear whether preference would
1 Act 123/1962 s.36(12).
2 Interview with Dr. Chatchu, MLNR, 15/10/1990, Accra.
J Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.68.
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be given to the highest bidder, in which case the 
environmental incentive might be lost, or to the previous 
concession holder. Whichever proposal is finally chosen, it is 
most important that regular reviews of financial and 
silvicultural performance are provided for.
A statutory minimum size for concessions will help to 
realise the policy of reducing the number of small scale 
loggers presently in the industry and is certainly to be 
commended. It may be argued that such a policy favours high 
technology, labour extensive, export dependent companies but 
the constraints of sustainable exploitation make the need to 
reduce excess capacity in the logging sub-sector urgent. 
Although they have not always proven themselves more 
efficient, larger companies are at least more easily monitored 
for silvicultural and financial purposes.1 Further processing 
industries which meet local demands have been urged as an 
alternative avenue for small investors. The paucity of 
measures under consideration to assist in this restructuring 
has already been commented upon.2
(C) Administrative and Quality Controls on Exploitation.
For administrative and other purposes, every person who 
wishes to fell trees for conversion or export must first 
register a property mark with the Forestry Department.3 Each
1 Supra p.243.
2 Supra p.244.
3 NRCD 273/1974 s.2.
287
area of Ghana has been assigned a locality mark.1 All logs 
cut from any tree felled for conversion or export must as soon 
as possible be inscribed with the property mark of its owner, 
the locality mark of the area in which it was felled, a stump 
number (being the serial number of the tree cut by that timber 
operator) and a log number (showing the number of logs 
obtained from any one tree).2 The stump of any felled tree 
must also be inscribed with the appropriate property mark3 so 
that upon inspection of any log its appropriate stump may be 
easily located.4
It is an offence to cut or fell any growing tree for 
conversion or export without owning a registered property 
mark;5 or to buy, sell, export or be in possession of any log 
not properly marked;6 or to loan, borrow, transfer or obtain 
a property mark except with the written permission of the 
CCF.7 A maximum fine of 5,000 cedis and/or five years 
imprisonment as well as forfeiture of any trees or timber 
involved in the offence is specified for these offences.8 A 
failure to obtain any requisite permission in connection with 
timber exploitation is grounds for determining any timber
1 ibid s.1.
2 ibid s.6.
3 ibid s.6(1).
4 ibid s.10.
5 ibid s.2.
6 ibid s.8.
7 ibid s.9.
e ibid s .11(1)(3).
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grant.1 It is also an offence to fraudulently mark any timber 
or trees as the property of some person or to alter, deface or 
obliterate any mark placed on trees or timber. Both these 
crimes are liable to a maximum fine of 10,000 cedis and/or 
five years imprisonment in the first instance.2
To ensure uniform standards of measurement and reliable 
quality products, all timber operators are required to obtain 
certificates of measurement for timber which is the subject of 
any transaction whatsoever.3 The FPIB is the institution 
responsible for issuing these certificates4 and for 
maintaining quality standards throughout the industry.5 
Uniformity in the grading of products is especially important 
in the export industry and the inspection procedures should 
also help to eliminate fraud.6
Property marks are required to prevent theft of timber. 
The wide discretion assigned to the CCF to refuse to register 
or renew property marks7 allows him indirectly to halt the 
activities of concessionaires who, for example, fail to pay 
fees regularly or who go bankrupt. An exercise of this power
1 Cl.4(e) of the standard timber lease and Cl.4(d) of the 
standard timber licence.
2 Forest Protection (Amendment) Law PNDCL 142/1986 
Para.(b).
3 Trees and Timber (Control of Measurement) Regulations 
LI 23/1960 as amended by LI 1090/1976.
4 ibid Para.1.
6 ibid Para.2(c).
" ibid Para.2(g).
7 NRCD 273/1974 s.5(1).
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does not terminate the concession although all concessions can 
be terminated for financial or other misbehaviour under the 
terms of every timber grant. Usually, therefore, the power to 
refuse to register a property mark is only employed on a 
temporary basis.1 The CCF is not required to give reasons for 
his decision and review is only by the Secretary.2
The law relating to administrative and quality controls 
has been flouted both by registered timber operators and by 
illegal chain saw operators.
The principal abuse relating to property marks revealed 
by the NIC Sub-Committee has been the sub-letting of property 
marks by fraudulently registered holders.3 The abuse is 
closely related to the illegal sub-letting of concessions. 
Both activities are clearly prohibited in the law.4 The NIC 
Sub-Committee also found that grading and measurement controls 
have been frequently contravened. Timber operators have been 
able to pass off primary species as secondary species in order 
to escape the ban on the export of unprocessed primary log 
species. Operators have also abused the "tolerance limit" (the 
allowance made for shrinkage of wood during transport) so that 
actual volumes of wood exported have been greater than those 
recorded for tax purposes. Quantities of wood exported have
1 In interview, the CCF stated that this measure is 
rarely employed. Interview with Mr. Francois, CCF, Accra, 
28/12/1989.
2 NRCD 273/1974 s.5(2).
3 Peoples Daily Graphic 6/10/90, p.7.
4 NRCD 273/1974 s.9, Act 124/1962 s.13, Para.2(e) of the 
standard lease and Para.2(e) and (f) of the standard licence.
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been under declared, as in the Bitar Case.1
The evidence produced by the NIC demonstrates how easily 
and how frequently laws designed to control the industry and 
facilitate sustainable exploitation have been flouted. 
Fundamentally, this level of malpractice results from the 
presence in the industry of unreliable and unco-operative 
entrepreneurs who are not interested in the long term 
sustainability of the resource base.
Specific and adequate legal penalties are absent in some 
cases - for contravening the ban on log exports for example - 
but the wide ranging offence of economic sabotage has been 
used in some instances.2 In addition, the authority to cancel 
or to refuse to register property marks3 and the power to 
refuse to register timber operators4 are powerful deterrents 
within the administrative sphere. Clearly termed 
administrative regulations should be formulated specifying 
circumstances in which these powers will be exercised. These 
circumstances should include any abuse of silvicultural, 
administrative or quality controls and they might extend to 
any abuse of the terms of a concession or any contravention of 
statutory provisions. These regulations should complement 
whatever procedure is chosen for the regular review of 
existing concessions. The authorities would then be in a 
position to choose the most appropriate sanction in each case
1 Supra p.261.
2 PNDCL 78/1984 s.16. See the Bitar Case supra p.261.
3 NRCD 273/1974 s.5.
4 PNDCL 117/1985 s.2(j).
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- the suspension of a recalcitrant operator's property mark, 
the determination of one or more of the concessions in the 
possession of an incompetent or unreliable logger or the 
cancellation of an operator's registration so as to prevent 
his participation in any aspect of the industry in the case of 
gross misbehaviour. For each sanction, the causes triggering 
its implementation and the procedure and responsible agency 
should be clearly defined so as to minimise the possible abuse 
of discretionary powers.
Nevertheless, the law is generally in place to secure a 
reasonable measure of quality and administrative control. 
Until recently, a failure to exercise the existing powers 
seems to have been more characteristic than their abuse. This 
has forced the MLNR to act directly, for example, in recalling 
all concessions which have been sub-let. Institutional 
strengthening is now a measure included in the FRMP to improve 
law enforcement. In particular, the need for institutional 
strengthening of the FPIB is highlighted by the evidence that 
quality control has been inadequate.
Law reform and institutional strenghtening to improve law 
enforcement are measures which, in view of the scale of 
illegal activities, only scrape at the surface of the problems 
in the industry. Of potentially greater impact, it is 
submitted, are the reforms in concession procedures. If entry 
into the industry by speculative concessionaires can be 
prevented at this early stage, then reputable and co-operative 
enterprises who are law abiding in their exploitation of the 
forest, will be afforded the priority they deserve. In
addition, measures to support technological upgrading in these 
enterprises deserve serious consideration because such 
measures could act as a "carrot" for good behaviour while 
improving the competitiveness and efficiency of honest 
companies.
Administrative controls are also undermined by the 
extensive activities of chain saw operators particularly 
outside forest reserves. Although property marks, stump 
numbers, locality marks and log numbers apply only to logs, 
all these details should be transferred to the certificate of 
log measurement which must accompany all timber in transport 
or in any transaction.1 A person who fells trees illegally and 
quickly converts the wood into lumber should therefore be 
identifiable by the absence of a valid certificate of log 
measurement. However, the road inspection coverage of the FPIB 
is not sufficient to check the large scale traffic in 
illegally cut timber which finds its way into the towns and 
villages along the minor roads and tracks. Conversion of 
timber in the forest by chain saw operators is the basis of 
this under cover trade. These operators thrive because they 
are able to supply the local market with lower priced timber 
than official outfits which have higher costs of production.
Proposals made previously for the renunciation of 
government title to timber outside forest reserves2 are 
relevant to the second category of illegal activities. It 
would be consistent with the basic needs orientation of the
1 LI 23/1960 Para.2.
2 Supra p.112.
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Brundtland Report1 to recognise that local people have an 
inherent right to satisfy, so far as possible, their need for 
affordable timber out of domestic supplies. It would reduce 
the present acrimony between concessionaires and farmers who 
have crops destroyed during timber operations if licences 
outside forest reserves were gradually allowed to lapse.
Whether or not these recommendations are heeded, there is 
a pressing need to reduce the demand for wood in the long 
term2 and to protect forest reserves from illegal encroachment 
once timber supplies outside forest reserves are exhausted. 
Rural forestry initiatives, agroforestry and plantation 
forestry should be encouraged now in order to alleviate 
pressure on forest reserves in the future.3
(D) Financial Controls.
The principal fees paid by the holders of timber leases 
and licences are royalties - charged per tree felled - and 
rent - charged per hectare of land held by the grantee each 
year.4 All rents and royalties due in respect of concessions 
are collected by the Forestry Department.5 Rents and royalties
1 WCED op cit p.45.
2 Infra p.304.
3 See the discussion of relevant projects in Bongo infra 
Chp.9.
4 Forest Fees Regulations LI 1089/1976, Paras.1,2.
5 Forest Improvement Fund Act no. 12/1960, s.4 and 
Circular from the Secretary responsible for the MLNR, 
4/4/1991. Rents and royalties due in respect of stool lands 
were, prior to the above Circular, collected by the Lands 
Department in accordance with PNDCL 42/1982 s.36(3).
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received from concessions in forest reserves are paid into the 
Forest Improvement Fund. Funds from the Forest Improvement 
Fund are to be used for costs incurred in connection with 
exploitation and silvicultural work.1 Rents and royalties from 
land outside forest reserves are paid into the Stool Lands 
Account which is managed by the Administrator of Stool Lands.2 
Disbursements are made from the Stool Lands Account to 
traditional authorities and district assemblies in respect of 
timber exploitation within their jurisdictions.3 Other fees 
include a small silvicultural fee charged each year for each 
hectare of land being exploited for timber, differential rates 
applying to land inside forest reserves and land outside 
them.4 Silvicultural fees are paid into the Forest Improvement 
Fund to meet the cost of silvicultural work.5 Silvicultural 
fees may be waived if a timber operator carries out 
silvicultural work6 or reduced if the value of the timber does 
not justify the fee.7
The principal problem with respect to forest fees is how 
to ensure that they reflect the true economic value of the 
timber being felled despite rapidly changing currency values
1 Forest Improvement Fund (Amendment) Act no.144/1962,
s. 2 .
2 PNDCL 42/1982 s.45(1).
3 ibid s.45(2).
4 Act no.144/1962 s.4.
5 ibid s.5(1).
6 ibid s.6(2).
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and high inflation. At the moment, the cumbersome procedure 
for review involves obtaining the consent of the PNDC before 
each increase. Inevitably, forest fees have dragged far behind 
changing economic circumstances, especially during the early 
1980s. While some operators in the timber industry were able 
to make enormous profits from cheap access to raw materials, 
the revenue to Government was minimal.
Another consequence of the minimal forest fees being 
charged in the early 1980s was the increased incentive for 
dishonest persons to register and obtain concessions solely 
with the intention of sub-letting rights of exploitation at 
true market values. The NIC Sub-Committee discovered, for 
example, that one Anthony Timbers sub-let its concession to 
Naja David for 18.5 million cedis but paid only 176,176 cedis 
to Government.1 Subsequent to these and other findings, the 
NIC Sub-Committee recommended an increase in royalties based 
on the actual rates that reliable timber firms were forced to 
pay to acquire adequate raw materials for processing. 
Consequently, when concessions which had been sub-let were 
recalled and reallocated to competent applicants, a charge 
equivalent to their market value was recouped and entered into 
a Special Forest Improvement Fund. Within one year of the 
directive forfeiting to the State all concessions which had 
been sub-let an amount of 600 million cedis had been realised 
from this charge.2
The FRMP Report proposed a new formula for determining
1 Peoples Daily Graphic 6/10/90 p.7.
2 ibid
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and revising forest fees, in which regular revisions of 
royalty rates would be based on a formula linked to the FOB 
average weighted value of exportable logs.1 Authorization of 
new rates would lie within the power of the CCF or the 
Secretary acting without recourse to the Council. As noted 
previously,2 proposals were made for concession rents to be 
based on a competitive market system in which concessions 
would be awarded to the applicant willing to pay the highest 
rent, among other factors. Rents would be adjusted every five 
years according to a formula which would take into account the 
FOB values and local costs of production. The Ministry has 
suggested that silvicultural fees should be abolished in 
order to simplify fee collection.3 It is hoped that these 
reforms will encourage more efficient production processes 
while weeding out inefficient and dishonest speculators.
In view of these suggested reforms, it may also be an 
appropriate time to reconsider what proportion of the revenue 
accruing from timber exploitation on stool land should be 
distributed to the traditional "landowners" and what 
proportion should be retained for the proper management of the 
permanent forest estate. One of the objectives of the FRMP is 
to put the Forestry Department on a self financing basis in 
the long term.4 It has been argued that disbursements of 
revenue to local institutions are not an effective method of
1 Staff Appraisal Report, o p  cit p.70.
2 Supra p.281.
3 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.67.
4 ibid p.48.
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integrating local communities into the forest economy.1 It is 
submitted that, in view of the irresponsible record of some 
landowners,2 priority should be afforded to increasing the 
income of the Department, especially now that the Department 
has been made responsible for the collection af all forest 
fees outside forest reserves. In addition, whatever payments 
are made to traditional authorities and district assemblies 
should be made subject to their co-operation in forest 
protection.3
(E) Silvicultural Controls.
Timber operators are subject to a number of controls when 
exercising their rights over trees or timber in order to 
protect the forest estate.
The Secretary is empowered to make regulations providing 
for the management, utilisation and protection of forest 
reserves and forest produce therein;4 for the protection of 
trees or timber generally;5 and for controlling or prohibiting 
the cutting or felling of trees below specified minimum 
girths.6 Minimum girth requirements have been formulated and 
no person may cut or fell, buy, sell or export or be in 
possession of timber which has been cut from a tree below the
1 Supra p.129.
2 Forest Protection in the Western Region supra Chp.7.
3 Supra p.225.
4 Cap 157 s.35(l),(3),(5).
5 NRCD 273/1974 s.l7(l)(f).
6 ibid s.17(1)(a).
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specified minimum girth for that species.1 The onus of proof 
that timber has not been cut from a tree below the minimum 
girth lies on the person found in possession of the timber.5
The Forestry Department is charged with managing the 
forest reserves.3 Before proceeding to the exercise of any 
rights under any timber grant, a grantee is required to 
ascertain from the CCF what prescriptions apply with respect 
to the exercise of his rights to trees or timber.4 The CCF may 
at any time alter or add to the prescriptions.5 It is an 
offence for a grantee to begin exploitation before 
ascertaining the necessary prescriptions or to contravene any 
prescriptions imposed by the CCF once exploitation begins.6 
The Secretary may terminate any grant if the grantee is found 
to have contravened such prescriptions.7
Techniques of silvicultural management are the subject of 
research by the FPRI. The optimum method of tropical forest 
silvicultural management is far from clear and activities such 
as selective felling to encourage the regrowth of primary 
species have now been abandoned due to the risk of losing good
1 Trees and Timber (Control of Cutting) Regulations LN 
368/1958, Paras.2,3. More precise requirements have been given 
in later administrative directives.
2 ibid Para.3(l).
3 Cap 157 s.18.
4 Cap 136 s. 30 as preserved by Act 124/1962 ss. 1,16(9) 
and para.2(d) of the standard lease or licence.
5 Cap 136 s.30(3).
6 ibid s.30(4).
7 Act 124/1962 s.16(10).
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secondary species. Natural regeneration is now the preferred 
method of the Department. This makes the enforcement of 
regulations on minimum girths all the more important because 
it is these regulations which prevent immature trees being cut
before they have had the maximum opportunity to produce new
seeds. In 1990, minimum girth requirements were tightened and 
special permits are now necessary to fell any tree of a
primary species within specified girth limits.1
Minimum girth requirements have not been uniformly 
applied to trees felled during timber operations but not taken 
from the forest. The destruction of very young trees of 
economic species during felling operations is not recorded or 
penalised. Wasteful logging methods and the unplanned and 
unnecessary building of logging roads all undermine the
protection afforded by current silvicultural methods. The 
temporary permits being issued by the Ministry now require 
that logs can only be rejected if certified as not utilizable 
by a District Forest Officer. Any logs left to deteriorate in 
the forest or in the saw mill now attract the export value of 
the log in foreign exchange.2
Fiscal measures of this type can provide an important 
incentive to reduce waste and to meet stricter silvicultural 
requirements. There remains an unmet need, however, to improve 
training and technology in the industry so that the new 
silvicultural requirements can be met. Preferential credit 
facilities to encourage technological upgrading offer a long
1 By direction of the CCF, 1990.
2 Para.6 of the Interim Permit to Operate a Concession.
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term solution to wasteful production processes.
The NIC Sub-Committee found that timber operators had 
successfully managed to contravene minimum girth 
requirements.1 This underscores the need to exclude wasteful, 
dishonest and unreliable loggers from the industry by 
measures, inter alia, to improve concession allocation 
procedures.
Measures to improve law enforcement in forest reserves 
are clearly welcome, but, in addition to strengthening the 
resources available to district forestry officers, thought 
should be given to the responsibilities of concessionaires. 
For example, if concessionaires were strictly liable for 
breaches of minimum girth and other requirements within their 
concession areas, whether or not there was evidence that they 
actually committed the offence and whether or not they were in 
possession of the immature timber illegally felled, then 
penalties could be imposed long after the commission of the 
offence by reference to stumps of felled trees and to stock 
maps which are prepared before exploitation begins. Strict 
liability may not be fair outside forest reserves where 
illegal felling is rampant but in forest reserves it would 
surely encourage concessionaires to take a long term view of 
exploitation. At the moment, proof of silvicultural abuses, 
except where the offender is caught in possession of the 
illegally felled timber, is one of the problems associated 
with enforcing the law.
1 Interview with Dr. Chatchu of the MLNR, Accra,
5/10/1990.
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The enforcement of an appropriate felling cycle is 
another simple and potentially effective silvicultural method. 
The felling cycle should stipulate the minimum length of time 
required between periods of exploitation in order to allow 
natural regeneration.
In the early 1970s the felling cycle was reduced from 25 
to 15 years.1 This was in part to allow the exploitation of 
over mature timber but it was also to satisfy the demands of 
loggers and traditional "landowners" who called for a faster 
exploitation of richly stocked forest reserves.2 In applying 
this pressure on the Department, both groups had their own 
interests closest to heart. Logging companies wanted quick 
profits from the sale of valuable primary species. Traditional 
authorities also stood to gain because they traditionally 
receive a proportion of the revenue accruing from royalties 
paid in respect of forest exploitation in their areas.3 The 
fact that the Department readily succumbed to pressure from 
these interest groups once again suggests the vulnerability
1 Martin op cit p.40.
2 Interview with Mr. Francois, CCF, Accra, 28/12/1989.
3 The Forest Improvement Fund Act, following the Forests 
Ordinance, originally provided for disbursements to be made 
out of the Forest Improvement Fund to traditional landowners. 
See, Act 12/1960 s.5 and Cap.157 s.18. This practice seems to 
have continued despite the removal of any explicit reference 
to this type of disbursement in the Forest Improvement Fund 
(Amendment) Act, no.144/1962. Authority can still be found in 
s. 18 of the Forests Ordinance for the disbursement of at least 
two thirds of annual revenue from forest reserves to the 
"owners" of the land but this provision seems to be 
inconsistent with the Forest Improvement Fund (Amendment) Act 
which states that all revenue from forest reserves should be 
paid into the Forest Improvement Fund to meet "costs incurred 
in connection with exploitation and silvicultural work". See 
Act 144/1962 ss.1,2.
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of sustainable development policies to conflicting, short term 
economic interests.
Working plans are potentially the most accurate method of 
securing sustained yield exploitation. These provide a 
detailed scheme for the sustained exploitation of forest land 
in harmony with appropriate felling cycles. In the 
deteriorating economic circumstances of the 1970s, financial 
support was not forthcoming to allow the adaptation of earlier 
working plans to a 15 year time scale. Thus, working plans 
ceased to operate as envisaged. It is only now that the Forest 
Inventory Project and the FRMP are providing support for the 
preparation of new working plans.1 Meanwhile, the felling 
cycle has been increased to 40 years,2 a clear indication that 
the fifteen year felling cycle could never have been justified 
on silvicultural grounds alone.
Working plans are a considerably more sophisticated and 
more complicated silvicultural tool than minimum girth 
requirements and felling cycle stipulations. However, should 
history repeat itself, difficulties may be experienced in 
continually revising and updating these plans in future. The 
adoption of working plans does not, therefore, diminish the 
need to ensure that regulations stipulating the appropriate 
minimum girths and felling cycle are effectively implemented 
and continually reviewed.
Silvicultural requirements of any type are not 
effectively enforced outside forest reserves. The rule here
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.79.
2 By direction of the CCF, 1990.
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has been salvage felling so that valuable timber can be saved 
from destruction during farming operations. Although minimum 
girth requirements are supposed to apply even where salvage 
felling has been authorised, in practice they have never been 
effectively enforced. The prospects for any kind of valuable 
regrowth outside forest reserves are, as a result, extremely 
bleak unless measures to encourage rural forestry initiatives 
prove successful.
(F) Minor Forest Produce and Rural Forestry.
Minor Forest Produce includes firewood, charcoal, 
building poles (not sawn), bushmeat, fruits, plants and all 
produce for use or consumption derived from the forest. It has 
been estimated that the current production of firewood, 
charcoal and building poles amounts to approximately 12.6 
million cubic metres equivalent per annum.1 No reliable 
figures exist on the production of other minor forest produce.
In general, the exploitation of minor forest produce 
outside forest reserves is governed by customary law. This 
frequently provides for free rights of community user where 
the land is uncultivated. Where the land is cultivated, rules 
vary between communities as to the exact division of rights 
between the community and various people with more specific 
rights. Where firewood has become a scarce commodity communal 
rights to collect deadwood on private land have disappeared.2
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.6.
2 Bongo and Gowrie offer examples of this development 
infra Chp.9, p.393.
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The cutting of firewood on a commercial scale usually requires 
the prior permission of the allodial owner and/or the usufruct 
farmer if the land is subject to a customary freehold estate. 
District Assembly bye-laws have in some cases further modified 
the general norm of free rights of community user over minor 
forest produce.1
The FRMP estimated that, without changes in patterns of 
exploitation, Ghana would have an overall deficit in the 
supply of firewood by the end of this century.2 Measures to 
avert this tragedy have been initiated. These include the 
promotion of energy efficient cooking stoves, more efficient 
charcoal production methods and alternative cooking fuels such 
as Liquified Purified Gas (LPG). Incentives to encourage 
industries to switch to electricity or LPG should be included 
in this campaign.
Plantation forestry, agroforestry and rural forestry 
initiatives of all types have the potential for improving the 
supply of MFP in the future. The FRMP Report made 
recommendations for increasing the level of institutional 
support for these activities.3 A detailed discussion of the 
impact of rural forestry initiatives in one part of the 
savanna zone is reserved for chapter eight.
Inside forest reserves, the Forests Ordinance provides a 
procedure whereby customary rights in, to or over land or
1 For example, some District Assemblies require a licence 
to tap raffia palms to be obtained from the Assembly.
2 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.6.
The Forestry Department supra Chp.6.
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forest produce in a proposed forest reserve are extinguished 
or admitted by the findings of the RSC, with effect from the 
publication of the order constituting the reserve.1 It also 
enables land within a reserve to be excluded from the reserve. 
Such land is not governed by the provisions of the Ordinance.2 
The Concessions Act preserved all rights in forest reserves 
subject to the terms of the Act3 but the Forest Protection 
Decree later made it an offence to exercise many if not all 
rights in, to or over land or forest produce in a forest 
reserve without the prior written consent of a competent 
forest officer.4 Fees may be charged for the issue of licences 
to exploit forest produce.5 Forestry staff are not competent 
to issue hunting licences.0 Fees charged for permits vary from 
region to region.
It has already been observed that the provisions for 
admitted rights in forest reserves are no longer relevant and 
that excluded village lands may not suffice to meet the 
demands of a growing population.7 In practice, persons caught 
taking minor forest produce without a written permit in a 
forest reserve will rarely be prosecuted but may be subjected
1 Cap 157 ss.15,17.
2 ibid s.11.
3 Act 124/1962 s.16(1).
4 NRCD 243/1974 s.l as amended by PNDCL 142/1986 
Para.(a).
5 Cap 157 s.33(1) (j ) .
1 Only Staff of the Game and Wildlife Department may do
this.
Supra Chp.7, p.189.
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to an on the spot fine while the produce will be seized. The 
law does not provide for on the spot fines of this type.
One of the suggestions of the FRMP Report was that more 
ways should be found of involving local people in the 
management of forest reserves.1 This is consistent with 
recommendations made in chapter seven favouring the closer 
integration of local communities in forestry affairs.2 The 
trend, however, has clearly been towards more restrictive 
entry into forest reserves. Stiffer penalties for forest 
offences and regulations designed to wholly exclude entry into 
forest reserves have been made in response to the increasing 
threat of illegal encroachments by farmers and chain saw 
operators. While this threat cannot be ignored, it is 
desirable that the exploitation of MFP in forest reserves 
should be increased because this sort of exploitation offers 
a low impact, productive use of forest reserves which enhances 
their value as a local resource and as a national asset 
providing further justification for their existence.3 If it is 
not possible to allow unimpeded entry by local people into 
forest reserves, entry which no doubt already occurs to some 
extent, then the ease and potential benefits of using the 
licensing procedure should be better publicised locally to 
encourage more people to participate in MFP exploitation. This 
would be one way of more closely integrating local people into 
the forest economy, an objective which must be addressed if
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.84.
2 Supra p.227.
J Browder op cit p.126.
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the logic of forest reservation is to be appreciated locally 
as well as nationally.
To date, there has been no attempt to optimize the 
utilisation of minor forest produce from forest reserves nor 
any attempt to control exploitation for a sustained yield nor 
even to inventory the resources available. Permits for 
exploiting minor forest produce are issued to any honest 
applicant and while it is assumed that more could be issued 
without detriment to the sustainability of the resource base, 
the scale of illegal exploitation is unknown. The FRMP hopes 
to improve data collection on minor forest produce.1 This 
information should be used to keep the proposed 
intensification of MFP exploitation within the constraints of 
sustainable exploitation and to add weight to the economic 
arguments in favour of forest reservation in Ghana.
The preservation of biodiversity, particularly in 
tropical forests, has now become an international issue.2 
Forest reserves in Ghana, except in the areas where no 
disturbance is allowed for protective reasons,3 do not ensure 
the strict level of freedom from disturbance which is 
necessary to preserve wholly intact the tropical forest 
ecosystem. This was never their intended purpose however, and, 
in view of the large area of land reserved to forestry 
(17,000km2), is not, it is submitted, a reasonable objective.
1 Staff Appraisal Report, op cit p.8.
2 Convention on Biological Diversity, 3-14/6/1992, Rio de 
Janeiro, (1992) 31 ILM 818.
3 For example, exploitation is prohibited on steep slopes 
and alongside watercourses.
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Consequently, there is a need to maintain the two existing 
high forest national parks and to guarantee their complete 
protection from any type of exploitation.1 Concessions in the 
Bia North and Bia South Reserves, which were formerly part of 
the Bia National Park, should not, therefore, be renewed. 
These reserves should as soon as possible be restored to the 
Bia National Park in order to improve its viability as a home 
for the only remaining herd of small forest elephants in 
Ghana.
1 These are the Ankasa National Park and Bia National 
Park. See further, E. Asibey, J. Owusu, The Case for High 
Forest National Parks in Ghana, (1982) Env i ronmenta1 
Conservation 9(4) 293-304.
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(v) A Summary of Problems in the Legal Framework of Control.
This chapter has described some of the characteristics of 
the timber industry in Ghana exposing economic, fiscal and 
administrative problems. It has reviewed the legal and 
administrative framework of control drawing attention to 
instances of abuse and areas of neglect.
The statutory procedure for the grant of concessions was 
found to be slow, cumbersome and, on the evidence, not free 
from error.1 The need to reform these procedures was found to 
be essential because the present statutory system has enabled 
unreliable entrepreneurs to get a foothold in the industry 
from which they subsquently pursue a number of illegal 
activities. A reorientation of concession allocation 
procedures to incorporate market mechanisms was applauded as 
one initiative which could help to reduce the opportunities 
for maladministration. The case for a permanent and active 
procedure for the review of concessions was considered2 and a 
rationalisation of concession types was urged so that 
eventually the long term lease will be the only type of grant.
Statutory limits on the size and duration of concessions 
were under review in 1990. Whether shorter or longer leases 
are made in future, the need for procedures incorporating 
regular reviews of financial and silvicultural performance was 
stressed.3 Larger concessions were welcomed as a measure which
1 Supra p.279.
2 Supra p.282.
3 Supra p.286.
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would help to rationalise the over subscribed logging sub­
sector .
Administrative and quality controls are in place to 
control the activities of timber producers but the work of the 
NIC Sub-Committee has revealed the extent to which these rules 
have been contravened. Illegal activities of two types were 
discussed. In the first category are the illegal activities of 
registered timber operators who are exploiting the system in 
order to make quick, personal profits.1 Measures to improve 
the efficiency of the regulatory institutions, in particular, 
the FPIB, were discussed but the root of the problem lies in 
the ease with which dishonest entrepreneurs have been able to 
enter the industry, purchase concessions and obtain loans for 
logging activities. Radical enforcement measures of the type 
employed by the PNDC continue to be necessary but so too are 
measures to clean up concession procedures, to improve 
administrative performance and to encourage honest 
entrepreneurs in their attempts to upgrade their technology. 
Support for honest entrepreneurs should help to drive 
dishonest speculators out of the business so long as 
corruption is not allowed to distort the effectiveness of 
market mechanisms.2
The second category of illegal activities stem from the 
buoyant local demand for cheap wood. This is satisfied by the 
activities of chain saw operators who cut timber illegally for 
sale in local markets. A suggested measure was the de-
1 Supra p.289.
2 Supra p.292.
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regulation of activities outside forest reserves which already 
seem to be out of hand but the underlying challenge is to 
reduce the demand for wood while developing rural forestry, 
agroforestry and plantation forestry in order to meet future 
requirements and to alleviate some of the likely pressure on 
forest reserves in the future.1
It was noted how the previously low rates charged for 
rents and royalties encouraged unscrupulous and inefficient 
entrepreneurs to enter the industry.2 Simplified procedures 
for more regular updates of rents and royalties under 
consideration in 1990 were applauded for their potential to 
encourage the more efficient use of timber resources by the 
industry. These reforms should help to reduce the scale of 
speculative activities.3
Another issue urged for consideration was a reduction in 
the amount of revenue disbursed to traditional authorities and 
district assemblies. The payment of any revenue should be made 
dependent on the successful contribution of these institutions 
to forest protection.4
The evidence that silvicultural requirements have been 
contravened demonstrated the need for more effective 
enforcement measures, regular reviews of silvicultural 
regulations and a continuing use of simple measures in
1 Supra p.293.
2 Supra p.295.
3 Supra p.296.
4 Supra p.296.
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addition to sophisticated working plans.1 Fiscal penalties 
should encourage moves to reduce the level of waste occurring 
during exploitation but, more fundamentally, positive 
measures, such as preferential credit facilities, are 
necessary to facilitate technological upgrading and staff 
training.
The ability of vested interests to obtain reductions in 
the felling cycle was noted as yet another example of how 
interest groups whose motives are not sympathetic to 
sustainable management may frustrate the goal of sustainable 
management.2
There is evidence that an overall deficit in the supply 
of firewood is threatening Ghana by the end of the century.3 
The more efficient use of firewood and charcoal and greater 
use of alternative forms of energy are measures currently 
being promoted to address this problem. In addition, rural 
forestry intitiatives are being encouraged in the hope that 
they will provide firewood and other wood products for future 
generations.4
It was suggested that, in general, a more intensive 
exploitation of MFP in forest reserves could be permitted 
because this represents a low impact, income generating 
activity which helps to justify the reservation of forest
1 Supra p.302.
2 Supra p.301.
3 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.6.
1 Supra p.304.
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land.1 In order to preserve maximum biodiversity in a select 
proportion of the forest estate, freedom from all forms of 
exploitation should be guaranteed to areas chosen as national 
parks.
(vi) Conclusion.
The objective of this chapter was to identify the 
fundamental constraints which affect the implementation of 
laws designed to promote the sustainable exploitation of the 
forest estate in Ghana. In line with the conflict model of law 
discussed in chapter one, various interests which conflict 
with the objective of sustainable development were identified. 
Firstly, attention was drawn to the presence of interest 
groups in the local industry whose motives are not consistent 
with sustainable management objectives.2 Secondly, attention 
was drawn to the constraints imposed by the international 
market for timber and by the economic situation in which 
developing countries find themselves generally.3 The evidence 
in this chapter suggests that it is the existence of these 
interests and constraints which has led in the past to 
widespread malpractice, the adoption of unsustainable policies 
and the neglect of long term, structural changes which could 
facilitate sustainable development.
The current efforts of the Ghanaian government to update
1 Supra p .306.
' Supra pp.259-265. 
Supra pp.265-270.
314
and enforce the law to eradicate pervasive malpractice in the 
industry are commendable.1 In addition, the FRMP is attempting 
to improve law enforcement and to strengthen sector 
institutions. Of potentially even more significance are the 
proposed reforms in concession procedures and revenue 
collection. The move to incorporate market mechanisms into 
official procedures should help to eradicate discretionary 
judgements, maladministration and the allocation of 
concessions and loans to dishonest, speculative 
entrepreneurs.2 In the long term, these measures should help 
to expel those business interests which do not favour 
sustainable development from the industry.
In order to speed up this process, financial support for 
industrial restructuring is essential. Industrial 
restructuring should improve efficiency and encourage further 
processing but, most importantly, it should help to force 
unreliable entrepreneurs out of the over subscribed logging 
and saw milling sub-sectors. This requires a more careful 
monitoring of development assistance. Without attention to 
fundamental structural reform, the outlook for sustainable 
exploitation in Ghana remains bleak because, although law 
enforcement and management capacities will be improved, no 
measures are being taken to assist the local industry to make 
the improvements in efficiency which, in the long term, could 
generate the essential support base for a sustainable
1 See in particular, the work of the NIC Sub-Committee on
Timber discussed at supra pp.259-265.
2 Supra p.281.
!■
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deve1opment st rategy.
Ghana's domestic reforms are not being matched by reforms 
at the international level. Reforms are necessary in the 
pricing of tropical timber, in the selection of species and in 
developed countries' tariff barriers which discourage the 
import of processed timber.1 In addition, international aid 
must take the environmental implications of policy based 
lending into account while NGOs should sponsor positive 
measures to promote sustainability.
In the past, the structural adjustment programme and debt 
servicing obligations facing Ghana forced decision-makers to 
maximise immediate foreign exchange earnings without regard 
for the long term sustainability of their resource base.2 In 
recent times, foreign assistance has done little to facilitate 
the further processing of raw materials in Ghana, a 
development which could improve Ghana's foreign exchange 
earnings, reduce the level of waste in the industry and 
facilitate the greater use of secondary species, measures 
conducive to sustainable development in the long term. 
Ghanaian leaders are keen to encourage this kind of long term 
economic development but they are constrained by the realities 
of their country's critical economic situation.
If the international community really is now committed to 
improving environmental management in Ghana and other 
developing countries, it would do well to listen to the calls 
of the latter for more debt relief, long term investment in
1 Supra p.269.
2 Supra pp.248-253.
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economic development and fairer terms of trade.1 Without these 
sort of measures, the threat to the tropical forest in Ghana 
remains despite the national endeavour to put forest 
exploitation on a sustainable footing. This is because 
international constraints, like the interests of unscrupulous 
entrepreneurs on the domestic front, frustrate the 
implementation of long term sustainable development policies. 
Low commodity prices, tariff barriers and the pressure to 
service foreign debt keep the price of tropical timber too low 
to make sustainable management economically feasible. In 
addition, these constraints frustrate Ghana's ambitions for 
restructuring the industry so as to improve efficiency and to 
encourage further processing, goals which would enhance the 
long term prospects for sustainable development in the forest 
sector.
The Brundtland Report identified the economic constraints 
to sustainable development for developing countries generally2 
but it failed to acknowledge the entrenched nature of the 
resistance to change which stems from the developed countries' 
lack of commitment to international economic and trade 
reforms. This constraint threatens the long term viability of 
measures being taken locally to strengthen the policies, laws 
and management capacities of institutions engaged in the 
control of timber exploitation in Ghana. This finding suggests 
that unless all the interests which conflict with sustainable
1 See also the recommendations of the WCED op cit pp.69-
70.
2 ibid p.36.
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development are squarely confronted, the prospects for 
sustainable development are bleak and the legal and 
institutional measures recommended in the Brundtland Report 
for its attainment are inadequate.
318
CHAPTER NINE: RURAL FORESTRY INTIATIVES IN BONGO - A CASE
STUDY IN THE NORTH-EAST SAVANNA.
The FRMP Report estimated the present production of non­
industrial forest products in Ghana to be 12.6 million cubic 
metres equivalent with an approximate value of $90 million, a 
value approaching that of annual hardwood exports at the time 
of the research.1 In addition, the calculations employed by 
the FRMP indicate that increasing demand for firewood may 
create a deficit of 11.6 million cubic metres by the end of 
the century. In view of this, the FRMP made specific 
provision for measures to improve the institutional framework 
and technical support for ongoing and proposed rural forestry 
projects. It recommended the creation of a Rural Forestry 
Division in the Forestry Department and the intensification of 
forestry extension through a strengthening of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.2
Additional support for rural forestry initiatives stems 
from the Draft Forest Policy which includes recommendations to 
encourage private and community forestry.3 The existence of 
several relatively small, ongoing rural forestry projects was 
noted in the FRMP Report.4 The multitude of potential benefits 
accruing from tree planting activites in rural areas and the
1 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.6.
2 ibid p.84.
3 Forestry Commission Proposals for the Revision of the 
National Forest Policy of Ghana 1990, Forestry Commission, 
Accra, pp.17, p.6.
4 Staff Appraisal Report op cit p.20.
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importance which should be attached to such measures are now 
widely recognised.1 Organised efforts to promote tree planting 
by the "development community" are still generally in an early 
stage of development, however. This makes an inquiry into 
existing tree planting initiatives in Ghana particularly 
instructive.
Rather than attempt a nation-wide survey of rural 
forestry initiatives throughout Ghana, the discussion in this 
chapter focuses on rural forestry initiatives in Bongo, a 
political district in the north-east of Ghana.2 This district 
was chosen in part because its physical, social and economic 
characterisitcs contrast so sharply with the conditions 
prevailing in southern Ghana and the Western Region. In 
addition, a variety of rural forestry initiatives are 
currently underway in the district. These raise a number of 
interesting issues, including those of project design and 
management. In particular, aspects of the local customary land 
law which have a bearing on the implementation of tree 
planting programmes have been chosen for an in depth 
discussion of the contribution of law to sustainable 
development measures of this type.
In this chapter, an attempt is made to assess the impact 
of current programmes in the district with particular 
reference to relevant legal issues. Another objective of the
1 FAO Tree Growing By Rural People 1985, FAO Forestry 
Paper no.64, FAO, Rome, pp.130, pp.9-11.
2 For the purposes of this discussion, "rural forestry" 
or "community forestry" are terms employed generally to mean 
all types of programmes and projects geared towards tree 
planting and tree husbandry by members of the public.
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chapter is to make comments on certain aspects of the 
Brundtland Report which seem relevant to this discussion. In 
particular, the widespread poverty in this district puts the 
Brundtland remarks on the links between poverty and 
environmental degradation, between basic needs and 
development, on the agenda for discussion.
The chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, the 
principal physical, social and economic characteristics of the 
area are described. An attempt is made in this section to put 
rural forestry initiatives into their broader development and 
environmental context by summarising the principal 
environmental concerns in this district. Secondly, this 
chapter discusses specific rural forestry initiatives in the 
district, paying some attention to issues of project design 
and implementation. A more thorough analysis is reserved for 
one particular project, tree planting for dam protection 
around the Vea Dam at Gowrie. This particular project raises 
a number of issues and allows for comments to be made on the 
links between development, environmental protection and the 
satisfaction of basic needs in this district. This discussion 
also serves to illuminate the role of the District Assembly in 
land-use affairs. Thirdly, aspects of the local customary law 
which have a bearing on environmental programmes generally and 
tree planting programmes in particular are analysed in some 
depth. Some comments are made on the desirability of reforming 
specific areas of customary law.
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(i) Background Information.
(A) Physical Characteristics.
Bongo lies in the savanna zone close to the border with 
Burkina Faso, approximately 11° north of the equator. The 
district is bounded on the east by the Red Volta River. The 
Yaratanga River flows through the district supplying the Vea 
Irrigation Dam. The average annual rainfall is approximately 
40" (1,016 mm).1 There is one wet season which begins in March 
and ends in October. The district experiences considerable 
annual fluctuations in the distribution of rainfall within 
that period. Adu calculated the rate of relative variability 
of rainfall to be in the order of 12-14%.2
The natural vegetation in this area is degraded tree 
savanna.3 Permanent cultivation and annual burning have been 
implicated in the conversion of this part of the Guinea 
savanna zone to a Sudan savanna zone type.4 Grasses 
interspersed with widely spaced, fire resistant, deciduous
1 Benneh, Population, Disease and Rural Development 
Programmes in the Upper East Region of Ghana, in Clarke, 
Khogali, Kosinski Population and Development Projects in 
Africa 1985, Cambridge University Press, London, pp.329, 
Chp.15, p.207. Adu recorded an average annual rainfall of 
898.70 mm over the period 1949-1960 at Zuarungu, Adu Soils of 
the Navrongo - Bawku Region 1969, Soil Research Institute 
(CSIR), Kumasi, pp.96, p.6.
2 ibid p.5.
3 ibid p.11.
4 Taylor The Vegetation Zones of the Gold Coast 1952, 
Government Printer, Accra, pp.12, p.10; Ramsey and Innes, Some 
Quantitative Observations on the Effects of Fire on the Guinea 
Savanna Vegetation of Northern Ghana Over A Period of Eleven 
Years, (1963) 8(1) African Soils 41-86, p.60.
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trees now characterise the natural vegetation. Naturally 
occurring trees of economic significance include the shea nut 
(Butyrospermum parkii), baobab (Adansonia digitata) and dawa 
dawa (Parkia biglobosa).
The area is generally low lying with rocky outcrops. The 
soils of the district derive from Granitic and Birrimian 
rocks. The former is high in phosphate and potash contents 
providing naturally fertile soils1 but permanent cultivation 
has led to low productivity, soil infertility and soil 
erosion. There is evidence of gully erosion and laterite 
formation in many parts of the district.2
(B) Demographic and Social Characteristics.
In 1984, the district had a population of approximately 
95,390.3 Population density varies throughout the district. In 
some upland areas population density exceeds 160 per km2 but 
in valley bottoms it may fall to 40 per km2.4 Formerly the 
latter areas were infested with the simulium fly which spread 
the disease Onchocerciasis and discouraged settlement.
The majority of people living in this district belong to 
either the Gurunsi, Boosi, Nabdam or Tallensi clans.5 Together
1 Adu op cit p .3.
2 ibid p.4.
3 Department of Statistical Services 1984 Population 
Census of Ghana - Preliminary Report 1984, Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Accra, pp.114.
4 Benneh op cit p.207.
5 A clan is a large unit comprising several lineages who 
share common ancestors of such great distance that precise 
genealogical links can no longer be traced. A lineage is all
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these clans constitute the Fra Fras.1 Each clan speaks a 
dialect of the Mole-Dagbane (Gur)language group.2 All the 
clans are agnatic and exogamous. It is generally believed that 
the Gurunsi, whose foremost representative is the tindana,' 
are the aboriginal inhabitants of the district while the Boosi 
are later immigrants from the more southerly Mamprusi Kingdom 
who brought with them the office of chieftaincy.4 This is why
the members of a descent group who trace their origin to a 
common ancestor, K. Bentsi-Enchi11, The Traditional Legal 
Systems of Africa, op cit p.77. In this district, clans are 
divided into sections which seem to approximate to Bentsi- 
Enchill's definition of a lineage.
1 Fortes doubted the applicability of the word "tribe" to 
describe the Fra Fras. "Tribe" usually connotes a community 
with a cohesive language and culture but in the Upper East one
dialect merges with another and there are no precise
territorial boundaries. M. Fortes, The Political System of the 
Tallensi, in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, African Political 
Systems 1940, Oxford University Press, London, pp.239-271,
p.239.
2 Fortes The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi 
1967, Oxford University Press, London, pp.270, p.6.
3 A tindana ("Earth Priest") makes sacrifices and is 
responsible for the well being of his clan. He also has 
functions with respect to land but controversy exists on 
whether these are purely religious functions or whether they 
include secular functions of land administration infra p.365.
4 Chiefs exercise customary law and political
jurisdiction over all the local clans. Some conflict of 
opinion exists on the earliest antecedents of the Gurunsi and 
Boosi. The reader is referred to comments made in A. Atobiga 
The Acguisition and Alienation of Property Among the Fra Fra 
(Gurunsi) 1979 LLB Dissertation, University of Ghana, Legon, 
pp.57, p.7; Eyre-Smith A Brief Review of the History and 
Social Organisation of the Peoples of the Gold Coast 1933, 
Government Printer, Accra, pp.45, pp.5-7; Fortes, The Dynamics 
of Clanship Among the Tallensi ... op cit; Northcott Report on 
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 1899, HMSO, London, 
pp.163, p.12. Combining the evidence, it seems likely that the 
Boosi have their origin in the Songhoi Kingdom from which 
their ancestors migrated firstly to Mamprusi, establishing a 
Kingdom whose descendants were to rule over the Gurunsi, Moshi 
and Dagomba. The Gurunsi may be the aboriginal inhabitants of 
Bongo or early migrants who share cultural similarities with
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the chiefs of Bongo are associated with the royal house of the 
Mamprusi Kingdom, the appointment of the Paramount Chief of 
Bongo always being made by the Mamprusi Chief in Nalerigu.1
Bongo is the district capital possessing a number of 
facilities including a health clinic, a large Roman Catholic 
church, a post office and a petrol pump. Several government 
departments have offices in Bongo and more are planning to 
move to the district when the necessary office space and 
housing has been built.
Gowrie is a densely populated area of the district lying 
between Bongo and Bolgatanga, the regional capital. It is home 
to the Vea Irrigation Dam and ICOUR Agroforestry.2
Adaboya is a much less densely populated part of the 
district lying close to the Red Volta and including large
areas of bush land parts of which have not been farmed for
many years due to the risk of Onchocerciasis. The 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme has freed the area of this 
risk in recent years making more land available for farming.3
There are fifteen small dams in the district. Water pumps 
have been installed throughout the district to provide clean
drinking water. Plans are under way to extend pipe borne water
autochthonous clans living within the Moshi Kingdom.
1 This account was given by the Regent of Bongo.
2 Infra p.349.
3 This Programme is an internationally sponsored regional 
project which involves larvicidal spraying of the affected 
river valleys. See NOS Onchocerciaisis: Onchocerciasis Control 
Activities 1989, Brief by the NOS, pp.7.
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from the Vea dam to Bongo township and Gowrie.1
(C) Economic Activities.
The principal occupation of the majority of inhabitants 
is settled agriculture. Farms are basically of three types - 
compound farms, farms away from the house and bush farms.2 
Compound farms may be cultivated by all the members of one 
house or they may be divided into units between brothers who 
farm the land separately with their wives, sons and unmarried 
daughters.3 Individual farms can be made away from the 
compound.4 Women participate in all farming jobs except 
bullock ploughing. Most farming jobs are not mechanised.
The staple crops grown on compound farms are early and 
late millet intercropped with guinea corn and cowpeas. 
Vegetables are grown along the borders, against the walls of 
the house and in small plots beside the house. Compound farms 
are easily manured using household compost but they are not 
normally fallowed. Bush farms and farms away from the house 
may be used to grow cash crops (rice, maize, groundnuts 
intercropped with bambarra beans) or staple crops. They may 
occasionally be fallowed and some are fertilised with compost
1 ”146 Million Cedis Voted to Extend Potable Water To 
Bongo" People's Daily Graphic 10/11/1989, p.16.
2 Benneh, Small Scale Farming Systems in Ghana, (1973) 
43(2) Africa 134-146, p.134.
3 For examples of different family and farming 
arrangements, see infra Appendix Two.
4 These farms may be held subject to a tenancy agreement 
infra p.375 or as part of the customary freehold interest in 
land away from the compound infra p.369.
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while a small minority receive artificial fertilisers. The use 
of artificial pesticides on farms is practically unknown.1
Compound farms in Bongo central, due to population 
pressure and land fragmentation, may be smaller than half an 
acre but bush farms, where they exist, may cover several 
acres. Commercial farmers are engaged in irrigation farming at 
the Vea dam.2
Insufficient rainfall or badly distributed rainfall 
continue to mean a poor harvest leading to high food prices 
and widespread hunger in the following year. Even in a good 
year, many farmers are left with insufficient produce to 
sustain their families through to the next year's harvest. In 
another densely populated district in the Upper East it was 
found that after a moderately poor harvest, 45% of households 
had insufficient food to last throughout the hungry season 
(April - July, but starting earlier in bad years).3 In May 
1991, the Government sent 1.2 billion cedis of food to the 
Region to help alleviate severe food shortages.4
Successive development policies have not been able to
1 Benneh op cit pp.142-143. For another good account of 
the local farming system, still largely relevant, see, C. Lynn 
Agriculture in North Mamprusi 1937, Department of Agriculture, 
Bulletin no.34, Gold Coast, pp.93.
2 Some aspects of the Vea Irrigation Project are 
discussed in more detail at infra p.349.
3 Report on the Distribution of Relief Foods During the 
Hungry Season (May/June/July) in Bawku District 1973, 
Unpublished Document. See also, Hunter, Seasonal Hunger in a 
Part of the West African Savanna: A Survey of Bodyweights in 
Nangodi, North-East Ghana, (1967) 41 Transactions of the 
British Institute of Geographers 167-185.
4 Famine Relief West Africa no.3844, 6-12/5/91, p.722.
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overcome the problem of perennial food shortages in Bongo. One 
writer has suggested that the situation may be worsening.' 
This is because the promotion of cash crops has encouraged 
farmers with spare land and capital to invest in commercial 
crops for sale outside the district in preference to the 
staple crops which are eaten locally. The improved purchasing 
power of townspeople in Bolgatanga and beyond draws this 
surplus food out of the villages. These factors raise the 
price of staple crops in village markets at a time when the 
rate of inflation is high and the population is growing.
The long dry season, haphazard weather conditions, 
shortage of land and poverty of the soil encourage 
diversification into animal husbandry of all types and non 
farming activities, including petty trading, house-building 
and various odd jobs. Nevertheless, migration remains the only 
meaningful opportunity for many young men. This may be 
seasonal but more often it involves long term migration by 
unskilled youths. Many migrants from the Upper East Region end 
up as landless farm labourers in the Western and Brong Ahafo 
regions. There have even been cases of parents sending their 
young children to work in the south.2
1 Shepherd, Farming and Drought in the North-East West 
Africa no.3157, 16/1/1978, p.96; Shepherd, Ghana's Northern
Food Crisis West Africa no.3136, 15/8/1977, p.1661.
2 Child Recruitment Again Peoples' Daily Graphic 
25/1/1990, p.6.
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(D) Environmental Problems and Priorities.
From the preceding information it is possible to identify 
some of the major environmental issues in this district.
The high population density in many parts of the district 
has contributed directly or indirectly to localised land 
shortages, under employment and outward migration of young 
adult workers. Settled agriculture, in part a response to high 
population density, has not been accompanied by adequate soil 
conserving measures.1 The result has been soil degradation 
leading to low soil fertility, low agricultural productivity 
and, in some cases, serious soil erosion.2
Soil infertility reduces crop yields. Low crop yields 
impoverish the farming community. Many people experience food 
rationing or hunger every year. They are trapped in a well 
recognised cycle of poverty.3
The shortage and the poverty of agricultural land 
increases the importance attached to animal husbandry as an 
alternative source of security but over stocking has reduced 
the fertility of grazing land and the quality of stock. These 
interlocking crises demonstrate the truth of the Brundtland 
premise that, at least in some circumstances, poverty itself 
is a cause of environmental degradation.4
The extension of settled agriculture has reduced the
1 Lynn op cit p.51.
2 Adu op cit p.4.
3 Chambers provides a perceptive analysis of the
"deprivation trap", Chambers Rural Development: Putting the 
Last First 1983, Longman, Essex, pp.246, p.111.
1 WCED op cit p.28.
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amount of communal and bush land. Annual cultivation and 
intensive grazing prevent new tree growth taking hold. Bush 
fires also prevent the rapid recovery of tree growth.1 
Meanwhile, the growing population places an increasing burden 
on existing tree resources to supply wood products. In the 
densely populated parts of the district, wood scarcity long 
ago caused crop stalks to replace wood as the basic cooking 
fuel but the use of crop stalks for cooking precludes 
mulching2 on farms and reduces the amount of dead vegetation 
which is returned to the soil.
The long dry season and variability of annual rainfall 
mean that water scarcity is often an issue. Many bore holes 
dry up during the dry season and some wells have had to be 
deepened although there is no conclusive evidence that the 
water table throughout the district is sinking.3 A year with 
little rainfall or with badly timed rainfall spells disaster 
for local agriculture. Tree loss has reduced the ability of 
the soil to store ground water. Many rivers are seasonal, 
their slopes denuded of the permanent vegetation which could 
help to regulate their flow.4
The natural vegetation appears to have been degraded by
1 Ramsey and Innes op cit p.60.
2 This is when the surface of the soil is covered so as 
to protect it from sun, rain, evaporation and erosion.
3 The Regional Water Authority records show that seasonal
levels at some observation wells in the district have become 
higher but the variability of rainfall from year to year 
prevents reliable analysis. The author would like to thank Mr. 
Anafo of GWSC, Bolgatanga, for the provision of this 
information.
1 Adu o p  cit p .4.
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permanent cultivation and annual burning. This has raised 
fears of desertification, often associated with the southward 
drift of the Sahara1 but more direct contributory factors are 
the reduction of tree cover and degradation of agricultural 
and pastoral land.
A factual analysis of environmental problems provides a 
framework for environmental planning but in order to set 
realistic priorities for action it is also important to heed 
the views of local people. Time and again development 
programmes have demonstrated that it is only when the active 
participation of local people is incorporated into project 
design that long term success will be achieved.2 The evidence 
seems to suggest that the same is even more true of 
environmental programmes.3 The writer therefore attempted to 
discover the views of local people.4
Farmers' comments quickly made it clear that 
environmental problems relating to agriculture vary from farm 
to farm. Soil erosion and pest attack, for example, were only
1 This was as much a concern in the colonial era as 
today. See, for example, Stebbing, The Encroaching Sahara: The 
Threat to the West African Colonies, (1935) 85 The 
Geographical Journal pp.507-524.
2 Chambers op cit pp.140-167; M. Edwards, The Irrelevance 
of Development Studies (1989) 11(1) Third World Quarterly 116- 
135.
3 SADCC Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation 
Programme People's Participation in Soil and Water 
Conservation Report from a SADCC Seminar, 2-6/3/1987, Report 
no.10, Maputo; Eckholm, Planting forthe Future op cit pp.56, 
p. 47; Adams, Green Development op cit p.202. See also, the 
recommendations of the Brundtland Report op cit pp.38,330.
4 On the various methods employed to gather information 
and their shortcomings, see supra Chp.2.
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serious problems for some farmers or in some years. Farmers 
frequently stated that their basic problem was shortage of 
food during the dry season. Many farmers saw the lack of 
income earning opportunities during the dry season as a 
serious problem contributing to this situation. This suggests 
that the solution to food shortages is not seen solely in 
terms of environmental or agricultural improvements.
A surprisingly large number of farmers did not rate the 
size of their farm or the infertility of their soil as very 
serious problems. This was not necessarily because they were 
ignorant of these issues but perhaps partly because the
potential for improvement, in their view, was lacking. For 
example, compounds possessing a shortage of young, adult 
labour could not afford to increase the acreage of their farms 
even if the land became available; the cost of artificial 
fertilisers is prohibitive for most farmers and the use of 
crop stalks for cooking as well as the small size of farms 
limits the amount of organic compost which can be made.
Backward linkages such as these appear to determine the
ability of farmers to make improvements in agriculture.1 The
fact that individual farmers face different problems and in 
varying degrees suggests that the agricultural problems of 
individual farmers cannot be dealt with in a uniform manner. 
Flexibility is therefore required in programmes designed to
1 The interlinkages which characterise poverty are 
recognised by Chambers in his discussion of the deprivation 
trap. Chambers op cit pp.108-114,152-163.
332
address their needs.'
Access to land, labour and capital are important factors 
which determine individual responses to environmental problems 
and programmes including tree planting projects.2 In order for 
all farmers, especially the most vulnerable, to adopt tree 
planting initiatives, attention should be paid to these 
underlying constraints which may determine farmers' responses. 
In some cases these constraints may be best tackled through 
general development programmes whose direct benefit to the 
environment is not immediately apparent but even programmes 
directly aiming for environmental improvement cannot afford to 
ignore these constraints. On the contrary, they should be 
designed with these constraints in mind. For example, low cost 
measures which show quick improvements in soil fertility and 
hence agricultural productivity are desirable in this district 
because they tackle the basic constraints of land shortage, 
low agricultural output and widespread hunger.
Both the factual analysis and farmers' responses make it 
clear that environmental problems are inter related and 
inseparable from general problems of development. The fact 
that many farmers wished to increase their income from non 
agricultural sources strengthens the argument that at least
1 J. Kramer, Sustainable Rural Livelihoods, in C. Conroy 
and M. Litvinoof, The Greening of Aid: Sustainable Livelihoods 
in Practice 1988, Earthscan Publications and IIED, London, 
pp.302 at pp.47-63, p.52.
2 L.Fortmann, J. Riddell Trees and Tenure: An Annotated 
Bibliography for Agroforesters and Others 1985, ICRAF/ Land 
Tenure Center, Nairobi/ Wisconsin, pp.135, p.vii; Barrows and 
Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: 
Theory and Evidence (1990) 28(2) Journal of Modern African 
Studies 265-297, p.294; WCED op cit p.143.
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part of the solution to environmental problems lies outside 
the direct man-environment relationship. To echo the 
philosophy of the Brundtland Report, all round social and 
economic development may be a pre-requisite for improved 
environmental quality.1
This analysis suggests some of the opportunities and 
constraints which face tree planting projects in this 
district. Trees are needed to improve soil fertility and 
agricultural productivity, to provide firewood, building 
poles, shade, fruit, fodder, medicines and other produce, to 
improve water retention and prevent soil loss along river 
banks and to upgrade common land. Other developments are also 
urgently needed in Bongo, however. In particular, there is a 
need to increase income generating opportunities outside 
agriculture and a need to address the needs of the poorest 
households whose very existence is marginal. While tree 
planting programmes can, in theory, help to improve the 
condition of the poorest, in practice they may not be the only 
or the most suitable means of achieving this, especially if 
access to land and natural resources by the poorest people is 
in any way limited. The overall impact of development 
programmes should therefore remain broad based and flexible so 
that needs which only indirectly relate to environmental 
degradation can be addressed simultaneously with those which 
do.
1 WCED op cit p.70.
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(ii) Rural Forestry Projects in Bongo District.
(A) Preliminary Definitions and Issues.
Rural forestry intiatives have been usefully sub-divided 
into three categories by the FAO. In the first category are 
"communal forestry programmes". These are defined as tree 
planting programmes in which rural communities or user groups 
participate co-operatively in their planning and 
implementation.1 They are often targeted for communally owned 
land, such as grazing land, and there is usually a commitment 
to a broad sharing of the potential benefits within the 
community.2 They may serve a number of objectives other than 
purely environmental ones. For example, they may be seen as a 
means of institution building, of increasing local self 
reliance and of improving the supply of minor forest produce 
to the local community. In reality, however, it may prove 
difficult to satisfy all these objectives and some goals may 
have to be sacrificed to ensure the overall success of the 
project.
Some of the problems which commonly confront these 
programmes include the weakness or unrepresentative character 
of existing institutions, the difficulty of gaining the 
initial and continuing commitment of members of the community 
who may not believe that they stand to gain and the challenge 
to make a fair distribution of the proceeds once harvesting
1 FAO op cit p .51.
2 ibid p.51.
335
begins.1 It may be difficult to obtain land, whether communal 
land, such as grazing land, or private, surplus farmland on 
which to establish woodlots. If communal land is obtained, it 
may already be severely degraded. This makes tree 
establishment a particularly difficult objective. In addition, 
projects of this type may require the unwelcome curtailment of 
existing communal rights, particularly free grazing rights. 
The consequences of this action may be of unequal impact, 
particularly hitting the poor.2 Communal forestry projects of 
many types have been attempted in Bongo District. The work of 
ICOUR Agroforestry, in particular, raises questions relating 
to the use of grazing land and farmland for tree planting 
activities.3
"Farm forestry for household use" is the second category 
of tree planting initiatives identified by the FAO. This 
category covers programmes which promote tree growing by 
individual households, primarily for their own use.4 The need 
to supply a variety of multi-purpose trees is particularly 
important in these schemes as is the need for projects which 
can respond to the demands of local people. Issues of land 
tenure and the small size of many poor peoples' farms may 
frustrate the implementation of these programmes. For example, 
tenants, women and under privileged groups may be denied 
access to land on which to plant trees or they may be denied
1 ibid pp.62-65.
2 ibid p.57.
3 Infra p.349.
4 FAO op cit p.47.
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the potential benefits if they do plant trees.1 In practice, 
problems such as these may mean that programmes of this type 
will not reach the poorest members of the community whether or 
not this is seen as an important project goal.
Tree planting for household use has been encouraged in 
this district by all the projects discussed in this chapter, 
with some degree of success. Potential and actual legal 
impediments to this type of tree planting are discussed in 
more detail in the third section of this chapter.
Agroforestry initiatives which seek to promote the 
integrated production of silvicultural, agricultural and 
pastoral requirements on farmland are perhaps the most 
exciting development in this category. Agroforestry systems 
have the potential to improve soil fertility and increase the 
production of firewood and other tree products. The concept is 
still at an early stage of development, however. Bongo 
Agroforestry has taken the lead in introducing agroforestry 
techniques in this district.2
The third category of rural tree planting programmes 
identified by the FAO is "farm forestry for the market". This 
category covers any programme which has the main objective of 
encouraging farmers to grow trees as a cash crop.3 These 
projects pre-suppose a market for tree products, often 
focusing on firewood and timber. Access to land, capital and 
markets are conditions for their successful uptake. They may
1 ibid p .73.
‘ Infra p.339.
3 FAO op cit p .47.
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alleviate local wood shortages and the associated pressure on 
communal resources and they may also be less dependent on 
wide-spread, intensive technical support. On the other hand, 
without special measures to improve access to land by the 
poorest members of the community, they will rarely provide an 
income-generating opportunity for small farmers and the 
landless poor. On the contrary, they may increase competition 
for land and they may eventually undermine the market for wood 
products which is frequently exploited by poorer members when, 
for example, they collect firewood on communal land for sale 
during the dry season.1 They may also create environmental 
problems if the species chosen are soil exhausting or demand 
too much water for the local environment.2 Projects of this 
type have not yet been initiated in Bongo District.
In addition to tree planting programmes, the degradation 
of grazing land evident in some parts of the district suggests 
the need for better management of existing resources if these 
are to continue to make a contribution to the livelihoods of 
local people. Some of the local initiatives which have been 
taken to tackle this problem are discussed later in this 
chapter.3
Whatever the design of the project, the FAO identified 
the need for responsive programmes which answer to the ideas, 
needs and aspirations of local people.4 Adequate logistical
1 ibid p.84.
2 ibid p.85.
3 Infra p.393.
4 FAO op cit p.47.
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support and long term planning are other basic requirements. 
Although many incidental benefits may accrue from tree 
planting activities, clear goals and specific priorities are 
required if the principal objective of establishing trees is 
to be achieved.1
(B) Bongo Rural Development Project (BRDP).2
Bongo Rural Development Project was an Oxfam supported 
project which ran from 1979 to 1989.3 Its principal objective 
was to encourage and support self help activities through 
voluntary, co-operative organisations. Between 1979 and 1985, 
BRDP assisted in the establishment and running of fourteen co­
operatives with a total membership of 1,556 co-operators in 
1985.
Among the concerns of BRDP was the need to increase the 
productivity of small scale, co-operative farmers. To this 
end, elements of an ecological farming package were being 
given more and more attention by BRDP in its later years.4 One 
of the attractions of the chosen conservation methods was 
their cheapness which made them available on a long term basis 
to even the poorest farmers. At this level, it was self 
evident that conservation measures and local development
1 ibid p.47.
2 The author would like to thank Mr. Jones-Awunui, 
Project Organiser, and members of Anafobisi and Adaboya co­
operatives for the provision of information relating to BRDP.
3 Oxfam, BRDP: History and Project Proposal BRDP: Volume 
One 1979, Unpublished Report made to Oxfam, Oxford.
4 Oxfam, 1988 Supplementary Report, BRDP: Volume Two 
1988, Unpublished Report made to Oxfam, Oxford.
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goals, such as increased food production, were complementary 
objectives.
The ecological package, run in cllaboration with Bongo 
Agroforestry, included measures to encourage interested 
members of each co-operative to establish co-operative tree 
nurseries where seedlings could be raised for sale or free 
distribution, at the option of the contributors, to local 
people generally. Other components of the ecological package 
included measures to encourage the greater production of 
compost and increased use of stone terracing on farms.
In 1989, Oxfam withdrew its financial support for BRDP. 
It appeared that, having supported so many activities, BRDP 
resources had become too thinly dispersed to realise 
sufficiently concrete achievements to satisfy the project 
donors. Nevertheless, BRDP's flexible and open ended approach 
to local development problems was exemplary. The tree planting 
components of the project were continued by Bongo 
Agroforestry.
(C) Bongo Agroforestry.1
Bongo Agroforestry is a Swiss sponsored project begun in 
1987, with the long term objective of promoting agroforestry 
farming techniques which are capable of sustaining and 
increasing local food production. In practice, local demand 
has dictated that the project focus more urgently on general 
tree planting activities.
1 The author would like to thank Franz Zemp and Thomas of 
Bongo Agroforestry for the provision of information about this 
project.
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In the early years, the project supported group tree 
planting in woodlots and along eroded valleys. The lack of 
clear leadership frustrated many of these schemes. Out 
planting was repeatedly followed by neglect in the protection 
and watering of seedlings during the dry season. Added to 
this, some landlords, who had not always been consulted in 
advance, refused to have the trees growing on their land and 
so they pulled them up. In 1990, the project was only 
continuing to assist two group planting schemes. Both groups 
belong to the 31st December Women's Movement (DWM) which is 
politically committed to tree planting.
The principal activity since 1987 has been the
establishment of "flying nurseries". These number
approximately twenty small nurseries spread throughout the
district. The stock of seedlings being raised in each nursery
varies from 50-10,000 plants. These nurseries are focal points 
for group training in tree raising skills. Extension is 
prolonged and relatively intense - the same people are visited 
fortnightly over a period of at least three years. The 
intention is that local people should acquire the skills and 
the commitment to raise their own trees from seed. Planting by 
individuals on their own farms is encouraged rather than group 
planting.1
Flying nurseries are an ambitious development which at 
the present time are proving hugely popular. They maximise 
group control, decision-making and training. They also
1 The project leader estimated that whereas the survival 
rate of trees planted by groups may be as low as 5%, with 
individual planting the rate may be as high as 60%.
I
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circumvent the need to transport seedlings across the 
district. Their future, however, may only be as certain as the 
future of the groups which are developing them. Each year 
three or four groups lose interest and drop out. Once groups 
disband, there remains the possibility that individuals will 
continue to grow seedlings employing the skills they have 
learnt as members of the group but the economic benefits of so 
doing are uncertain. Local demand has not yet developed to the 
stage where seedlings, except fruiting varieties, are 
commercially marketable.
The project has its own very small nursery. In co­
operation with flying nurseries in Bongo central, staff sell 
fruit tree seedlings in communities without nurseries during 
the rainy season. Approximately 18,000 seedlings are 
distributed in this way.
A small number of contact farmers have established 
agroforestry systems on their farms in collaboration with 
project staff. There is also a demonstration farm at the 
project headquarters where appropriate models of agroforestry 
are being adapted to local conditions.
Bongo Agroforestry has helped to popularise tree planting 
in this district. Nevertheless, many farmers continue to 
object to agroforestry techniques on the grounds that trees 
consume space and create too much shade for annual crops. 
Although woodlots and windbreaks may partially justify these 
fears, in a well organised agroforestry system these problems 
can be eradicated by the choice of species planted. In a 
community where firewood and fodder are highly prized and soil
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degradation is a serious threat to sustainable productivity, 
agroforestry has great potential. Intensive extension is 
necessary, however, to persuade farmers that overall 
agricultural productivity will not fall when large numbers of 
trees are planted on their farms and to familiarise farmers 
with the recommended tree species.
One of the principal constraints is the time scale on 
which this project is planned. Agroforestry is a revolutionary 
development in the context of Bongo and its development will 
be the work of generations not years. The need for quick 
results with which to impress project donors cannot be easily 
reconciled with long term environmental objectives. Another 
constraint is the contact farmer method of extension which, in 
other contexts, has proved itself slow to show the desired 
results of emulation among neighbouring farmers.1 Group 
meetings and group farms may be fertile ground for promoting 
agroforestry techniques but, needless to say, the job is more 
than project staff can begin to accomplish alone.2
In the longer term, customary laws which prohibit tree 
planting by tenants and which discourage the enclosure of 
farmland may present legal obstacles to the success of 
agroforestry techniques. These issues are discussed in more 
detail below.3
1 The Focus and Concentrate Programme in the Bolqatanqa 
District: Evaluation of an Extension Programme 1972, Research 
Report Series Paper no.7, University of Cape Coast, pp.90, 
pp.51-53.
2 The project provides for only two members of staff. The 
MOA is planning to promote agroforestry in the near future.
3 Infra pp.387,390.
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(D ) Collaborative Community Forestry Initiative (CCFI).1
The Collaborative Community Forestry Initiative (CCFI) is 
a Peace Corps programme run in co-operation with USAID, the 
Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) and the Ghanaian 
Forestry Department. The basic objective is to establish self 
financing nurseries in various districts in northern Ghana to 
supply local demand for seedlings. The project also provides 
nursery training and extension advice in support of tree 
planting. One American volunteer and fourteen local nursery 
staff are engaged by the project.
In 1989, the first year of operation in Bongo, CCFI 
raised and distributed 24,000 seedlings. In the second year, 
production of seedlings was increased to approximately 80,000 
trees. During the dry season, time was devoted to extension 
campaigns in collaboration with Bongo Agroforestry. More than 
fifty communities fall within the range of Bongo CCFI but up 
to 1990 regular extension was possible in fewer than ten 
communities. The Project was hampered in this respect by the 
lack of any transport facility other than a bicycle. This also 
hinders the distribution of seedlings which must normally be 
organised by the villagers concerned. To assist in planning, 
distribution and monitoring, a small committee of village 
representatives was established in 1990. Up to 1990, the 
majority of seedlings had been distributed to village 
organisations including BRDP co-operatives, 31st DWM groups 
and mobisquads. Survival rates had not been monitored.
1 The author's thanks are due to Constance, the project 
leader in Bongo, for the provision of information relating to 
this project.
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In 1990, CCFI was promoting community woodlots for 
firewood and timber supply. These have the advantage of 
spatial concentration which should simplify watering and 
protection activities. Neem, teak, cassia and leuceana are 
among the species favoured for woodlots. However, group tree 
planting efforts, sponsored formerly by BRDP, have not in the 
past been particularly successful in this district so project 
staff may be over optimistic in their plans for establishing 
community woodlots. The shortage of land is one of the 
problems. Often the only land available for woodlots is 
grazing land which is already seriously degraded, largely 
unsuitable for anything else. This accentuates the problems of 
husbandry. It also implies de facto alterations to the 
existing rights of grazing and free access. These alterations 
may not be uniformly acceptable to all members of the 
community, particularly members not directly involved in the 
tree planting project. As of 1990, no attention had been 
afforded to group rules as to watering and protection nor to 
distribution and marketing arrangements for tree produce in 
the future. These were said to be matters for the groups to 
decide among themselves but this policy might lead to an 
unfair distribution of project benefits.1
In programmes of this type, the task of balancing the 
rights of every community member to exploit resources on 
communal land with the need to reward those members who have 
made a special effort to water and protect young trees is a 
difficult one. It is desirable that the whole community should
1 FAO op cit p.64.
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be assured of access to the trees when mature because this 
assurance will help to reduce opposition to the temporary 
curtailment of existing rights, such as the right to graze 
animals freely, which might otherwise destroy the trees. This 
makes it important that sufficient trees are planted to meet 
local demand and also that alternative, perhaps more immediate 
measures are employed to reward the most active project 
participants. Such measures could include gifts of fruit trees 
or watering cans or cash payments if provided on a consistent 
basis.1
Another activity begun in 1990, with the assistance of 
Bongo Agroforestry and other institutions was a school tree 
planting competition. Schools were invited to compete for 
prizes by planting and caring for woodlots each numbering 
about fifty trees or more. Several schools were showing an 
interest at the start of the 1990 rainy season.
Local people are keen to plant trees in Bongo and many 
are aware of their multiple benefits. Accordingly, CCFI has 
been received enthusiastically as the successful distribution 
of seedlings in the first year of its operation demonstrates. 
The pressure to increase seedling supply has reduced the 
amount of time which can be spent on extension, however. One 
Peace Corps volunteer cannot possibly satisfy the demand for 
training which the current level of production implies. 
Nursery workers could be trained as trainers but their 
concentration in Bongo is a limiting factor.
1 Not, for example on the uncertain basis that food aid 
was provided, infra p.346.
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Remuneration of local staff and tree planting volunteers 
has been poorly organised. In 1990, local staff received food 
aid and a small cash reward linked to the successful care of 
their allocated seedlings but whereas the original intention 
was that there would be a rapid turnover of staff so that the 
total number of trained people would be increased, the 
original employees have clung to their "jobs" as permanent 
positions. "Lay offs" would now cause considerable ill 
feeling.
The experiment with providing food aid to voluntary 
groups engaged in tree planting has also been disappointing. 
Jealousies were aroused when only some of the groups were 
remunerated in this way. When, in 1990, the decision was taken 
not to provide more food aid for tree planting, extension
activities were met with some level of apathy. As of 1990, the
project had failed to establish training and self help as its 
working principles with the result that it was forced to 
volte-face and re-orient peoples' expectations.
A supervisory committee has been established with the 
assistance of the District Assembly. Its functions include the 
co-ordination and promotion of the project in the community. 
In the long term, it is hoped that the District Assembly will 
be able to participate more fully in the overall management of 
the nursery but more detailed plans have not been made.
The project's objectives are too narrowly drawn. The
rapid expansion of the nursery has been pursued without any
knowledge of local capacity to usefully absorb the increased 
supply. Without greater attention to after care the current
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enthusiasm for tree planting may quickly dwindle if success 
rates remain low. Although the project leader was aware of 
this, lack of flexibility in the design and requirements of 
the project prevent its adaptation to local needs. A more 
sensitive approach and an expanded set of project goals are 
desirable to improve on the long term prospects for this 
project.
(E) ICOUR Aqroforestry.1
This project was initiated by the Irrigation Company of 
the Upper Regions (ICOUR) sited at the Vea Dam, Gowrie. It is 
now sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) for a period of five years, 1988-1992. In 1990, the 
project employed a total of eight permanent staff, seventeen 
casual labourers and thirty tree guards. The latter are local 
farmers paid, inter alia, to protect growing trees around the 
dam from grazing animals.
The priority of the project is to raise trees around the 
dam in order to slow down the rate of siltation in the dam. 
This aspect of the project is discussed below. Other Project 
activities include the establishment of a nursery containing 
approximately 80,000 seedlings including only a small number 
of fruiting varieties. All seedlings are distributed free of 
charge usually to interested groups such as the local DWM and 
to the tree guards as a work bonus. In 1990, project extension 
workers were encouraging all the local villages to form tree
1 The author is grateful to the ICOUR project manager and 
ICOUR Agroforestry nusery manager for the provision of 
information relating to this project and the Vea Dam.
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planting groups. Free technical advice is given to interested 
groups. Liaison with other tree planting projects in the 
District is purely incidental. There is a possibility that 
UNDP will renew its funding for the Project after 1992.
In 1988, approximately 23,000 seedlings were out planted 
and in 1989, approximately 45,000 seedlings were out planted 
with approximately 19,000 of those seedlings being planted 
around the shore of the Vea Dam. Survival rates were said by 
project staff to be approaching approximately 60%.1 Reasons 
accounting for this include the intensive level of monitoring 
after planting out, the practice of beating up (replacing lost 
trees regularly) and the use of diazinon to control termite 
attack on young trees. In addition, trees are planted out 
early in the wet season so that they are well established 
before the dry season sets in, minimising the need for 
watering during the dry season. The principal reason 
accounting for loss of trees is destruction by grazing 
animals.
Overall, the Project represents a more professional and 
better financed approach to tree planting activities which is 
evidently having some success, at least in establishing trees. 
The benefits to the local community, however, are not so 
clear. To demonstrate this point, a fuller discussion of 
issues arising out of tree planting activities around the Vea 
Dam is necessary.
1 A similar rate was claimed for individual planting by 
Bongo Agroforestry supra p.340, Fn.l.
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(F) Tree Planting for Dam Protection - A Study of ICOUR 
Agroforestry and Bongo District Assembly.
The controversy concerning tree planting activities for 
dam protection centres on the Vea Dam at Gowrie. This is a 
medium scale irrigation development which was begun in 1965 
and completed in 1980.1 It is managed by a government 
organisation, the Irrigation Company of the Upper Region 
(ICOUR), which leases irrigated land in plots ranging from 0.2 
- 0.6 hectares. Tomatoes and rice are the principal crops 
although diversification is now being encouraged.2
The irrigation project at Vea has been plagued with 
problems throughout its short history. Firstly, all decisions 
associated with the design and location of the dam were taken 
without any prior consultation with local farmers and 
traditional authorities. In the densely populated area around 
Gowrie, compulsory resettlement and dispossession was 
inevitable but compensation was only paid for houses which had 
to be demolished. This was because all land in northern Ghana 
at that time was, according to the formal law, already vested 
in the Government in trust for the people.3 What compensation 
was paid to the chiefs on behalf of the people was not 
carefully assessed in proportion to the loss suffered in each 
case and it did not, in every case, reach all the affected
1 The dam covers a maximum surface area of 405 hectares 
and the irrigated land amounts to 850 hectares.
2 ICOUR ICOUR: To Promote the Production of Food Crops 
1988, MOA, Accra, pp.8.
3 State Property and Contracts Act C.A.6/1960, s.26.
350
farmers.1
Without hope of formal redress, local farmers took the 
law into their own hands. Irrigated farms were burned in some 
cases but a more permanent form of action has been the 
persistent re-entry by local farmers onto their upland farms 
during the wet season where they have continued to cultivate 
their traditional staple crops. This has rendered completely 
nugatory the beneficial effects of irrigation on the upland 
during the wet season. The value of the dry season crop has 
not been sufficient to compensate for the reduced commercial 
crop in the wet season. In almost every year, a seasonal glut 
of tomatoes brings prices down so low that production is 
barely viable in some years. The Pwalagu Tomato Canning 
Factory has not over the years been able to provide a steady 
market for the annual crop due to its internal problems of 
mismanagement, financial insolubility and lack of spare 
parts.2
In recent years the dam has been faced by increasingly 
severe problems of siltation. The depth of the dam at Gowrie 
has been regularly measured since 1986. In 1989, it was 
estimated that, without concerted action, the depth of the 
lake by 1991 would be only half that of 1986 and that by 1995, 
the dam would only contain half the amount of water required 
to irrigate the land presently under irrigation. Also
1 K. Kasanga Agricultural Land Administration and Social 
Differentiation: A Case Study of the Vea, Tono and Fumbisi 
Belts. North-Eastern Ghana 1990, Unpublished Paper, pp.65, 
pp.17-23.
2 "Pwalagu Tomato Canning Factory to Be Re-Activated" 
People's Daily Graphic 13/2/1990, p.16.
351
threatened is the supply of pipe borne water to Bolgatanga and 
the livelihoods of fishermen living around the dam.1 Technical 
experts therfore recommended tree planting around the dam site 
and the abandonment of all farming activities within a 100 
metre radius of the dam in order to slow down the rate of 
si 1tation.
The establishment of ICOUR Agroforestry in 1986 had as 
its principal objective these goals. In the agreement setting 
up UNDP sponsorship for the Project, one of the conditions for 
international funding was a commitment by the Government of 
Ghana that farming around the dam would cease. The duty to 
implement that international obligation was quickly passed on 
to Bongo District Assembly.
From 1988 to 1990, the matter was raised regularly at 
meetings of the Assembly. At the very first meeting of the 
Assembly, an ICOUR representative put the case for the 
immediate enactment of a bye-law prohibiting farming around 
the dam. The issue of compensation to displaced farmers was 
raised and the Assembly was invited to make recommendations. 
It was clear, however, that neither central Government nor 
ICOUR had made financial provision for compensation.2
The dam at Gowrie is not alone in the matter of 
siltation. In varying degrees, every dam in the district is 
affected by this problem. At the Second Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly it was therefore decided that the catchment areas
1 Speech made by Mr. Perrin of ICOUR Agroforestry to 
Bongo District Assembly Minutes of the Bongo District Assembly 
First Ordinary Session, 4/5/1989.
2 Minutes of the Bongo District Assembly ibid
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of all dams in the district should be re-demarcated as a first 
step towards protecting them from siltation. The Economic 
Development Sub-Committee of the Assembly was meanwhile asked 
to take up the issue of compensation.1 Assistance from URADEP 
was obtained for desilting three local dams but one started to 
refill immediately. UNDP and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) later identified eight dams 
which they were prepared to desilt.2
In November 1989, the District Secretary stressed that 
the need to pass a bye-law protecting dam sites was now urgent 
and that delays could no longer be justified as a failure to 
act could lead to UNDP withdrawing its support for ICOUR 
Agroforestry. In December of the same year, the Presiding 
Member advised the Assembly to pass the necessary bye-law. One 
member again raised the question of compensation but he was 
informed that affected farmers had already been compensated 
and that many of them were now being employed as tree guards. 
Members were reminded of their statutory duty not to stand in 
the way of Government policies.3
In mid 1990, the anticipated bye-laws were passed at 
last. Chapter Two of the Bongo District Assembly Bye-laws 
prohibits any person from doing anything which may result in 
the silting up or pollution of any dam or dug-out in the
1 Minutes of the Bongo District Assembly Second Ordinary 
Session, 24-25/7/1989.
2 Minutes of the Bongo District Assembly Fourth Ordinary
Session, 28-29/12/1989.
PNDCL 207/1988 s.6(6).
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district.1 In particular, all farming activities within 100 
metres of any dam or 30 metres of a dug-out are expressly 
prohibited.2 A fine not exceeding 30,000 cedis or imprisonment 
not exceeding five months is the specified penalty for people 
who contravene the prohibitions and, in addition, any crops 
grown illegally are liable to be confiscated.3 The bye-laws 
were passed unanimously without comment. The issue of 
compensation was left in abeyance.
The claim made in the Assembly that affected farmers had 
already been compensated refers to the compensation 
settlements made at the time the dam was built. There are 
problems, however, in equating the two issues even though many 
of the farmers involved are the same.
Firstly, the statement assumes that the land within a 100 
metre radius of the dam formed an integral part of the 
original acquisition by the Government but, even officially, 
this may not have been the case because boundaries were not 
clearly demarcated. The failure to observe defined legal 
procedures has contributed to the problem arising today.4
Whether or not the land was officially acquired as a part 
of the original programme, all that is clear to local farmers 
is that, after the dam was built, they continued to farm some 
of the land and to graze their animals around the fringe of
J Bye-Laws of the Bongo District Assembly 1990, Chapter 
Two, s.14.
2 ibid s .15.
J ibid ss.17,18.
1 Kasanga op cit p.23.
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the dam. In their view, the confiscation of that land is now 
a separate issue, whatever the position in law.
Another problem with the claim that compensation had 
already paid is that only those farmers who lost building land 
and growing crops were eligible for compensation at the time 
the dam was built. This in itself was considered unfair by 
local farmers whose only security in life is their guaranteed 
right to farm ancestral lands in perpetuity for free. In a 
subsistence, land hungry, agricultural society where all the 
available farmland has already been allocated, the 
significance of a perpetual title to land, however small its 
area, cannot be over estimated, yet farmers were not 
compensated for this, their greatest loss.
The 1979 Constitution revested land in northern Ghana in 
the traditional authorities1 and made the public acquisition 
of land subject to the payment of full compensation in 
accordance with the State Lands Act.2 This is of no assistance 
to the farmers, however, because ICOUR claims that the land 
was acquired prior to 1979 when the dam was originally built 
and, even if the land was not so acquired, there has been no 
attempt to acquire the land but only to prohibit farming 
activities and free range grazing on the land.3
The issue today is categorically different to that for 
which compensation has been paid. It does not relate to a 
change of ownership, the loss of buildings or crops but to the
1 Art.188 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1979.
2 Act 125/1962 s.4.
; Cf. Kasanga op cit p.25.
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loss of farming and grazing rights. The loss of farming rights 
is of greatest concern to local farmers because it is a threat 
to the affected farmers' means of livelihood. Perhaps the only 
adequate compensation for these farmers would be the award of 
free and potentially perpetual titles to land elsewhere.1 In 
such a densely populated area, this option does not seem to be 
very feasible. Perhaps grazing land away from the dam could 
have been offered as alternative farmland but this land is far 
away from the affected farmers' homes and much in demand for 
communal purposes.
Originally, it was intended that farmers who lost land 
from the dam would be given irrigated land but few farmers 
actually received land and the rents charged by ICOUR soon 
forced many of those who were given land out of production. 
Unless the problem of high rents is satisfactorily resolved, 
not even the award of land behind the dam could offer a 
feasible solution. Few farmers would believe that the title 
they were acquiring was adequate compensation for the loss of 
a perpetual right to farm their own land for free. Not even 
the alternative available employment in guarding trees, 
despite the very reasonable rate of pay,2 can compensate 
adequately for the loss of a permanent title to land. Tree 
guards, after all, are not guaranteed a job after the life of
1 This would be consistent with the nature of the rights 
of the customary freehold interest which they have lost. On 
the customary freehold interest in this district see infra 
p.369.
2 In 1990, tree guards were paid 8,600 cedis per month by 
ICOUR (not UNDP). Their employment is revocable if their 
allocated trees are not sufficiently well protected in 
practice.
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the project.
The fundamental problem is that, whatever benefits the 
dam has brought to the rest of society, these farmers have 
lost more than they have gained from the construction of the 
dam. In the final analysis, should the dam completely silt up 
and the whole project fail, the affected farmers no doubt 
believe that they personally would be no worse off than at the 
present time. Indeed, they would have highly fertile land to 
return to!
Once again, it is the problem of conflicting interests 
which underlies this issue. On the one hand, the Government 
and UNDP are concerned to safeguard the dam but, on the other 
hand, local farmers desperately need their farmland in order 
to earn their livelihood and satisfy their basic needs. The 
problem is a graphic example of how, contrary to the 
implication of the Brundtland Report, environmental and basic 
needs requirements do not always present themselves in a 
readily reconcilable form.
However urgent the need to address the problem of 
siltation in the dam may be, justice requires that, at the 
very least, some form of compensation should be made to local 
people who so far have gained so little from the irrigation 
project. If their views had been taken into account at the 
initial stages of planning for the dam, the fundamental 
injustice of planning a sophisticated irrigation project in 
the middle of a land hungry, impoverished agricultural 
community would perhaps have been realised. Now that the dam 
is in place, however, the injustice to local people can be
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partly remedied by considering the whole range of options 
available to prevent siltation. These include the installation 
of better desilting equipment or a compromise solution in 
which trees are planted as part of an agroforestry scheme 
which allows some agricultural activity.
In addition, measures which will provide benefits of the 
type desired by local people could be introduced as part of a 
package of integrated development measures. This would be in 
line with the call made in the Brundtland Report for an 
integrated, holistic view of development and environmental 
issues.1 Such measures could help to introduce farmers to 
additional sources of income such as fishing or pig farming. 
At the end of the day, however, the extent of land hunger and 
the central role of agriculture in the local economy make it 
difficult to recommend measures which can adequately 
compensate local people for the loss of their land.
The fact that the 1990 Bye-Laws were passed unanimously 
despite a failure to adequately resolve the issue of 
compensation suggests that the District Assembly had little 
choice but to pass this locally unpopular bye-law.
District Assemblies are subject to the general guidance and 
direction of the Council on matters of national policy.2 The 
cursory treatment of such an important issue by elected 
institutions shows that they are a long way from being truly 
democratic and autonomous institutions. It is questionable how 
far the actions of the Assembly, the Government and UNDP can
1 WCED op cit p.37.
2 PNDCL 207/1988 s.6(6).
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be said to truly reflect the recommendations of the Brundtland 
Report:
"Recognition by states of their responsibility to 
ensure an adequate environment for present as well 
future generations is an important step towards 
sustainable development. However, progress will also 
be facilitated by recognition of, for example, the 
right of individuals to know and have access to 
current information on the state of the environment 
and natural resources, the right to be consulted and 
to participate in decision-making on activities 
likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment."1
In the present case, it appears that the Assembly, as of
1990, had only served to worsen the district's fundamental
problem of land hunger while acting in the name of
conservation. Environmental problems of this complexity, it is
submitted, cannot be adequately addressed by implementing
unpopular laws which deal only with the symptoms but not the
causes of environmental deterioration.2 This approach fails to
satisfy the call made in the Brundtland Report for measures
which address basic needs to be included as an integral part
of sustainable development policies:
"Physical sustainability cannot be secured unless 
development policies pay attention to such 
considerations as changes in access to resources and 
in the distribution of costs and benefits. Even the 
narrow notion of physical sustainability implies a 
concern for social equity between generations, a 
concern that must logically be extended to equity 
within each generation."3
The call for sustainable development suggests that
1 WCED op cit p.330.
2 The same argument was made with respect to the strategy
of Operation Halt in the Western Region supra Chp.7.
; WCED op cit p.43.
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environmental protection cannot be afforded a priority that is 
inconsistent with meeting basic needs. In this case, either 
the affected farmers should be adequately compensated or some 
other lasting compromise should be sought. Agroforestry, 
windbreaks on the river banks and improved desilting equipment 
are among the options which deserve consideration.
Finally, it is a sad reflection that a benevolent 
organisation such as UNDP should be able to dictate such 
oppressive terms in its international agreements when, with a 
little prior research, the needs of local farmers could have 
been provided for. Prior consideration of the social and 
economic costs to the poorest members of society arising out 
of development projects is a basic requirement for these 
organisations which is long overdue. Environmentally friendly 
projects, such as ICOUR Agroforestry might appear to be, are 
in no way less immune to this requirement than any other type 
of development project.
(G) A Summary of Project Design Issues.
A brief review of tree planting initiatives in Bongo 
District confirms the desirability of the FAO's general 
recommendations for tree planting projects.1 In particular, 
they confirm the need for clear cut priorities to be settled 
at the start of the project. Management and institutional 
issues must also be clarified at an early stage.
Certain aspects of CCFI demonstrate these points. The
1 Supra p .337.
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conditions for food aid and the short term nature of
employment at the nursery are issues which, because they were 
not clearly explained at the start of the project, threatened 
in 1990 to frustrate the goals of broad based training and 
activities motivated by self help.1
Management issues have also presented obstacles to
communal planting schemes. While some landlords have objected 
to tree planting activities, in other cases, the incentives to 
water and protect young seedlings have not been sufficient to 
ensure a good survival rate for trees planted as a communal 
endeavour.2 The problem of motivation may be reduced in the 
case of trees planted by much smaller, well motivated groups, 
such as the DWM and voluntary co-operatives but problems of 
access to land may remain.
An alternative approach is that of the flying nurseries 
now promoted by Bongo Agroforestry. These mix communal and 
individual involvement by establishing nurseries on a small 
plot of land subject to group management while planting out is 
for individuals on their own farms to organise.3 The
adaptation of the project to promote these popular flying 
nurseries demonstrates the value of maintaining a flexible 
approach to methods of goal implementation.
All the projects, it is submitted, would be more
successful if greater attention was paid to general extension 
on tree husbandry and protection. Staffing constraints were
1 Supra p.346.
2 Supra p.340.
J Supra p.340.
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the usual obstacle to more extension activities.
Long term financial and technical support is a 
particularly pertinent recommendation for tree planting 
projects because of the relatively long time span required for 
tree growth. Projects to promote agroforestry must, in 
addition, be based on a long time span because of their quite 
radical implications for existing farming practices.
Public participation is frequently cited as the most 
fundamental pre-requisite for the success of "bottom up" 
development projects of the type under review.1 The preceding 
discussion has demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric, many 
projects continue to be designed without sufficient regard to 
the views of the local community at the stage of project 
planning and decision-making as well as implementation.
Tree planting around the Vea Dam is the project most 
vulnerable to this criticism. In this project, international, 
national and local institutions have been insensitive to local 
circumstances with the consequence that widespread hostility 
has been aroused. The desirability of more open, democratic 
and participatory methods of decision-making is exemplified by 
this project. These were goals recommended by the Brundtland 
Report.2 The district assemblies were established to meet 
these sort of objectives but the actions of Bongo District 
Assembly in 1990 show to what extent this decentralized, 
democratic philosophy has been compromised by the
L SADCC, People's Participation in Soil and Water 
Conservation op cit; Eckholm op cit p.47; Seidman, The State, 
Law and Development op cit p.333.
2 WCED op cit p.330.
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centralising, hierarchical style of government which appears, 
in reality, to have charaterised the PNDC era.1
Bongo Agroforestry demonstrates a more flexible, learning 
and adaptive approach to project design which embodies
participatory principles and which may, in the long term,
achieve lasting success without antagonising local people. 
Long term financial support for this project is greatly to be 
recommended.
In addition to issues of project design and management, 
all the projects raise a number of legal issues. It is to
these issues that the discussion now turns.
1 "Verdict on Assemblies" West Africa 3-9/2/1992, 
no.3881, pp.181-182, p.182; "Transition and Its Meaining" West 
Africa no.3920, 2-8/11/1992, pp.1864-1865, p.1865.
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(iii) Customary Law, Environmental Problems and Tree Tenure.
Customary land law is the part of the law which has the
greatest practical impact on environmental issues in Bongo. It
determines the allocation and distribution of rights to land
and it defines the powers, rights and duties of individuals
and groups with respect to most other natural resources. These
issues are relevant to any discussion of rural forestry
projects in the district because they have the potential to
frustrate or facilitate their goals and agendas:
"Given the multiplicity of conflicting claims that 
are found attached to the land it is imperative for 
those seeking change to find out at which levels the 
control of land allocation is lodged ... (and) whose 
rights are added to or detracted from by planting 
trees."1
This realisation makes a brief study of the general 
principles of customary land law in this district desirable 
with particular attention being paid to rights to trees and 
other aspects of the law which may influence the 
implementation of rural forestry programmes. Among these, the 
rights of tenants to plant trees,2 the nature and extent of 
communal rights of exploitation and the management of and 
access to communal grazing land3 are among the legal issues 
which the preceding discussion of ongoing tree planting 
projects has raised for further consideration.
For the purposes of this discussion, which is orientated
1 Fortmann op cit p.xii. See also FAO, op cit p.27.
2 Supra p.342.
J Supra p.344.
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to a consideration of legal and environmental interactions, it 
was not considered necessary nor, given the constraints of 
time and resources, possible to make a comprehensive, 
authoritative investigation of all aspects of local customary 
land law in this district. Traditional authorities in three 
villages, Bongo, Gowrie and Adaboya, were interviewd, however, 
and attempts made to cross check and confirm the general 
validity of their evidence in interviews with local people.1 
In presenting the most relevant parts of this evidence to the 
reader, the intention is not to finally determine complex 
issues of legal uncertainty which are remote to the discussion 
of environmental issues.2 Much less ambitiously, the intention 
is to put environmental issues into a legal context by 
describing broadly, the extent and character of the relevant 
rights and obligations in customary law.
The general scheme of interests in the land law of Ghana 
has been very briefly introduced to the reader in chapter 
five.3 The generally accepted three fold classification of 
customary interests in land - allodial, customary freehold4 
and tenancy - described in that chapter has been adopted as 
the framework for the following summary and analysis of 
customary law in Bongo District. In addition, legal rights to
1 The method and problems of this research have been 
discussed in chapter two.
2 One such controversy relates to the identity of the 
allodial landowner in this district. See comments at infra 
p.365.
1 Supra p .96.
1 Also known as the determinable or usufruct interest.
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trees and common rights of exploitation, subjects which have 
a particular bearing on tree planting programmes, are afforded 
special consideration.
(A) The Allodial Interest.
It will be recalled that the allodial interest in land is 
the indivisible right of the community to all the land which 
its members occupy or which is held in trust for their future 
needs.1 In every case, the community is represented by a 
person or persons who, inter alia, make grants of land not 
already allocated. This person(s) is sometimes referred to as 
the "landowner" although the real character of his interest is 
that of a trustee administering the land on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the allodial community.2
Writers are at variance as to who is the allodial 
"landowner" in the various communities of northern Ghana. 
Ollennu takes the controversial view that throughout northern 
Ghana the allodial title to land is vested in the occupant of 
the skin who is the equivalent of the stool occupant in 
southern Ghana.3 He cites the case of Azanti low Sandemanab v 
Nayeri Mamprusina in which it was ruled that the allodial 
title to land was vested in the chiefs and not the tindanas 
but the finding in that case was expressly restricted to the
1 Supra p.97. See also, Bentsi-Enchill, The Traditional 
Legal Systems of Africa, op cit p.75.
2 Ollennu op cit p.8.
; ibid p .10.
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Bui Isa community.1 Other writers have been careful not to 
generalise in this way and it is widely recognised that, at 
least in some communities in northern Ghana, the allodial 
title vests in tindanas.2
The 1979 Committee on Land Tenure in the Northern and 
Upper Regions attempted to identify the allodial landowner in 
each of the separate communities in northern Ghana. The Report 
of the Committee states that in the Fra Fra Traditional Area 
the allodial title vests in the tindanas in the Nangodi and 
Sekoti divisions but in the chiefs in the Bongo and Tongo 
divisions.3 This finding contrasts with one decision of the 
High Court where it was said, obiter dictum, that the tindana 
is the allodial landowner in the Balungu/Lungu area of Bongo.4 
Atobiga is firmly of the view that among the Gurunsi it is the 
tindanas who are the allodial owners of the land.5
Another possibility is that the allodial title to land 
vests in individual sections. Fortes provides some support for
1 ibid p.9. Azantilow Sandemanab v Nayeri Mamprusina 
(1952) DC (Land) ('52-? 55) 20.
2 Pogucki A Survey of Land Tenure in Customary Law of the 
Protectorate of the Northern Territories 1955, Lands 
Department, Accra, pp.60, pp.8-12,55; Cheshire Observations on 
the Land Tenure System in the Northern and Upper Regions 1975, 
Land Administration Research Centre, University of Science and 
Technology, Kumasi, p.C2.
3 Report of the Committee on Ownership of Lands and 
Position of Tenants in the Northern and Upper Regions 1979, 
Accra, p.28.
4 Akuruqu v Ania, Amoa and Akuqre Land Suit Case 
no.4/1984, Bolgatanga High Court Records.
5 Atobiga, The Acquisition and Alienation of Property 
Among the Fra Fras op cit p.9.
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this view.1 If this is the correct view, then the tindanas and 
chiefs hold only jurisdictional rights,2 the former being
religious officers and the latter political officers. On the 
other hand, Fortes' evidence may only confirm the communal
basis of the allodial interest which is charactersitic of the
allodial interest everywhere in Ghana or, alternatively, the 
considerable practical importance which attaches to the 
customary freehold interest in this district as in other parts 
of Ghana.
In 1989, interviews were conducted with traditional 
authorities in Adaboya, Bongo and Gowrie during which
respondents were invited to describe the respective roles of 
the Chief and Tindana in their own villages.
In Adaboya, the Chief and the Tindana, interviewed on 
separate occasions, made some mutually consistent statements 
to the effect that the Tindana is the primary authority on 
most land matters.3 In Bongo, the Regent expressed the view 
that the relationship between the Paramount Chief and local 
Tindana was one of "brothers" but decisions on land matters,
1 "Chiefs and tendaanas have no over-riding rights of 
ownership entitling them to rent, tax or tribute." Fortes, The 
Political System of the Tallensi op cit p.250.
2 Allott and Kludze recognize the essential difference 
between the jurisdictional and proprietary rights of chiefs. 
Allott The Akan Law of Property 1954, PhD. Thesis, London 
University, London, pp.494, p.85; Kludze Ewe Law of Property 
1973, Sweet and Maxwell, London, pp.324, pp.146-148.
3 For example, the Tindana and the Chief gave consistent 
evidence to the effect that the Tindana is for the land and 
also for all shea and dawa dawa trees. On the other hand, some 
apparently irreconcilable statements were also made. For 
example, the Tindana laid cliam to grazing land but so did the 
Chief Appendix One
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with the exception of religious affairs, were taken by the 
Paramount Chief, who as a matter of formality, would inform 
the Tindana of his decision.1 In Gowrie, the position of Chief 
and Tindana is always held by the same man and, consequently, 
clear distinctions between the two roles are no longer 
possible.2 In each village, close liaison between the Chief 
and the Tindana was usual. In addition, the importance 
afforded to the role of section heads in matters of land 
administration was striking.
While this evidence does not convincingly settle the 
academic dispute, it does suggest that differences in the 
exact divisions of legal powers may be even more locally 
distinguished than has previously been suggested.3 This would 
help to account for some of the controversy stemming from 
previous accounts. More importantly to the analysis in this 
thesis, the realisation that there exist highly localised 
variations in power configurations suggests how important it 
is for project co-ordinators to make very specific inquiries 
in every case. The desirability of this task is underscored by 
the evidence given below of the rights and powers which the 
chiefs and tindanas exercise with respect to trees and 
communal resources. In addition, the task of inquiry is an 
important one because these authorities carry not only legal 
powers but, perhaps more significiantly, varying degrees of
1 Appendix One
2 The Chief/Tindana did attempt to draw out some of the 
theoretical distinctions. See Appendix One
3 Report of the Committee on Ownership of Lands . . . op
cit
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political and religious influence about which outsiders can 
rarely afford to remain ignorant.1
(B) The Customary Freehold Interest.
The customary law freehold is the usual interest which 
a member of the land owning community holds in the portion of 
community land which has been acquired by or allocated to him 
or his ancestors.2 It has been described as a right which is 
inheritable and alienable.3
In this district, for almost all practical purposes, it 
appears to be the landlord of each compound belonging to the 
section who enjoys the rights of the customary freehold 
interest in the land attached to his compound.4 He holds these 
rights on behalf of and for the benefit of all the members of 
the compound.5 It is an indefeasible, inheritable and
1 For example, a local superstition formerly prevalent, 
was that the planter of mango trees will die. A condemnation 
of this superstition by the relevant religious authorities 
could, it is submitted, help to diminish this fear. On the 
religious roles of tindanas see, Rattray op cit pp.256,313.
2 On the nature of the customary law freehold in Ghana 
generally, see, Ollennu op cit pp.62-68, Woodman, Other 
Interests in Land op cit pp.63-98, Asante, Interests in Land 
in the Customary Law of Ghana - A New Appraisal o p  cit pp.848- 
885.
3 Ollennu op cit p.62.
4 Pogucki op cit p.30.
5 Ibid p.29. However, it is possible that in strict 
customary law, the customary freehold interest vests in 
sections as a whole, in which case it would be more accurate 
to say that the compounds of each section hold only those 
specific rights which are the practical expression of the 
section's interest. Support for this view can be found in 
Atobiga op cit p. 35. From the evidence presented to the 
author, it was not possible to determine whether the 
importance attached to the section heads stemmed from rights
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potentially perpetual interest.1 All the traditional 
authorities agreed, however, that they would refuse to 
recognise any attempt to alienate the entire customary 
freehold interest for valuable consideration.2 The customary 
freehold interest in compound land only reverts to a more 
distant member of the section upon the voluntary abandonment 
or complete extinction of the family in immediate possession 
of the land.3
Land attaching to the compound may be farmed by the whole 
compound as one group or separately by the families of each 
brother if the latter have made a division of the land but 
have continued to live together.4 Sons were said to have a
associated with kinship ties, or the allodial interest or the 
customary freehold interest.
1 Cheshire op cit p.C3; Pogucki op cit p.33.
2 Cf. Woodman, Other Interests in Land o p  cit pp.79-85. 
The Chief of Gowrie explained that evidence of a cash 
transaction would imply that the land was pledged or loaned 
but not irreversibly alienated on a permanent and irredeemable 
basis Appendix One A grantee who claimed that he had given 
valuable consideration for a grant of land would thus be 
prejudicing his own security of tenure by providing crucial 
evidence that the grant was not a permanent one. The 
indications which imply that an irredeemable grant has been 
made are signs that building rights and rights to self-seeded 
trees on the land have passed to the grantees. This does not 
prove that cash transactions are or were unknown. What, for 
example, would be the proper interpretation of a case in which 
the building rights and rights to self seeded trees had been 
transferred as part of a long term grant made for valuable 
consideration? Pogucki op cit at p.34, states that although 
sales of land were known in Bongo, they appeared, at the time 
of his research, to be dying out.
3 Pogucki op cit p.33.
4 Pogucki ibid p.29. Contrast the farming system adopted 
in Azure's House and Akiriba's House Appendix Two
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duty to help their fathers until the death of the latter.1 
Women have no independent legal rights to family land.2 They 
help their fathers/husbands to cultivate the family farm 
before attending to their individual farms.3 The present 
writer found one instance in which an unmarried sister was 
allotted a small part of the family land by the landlord to be 
cultivated as her individual farm, the duration of her tenure 
being at the will of the landlord.4 On the death of their 
husbands, women commonly remain in their husband's house 
cultivating his land with or on behalf of their sons.5
There are discrepancies in accounts of the customary law 
relating to succession in this district.6 Pogucki states that 
compound farms in this district are divided among the 
surviving grown up brothers.7 Rattray maintains that the 
brother of the deceased has a right to the farm but "if he is
1 See the evidence of the Chief of Adaboya and the Chief 
of Gowrie Appendix One This accounts for the position of Mba 
in Azure's House Appendix Two
2 Pogucki op cit p. 52. See also the evidence of the 
Regent Appendix One
3 These farms are usually held on the basis of year to 
year tenancies infra p.377.
4 Akake in Ayalkoom's House Appendix Two
5 Pogucki op cit p.62. Rattray reports that widows never 
leave the compound of the heir op cit p. 267 but Ayewuni in 
Azure's House Appendix Two returned to her father's compound 
on the death of her husband.
6 Local people generally seemed to be unaware of the
provisions of the Intestate Succession Law, PNDCL 111/1985.
Pogucki op cit p.44.
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a good man" he will give a share to the eldest son.1 Farms 
made by an individual on land away from the compound will be 
inherited by the eldest son of the deceased.2 Atobiga states 
that, if the deceased was not survived by any brothers, on the 
death of their father, sons may decide to leave the compound 
and divide the land equally among themselves.3 Cheshire found 
that succession is patrilineal with land passing from fathers 
to their sons.4
Information gathered by the present author, from the 
Chiefs of Adaboya and Gowrie suggests a modification to the 
rules identified by some writers vesting succession to land in 
the brother. Where the farm is made by the elementary family, 
it is common for the sons to demand an equal distribution of 
the land among themselves upon the death of their father.5 It 
is only when the deceased was actually farming with his 
brothers up until the time of his death that the next oldest 
brother will become responsible for the whole farm.5
Customary succession laws which insist on partible 
inheritance are sometimes identified as a cause of
1 Rattray op cit p.268.
2 ibid; Pogucki op cit p.45.
3 Atobiga o p  cit p.52.
4 Cheshire op cit p.C3.
5 Appendix One If all the sons have the same mother there 
is a greater chance that the brothers will remain united. This 
is the position in Akiriba's House Appendix Two It is more 
common for the land to be divided among the sons as in Azure's 
House Appendix Two
The existence of different inheritance patterns for 
different farming arrangements was identified by Pogucki in 
Lawra, northern Ghana op cit p.45.
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environmental degradation.1 It is suggested that partible 
inheritance, in situations of settled agriculture and growing 
population, may lead to fragmented farms, over cultivation and 
impoverished soils. These problems were cited to the author in 
some parts of the District, particularly around Bongo. 
Pogucki, however, reported instances where, because the land 
of the deceased was so little, the eldest son inherited the 
whole farm.2 The problem of fragmentation may also be at least 
partly resolved by sons opting not to divide the compound farm 
or by the long term migration of some compound members who may 
then fall out of the line of inheritance.3
Customary land law has sometimes been caricatured as law 
which perpetuates communal interests in land with the 
implication that individual farmers, lacking security of 
tenure, have no incentive to invest in the long term 
development and conservation of their farmland.4 An 
implication of this analysis is that individual farmers will 
be reluctant to plant trees because they represent a long term 
investment. It is clear from this account, however, that the 
substance of the customary freehold title in this district
1 Abalu, The Role of Land Tenure in the Agricultural 
Development of Nigeria, (1977) 15 Odu 30-41, p.38.
2 Pogucki op cit p.44.
3 ibid
4 Lowe Agricultural Revolution in Africa? 1986, 
MacmiIlian Publishers Ltd., London, pp.295, p.155; Omutunde, 
Economic Analysis: The Legal Framework and Land Tenure
Systems, (1972) 15 Journal of Law and Economics 259-276,
p. 262. On the position in customary law, Tiiani v Secretary of 
State for Southern Nigeria (1921) 2AC (PC) 399; Konkomlemle 
Consolidated Cases (Ashrifi v Golightly) (1951) GLC 312.
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rests in each independent "household"1 whose security of 
tenure is practically complete.2 It is only when the landlord 
has allotted portions of the family land to family members 
such as unmarried sisters that their specific interest can be 
described as insecure because the allotment can be terminated 
at any time.3 However, in this situation the landlord is 
responsible for the general welfare of all his family members 
so the latter can be confident that the land will, other 
circumstances permitting, generally remain in their hands for 
so long as they require it. The significance of their apparent 
insecurity of tenure should not, therfore, be over estimated. 
In practice, there are many other factors which tend to 
discourage individual investment, particularly shortages of 
manpower and capital.4 In addition, there are many soil 
conserving measures - composting and stone terracing, for 
example - which may improve environmental quality in the short 
term and which do not, therefore, depend upon a secure, long 
term title to land.
1 In this context the term is taken to mean the 
appropriate farming household eg. the nuclear family living 
and farming as one household (Adi'bono's House), the extended 
family living and farming together as one household (Akiriba's 
House), or the nuclear families of each brother living 
together but farming as separate households (Azure's House). 
See infra Appendix Two.
2 The security of the customary freeholder in Ghana is 
discussed generally in Ollennu op cit p.64; Woodman, Other 
Interests in Land 1990, pp.65,80.
3 For one example, see, Ayalkoom's House infra Appendix
Two.
4 R. Barrows, M. Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in 
African Agriculture: Theory and Evidence, (1990) 28(2) Journal 
of Modern African Studies 265-297, p.294.
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(C) Customary Law Tenancies.
As in other parts of Ghana, a customary tenant in this 
district may be a stranger to the community, a friend of the 
family or even a member of the landowning section who is not 
immediately entitled to farm the land.1 Two distinct types of
tenancy are common. The first may aptly be described as
permanent tenancy while the second type are of temporary 
duration. Traditionally, all types of tenancy were granted 
free of charge.2 Some (younger) farmers now charge strangers 
(or rich men) for the privilege of farming on their land.3 
With the exception of permanent tenancies, customary tenancies 
in this district appear to be revocable at the will of the 
grantor, they are not inheritable and they do not confer 
rights in rem.4
A permanent tenancy typically occurs where strangers,5 
usually a family, settle permanently on the land, building a
home on part of it and farming the rest.6 The grant is by
1 Ollennu op cit p.87.
2 "Land can be borrowed; it can not be rented, " Fortes op 
cit p.250.
3 Atobiga op cit p.15.
4 Cheshire op cit p.C4. See also the evidence given by 
Francis in Ayalkoom's House Appendix Two and the evidence of 
the Chief of Gowrie Appendix One
5 A stranger is a person who has no inherent right to 
occupy the land, Ollennu op cit p.70.
6 The testimony of the Chief of Gowrie Appendix One seems 
to accurately reflect the practice of the law on this point.
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express agreement.1 Cheshire describes how these families may 
become closely integrated into the community, their security 
of tenure improving over time to a point where the tenancy is 
both inheritable and potentially perpetual.2 It is important, 
however, that the grantees do their utmost to remain on good 
terms with their grantors.3 It has been said with respect to 
Ghanaian law generally that a tenant who denies the title of 
his licensor forfeits the right to continue in possession of 
the land.4 In one case, the High Court in Bolgatanga ruled 
that a customary freeholder was entitled to dispossess a 
tenant who disputed his title.5 Damages for trespass were 
awarded to the successful plaintiff. However, the Regent of 
Bongo stated that in a dispute of this type, he would do his 
utmost to enable a tenant to remain on the land. Furthermore, 
a permanent tenant should never be evicted without prior 
recourse to the Chief.6 This policy of mediation is in accord
1 Cheshire op cit p.C4 and the Report of the 1979 
Committe on Land Tenure ... op cit p.29, describe the 
procedure for the grant of permanent tenancies. See also the 
information gathered on Akiriba's House and Azure's House 
Appendix Two
2 Cheshire op cit p.C5. See also, Woodman, Other 
Interests in Land op cit pp. 107-108, on the position of 
tenants generally in Ghana.
3 Cheshire op cit p.C4.
1 Sarbah op cit p. 68; Woodman op cit p. 118 and cases 
cited therein.
5 Akuruqu v Ania, Amoa and Akuqre Land Suit Case 
no.4/1984, Bolgatanga High Court Records.
6 Appendix One
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with some recent developments in the case law.1
A temporary tenancy may be granted by members of a 
section who have spare land which they cannot or do not wish 
to cultivate to friends who "beg" for land.2 The grant is 
personal and inalienable.3 The grantor is entitled to take 
back the land at any time.4 The grant may be valid for only 
one year5 but if the parties continue on good terms and there 
is no material change of circumstances in the position of the 
grantor, it is possible that the original agreement will be 
allowed to continue for several years.5 Every year, at the end 
of the harvest, a tenant may make a gift of crops from the 
land to the grantor in order to seal good relations and to 
enhance his prospects of being allowed to cultivate the land 
in the following year.
In its annual variety, this type of tenancy approximates 
closely to the sowing tenancy described by Sarbah7 but whereas 
it is implied by that writer that the tenant under a sowing
1 Agbloe II v Sappor (1947) 12 WACA 187; Kano v Atakpla 
(1959) GLR 387; Adii and Co. v Kumaning (1982-3) GLRD 132; 
Blewudzi v Dzotsi (1979) GLR 173.
2 Atobiga op cit p.15; Pogucki op cit p.52. Ayalkoom's 
House Appendix Two See also the evidence of the Chief of 
Gowrie Appendix One
3 Cardinall op cit p.63.
4 Cheshire op cit p.C4; Cardinall op cit p.63. Ayalkoom's 
House Appendix Two
5 Atobiga op cit p.15.
(’ Cardinall op cit p. 62; Cheshire op cit p.C4. See also,
the arrangement which Adi'bono has with a friend, Adi'bono's 
House Appendix Two
1 Sarbah op cit p.68.
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licence is not permitted to grow cash crops, a tenant in Bongo 
district seems free to cultivate cash crops in the absence of 
an express prohibition.1 The obvious explanation for this 
difference is the fact that the local cash crops (mainly rice 
and groundnuts) are not permanent crops.2
When a woman is given a small plot of family land to farm 
for herself by her landlord3 it may be more accurate to 
describe the grant as a tenancy arrangement than as an 
allotment which constitutes an integral part of the customary 
freehold interest because women have no immediate right to a 
portion of the family land. Thus, in Akologo v Adachema the 
interest of the descendants of a woman who had been allotted 
a portion of family land by her own father was construed as 
that of permanent tenancy and not the customary freehold. The 
nephews of the woman were therefore entitled to collect the 
fruit of dawa dawa trees on the land but not her sons. The 
point was made clear that inheritance to land cannot run 
through the female line.4
Proponents of moves toward western style modernisation
1 Women and group farmers often cultivate cash crops on 
farms held under short term tenancies. Adi'bono grows 
groundnuts on his begged land, Adi'bono's House Appendix One 
Cheshire, however, found that strangers were not entitled to 
grow tree crops or cash crops op cit p.C4.
2 Atobiga mentions that it is also possible for a tenant 
to be permitted to grow one crop on the land while the 
landlord grows a different crop on the same land, Atobiga op 
cit p.15.
3 Akake, for example, in Ayalkoom's House Appendix One
1 Land Appeal Suit no.1/1980 Bolgatanga High Court. This 
was confirmed by the Chief of Gowrie Appendix One
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argue in favour of creating a dynamic market in land.1 The 
advantage of a commercial market for land is seen to lie in 
the opportunity it affords progressive farmers to expand and 
consolidate their farms. Environmental quality should then 
improve as long term, modern investments become feasible and 
as fewer people attempt to live off the land.2
It has previously been stated that traditional 
authorities in this district abhor the concept of land sales.3 
Accumulation of land is possible, however, because of the many 
types of tenancy arrangement recognised in customary law. 
Their drawback is, however, that temporary tenants may not 
have sufficient security of tenure to encourage long term 
investments in land, including soil conserving practices such 
as tree planting, in the same way that an absolute alienation 
would permit.4 However, it has already been pointed out that 
there are many other factors which tend to discourage 
individual investment and, in any case, there are short term, 
low cost soil conserving measures, such as composting, which 
may improve environmental quality within the constraints of 
the existing legal framework.
Assumptions about the benefits of a market in land - 
including land consolidation and long term investment - should
1 Omotunde op cit p.262.
2 Migot-Adholla et.al., Indigenous Land Rights Systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity? (1991) 5(1) 
World Bank Economic Review 155-175, p.156.
3 Supra p.370.
1 For a further discussion of this point, see infra 
p.388.
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also be weighed against the prospect of landless labour, land 
hoarding and land speculation which may indirectly result from 
measures which facilitate a market in land. If land is freely 
marketable, a danger is that the poorest, marginal farmers 
will quickly be bought out either by more enterprising and 
successful farmers or by people investing in land for 
additional security. While the former scenario may be 
desirable if the main goal of development is to rapidly 
increase agricultural productivity without regard to the 
disrtibution of benefits from agricultural development and 
without regard to the environmental risks associated with, for 
example, large scale, modern farming techniques,1 it is a 
prospect which implies a large measure of dislocation for the 
poorest people in agricultural societies. The prospect of 
landless, unemployed labour poses indirect threats to the 
environment, as pointed out in the Brundtland Report.2 Where 
customary law restricts the free alienation of land it does so 
in order to prevent the emergence of a landless class and in 
order to preserve for future generations an interest in the 
land of their forefathers. Thus, in a very concrete way, it 
makes provision for meeting the basic needs of present and 
future generations. Rather than risking the further 
impoverishment of many small scale farmers by promoting
1 Comments on the environmental damage caused to land in 
northern Ghana by large scale rice farmers are made in, Goody, 
Rice Burning and the Green Revolution in Ghana, (1979-1980) 
16(2) Journal of Development Studies 136-155.
2 WCED op cit p.55.
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measures to encourage a free market in land,1 a more equitable 
strategy would be the promotion of appropriate technology and 
co-operative ventures which will gradually upgrade local, 
small scale, agriculture within the existing framework of land 
tenure. Integrated rural development measures at this level 
were recommended by the WCED.2
(D) Rights to Trees.
The rights of individuals to own and harvest specific 
types of trees under existing customary laws have an important 
bearing on the exploitation of existing resources as well as 
on tree planting schemes designed to promote environmental 
protection. For example, in its allocation of rights to tree 
produce, customary laws may sometimes discourage farmers from 
planting trees on their farms.3 Either an absentee landlord 
will demand to receive the produce or, alternatively, any 
member of the community may be entitled to reap the fruits. In 
either case the incentive to the individual farmer to plant 
trees is lost. To what extent is this interpretation of 
customary law applicable to Bongo District?
Customary law in this district appears to distinguish 
between rights of tree ownership and rights to the produce of 
trees.4 Other important distinctions are between shea and dawa
1 Title registration and individual proprietorship are 
among the measures called for. See, Abalu op cit p . 4 0; Lowe op 
cit p.155.
2 WCED op cit p.143.
3 FAO op cit p.25.
1 A distinction recognised by Pogucki op cit p.39.
382
dawa trees (or sacred trees), other self-seeded trees and 
planted trees. Because of the central importance of this 
aspect of customary law to rural forestry initiatives, the 
present author made extensive inquiries as to the nature of 
interests in trees in this district. Firstly, the evidence of 
the traditional authorities on the question of tree ownership 
will be presented and considered. This will be followed by an 
analysis of rights to the produce of self-seeded and planted 
trees.
(a) Tree Ownership: On the ownership of self-seeded
trees, the following evidence was given:
Evidence of the Tindana of Adabova:1 All shea and all 
dawa dawa trees belong to the Tindana. In the bush, where 
these trees are abundant, anyone can eat their fruits but the 
Tindana has reserved the right to collect shea nuts and dawa 
dawa fruits on compound land. A landlord should come to a 
special arrangement with the Tindana if he wishes to be 
allowed to collect the fruit of shea and dawa dawa trees on 
his farm.2 Even when these trees are planted by the farmer 
there should be a special arrangement in order to prevent the 
trees vesting in the Tindana.3 The Tindana also claimed to be
1 Appendix One
2 For example, a landlord may offer the tindana a fowl 
and in return be granted the right to collect dawa dawa and 
shea fruit. A transaction of this type has no bearing on the 
interests of the parties in the land.
3 This evidence is only reconcilable with the actions of 
Namobire, who has confidently planted shea trees on some bush 
land in Adaboya, in so far as he claims to be on good terms 
with the appropriate representative of the (allodial) 
landowner, Akiriba's House Appendix Two
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the owner of all other self seeded trees on grazing1 and bush 
land2 whatsoever but he allows anyone to harvest their 
products. The Tindana should be informed when any trees are 
planted in the bush or on grazing land in order to prevent 
them vesting in him.
Evidence of the Regent of Bongo:3 The Regent claimed that 
all trees anywhere in Bongo are owned by the Chief even 
though, in practice, there is no instance in which the Chief 
reserves the right to collect tree produce. As an illustration 
of his ultimate ownership, the Regent suggested that in a 
dispute concerning the right to gather tree produce, he has 
the power to confiscate that right for himself if the 
disputants fail to come to a settlement.
Gowrie:4 The Chief/Tindana claimed that he is the owner 
of all trees growing naturally on bush or grazing land. He is 
entitled to receive a share of the fruits harvested from shea 
and dawa dawa trees growing on any farm land but in actual 
practice, this right is not enforced. Anyone can collect the 
fruit of any trees growing on bush or grazing land but no one, 
not even the Chief, is allowed to collect that fruit on a
1 Grazing land is land set aside from agriculture for the 
use of the community to graze animals etc. See infra p.392.
2 Bush land is farm land away from the compound which has 
not been recently farmed. The Tindana claimed to be for all 
bush land but it was not discernable at what point, if ever, 
the customary freehold title of the previous farmer or his 
family could be said to have reverted to the allodial 
landowner. It is possible that the Tindana was only laying 
claim to the ultimate reversionary title which he is said to 
have in all land Pogucki op cit p.34.
3 Appendix One
ibid
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commercial scale. If a person wants to plant trees on bush or 
grazing land, he should consult with the Chief in order to 
secure an exclusive title to reap their produce. Trees are 
like human beings and whoever looks after the people also 
looks after the trees.
The ownership of trees stands out as being of paramount 
importance in this district because it appears that tree 
ownership is vital evidence of ultimate land ownership.1 The 
informants invariably seemed to claim that the ownership of 
trees (as opposed to the right to collect their produce), at 
least in theory, was the prerogative of the allodial 
landowner.2 The evidence that the Tindana of Adaboya, who 
claims to be the ultimate owner of land in that village, 
reserves to himself and the members of his section, the right 
to collect the fruit of shea and dawa dawa trees growing on 
any farm land within his jurisdiction is perhaps the clearest 
demonstration of this point.
(b) Rights to the Produce of Trees: Although issues of
1 This is confirmed by Pogucki op cit p.38. Claims to the 
ownership of particular tree species are not confined to 
Bongo. Cardinall op cit p .61, found that shea butter trees in 
Tale land were owned by the chiefs while locust bean trees 
near Zuarungu were owned by the tindanas. Pogucki draws 
attention to the variety of arrangements found within northern 
Ghana op cit pp.38-40. In southern Ghana, a finding of 
quicquid plantatur solo non solo cedit was recorded in Asseh 
v An to (1961) 1 GLR 103. See Woodman, Rights to Fixtures in 
Customary Law (1970) 7 UGLJ 70.
2 See, in particular, the evidence of the Chief of Gowrie 
Appendix One If this implication is correct, claims to tree 
ownership can provide vital clues as to the identity of the 
allodial landowner in each village. The above evidence 
indicates that the allodial title to land vests in the Tindana 
in Adaboya, in the Chief in Bongo and in the Chief alone or in 
conjunction with the Tindana in Gowrie.
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tree ownership are important in this district, rights to the 
produce of trees appear to be of more practical value. In most 
cases described to the author, the landlord holding a 
customary freehold interest, was considered to own the fruit 
of economic trees growing naturally on compound land, 
including kapok, shea and dawa dawa trees.1 The exception to 
this rule is the right exercised by the Tinadana in Adaboya to 
collect shea and dawa dawa fruits from trees on any farmland. 
When land is granted to tenants, the landlord holding the 
customary freehold in the land usually reserves to himself and 
his family the right to the produce of self seeded economic 
trees on the land.2 If the tenancy is likely to be of a 
permanent duration, the Tindana of Adaboya suggested that an 
express arrangement may instead be made to share the produce 
of the trees.3 The Chief of Gowrie stated that, in the case of 
permanent tenants, the tenants would normally collect tree 
produce.4
Rights to pluck fruit from non economic, self seeded 
trees on any land appear to be free to everyone5 although the
1 Pogucki op cit p.39; Cheshire op cit p.C3. This 
corresponds to Ollennu's statement of the law op cit p .66. See 
the evidence given by Abugre, Abugre's House and Francis in 
Ayalkoom's House Appendix Two and the Chief of Gowrie Appendix 
One
2 Cardinall op cit p.62. The Chief of Gowrie confirmed 
this tendency by pointing out that the act of collecting tree 
produce serves as evidence of the title of the customary 
freeholder Appendix One
3 Appendix One
4 ibid
Pogucki op cit p.39.
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present author met with one case where a landlord was taking 
active measures to restrict the access of children to fruit 
trees on his land during the wet season.1
Dead wood and timber from trees growing on farmland 
appear to be reserved generally for the compound which farms 
the land.2 Dead wood and timber may be collected by anyone 
from grazing land and, in practice, also from bush land.3
Pogucki states that the planter of trees is generally 
regarded as their owner.4 The Chief of Adaboya said that 
although this is generally true, trees planted by a woman are 
the property of her husband.5 This rule was confirmed by 
several landlords who also took the view that all trees 
planted on compound land are the property of the landlord.0 
They claimed that although they would allow the women of the 
house to harvest any marketable fruit, they would expect the 
women to account for the proceeds to them. In one compound, 
where the land is divided for farming purposes and where the
1 Akasali in Adi'bono's House Appendix Two
2 Pogucki op cit p.39. See also the evidence of Francis 
in Ayalkoom's House Appendix Two and the Chief of Adaboya 
Appendix One One landlord in Adaboya said that anyone can take 
dead wood from his compound land, Akiriba's House Appendix Two
3 Pogucki op cit p.39. See also the evidence of the Chief 
of Adaboya, the Regent of Bongo and the Chief of Gowrie 
Appendix One
4 Pogucki op cit p.39.
5 Appendix One In addition, shea and dawa dawa trees will 
be claimed by the Tindana unless a special arrangement is made 
by the planter with the Tindana or his representative. The 
Regent of Bongo claimed to be the owner of any tree whether 
self seeded or planted Appendix One
Akasali in Adi'bono's House, Francis in Ayalkoom's 
House and Ayanga in Azure's House Appendix Two
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trees were planted by two of its male members, the landlord, 
while not denying his title to the trees, stated that he would 
first share the fruit among family members and then allow any 
surplus to be sold with all the revenue being given to their 
planters.1
From this summary, it is clear that in the majority of 
situations it is the landlord on behalf of the family as a 
whole, who controls not only farming operations but also 
rights to tree produce. Thus, for individual landlords there 
is no insecurity in their rights to compound land or the 
produce of trees planted thereon. There is no legal impediment 
to discourage them from planting trees on the compound land.
It is arguable that this coincidence of rights over land 
and trees discriminates against the individuals within the 
compound, particularly women, who have no independent legal 
rights to land or tree produce. It appears that, so long as 
women plant trees on compound land, they will gain no personal 
economic benefit from their produce in the years to come. This 
might help to explain the evident enthusiasm of many local 
women for planting trees on communal land. However, it was 
evident that women have also been active in planting trees on 
compound land. Although in this case there is no direct, 
personal, economic reward for their labour, the prospect of 
fruit, timber and shade for the family as a whole may be the 
incentives motivating their endeavours. Their actions are 
demonstrative of the essentially group basis of agricultural 
activity, at least with respect to the compound farm. The
1 Ayanga, Azure's House Appendix Two
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dominance of the group interest is most clear in the case of 
small households and in compounds where all farming tasks are 
undertaken jointly but even when the land is divided between 
the compound members for farming purposes, many farming tasks 
are shared. The compound farm provides the household diet in 
which all members have a stake. The search for independent 
economic motives, grounded in individual legal rights of 
control, may be partly unwarranted in view of this.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that women 
throughout the district are anxious to improve their 
independent sources of income. If they were permitted to 
retain the revenue obtained from the sale of produce from 
trees which they have planted, the incentives to persevere 
with tree planting and tree husbandry in the early years after 
initial planting would be very much greater. At the same time, 
the broad developmental goal of improving the financial 
position and legal status of women in this area would be 
furthered.
The second case in which local land law may act as a 
deterrent to tree planting activities is in the case of 
tenancy agreements. Close associations are drawn locally 
between rights to trees and claims to the customary freehold 
interest in land. It seems likely, therefore, that many 
grantors would not tolerate the planting of permanent crops by 
short term tenants on their land as this would be seen as a 
threat to the easy termination of the grant if not a claim to 
the customary freehold or allodial interest in the land 
itself. The activities of permanent tenants do not, in every
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case, appear to be so restricted. In Azure's house, the 
landlord claimed to be the owner of trees planted by his 
members on land held under a permanent tenancy agreement.1 
This contrasts with the doubts expressed by Namobire, in 
Adaboya, on his right, as a permanent tenant, to plant trees 
anywhere on his compound farm.2
The conventional wisdom that security of tenure to land 
is a pre-requisite to tree planting appears to be borne out in 
the case of short term tenants. Women, for example, seem to 
prefer to plant trees on their husbands' land around the 
compound, where at least the group title is secure, rather 
than on their individual farms because the latter are made on 
land which is only temporarily begged from friends or 
relatives. In either case, it will be noted, women cannot gain 
legal rights to the produce of the trees they plant because 
they are not allowed to hold long term, individual legal 
rights to land.
The fact that so much land in the district is held under 
customary tenancies presents a problem for agroforestry 
schemes. Most farmers who have planted trees have chosen to do 
so on family land around the house yet the fertility of the 
soil is often greater here than on more distant fields begged 
from friends. Some tenants seem to be restricted in their 
rights to plant trees even around their compound.3 If suitable
1 Appendix Two If the family ever left the land, it was 
thought most likely that ownership of the trees would pass 
with the land back to the grantor section.
2 Appendix Two
As in Akiriba's House Appendix Two
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forms of agroforestry are to be adopted in this district then 
flexible types of share cropping might be encouraged. These 
could, for example, take the form of an agreement dividing the 
right to tree produce between the farmer and the original 
landlord. An amicable prior agreement should be all that is 
required provided the traditional authorities are willing to 
enforce contracts of this type. The possibility of special 
agreements dividing the right to the fruit of self-seeded 
trees between tenants and their landlords was recognised by 
the Tindana of Adaboya and the Chief of Gowrie.1
The tenure impediment in tree planting schemes should not 
be overstated. The majority of farmers do not yet appear to 
plant trees solely or mainly as a conservation measure. Many 
farmers simply do not choose to plant trees on distant farms 
because of the difficulty of watering and protecting seedlings 
so far from the house. Women have not been discouraged from 
planting trees on their husbands' land even though they will 
never own the land, the trees or the fruit of those trees. 
They plant in the knowledge that profit accruing to their 
husbands from the sale of fruit may, in times of need, 
contribute to the purchase of millet for the whole family. 
There are, in fact, far more practical problems - termite 
attack, water shortages, browsing animals - which continue to 
undermine the success of tree planting programmes.
For the time being, it is submitted, attention can 
conveniently be focused on establishing trees on compound land 
where security of tenure to trees and land, for the family
1 Appendix One
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considered as a single entity, is generally not a problem. 
Where permanent tenants are forbidden to plant trees around 
their homes, thought could be given to interesting their 
landlords in share cropping agreements.
(E) Common Rights of Exploitation.
Systems of customary law often allow the free 
exploitation of some natural resources, including some types 
of tree produce, by any member of the community. Critics of 
these generally unregulated community rights of user argue 
that, in situations of high population growth, they inevitably 
lead to over exploitation of the resource base.1 Enclosure of 
private farms and "privatisation" of grazing land have been 
suggested as possible solutions to problems of over 
exploitation.2
The degradation of grazing land and shortage of firewood 
evident in some parts of Bongo District suggest that over 
exploitation has occurred. An attempt will be made here to 
identify the relevant communal rights and to consider 
appropriate reforms which have or could be made to prevent 
continuing over exploitation.
Common rights should be and are distinguishable from 
rights exercised exclusively by members of the allodial 
community such as the right, noted above, of the members of 
the allodial community in Adaboya to collect dawa dawa fruits
1 Omutunde op cit p.271.
2 Lowe op cit p.253.
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and shea nuts.1 A further distinction is between rights which 
may only be exercised over bush land and grazing land and 
rights which may be exercised over any land. Throughout the 
district there are areas of land specifically demarcated for 
use by the whole community for grazing and other purposes. 
Within the boundaries of this "grazing land", farming by 
anyone is prohibited. The ownership of this land was claimed 
variously by the Chief/Tindana in Gowrie, by the Regent in 
Bongo and by the Tindana and the Chief in Adaboya.2 
Nevertheless, in practical terms, the rights of these 
authorities were no more extensive than any other member of 
the community.3
The Chief of Gowrie gave evidence of a number of common 
rights which were not disputed by the other traditional 
authorities. These were said to include the right to graze 
animals anywhere during the dry season and on designated 
grazing land during the wet season. He also stated that anyone 
can collect roofing grass in the bush, that manure can be 
gathered by anyone from anywhere and that anyone can walk on 
any land during the dry season and along any path during the 
wet season.4 The right to pluck the fruit of self seeded, non 
economic trees anywhere and to collect dead wood, fruit and 
fodder from self seeded trees in the bush and on grazing land
1 Supra p.382.
2 Appendix One
3 See, for example, the statement of the Chief of Gowrie 
that he is not able to collect the produce of trees growing on
bush or grazing land on a commercial scale Appendix One
1 ibid
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were also said to be of a common nature.1
The privatisation of rights to trees in response to 
growing scarcity may account for the general rule in this 
district that dead wood on compound land can only be collectd
by an outsider to the compound with the permission of the
relevant landlord.2
In some cases, people have found ways of working within 
the existing framework of common rights to promote
conservation measures on their farms. For example, trees are 
individually walled during the dry season to prevent their 
destruction by freely grazing animals. Individual families 
have not been prevented from walling off dry season gardens. 
This last development suggests that the voluntary enclosure of 
farmland, as part of measures to promote agroforestry for
example, may become acceptable in the years ahead. This would 
gradually modify the extent of dry season, communal, grazing 
rights.
In an attempt to stem the further degradation of grazing 
land, the traditional authorities have enacted rules to 
regulate the practice of common rights. They have, for
example, prohibited the cutting of live wood in the bush.3 
Unfortunately, this has led to rumours of live trees being
1 ibid Cardinall found that the right to take honey from 
any tree excluding those on compound land was of a common 
character op cit p.64.
2 This rule was stated by the Chief of Adaboya and the 
Regent of Bongo Appendix One Pogucki previously found that 
self seeded trees were always subject to common rights of use 
for timber and firewood op cit p.39.
3 Appendix One
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burned in the night to increase the supply of dead wood. The 
problem is that, once again, legal solutions have been sought 
which touch only the symptoms of the problem without 
addressing the underlying causes of environmental degradation. 
Little attention has so far been paid to the enforcement of 
the law. No offenders had been reported to the traditional 
authorities at the time of research.
Another problem which affects the efficacy of this law is 
the lack of clarity on details. The Chief of Adaboya was of 
the view that his special permission is required before live 
wood on any land can be cut but the Chief of Gowrie said it is 
lawful for a person to cut live branches from trees which he 
plants himself.1 The Chief of Gowrie's interpretation of the 
law would seem to be preferable if the planting of timber 
trees is to be encouraged. In Bongo, it was observed by the 
author that the cutting of small branches to collect leaves 
for fodder and the cutting of bark for medicinal purposes did 
not seem to be penalised.
Despite the introduction of "customary" regulations it 
was clear to the author that common land has been degraded to 
a poor state which will require active measures for its 
rehabilitation. Grazing land, especially in the most densely 
populated parts of the district, is frequently located in 
river valleys where the implications of soil degradation and 
soil loss are very serious.
Measures to address the underlying causes leading to 
degradation are necessary so that local people will have a
' ibid
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real option to conform to laws designed to protect communal 
grazing land. Tree planting on private land should help to 
reduce some of the existing pressure on communal land by 
providing a multitude of tree products. Tree planting on areas 
of grazing land could help to improve their overall
productivity and prevent serious river valley erosion. 
However, communal tree planting schemes on grazing land have 
been largely unsuccessful in the past, at least for Bongo 
Agroforestry.1 In addition to problems of husbandry and
management in projects of this type,2 the use of this land for 
free range grazing poses a problem for tree protection. 
Individual trees are often walled off to prevent their
destruction by animals but this solution may be too labour
intensive for larger projects. In Gowrie, farmers have simply 
been told not to let their animals loose around the dam. Even 
though farmers are allowed to cut grass, there is still 
resentment at the curtailment of traditional rights.
By working closely with local communities it may be 
possible to reach more acceptable solutions. In a community 
forestry project in northern India, for example, villagers 
opted to stall feed their animals in order to protect newly 
established trees on grazing land. The "carrot" to encourage 
this behaviour was equitable access to irrigation water also 
newly provided under the project.3 There has been no such
1 Supra p.340.
2 Supra p.344.
1 P. Mishra, Madhu Sarin, Social Security Through Social 
Fencing, Sukhomajri and Nada, North India, in Conroy op cit 
pp.22-28, p.24.
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attempt to work closely with local communities around the Vea 
Dam. The absence of integrated and participatory development 
processes is the principal factor accounting for such 
different responses to restrictions on communal grazing 
rights.
(F) Reform of Customary Law?
Customary land law is often blamed for holding back 
economic development and contributing to environmental 
degradation. Proponents of this viewpoint argue that customary 
laws discourage individual initiative so that productivity 
remains low, long term investments are not made and the 
resource base is gradually degraded.1 They typically argue in 
favour of law reform to strengthen individual title to land, 
to encourage a market for land, to prevent the fragmentation 
of farms, to privatise the management of natural resources and 
to initiate the enclosure of common land.2 These measures, 
they argue, will lead both to the most efficient long term use 
of land and conservation of the resource base.3
The review of customary law in this chapter has not 
confirmed the validity of these criticisms. In many cases 
customary law does provide security of tenure, at least for
1 Omutunde op cit p.259-276.
2 These views are symptomatic of the series of law and 
development studies in the 1960s which viewed development 
narrowly in terms of western style modernisation. For a 
critique of law and development studies of this era see,
Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 
op cit pp.723-804.
Abalu op cit pp.30-41.
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individual farming households. Where specific customary laws 
have the potential to discourage environmentally beneficial 
activities, any attempt to assess their real impact should 
take into account the overall social and economic context. The 
law is only one of many factors which may contribute to or 
hold back sustainable development.
It follows from this analysis that the law, by itself, 
cannot provide a catalyst for change if measures associated 
with the desired legal reform are not in place or provided 
for.1 A system of title registration, for example, is unlikely 
to prove successful in a largely illiterate, small holder, 
farming society.2 Long term security of tenure is an 
irrelevant incentive to investment if the most popular 
conservation measures are short term ones such as composting 
and use of artificial fertilisers; the free alienation of land 
may spell disaster if there is no alternative employment to 
farming; over cultivation cannot be averted by prohibiting 
partible inheritance if the number of dependents per farmer is 
increased as a result; the privatisation of the commons may 
only be successful if adequate supplies of essential raw 
materials can be guaranteed for all local people.
This analysis highlights the need for integrated, 
holistic development programmes which tackle the underlying 
causes of environmental degradation instead of merely using
1 I. Gershenberg, Customary Land Tenure as a Constraint 
on Agricultural Development: A Re-Evaluation, (1971) 4 East 
African Journal of Rural Development 51-62, p.61.
2 S. Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title Upon 
Customary Land Rights in Kenya, (1978) 22 JAL 91-111.
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the law to attack environmental problems on the surface. Tree 
planting programmes may help to confront underlying problems 
such as soil infertility and low agricultural productivity but 
there is a need for these programmes to be more responsive to 
the views of local farmers. There is also a need to continue 
supporting development programmes which tackle the problems of 
poverty more directly, in particular for programmes to 
increase income generating opportunities. The appropriate time 
for law reform, it is submitted, is when development 
programmes which tackle the underlying constraints to 
environmental improvement are underway.
It is now widely recognised that, contrary to the 
conventional view, customary law has frequently proved to be 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the demands of economic 
change:
"Because tenure rules are the result of existing 
social relations they are always dynamic. As social 
realities change, so do the the interpretations of 
existing tenure rules and new rules are created."1
Although it is not possible within the context of this
thesis to consider in depth the debate on the process of
customary law reform,2 it may be possible here to summarise,
1 Fortmann op cit p.x. See also, Migot et al. op cit 
p. 171.
2 Although it is generally acknowledged that customary 
law is not a static regime, the debate as to how best it can 
be reformed continues. On the one hand, it is argued that any 
degree of formalisation - written records, greater use of 
precedents, unification - stultifies the development of the 
law. On the other hand, many African governments are anxious 
to quicken the pace of change and have resorted to progressive 
statutory interpretations of customary law designed to over 
rule existing practices. See, Allott, The Changing Law in a 
Changing Africa, (1961) 11(2) Sociologus 115-131.
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in conclusion to this section, some developments which may be 
likely or desirable in response to the various types of tree 
planting projects which are currently underway in this 
district. The fact that practical measures are already 
underway to encourage tree planting makes recommendations on 
these legal issues consistent with the view that law reform 
should co-incide with ongoing developments in society.
(a) New laws to improve the collective management of 
communal resources and better enforcement of existing laws. 
Prohibitions imposed by the traditional authorities do not 
appear to have saved grazing land from over exploitation. 
Temporary restrictions on common rights of exploitation are 
desirable so that trees can be planted on grazing land, 
thereby improving their long term productivity. Whether or not 
the enforcement of declarations by the traditional authorities 
is stepped up and/or appropriate bye-laws are passed by the 
District Assembly, efforts should be made to harness the 
active support of local communities for any measures which 
curtail existing customary rights.1
(b) Modifications of the law in order to guarantee to 
farmers who plant trees, especially tenants and women, a share 
in the fruits of their labour. Informal share cropping 
arrangements might encourage tenants to plant trees on 
degraded agricultural land. Another dimension to this issue is 
the need for clear rules regarding the maintenance, protection 
and exploitation of trees planted by groups on grazing land.2
1 Supra p.395.
2 Supra p.344.
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(c) A modification of the law allowing free range grazing 
over private land during the dry season. It is envisaged that 
this will occur as the enclosure of private land becomes more 
prevalent so that protection from browsing animals can be 
afforded to dry season and perennial crops and trees. The 
evidence that some farmers have walled off dry season gardens 
without opposition suggests that enclosure of some land may 
gradually become more common. This will greatly facilitate the 
kind of multiple tree establishment associated with 
agroforestry.
(iv) Rural Forestry Initiatives and Issues of Sustainable 
Development.
A study of environmental policies and programmes in Bongo 
endorses some of the general findings and recommendations of 
the Brundtland Report.
The Report of the WCED argued that poverty forces poor 
people to adopt environmentally damaging life styles.1 To some 
extent this is the case in Bongo District where communal land 
is being over grazed and soil is being degraded by over 
cultivation. On the other hand, environmental problems 
associated with the Vea Dam, for example, have an underlying 
basis in poorly planned programmes of agricultural 
modernisation in which poor people have had little or no 
influence.
The Brundtland Report argued that policies which promote 
more equitable access to resources could help to overcome
WCED op cit p.28.
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supply problems1 but in Bongo, where population growth, 
stagnant agriculture and land degradation combine, a basically 
equitable system of land tenure has not prevented 
environmental degradation. Equitable access to resources 
cannot by itself guarantee sustainable development. What is 
needed in addition are integrated, low cost and broad based 
agricultural development projects to raise the productivity of 
small scale and marginal farmers. This recommendation is 
consistent with those of the WCED.2
The WCED took the view that a revival of economic growth 
is essential for the funding of environmental improvement 
programmes.3 In Bongo, not all environmental packages are 
dependent on preceding improvements in material well being. 
For the majority of farmers, inexpensive improvements in 
farming techniques, such as tree planting, better composting 
and soil conservation practices, offer more viable, long term 
solutions than, for example, the increased use of expensive, 
inorganic fertilisers. On the other hand, the adoption of 
environmental protection measures without regard for the most 
pressing economic needs of local people is a strategy which 
cannot satisfy the basic needs objectives of sustainable 
development. The tree planting programme around the edge of 
the Vea Dam is the clearest example of this.4 Environmental 
problems in Bongo require an approach to development which
1 WCED op cit p.44.
2 ibid p.143.
3 ibid p.50.
4 Supra p.349.
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includes but is not limited to or dependent on preceding 
wealth creation.
The evidence from Bongo confirms the view of the WCED 
that programmes to promote environmental protection should be 
holistic in view and integrated in response.1 This requires 
environment and development programmes which are flexible in 
design, long term in their support and responsive to the needs 
of local farmers. These recommendations are pertinent to the 
various tree planting projects currently being implemented in 
the district.
In a broader context, development in the non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy may be a crucial requirement for 
improvements in the quality of the local environment.2 This is 
because more employment opportunities outside agriculture 
would render fewer people critically dependent on subsistence 
agriculture. This is recognised by local people. This means 
that NGO programmes which have as their principal aim support 
for income generating activities outside agriculture should 
not be afforded a lower priority than high profile 
environmental projects. The success of the latter, which 
frequently take a narrow approach to environmental problems, 
is in no way assured whereas some other social and economic 
projects have proved hugely popular and relatively 
successful.3
1 WCED op cit p.313.
2 A requirement recognised in the Brundtland Report at 
p. 143 ibid
3 For example, BRDP included health, craft and lending 
components which were very popular locally.
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The Brundtland Report argued in favour of more 
participatory development processes.1 While the desirability 
of this recommendation was wholly endorsed in this chapter, 
the analysis made of ongoing programmes suggests that there is 
still a long way to go in this direction. In particular, the 
District Assembly can be criticised for its failure to fully 
represent and act upon the wishes of local people in the 
matter of dam protection. The Assembly appears to have let 
national policy take an over riding priority in much the same 
way as, for example, Operation Halt has been endorsed by 
district assemblies in the Western Region.2
(v) Conclusion.
In this chapter a number of ongoing rural forestry 
initiatives in Bongo District have been reviewed. An attempt 
was made to put these projects into their overall social, 
economic and environmental context by providing the reader 
with some general information about the district. An analysis 
of environmental problems and priorities in this district 
revealed that environmental and development problems are 
interlocking and multi-faceted. Rural forestry initiatives can 
help to address some of these problems. Their implementation 
must be flexible, however, in order to meet the different 
needs of different farmers and in order to take into account 
the backward linkages and underlying factors which may 
frustrate the successful implementation of project objectives.
1 WCED op cit p.63.
2 Supra Chp.7.
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In the discussion of ongoing tree planting projects, some 
weaknesses in their design and management were exposed. These 
confirmed the desirability of establishing clear objectives at 
the start of the project while maintaining flexibility in the 
methods employed to achieve these ends. The need for long term 
financial and technical support seemed indisputable in the 
case of tree planting projects. In addition, it became 
apparent that more could be done to incorporate the views of 
local people in the early planning and decision-making stages 
of project development.
The account of tree planting for dam protection exposed 
the controversial role played by the District Assembly which 
has adopted locally unpopular bye-laws to protect the dam 
under pressure from the central Government and the UNDP. A 
failure of the project to address the underlying problem of 
land hunger was noted. The project also failed in every 
respect to heed the views of local people. This strategy is 
inconsistent with the basic needs and participatory 
orientation of the sustainable development model propounded by 
the WCED. A much greater effort should be made to work hand in 
hand with local people to reach mutually acceptable solutions 
to complex environmental problems.
The third part of this chapter examined aspects of 
customary law which could have a bearing on many types of 
environmental projects, particularly tree planting projects. 
It was argued that, in many respects, the conventional 
criticisms of customary land law which link it to subsistence 
agriculture and environmental degradation, are unfounded. Any
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attempt to assess the impact of customary law on the 
environment should take into account the overall social and 
economic context in which they operate. Legal measures to 
protect the environment cannot succeed if the underlying 
causes of environmental degradation are not confronted. 
Changes in the law should arise out of broad based development 
initiatives which tackle the underlying constraints to 
environmental improvement, such as land hunger and low 
agricultural productivity. Such changes might include 
temporary restrictions on communal grazing rights, recognition 
of share-cropping agreements which allow tenants to plant 
trees on their farms and appropriate modifications to the law 
on free range grazing to allow for the enclosure of more 
private farmland.
Overall, the analysis of environmental problems and 
priorities, the discussion of current tree planting projects 
and the investigation into legal and environmental inter­
relationships all exposed the need for an integrated and 
holistic approach to development and environmental protection. 
This approach suggests the need for a variety of long term, 
participatory and flexible programmes which take cognisance of 
the underlying causes of environmental degradation. This is 
precisely what the Brundtland Report argued for, but the 
evidence from Bongo suggests that current environmental 
programmes do not adequately embody these ideas. In 
particular, measures to promote the satisfaction of basic 
needs and participatory decision-making processes are 
frequently lacking. Once again, although the Brundtland
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proposals look faultless in theory, there is still a long way 
to go in order to make those goals realisable at the local 
level.
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CHAPTER TEN: FOREST POLICY FOR THE 1990s,
Originally, the forest policy in the Gold Coast aimed at 
the conservation of a significant part of the tropical forest 
to preserve climatic conditions and water supplies and to 
minimise erosion. This was the major premise of Mr. Thompson 
as early as 1909.1 The rational exploitation of the permanent 
forest estate on a sustained yield basis was a secondary but 
not insignificant concern. In 1949, the official forest policy 
added the most efficient exploitation of the unreserved forest 
to the objectives of forest administration.2 Today, the aims 
of the 1949 Forest Policy are thought to be too narrow and a 
new forest policy has been drafted to address the issues of 
the present day.
The draft forest policy, unlike its predecessors, 
attempts to provide a comprehensive policy document covering 
all areas of concern to the forest sector and including an 
action plan for the better implementation of its objectives.3 
The document has been rigorously thought out and represents 
the very latest thinking on forest policy generally while not 
neglecting issues peculiar to Ghanaian circumstances. From the 
preceding analysis of ongoing reforms in the sector it may be 
possible to give an indication of what the new policy can
1 Supra Chp.4, p.79.
2 Forestry Department Annual Report 1949, Government 
Printer, Accra, p.l.
3 Proposals for the Revision of the National Forest 
Policy of Ghana (Draft Forest Policy) 1989, Forestry 
Commission, Accra, pp.17.
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realistically hope to achieve and to suggest the way forward 
in the light of recent experience.
The proposal for the revision of the national forest 
policy lists five major changes since 1949 in the 
circumstances in which forest policy must operate. These are - 
the serious reduction in the area of forested land, the 
increased demand for forest produce of all types, advances in 
science and technology, institutional changes since 1949 and 
biological changes.1 The Draft Forest Policy contains a number 
of recommendations covering, inter alia, management, 
exploitation and rural forestry policies for the forest 
sector.
Proposals are made for the strengthening of management 
institutions in the sector. Adequate remuneration is a factor 
mentioned as well as the co-ordination of programmes and 
adequate and continuous funding of sector institutions.2 
Action to secure these objectives will include the 
establishment of a Sector Co-ordination Committee including 
heads of forest sector institutions and representatives of the 
industry.3 A special Forest Fund is envisaged to help finance 
development, management, research and training.4
The need for institutional strengthening was considered 
in chapter six. Co-ordination, accountabi1ity and efficiency 
are the appropriate goals to be aimed for. The FRMP is
1 ibid p.l.
2 ibid p.8.
3 ibid p.16.
1 ibid p .17.
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attempting to address these issues. Its proposals for greater 
reliance on market mechanisms in concession allocation 
procedures1 and to determine forest fees" have the potential 
for reducing discretion and curtailing maladministration. 
While Ghana should and will reject solutions imposed by 
foreign agencies, no time should be lost in implementing 
appropriate administrative reforms.
Logistical support for under staffed and under funded 
sector institutions is also essential. Although the FRMP 
includes measures of this type, the Project was criticised for 
the inadequate level of logistical support targeted for 
district forest offices.3 The problems in the Western Region, 
discussed in chapter seven, underscored the relevance of this 
criticism. The problems discussed in chapter eight suggest the 
importance which should be attached to making logistical 
support continuous and adequate, especially during periods of 
intense forest exploitation.
On silvicultural management, the Draft Forest Policy 
envisions the continuous inventory of forest reserves and the 
more intensive monitoring of logging activities.4 The method 
of estimating the Annual Allowable Cut will be improved by 
including as many species as possible in the calculation.5 The
1 Supra p.281.
2 Supra p.296.
3 Supra p.158.
4 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.12.
5 This will make the AAC estimate artificially high if 
species which have a potentially commercial value but which 
are not currently being exploited are all included in one
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need for continual research figures prominently in the 
Pol icy.1
The emphasis in the Draft Forest Policy on continuing 
research into silvicultural management in tropical forests is 
justified in view of the many uncertainties in this field. 
Whatever techniques are used, they should not be beyond the 
capacities of the Forestry Department to administer, even in 
times of economic stringency. The greater use of fiscal 
measures in support of silvicultural regulations was applauded 
in chapter eight as one measure which could help to reduce the 
high level of waste in the industry.2
The problems of protecting the permanent forest estate 
are not dealt with in any great detail in the Draft Forest 
Policy. This is surprising in view of the seriousness of the 
problems discussed in chapter seven. In view of the scale of 
illegal encroachment into some reserves a more realistic, more 
comprehensive and more integrated strategy than that of 
Operation Halt was canvassed. It was suggested that reserves 
which are almost wholly deforested should be de-reserved in 
return for a guarantee by traditional and district authorities 
that they will accept a share of the responsibility for 
preventing any future encroachments into forest reserves.3 The 
need for more positive measures to improve agricultural 
productivity outside forest reserves was highlighted as was
estimate supra p.235.
1 Draft Forest Policy o p  cit pp.3,8,15.
2 Supra p.299.
' Supra p.225.
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the desirability of comprehensive development planning to
improve the co-ordination and harmonisation of agricultural
and forestry activities.1 Underlying these recommendations was
a recognition of the need to integrate local communities more
carefully into the forest economy so that the fundamental
logic of conservation and sustainable development policies
will appeal to local people. This realisation is consistent
with comments made in the Draft Forest Policy:
"The participation and involvement of individuals, 
communities, community organizations and local 
authorities is essential to the effective
conservation and development of forest resources and 
to deriving optimum benefit from their utilisation.
The majority of the people have not shown sufficient 
appreciation of the importance of forests and the 
necessity for the management and conservation of 
forest resources. Public education and the promotion 
of measures to increase public participation are 
therefore essential to successful forest management 
and conservation. 1,2
The Draft Forest Policy does not make clear what level of 
protection should be afforded to remaining timber resources 
outside reserves. It makes no explicit recommendations on how 
to combat the buoyant illegal timber trade but seems instead 
to rely on rural forestry initiatives as the bedrock of future 
supplies for the nation.J
Suggestions have been made in this thesis for the de­
regulation of activities outside forest reserves in 
recognition of the important role which the illegal timber
1 Supra p.227.
2 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.3.
3 ibid p.10.
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trade plays in supplying affordable timber to local people.1 
This would entail the phasing out of timber grants over land 
outside forest reserves and, preferably, the renunciation of 
the government's title to forest resources outside forest 
reserves.2 This would allow the regulatory institutions to 
focus on controlling activities in forest reserves, it would 
prevent the sort of acrimony which often arises between 
farmers and concessionaires when the former are not 
compensated for damage caused to their crops during logging 
operations and it could encourage private investment in trees 
and timber.
Ambiguity on issues of forest protection results from the 
lack of an overall land-use policy in Ghana which sets clear 
priorities between the different potential land-uses and 
which, among other things, deals with the difficult issue of 
providing alternative means of livelihood for those who are 
genuinely made to suffer by the reservation of land or 
conservation of timber for forestry purposes. The fact that 
the Forestry Commission, which drew up the Draft Forest 
Policy, does not have primary responsibility for land-use 
planning overall is one of the factors contributing to this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs.3 Institutional isolation of 
the type identified with respect to the Commission was 
condemned in the Brundtland Report.4 The FRMP Report
1 Supra pp.112, 292.
2 Supra p.112.
3 Supra p.142.
4 WCED op cit p.9.
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recommended the establishment of a Policy, Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PPMEU) in the Ministry of 
Lands and Natural Resources which, when fully established, may 
provide a better forum for the determination of forest 
policy.1 In addition, this thesis has exposed the need for 
more decentralised, district level planning with greater 
attention paid to local needs and circumstances.2
The Draft Forest Policy makes several recommendations 
with respect to the timber industry. The aim here should be to 
develop more efficient production methods, reducing waste, 
expanding resource utilisation, increasing the production of 
value added products and encouraging the use of a wider 
selection of species.3 Training of manpower at all levels will 
be necessary.4
Chapter eight has drawn attention to the need to 
rationalise the industry along the lines recommended in the 
Draft Forest Policy. The Policy is silent, however, on the 
means of implementing these urgent requirements. Under the 
FRMP, increases in forest fees and improvements in concession 
allocation procedures are policies designed to further these 
goals.5 These policies would seem to favour larger operators 
although the ultimate test is efficiency. Little, however, is 
being done by way of manpower training or financial support to
1 Supra p.152.
2 Supra p.227.
3 Draft Forest Policy op cit pp.6-7.
4 ibid p.7.
r Supra pp.281,296.
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hasten the necessary industrial restructuring for the adoption 
of more efficient techniques. The ERP has a shameful record on 
its financial support. It will be recalled how 54.4% of 
credits contributed to the purchase of logging equipment 
despite the Government's declared support for further 
processing.1 Ghana cannot afford to waste opportunities such 
as these. Serious consideration should be given to improving 
the methods of selecting industrial borrowers when favourable 
credit facilities are avaiable and to the type of investment 
which is really acceptable. Foreign governments should be more 
flexible on the type of aid which they are prepared to give. 
In addition, they must recognise and reform the international 
constraints - low prices, tariff barriers, selective demand 
and onerous debt servicing obligations - which continue to 
frustrate Ghana's attempts to implement a strategy of 
sustainable exploitation.2
In order to meet the increased demand for all kinds of 
forest produce the Draft Forest Policy sees the need for a 
much greater emphasis on the development of forest and tree 
resources outside forest reserves.J Local communities and 
individuals should be encouraged to participate in the 
planting, care and utilisation of trees, especially multi­
purpose trees. Incentives for private and community 
plantations should be developed and obstacles to tree tenure 
should be removed. Increased co-operation with agricultural
1 Supra p.248.
2 Supra pp.265-270.
3 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.3.
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research institutions to develop agroforestry techniques is 
envisaged.1
In chapter eight, it was suggested that MFP (Minor Forest 
Produce) in forest reserves could be more intensively 
exploited, not least because this form of exploitation is a 
low impact, income generating use of reserved forest land.2 In 
chapter nine, some current rural forestry initiatives were 
discussed. It was suggested that although the objectives of 
each project should be clear, there should be flexibility in 
the methods employed to achieve project objectives.3 The 
greater participation of local people in the planning and 
decision-making stages of project development should help to 
make tree planting projects more relevant to their needs and 
adaptable to their constraints. It may be many years, however, 
before a large proportion of farmers are keen to adopt such 
innovative ideas as, for example, agroforestry implies so the 
emphasis must be on long term, adaptive programmes. If the 
funding requirements of these programmes can be kept at a 
modest level then their chances of long term survival are 
greatly enhanced. Assessments of success or failure should not 
be too ambitious.
The Draft Forest Policy tackles the evidence that the 
resource base is shrinking with proposals for reducing demand 
as well as increasing supplies. Institutions which use 
firewood should be encouraged to switch to other sources of
1 ibid p.6.
' Supra p .306.
J Supra pp.359-362.
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energy.1 More efficient wood fuel stoves and charcoal making 
methods are to be promoted as a temporary conservation 
measure.2
The implementation of these measures will require co­
operation between the forest sector institutions, research 
institutions, the Environmental Protection Council (EPC) and 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power. At the moment these other 
institutions are taking the lead in these newer areas of 
concern. None of these institutions have their own 
representatives at the district level. The district forestry 
departments, district assemblies and NGOs should be encouraged 
to disseminate programmes initiated by the national 
institutions. District forestry officers have no superior 
skills in these new areas of concern and, where they are 
anyway over burdened by existing duties, the lead will 
probably have to be taken by the district assemblies, NGOS and 
local representatives of bodies such as the Department of 
Mobilisation.
Other new features in the Draft Forest Policy are a 
recognition of the need to preserve and enhance biodiversity 
and to meet amenity and recreational needs.3 Sacred groves 
should be formally recognised by law.4 It is also stated that 
sites for trees and forests should be incorporated into human
1 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.11.
1 ibid p.14.
; ibid p .5.
1 ibid p .13.
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settlements sites1 and that the forestry aspects of any 
development subject to environmental impact assessment should 
be considered and reference made to the appropriate forestry 
agencies.2 Approval for the establishment of industries using 
wood energy should not be given until it is shown that they 
will not be solely dependent on the natural resource base.3
These recommendations are commendable for their 
comprehensive, integrated and cross sectoral reach. They are 
consistent with the philosophy of the Brundtland Report which 
called for the closer integration of ecological and economic 
decision-making and the reform of sectoral rigidities.4 Some 
of the difficulties of achieving this more integrated 
management style were discussed in chapter six. If this 
approach is to be successful, the risks of bureaucratic 
proliferation, unnecessary and lengthy delays must be guarded 
against. The evidence from chapter six suggests that the 
necessary degree of institutional sophistication may as yet be 
lacking in Ghana.
On the legal side, the Draft Forest Policy suggests that 
district assemblies should be involved in the procedure for 
the grant of rights to trees or timber.5 With the possible 
exception of forest resources outside forest reserves,6 there
1 ibid p.4.
2 ibid p.5.
3 ibid p.11.
4 WCED op cit pp.62-64.
5 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.12.
b Supra p .115.
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seems to be no special need for their involvement in 
concession procedures. It is not envisaged by the proposals of 
the FRMP. Although it is a laudable proposal consistent with 
the participatory philosophy of the Brundtland Report,1 truly 
decentralised and democratic decision-making procedures do not 
seem to have characterised recent developments in the Western 
Region2 or Bongo.3
The Draft Forest Policy contains a sweeping 
recommendation for the review of all current forestry 
legislation to ensure its conformity with the provisions of 
the Forest Policy.4 The enactment of appropriate laws for the 
implementation of the Forest Policy is envisaged.5
The analysis in this thesis has shown that in many cases 
it is not the absence of appropriate laws which has prevented 
forest conservation but the ineffective enforcement of 
existing legislation. The need is therefore for a careful 
review of specific weaknesses in the existing law. Some of the 
specific weaknesses in the law discussed in previous chapters 
related to the co-ordination of sector institutions,6 the 
allocation of concessions7 and the review of silvicultural8
1 WCED op cit p.63.
2 Supra Chp.7.
3 Supra Chp.9.
4 Draft Forest Policy op cit p.17.
5 ibid
b Supra p .176.
7 Supra pp.276-283.
B Supra p .302.
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and fiscal regulations.1
Whatever legal reforms are adopted, policy makers would 
do well to consider the following issues which have become 
evident from the analysis made in preceding chapters:
(a) Environmental protection cannot be isolated from the 
politics of resource utilisation. More particularly, forest 
conservation cannot be isolated from issues of land ownership 
and control. The history of the Public Lands Bills and the 
experience of protecting forest reserves in the Western Region 
amply demonstrate this point. Although forestry is liable to 
neglect if it is seen only as one part of land policy, it is 
essential that a separate forestry policy takes cognisance of 
and is consistent with land policy and land-use practices 
generally. The evidence from the Western Region suggests that 
a land-use policy in forest areas outside forest reserves is 
just as necessary as a clear forest policy if conservation is 
to be successful. Equally important is an economic strategy 
which defines the legitimate use of forest resources and 
integrates the local economy and forest sector.
(b) Official commitment to environmental protection falls 
and rises at the mercy of the policy and law makers in power. 
The wavering commitment of colonial governors to environmental 
protection is one example of this. The PNDC appears to have 
been committed to forest conservation. This is essential if 
radical measures are to be implemented but nevertheless a well 
thought out and practical policy must complement the 
enthusiasm of the Government. In the Western Region the
Supra p .294.
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wholesale burning of villages by the military failed to 
achieve any long term goal. It remains to be seen whether 
"Operation Halt" will achieve a more lasting success but the 
prospects do not look good if the strategy is limited to one 
of expulsion without any cognisance of the underlying factors 
which have led to massive encroachments into some forest 
reserves.
(c) Unless environmental policies carry the broad support 
or acquiesence of powerful interest groups already involved in 
the exploitation of natural resources they are unlikely to 
succeed whether or not they have the official support of 
Government. The ability of vested interests to frustrate the 
enactment or implementation of laws and policies supportive of 
sustainable development was demonstrated in the discussions of 
colonial forestry law, forest protection in the Western Region 
and the control of the timber industry.
(d) If forest conservation measures do not have, in 
addition to the above, an effective support base in the rural 
areas where their impact will be felt, their chances of 
success remain slim. This is why the strengthening of district 
forestry offices should be a more central objective of the 
FRMP. It is also the principal reason why efforts are needed 
to integrate local communities into the forest economy, so 
that the rationality of conservation and sustainable 
development will be fully appreciated by people who could 
otherwise prevent such policies taking effect. Measures to co­
opt honest business interests into support for sustainable 
timber exploitation have also been discussed. Rural forestry
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and agroforestry intiatives also need to strive for widespread 
community support if they are to be truly effective and 
popular in the long term.1
(d) Logistical support is only one aspect of 
institutional strengthening. Of equal if not more importance 
in the long term, are reforms which will improve the 
accountability, co-ordination and efficiency of sector 
institutions and official procedures. The analysis of sector 
institutions in chapter six highlighted the need for these 
sort of reforms. Without such reforms, vested interests will 
continue to distort the impact of laws, policies and projects 
designed to improve performance throughout the sector. The 
doubtful results of sector lending under the ERP are a case in 
point.2 The history of the ERP also demonstrates the need for 
more responsible and more appropriate international aid if the 
requirements of sustainable development are to be met.
(e) A rationalisation of the timber industry to reduce 
excess capacity in the logging and milling sub-sectors and 
support for technological upgrading in respectable, 
competitive companies are the pillars on which the drive for 
reducing waste and increasing further processing should 
ultimately rest. If the industry can be rationalised and the 
output of secondary species and processed timber increased, 
then the prospects for sustainable development are enhanced 
because more income will be generated to pay for sustainable 
management. This assumption is valid only in so far as
1 Supra Chp.9.
2 Supra p.249.
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official procedures are reformed and interests supportive of 
sustainable development are nurtured.
(f) Economic growth and sustainable management must go 
hand in hand if exploitation is not to cause irreversible 
damage to the environment. In chapter eight, evidence was 
presented to show that timber exploitation in recent years has 
exceeded the AAC and that some primary species in Ghana are 
now facing extinction.1 Exploitation was intense during the 
1980s at a time when sector institutions were seriously under 
funded and neglected. It is quite likely that Ghana will have 
to pay for these mistakes with reduced foreign exchange 
earnings in the forest sector.
(g) The buoyancy of local demand for affordable wood 
suggests that attempts to contain the illegal exploitation of 
forest resources outside forest reserves may now be futile.2 
Consequently, it may now be more sensible for institutions 
such as the FPIB to concentrate all their attention on 
controlling the activities of lawful timber operators.
(h) Rural forestry initiatives should proceed hand in 
hand with broad based development and environment programmes 
which directly tackle the underlying constraints, such as land 
hunger and low agricultural productivity, to environmental 
improvement. The desirability of this more holistic approach 
to development planning was made clear in the discussion of 
rural forestry initiatives in Bongo. Integrated land-use and 
development planning was also considered desirable in the
1 Supra pp.234-235.
Supra p .292.
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Western Region where it may help to reduce the threat of 
agricultural expansion into forest reserves.1
There is a limit to what can be achieved by legal reform 
even when it is accompanied by institutional reform and 
projects and policies which are designed from the "top down". 
Measures such as these fail to identify the real determinants 
of change in the rural areas where the forests are situated. 
It is the argument of this thesis that until the underlying 
interests and constraints which conflict with the goal of 
sustainable management are adequately addressed, these 
conflicting forces will continue to frustrate the efficacy of 
legal and institutional reforms. Loose policy statements will 
not by themselves modify the actions of interest groups whose 
motives run counter to sustainable development. Measures to 
build up a support base which will counterbalance and help to 
dismantle these negative interests have been suggested 
throughout this thesis. They include - measures to integrate 
local communities into the lawful forest economy; actions to 
enlist the support of local people, district assemblies and 
traditional authorities for forest conservation and rural 
forestry; measures to facilitate the necessary rationalisation 
in the timber industry including incentives to encourage 
technological upgrading in law abiding businesses in 
preference to speculative and dishonest timber operators.
Nevertheless, realism suggests that, in many cases, 
counter interests are entrenched and the options available to
1 Supra p .227.
424
the Government are limited. This was found to be especially 
true of the international constraints to sustainable timber 
exploitation. This finding suggests a considerably more gloomy 
outlook for sustainable development than was accepted by the 
WCED Commissioners in the Brundtland Report.
425
PART THREE: CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION.
The objective of this thesis was to assess the concept of 
sustainable development, as propounded in the Brundtland 
Report, in the light of policies and laws in the forest sector 
of Ghana. This study has raised a number of issues which 
generally confirm the findings and recommendations of the WCED 
but which, in some cases, add to its analysis or raise doubts 
as to the feasibility of the proposals made in that Report. 
The principal findings of the study are summarised below.
Conservation and sustainable development of resources 
have for long been key policy objectives in Ghana's forest 
sector but the analysis in this thesis exposed a number of 
problems associated with the implementation of those policies.
From an historical perspective, there is ample evidence 
that forest conservation cannot be isolated from questions of 
land-use, ownership and control. The Colonial Government, 
inspired by fears of denudation, found that its hands were 
already tied by a commitment to native land tenure when it 
attempted to legislate for the protection and conservation of 
Ghana's forests.1 The opposition of local leaders and British 
business interests to government intervention and the 
political commitment to non intervention in West African land 
affairs were factors which defeated attempts to legislate for
Supra Chp.4.
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the protection of Gold Coast forests. It was not until 1927 
that forest legislation became operative in the Gold Coast. 
The successful enactment of forest legislation in that year 
can be attributed partly to the diminished level of effective 
political opposition and partly to the compromising tone of 
the statute which embodied the principle of indirect rule by 
allowing for reserves to be constituted under bye-laws made by 
local chiefs. Faced with the threat of forest reservation 
under the national law, traditional authorities were more 
easily persuaded to create bye-law reserves. By 1940, the 
Forestry Department had reserved approximately 11,000 square 
miles of forest reserves. The policy of indirect rule 
continued to frustrate attempts to enforce the law in a 
meaningful way, however, because many of the reserves were 
constituted under bye-laws which provided only nominal 
measures for their protection.
In chapter five the post independence legislation 
relating to forest ownership and exploitation was discussed. 
The principal reforms enacted in 1962 were designed to 
strengthen the hand of government, particularly in relation to 
forest reserves, and to provide a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for the protection and controlled exploitation of 
forest resources. The legislation was criticised on some 
technical points. Particularly interesting is the 
interpretation of section 16 of the Concessions Act.1 The Blay 
Report, however, is of more practical significance. It 
revealed the vulnerability of an economically important
Act 124/1962 s.16(1).
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national resource to political malpractice.1 Malpractice 
flourished sometimes within the framework of the law but more 
frequently in direct contravention of statutory provisions. 
This evidence raises important questions of how to ensure that 
the government's need to control key economic resources is not 
frustrated by political mismanagement at the highest levels. 
The strict accountability of institutions and administrators 
is required, both in law and in practice.
The Brundtland Report called for the review and 
reinforcement of existing laws relating to environmental 
protection/ It failed, however, to identify the political 
factors which can undermine the success of any legislative 
programme in the absence of a firm commitment to institutional 
accountability. The evidence of widespread malpractice in many 
developing countries casts doubt on the likely effectiveness 
of the WCED's recommendations on legal and institutional 
reform.
Recent measures to amend the institutional framework in 
the forest sector, particularly in the light of the World 
Bank's findings and recommendations, were the focus of the 
analysis in chapter six. Areas of institutional duplication or 
neglect were highlighted. Shortages of manpower and logistics 
were exposed. It was found that the current law often provides 
for institutional autonomy to the detriment of effective co­
ordination and accountability.3 A system of institutional
1 Supra p.130.
‘ WCED op cit p.330.
Supra p .175.
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checks and balances was provided for by the 1969 
Constitution. This is desirable in order to minimise the 
opportunities for malpractice but it requires a clear 
demarcation of legal duties to prevent duplication, 
institutional rivalry and problems of leadership. Unnecessary 
bureaucracy and an excessive concentration of resources at the 
centre are attendant risks which Ghana, like other developing 
countries, can ill afford to run.
The Brundtland Report called for the strengthening of 
institutional capacities so that environmental issues can be 
afforded the priority they deserve and so that integrated and 
comprehensive measures can be taken.2 The analysis in this 
chapter, however, revealed some formidable obstacles to the 
kind of integrated decision-making called for in the Report. 
The complexity of development problems, staff shortages and 
national economic crises were among the factors identified.3
In the Brundtland Report it was argued that traditional 
institutions, such as the Forestry Department, are often 
poorly equipped to deal with multi-dimensional environmental 
problems.4 The Forestry Department in Ghana, however, is not 
insensitive to the multi-dimensional role of forests in the 
national economy and it is well represented in the districts. 
With increased liaison between the Department, district 
assemblies and grass roots political organisations, the 
prospects for concrete action at the district level are better
1 Art.163 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1969.
2 WCED op cit p.313.
J Supra p.17 6.
1 WCED op cit p.310.
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now than for many years. The Department may also be the most 
suitable agency to deal with the issue, review and termination 
of timber grants subject to the overall supervision of the 
Ministry. Of course it is necessary to engage all relevant
agencies in pertinent aspects of forest administration and 
control but there is a strong case for prioritising measures 
to immediately strengthen the traditional sector institution 
in this case. It is this institution which offers the key to 
better management.
The FRMP includes measures to strengthen the Department 
and other sector institutions but a weakness in the project is 
its failure to adequately address the needs of the 
decentralised district forestry offices. The heavy 
centralisation of Government administration, leading to 
inertia and inefficiency, is a typical feature of many
developing countries but the Brundtland Report failed to make 
any recommendations which directly address this problem.
The need to ensure greater accountability and efficiency 
in administrative procedures throughout the sector was 
highlighted in this chapter. It was suggested that without 
reforms in this direction, measures to increase integrated
decision-making, as recommended in the Brundtland Report, may 
only result in more red tape, more delays and greater
administrative inefficiencies. The Brundtland Report was 
criticised for its failure to make firm recommendations on the 
institutional issues of accountability and efficiency. The 
failure to give due weight to the administrative problems 
which characterise many developing country bureaucracies was
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viewed as a serious flaw in the feasibility of the Brundtland 
recommendations on institutional strengthening.’
Where large areas of forest land already exist, the 
success of forest conservation depends first and foremost on 
the impact of protective measures. The law relating to forest 
protection in Ghana was examined in chapter seven. Although 
forest protection is primarily the responsibility of the 
Forestry Department, the need for the unambiguous support of 
other government departments became demonstrably clear upon an 
examination of the critical situation in the Western Region.2
Increased manpower and logistical support in forestry 
districts are recommendations which touch only the tip of the 
iceberg. Once again, it is a fundamental conflict of interests 
over land-use which lies at the root of the problem of forest 
protection. On the one hand, cocoa producers, small and large, 
are anxious to continually increase their acreage but on the 
other hand, the government has a vested interest in protecting 
the forest estate, not only on environmental grounds but 
because timber exports contribute to a more diversified 
economy. Cocoa producers simply cannot be allowed to pursue 
their personal interests to the detriment of the environment - 
upon which agricultural activity ultimately depends - and the 
nation. However, the scale and complexity of the problem 
suggest that attempts to stop the wave of illegal farming 
should include measures to compensate the needy, to galvanise 
public opinion in favour of forest protection and to over-ride
1 Supra p .180.
' Supra Chp.7.
431
the political power of some of the largest estate owners. The 
size of the task cannot be over estimated in view of the 
damage which has already been done over a long period.
Military action has failed in the past.1 What is needed 
is pragmatic action based upon a realistic policy which 
balances competing land-use options and which takes into 
account the different requirements of farmers, timber 
enterprises, the Government and the environment. The 
enforcement capacities of local institutions must also figure 
in this equation.
The Brundtland Report made recommendations for land-use 
planning in all countries.2 It recommended that land should be 
classified according to "best use" criteria but the conclusion 
of this thesis is that a more pragmatic approach is needed 
when complex land-use conflicts are at issue. Too readily, the 
WCED adopts technical solutions which afford too little 
attention to the reality of the political situation in many 
developing countries. Population growth, rural poverty and the 
increasing commercialisation of agriculture are 
characteristics of developing countries which do not always 
allow for the attainment of optimum environmental solutions. 
In these situations, it is not just a question of more law 
enforcement3 and more long term planning4 but of finding 
workable compromises in which those who will genuinely suffer
1 Supra p.206.
2 WCED op cit p.133.
3 ibid p.46.
' ibid p.45.
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are compensated while powerful vested interests are appeased 
or confronted. Only when these divergent interests are 
adequately taken into account will lasting solutions be 
possible.
The view found so clearly in the Brundtland Report that 
poverty is a causal factor of environmental degradation,1 was 
found to reflect only a small part of the problem of forest 
destruction. Reports from the Western Region of Ghana suggest 
that the largest illegal farms belong to relatively wealthy, 
capitalist farmers including, it is rumoured, political and 
military personnel.2 Poverty, in this case, should not be 
blamed for the worst environmental degradation because the 
poorest people do not have sufficient capital or labour to 
pursue expansionary, large scale activities which pose a 
serious threat to the environment.
Operation Halt was planned over many months and appears 
to have broken through the web of vested interests, at least 
in the short term.3 It is doubtful however, whether, in the 
absence of compensatory and/or resettlement measures for the 
homeless, local grievances can be so easily dealt with. It 
remains to be seen whether support for the hard line of the 
Government will be sustained in the long term or whether it 
will soon be broken down by vested interests. It was suggested 
that the implications for law enforcement and re-afforestation 
could prove to be beyond the capacity of local organisations,
1 ibid p.5.
2 Supra p.207.
; Supra pp.216-221.
433
particularly the local district forestry offices, to 
implement.1
An alternative strategy endorsed in this thesis was to 
de-reserve the most seriously encroached upon reserves in 
return for an assurance from traditional and district 
authorities that they accept some responsibility for helping 
to prevent future encroachments into the remaining forest 
reserves. This would allow the district forestry offices to 
concentrate on the protection of the older, well preserved 
forest reserves.2
Attention should also be paid to opportunities for 
improving agricultural productivity on existing farmland so 
that continual expansion into forest land is no longer viewed 
as the only method of increasing agricultural output. This 
recommendation is consistent with the call for integrated, 
system-wide solutions to environment and development problems 
made in the Brundtland Report.3
There is a fundamental need to integrate the local 
economy much more closely with forest exploitation so that the 
logic and goals of sustainable development will coincide 
rather than clash with the immediate economic interests of 
local people. This suggests the need for a long term, 
comprehensive development programme including measures to 
increase employment opportunities in the forest sector. An 
holistic view of environment and development inter­
Supra p .224.
Supra p .225.
WCED op cit p.37.
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relationships was called for in the Brundtland Report but the 
problem lies in implementing integrated reforms. To date, 
there has been no major reorientation of Government policy 
towards this longer term view of the problem.
Chapter eight examined aspects of timber exploitation in 
Ghana. There is evidence which suggests that the resource base 
has been mined in the past1 but efforts are currently being 
made to put exploitation on a sustainable footing. Ghana needs 
to exploit more of its secondary species and to strictly 
conserve some endangered primary tree species.2
The timber industry makes an important contribution to 
the national economy both in foreign exchange earnings and in 
the satisfaction of domestic requirements. However, the 
industry exhibits structural inefficiencies including excess 
capacity in the logging and milling sub-sectors.3 It is also 
wasteful in its use of the resource. The industry needs to 
move into processing higher value products using more 
efficient technologies and more secondary species. The ban on 
the export of fourteen primary species in their log form aimed 
to promote further processing but without special credit 
facilities business development is constrained. The Forest 
Resources Management Project and the Forest Inventory Project 
are helping Ghana to meet the challenge of sustainable 
development by providing financial, technical and 
institutional support. These projects were criticised,
1 Supra p.234.
' Supra p.236.
Supra p .240.
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however, for their failure to provide support for the 
necessary industrial restructuring.1
The timber industry exhibited an impressive level of 
growth in Ghana during the 1980s but the priority afforded to 
economic recovery had disastrous repercussions for the 
resource base. Valuable timber was pillaged without the 
requisite type of scientific and effective management which 
could have kept exploitation within a sustainable yield. 
Moreover, the Government lost valuable foreign currency in 
rushing to export unprocessed timber and in failing to enforce 
strict accountability in the industry.2
The Brundtland Report came down clearly in favour of 
reviving environmentally sustainable economic growth, 
particularly in developing countries.3 Ghana's experience in 
the forest sector is ample evidence that not all kinds of 
economic growth are consistent with environmental 
sustainability. In future, international assistance should be 
more carefully planned with the environmental impact of all 
types of assistance being subject to review. International 
sponsors should be prepared to offer Ghana assistance in 
meeting nationally determined priorities. These 
recommendations are in line with those of the Brundtland 
Report.4
Illegal business practices were exposed by the
1 Supra p.243.
Supra p .2 49.
WCED op cit p.89.
1 WCED op cit pp.77,78.
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investigations of the NIC Sub-Committee on Timber.1 
Entrepreneurs have contravened the law, undermining its 
effectiveness. Their short term, economic interests conflict 
with the long term requirements of environmental 
sustainability. The NIC Sub-Committee has made an impressive 
attempt to stamp out illegal practices. In addition, 
components of the FRMP which are designed to place greater 
reliance on the use of market mechanisms, to determine 
concession allocations, for example, should also help to clean 
up the industry in so far as they may eliminate opportunities 
for administrative corruption. Measures to rationalise the 
industry should include favourable credit facilities for 
respectable, potentially more efficient operators who are 
willing to co-operate with ongoing efforts to put exploitation 
on a sustainable footing. This will further help to push 
dishonest and disreputable entrepreneurs out of the market.2
Low commodity prices, selective demand and tariff 
barriers which protect developed countries' timber processing 
industries, were identified as the principal factors in the 
international market which constrain the implementation of 
sustainable development policies in the forest sector of 
Ghana.3 In a structurally under developed economy, vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the international commodity market and 
saddled with international debt, the commitment to maximising 
foreign exchange revenue has been made, almost inevitably, at
1 Supra pp.259-265.
2 Supra p.2 64.
3 Supra pp.265-270.
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the expense of the forest environment. Heightened political 
sensitivity to environmental issues in national institutions 
is only part of the solution. Ghana's deep dependency on the 
international market and the policies of international 
financial institutions restrict the opportunities for national 
decision-makers to commit their country to sustainable 
development policies. If Ghana is to switch successfully to 
long term sustainable development strategies, it needs the 
support of the international community and its financial 
institutions. It needs more debt relief, more environmentally 
sensitive aid and long term assistance to develop beyond an 
economy based on primary commodity exports.
The Brundtland Report did go so far as to trace 
environmental linkages back to these macro economic factors' 
but it failed to make radical or convincing recommendations as 
to how to overcome them. Identifying the causes is only the 
first step in any programme of reform. At the present time, 
despite some propaganda and some remedial measures to the 
contrary, the political will to alter international economic 
and financial policies simply does not exist. This reality 
prejudices unfavourably the long term prospects for 
sustainable development in Ghana, as in many other developing 
countries.
A number of measures which could improve the legal and 
administrative control of exploitation in the forest sector 
were discussed. In particular, reforms in concession 
allocation procedures were applauded because these should help
WCED op cit pp.69-70.
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to rid the industry of disreputable entrepreneurs.1 Moves to 
increase the size of concessions2 and to ensure regular 
reviews of rents and royalties' were welcomed for their 
potential to rationalise the over subscribed logging sub­
sector. Fiscal measures can also be used to reduce the level 
of waste occurring during exploitation.4
Despite the progress being made in domestic reforms, 
there remains a fundamental need for direct measures to help 
the local industry make the improvements in efficiency which 
are necessary in order to put exploitation on a more 
sustainable basis in the long term. In addition, Ghana's 
efforts to improve forest management are not being matched by 
reforms in the international market for timber. These are 
necessary in order to make sustainable development policies 
feasible in developing countries. It was suggested that, 
without reforms at the international level as well as on the 
domestic front, the prospects for long term sustainability 
appear more bleak than the Brundtland Report appears to 
suggest.5
In chapter nine an analysis of tree planting projects in 
one district in north-east Ghana was attempted. The choice of 
a district level analysis allowed a number of practical issues 
arising out of current tree planting projects to be examined.
1 Supra p.281.
2 Supra p.284.
1 Supra p.296.
4 Supra p.299.
" Supra p .317.
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It also provided an opportunity to examine tree planting 
projects within their broad social, legal and environmental 
context. To that end, an introductory account of some relevant 
physical and social characteristics of this district was 
provided at the start of this chapter. An attempt was made to 
identify environmental problems and priorities on the basis of 
this information. Deforestation, declining soil fertility, 
water shortages and degradation of communal lands were among 
the most pressing environmental issues identified which may be 
addressed by tree planting projects.1
The views of local people made it clear, however, that 
farmers face different problems in varying degrees and with 
different abilities and resources to assist them. Tree 
planting programmes therefore need to be sensitive to 
individual circumstances and they should take into account the 
underlying resource constraints which farmers' face. In 
addition to tree planting programmes there is a need for 
integrated development programmes which may help to tackle 
widespread poverty more directly.
Some weaknesses in the design and management of current 
tree planting programmes were exposed in this chapter.2 These 
confirmed the need to mix clear objectives with flexibility in 
the methods of project implementation. A failure to 
incorporate and respond to the views of local people became 
demonstrably clear in the account of tree planting for dam 
protection. This case exemplifies the need to address
1 Supra pp.328-333.
Supra pp.359-362.
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fundamental problems of land hunger, finding solutions which 
do not afford conservation priority over and above the most 
basic needs of local people. This can only be achieved by 
incorporating their views and requirements into the design, 
management and implementation of projects which so 
fundamentally affect their livelihoods. This recognition of 
the need for development and environmental protection to 
proceed hand in hand, is consistent with the fundamental 
premise of the Brundtland Report.1
The Brundtland Report argued in favour of a change in the 
quality of growth. This meant a change from short term to long 
term planning, taking into account the relative physical 
limits to growth, and a change to growth strategies based on 
meeting the basic needs of present and future generations.2 A 
basic needs approach to sustainable development planning was 
found particularly lacking in the case of tree planting for 
dam protection. For example, the action taken by the District 
Assembly appears to be in direct contradiction to the basic 
need for farmland of families living around the dam. The 
decisions of international agencies are at least partly 
responsible for the neglect of this issue. Affected farmers 
should be compensated in some way but, just as importantly, 
their participation in the long term planning and 
implementation of environmental programmes should be sought.
The WCED called for increased public participation in
1 WCED o p  cit p.8.
2 ibid p.43.
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decision-making processes.1 In Ghana, the decentralisation 
programme including the establishment of district assemblies, 
has had as its objective this goal. While the importance of 
local institutions in the management of natural resources and 
environmental campaigns cannot be over emphasised, it is 
questionable how far Ghana has in fact gone down the road to 
decentralised, participatory and democratic decision-making. 
It is most unlikely that the majority of Bongo residents 
approve of the section in the 1990 Bye-laws which relates to 
dam protection. There is every reason to believe that the 
draconian measures were imposed from the top without regard to 
some important local consequences.2 It may be argued that the 
needs of the whole community outweigh the needs of individuals 
living around the dams or that, in a largely illiterate 
society, more participatory decision-making processes are not 
feasible, but the real challenge is to work out viable 
compromises within these constraints. The District Assembly is 
a competent and enthusiastic forum in Bongo and it is to be 
hoped that with time its record on matters such as these will 
improve.
Aspects of customary land law which may affect 
environmental programmes generally and tree planting 
programmes in particular were also the subject of analysis in 
this chapter.3 Customary land law has sometimes been 
identified as one factor holding back development and
1 WCED op cit p.330.
2 Supra p.3 57.
1 Supra pp.363-400.
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environmental improvement programmes but some of the 
shortcomings of this analysis were exposed. In particular, the 
need to examine specific laws within their overall social, 
economic and environmental context was highlighted. The 
adaptability of customary law and its fundamental concern to 
secure for every farmer at least a small share in the proceeds 
of the family farm were arguments in favour of retaining the 
main body of that system of law. However, reforms of some 
particular laws which, in their current form, may discourage 
or prevent the uptake of current tree planting initiatives, 
were considered likely or desirable.1 These recommendations 
were consistent with the view that the appropriate time for 
law reform is when broad based development initiatives which 
address the underlying constraints to environmental 
improvement are under way. Once again, this confirms the 
desirability of an approach to development and environmental 
problems which is both holistic and integrated, as recommended 
in the Brundtland Report.2 The failure of some current 
programmes to adequately incorporate a basic needs dimension 
and a participatory approach to development implies that the 
objective of sustainable development may not be so readily 
implemented as the Brundtland Report appeared to suggest.
The National Forest Policy, discussed in chapter ten, 
will require more than oral support if it is to be effective. 
Long term provision for financial and technical support must 
be guaranteed. Some highly political questions were not fully
1 Supra p.399.
•’ WCED op cit p . 9.
443
addressed in the draft Forest Policy. There is no mention of 
Operation Halt, for example and no consideration of the 
fundamental question of how competing land-use options are to 
be reconciled in a country whose population is growing quickly 
while its economy is not.
The National Forest Policy contained a number of 
recommendations for law reform in the forest sector. It was 
argued that, in many cases, the problem lies more in the 
enforcement of the law than in its terms per se.! 
Nevertheless, a number of factors which policy and law makers 
may wish to bear in mind when considering law reform were 
suggested on the basis of the analysis made in preceding 
chapters. These included - the need to see environmental 
problems within the context of land-use policy and overall 
economic policy; the need for pragmatic measures to complement 
and make feasible environmental protection policies; the need 
to galvanise the support of interest groups involved in the 
exploitation of the resource; the need to ensure institutional 
accountability throughout the sector; the need to rationalise 
the industry and clean up industrial practices; the need for 
economic development and sustainable development policies to 
be implemented at the same time and within a broad based, 
integrated and holistic development programme.2
Fundamentally, there is a need for measures which tackle 
the underlying conflicts of interest which have been exposed 
in this thesis so that sustainable development policies and
Supra p .418.
Supra pp.418-423.
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laws will not be undermined by these conflicting interests as 
they have been in the past. Nevertheless, on a realistic 
assessment, it seems credible to suggest that the interests 
which conflict with the objectives of sustainable development 
pose powerful constraints to the feasibility of the 
sustainable development concept as propounded by the WCED.1
The major proposition of the Brundtland Report, that 
economic development and environmental protection must be made 
to complement each other,2 has been endorsed by the analysis 
in this thesis. In the short term, it may be possible to 
pursue either objective without regard to the other but the 
analysis made in this thesis suggests that in the long term, 
problems arising from the neglect of one of these objectives 
may frustrate the progress of the other. Policies to protect 
the environment which ignore development objectives cannot 
satisfy all the requirements of sustainable development, 
particularly its basic needs component.
Research into the relevant law and practical workings of 
sectoral and local institutions has indicated that the WCED 
may have over estimated the potential impact which 
institutional and legal reform can have.3 The reality of the 
domestic and international situation gives little grounds for 
optimism that enlightened reforms of the type recommended will 
in fact occur. The impartial, sometimes technical and always
1 Supra p .423.
: WCED op cit p.49. 
J ibid p.46.
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compromising tone of the Brundtland Report gives insufficient 
weight to the intense political conflicts which surround 
environmental questions in developing countries. Population 
growth, land hunger, environmental degradation and economic 
decline are problems rapidly increasing in magnitude, locking 
developing countries into a vicious circle from which they 
look set to have great difficulty of escaping.
The call made by the WCED for greater social equity 
within generations and between nations1 is poorly reflected in 
current international developments. Environmental degradation 
is already of such importance in many developing countries 
that there is no need to argue principally in terms of the 
rights of future generations.2
On the domestic front, democracy, participatory decision­
making and institutional accountability are goals which Ghana 
is making some effort to implement but, in many ways, the call 
for a basic needs approach to development has not yet been 
realised. In these circumstances, the Brundtland agenda for 
sustainable development has so far only partially been 
accepted.
Nevertheless, in general, the efforts made in recent 
years to implement sustainable development strategies in Ghana 
are commendable. Policy makers, administrators and the general 
public are increasingly aware of important environmental 
issues. Environmental programmes are being stepped up and
1 ibid p .43.
This observation contrasts with the definition of 
sustainable development given by the WCED ibid at p.8.
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environmental issues are being afforded greater consideration 
in economic, national and local decision-making. The 
logistical requirements of forest sector institutions and the 
need for better enforcement of forest laws are matters now 
receiving the attention they deserve. In some cases this has 
involved highly political decisions being taken.1
The analysis in this thesis, however, has shown that 
greater attention must be afforded in the relevant laws and 
policies to long term planning, effective and feasible 
enforcement strategies, participatory decision-making 
processes and basic needs requirements if the sustainable 
development model is to be wholly embraced. The international 
community, instead of sometimes frustrating these efforts, 
should support Ghana's attempts to implement policies and laws 
which are consistent with a long term sustainable development 
strategy.
1 In the decision to implement Operation Halt, for 
example.
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APPENDIX ONE: INTERVIEWS WITH CHIEFS AND TINDANAS.
During her stay in Bongo District from March-July, 1990, 
the author conducted, interviews with traditional authorities 
in Adaboya, Bongo and Gowrie. The objective was to obtain a 
fuller understanding of customary law in this dsitrict paying 
particular attention to rights to trees and other aspects of 
the law which may influence environmental quality and 
associated projects and programmes. The basic questions which 
were used to develop a discussion on various points of law are 
set out below, followed by a summary of the information 
provided by each authority interviewd.
Basic Interview Format Used in Discussions With Chiefs and 
Tindanas.
1. What are all your duties as Chief/Tindana?
2. What is the division of roles between you and the Tindana 
/you and the Chief?
3. Who is the owner1 of - (a) bush land (b) grazing land (c) 
compound land?
4. What rights do you exercise over - (a) bush land (b) 
grazing land (c) compound land?
5. Who is the owner of - (a) self seeded trees on bush land 
/grazing land /compound land (b) trees planted on bush land 
/grazing land /compound land (c) trees planted on begged or 
borrowed land
6. What free rights exist in - (a) bush land and the trees 
thereon (b) grazing land and trees growing there (c) compound 
land and trees thereon?
7. Are there any other special laws or customs about trees in 
your area?
8. What is the procedure for acquiring land (a) temporarily 
(b) permanently?
9. What is the appropriate procedure for (a) the sale of land 
(b) a pledge of land (c) a grant of land to settler tenants?
10. Is it ever possible for a family /section to make a 
permanent grant of land to an individual or family?
11. How do women get land in this area, and on what terms?
1 For comments on linguistic problems associated with the 
use of terms such as "owner of", see supra Chp.2.
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12. What is the law on succession to land?
13. How would you resolve a dispute between a tenant and a 
grantor family?
1. Interview With the Tindana for Adaboya, June 1990.
Nobody has authority over the Tindana. Even the Paramount 
Chief of Bongo is under him in that the Paramount Chief will 
come to the Tindana to have sacrifices made for him when he is 
first appointed. The Tindana confirms the appointments of all 
the chiefs within his area of jurisdiction. He has sub- 
Tindanas representing him throughout the area.
The saying that "the Tindana is for the land" means that 
the Tindana is for the land itself but not the farms. He is in 
charge of houses, graves and sacrifices.
The Tindana settles land disputes including boundary
disputes. The Chief is for the people but not for the land so
the Chief only gets involved in land disputes if blood has 
been shed. If there is a dispute, the people go to the Chief 
and the Chief sends them to the Tindana. The Tindana can go 
and divide the land among them or even take back the land. The 
Chief could not take back the land.
The Tindana is for all grazing land. The Tindana is for
all trees on grazing land and bush land. He is also for all
dawa dawa and shea trees anywhere. Anyone can harvest their 
fruits on bush or grazing land but only the Tindana can 
harvest fruits from those trees on farmland. He has agreed to 
allow some families to harvest the dawa dawa and shea trees on 
their farmland themselves. The Tindana is for all other self- 
seeded trees on any land but this is more in name than 
anything else. Anyone can harvest the fruits of any self­
seeded tree, except shea and dawa dawa, anywhere, but trees 
planted on farmland belong to their planter. If somebody 
plants trees in the bush those trees will belong to the 
Tindana unless he first informs the Tindana.
The Tindana allocates land. If a stranger comes to beg 
land he must first see the landlord and then the Tindana. Once 
land has been begged, farmed and built on, it cannot be taken 
back. A settler farmer could only really be removed if he was 
doing harm to the people, destroying the village, for example, 
but it has not happened yet.
Land is never sold and it is not even pledged in this
area.
Rivers, streams and dams are for the Tindana. On bush 
land and grazing land anyone can collect dead wood but nobody 
can take live wood without first asking permission - from the 
Tindana, for example.
When the Tindana allocates land to a farmer all the 
trees, excluding shea and dawa dawa trees pass to the farmer. 
When a landlord gives land to a farmer who has begged for 
land, the trees remain with the landlord, unless the landlord 
is a stranger coming to settle on the land. In that case, the 
trees pass to the settler and he and the original landlord 
will share the fruits.
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2. Interviews With the Chief of Adaboya, 18/5/1990 and 
21/5/1990.
The duties of the Chief are to settle disputes. He also 
represents the Government. Although he helps to settle land 
disputes, the Tindana is for the land in every other respect 
"the Chief is for the people and the Tindana is for the land" . 
Land is for the Chief and the Tindana in that the Chief could 
take back the land if there was a dispute.
Strangers who wish to make new farms in the bush should 
first consult the Chief after seeking the permission of the 
landlord so that there will be no disputes in the future.
The Chief is for the grazing land. Nobody is allowed to 
farm there. Some people have tried to encroach into the 
boundaries of grazing land so in some years the Chief and 
Tindana unite and go to mark all the boundaries with pegs.
In the bush and in grazing land, everything can be taken 
freely, even dawa dawa and shea nuts. Compound land is for the 
landlord but the shea and dawa dawa trees are for the Tindana, 
unless the landlord, for example, gives the Tindana a fowl in 
which case the Tindana will let the landlord's family harvest 
them. Sacred groves belong to the whole village. Nobody can 
cut anything from them.
Shea and dawa dawa trees belong everywhere to the 
Tindana. If a person plants shea or dawa dawa trees anywhere, 
he should first inform the Tindana so that when grown, those 
trees will belong to their planter. If he does not, those 
trees will belong to the Tindana.
Trees planted in the bush or on compound land belong to 
their planter but if a woman plants trees on her husbands 
land, although those trees belong to both, the husband becomes 
their owner. The situation is like children - if the couple 
split, the children belong to the man.
It is completely forbidden to cut live wood from any tree 
in Adaboya. The Fire Volunteers forbade it. Any dead trees can 
be cut by anyone but if those trees are standing on compound 
land, then people should first ask the landlord for permission 
to take the wood. A tenant should ask his landlord first. 
Branches from living trees can only be cut with the permission 
of the Fire Volunteers and then only for a very good reason.
The sale of land is prohibited in Adaboya. Not even the 
Chief or the Tindana could do that. Land cannot even be 
pledged although it can be begged for an unspecified number of 
years in which case the landlord can take back the land at any 
time. If strangers want land then all the elders, sub-chiefs, 
chiefs and tindanas meet to confirm the allocation so there 
will be no future problem. A landlord who gives land to a 
person who settles on it and builds a house can still claim it 
back if the settlers are bad to him or his family but, so long 
as they are good, they cannot claim back the land.
On the death of a landlord, all the land is divided among 
the sons. A father would not give his sons a farm while he is 
still alive. His sons can only go to beg land from someone 
else.
Rivers and streams belong to the Tindana but man-made
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dams belong to the Chief.
3. Interview With the Regent of Bongo, 8/7/1990.
The duties of the Chief are to look after the village and 
to settle marriage and land disputes. The Chief is for all the 
land and human beings. The Chief and the Tindana are like 
brothers so the Tindana will always be kept informed. They 
should both be consulted. The Chief is for the grazing land. 
If there are any problems, the Paramount Chief will consult 
with the Tindana. Every Chief consults his own Tindana for 
that area. The Tindana is not consulted on land matters but 
only about sacrifices. It is the Chief who installs the 
Tindana in this part of the District.
All trees, planted and self seeded, are for the Chief, 
wherever they are cited. The Chief is for the people so why 
not also their trees? For example, if a landlord misuses his 
trees, the Chief can confiscate them and this action has been 
taken in the case of dawa dawa trees. The Tindana has no 
rights over trees. Anyone can pick shea nuts because the 
Paramount Chief is not able to pick them all. The ownership of 
all fruit trees is with the Chief but the right to their 
produce rests with the landlords. On compound land anyone can 
take baobab leaves but a person should ask permission of the 
landlord to take grass from compound land.
It is prohibited to fell live trees for any purpose but 
anybody can cut small branches for fodder and rafters. Nobody 
could cut large branches without a good reason. People can 
take dead wood but they should ask permission of the relevant 
landlord to take it. Out in the bush and on grazing land 
anyone can gather tree produce for free but for firewood they 
can only cut dead wood. If a person was caught cutting live 
wood, he would be charged by the Chief. It was the forefathers 
who first said that live trees should not be cut.
The one who is for the land is for the trees. If land is 
leased to a tenant the landlord can still collect the fruit of 
trees on that land but in practice much will depend on the 
relationship between the landlord and his tenant. A landlord 
owns the produce of trees planted by his wife(wives) on the 
compound land. A woman can never own trees because she can 
never own land.
Land can never be sold but pledges of land occur 
frequently. Land can also be granted away to permanent tenants 
but in theory the grantor could always claim it back at any 
time.
Many cases are brought to the Chief concerning rights to 
trees, especially dawa dawa and shea trees. In these cases, 
the Chief always awards the trees to the descendent of the 
original landlord. He traces the landlord through all the 
ancestors. Cases about rights to trees are brought about two 
or three times a year. If the people do not agree to the 
Chief's judgement, he has the power to confiscate the trees 
for himself. A tenant could be collecting tree produce through 
lapse of time or because of an original agreement with the 
landlord, so it is not an absolute indication of title to the
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land.
If a permanent settler plants trees he will use those 
trees for so long as he remains on the land but if he leaves 
the land then the land and the trees revert to the original 
grantor's family.
About once a year, a case will arise in which a landlord 
wishes to evict a tenant. Usually, the Chief will plead with 
the landlord to let the tenant stay but if the landlord has a 
very good reason he will be allowed to evict the tenant. A 
landlord should always consult the Chief before taking any 
action.
Most disputes about land arise between landlords and 
tenants, or about whether land was pledged or leased or about 
the removal of annual tenants.
4. Interviews With the Chief of Gowrie, 4/4/1990 and 
12/4/1990.
The Chief became the Tindana for Gowrie at the same time 
that he became the Chief because, in this village, the one who 
becomes the Chief automatically becomes the Tindana.
The principal duty of the Chief is to keep the peace by 
solving the peoples' problems. The principal duties of the 
Tindana are to look after the land and the gods. If there is 
any problem, he will go to the soothsayer's house and if there 
is a need to make sacrifices, the Chief provides it - for good 
health and a good harvest, for example.
When it is said that the "Tindana is for the land," it 
only really means that he is in charge of sacrifices to the 
Gods for the village lands. But it is also true that the 
Tindana has some kind of interest in the land and the trees 
because he sacrifices to the gods. Trees are like human 
beings. Whoever looks after the people also looks after the 
trees.
The landlord is for all types of self-seeded trees on 
compound land including dawa dawa and shea trees. After 
harvesting dawa dawa and shea trees, the landlord should bring 
a portion for the Tindana but the requirement is not strictly 
enforced. A farmer cannot really say that he "owns" self- 
seeded trees growing on his farm, he only "owns" their fruits 
and can share some of the produce with the Chief/Tindana. 
Also, a farmer can really only say that he "owns" his farm not 
the land.
The Chief is for the grazing land, the Tindana is for the 
gods. The Chief is for all self-seeded trees growing on bush 
or grazing land. If a person wants to plant trees on grazing 
land, they will belong to him but he should first ask the 
Chief for his permission. The status of the land will be 
unaffected. All the land belongs to someone.
Anyone can collect the fruit from trees growing on 
grazing land or bush land but nobody, not even the Chief, can 
collect the fruits on a commercial scale. In order to collect 
wild fruits from compound land people should first ask the 
permission of the landlord but if he is not around they will 
just eat and go. Dead wood on grazing land and bush land can
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be taken by anyone but long ago the Chief passed a law 
prohibiting the cutting of live trees. There would be no trees 
left by now if he had not! Other common rights in grazing land 
include the right to graze animals, the right to collect grass 
for roofing and the right to collect manure.
In Gowrie, some people get wood and building poles from 
their own trees, others have to buy it in the market. If 
anybody wants to cut live wood on grazing land, they must 
first ask the opinion of the Chief who will show them the best 
places and warn them never to cut the whole thing down. Nobody 
can cut down a living tree anywhere but people can cut 
branches from their own trees on their land.
The Chief has power to settle disputes about land. They 
usually relate to whether the land was pledged or loaned or 
granted to permanent tenants. If the trees and the land have 
passed to a farmer then a permanent grant of the land has been 
made. A permanent grant is made when tenants settle, build a 
house, collect the tree produce and remain on the land for 
many years. The original landlord cannot remove these kind of 
tenants unless they decide to go. If the trees have not passed 
then the grant was a temporary one which can be called back at 
any time. Whenever land is pledged or leased temporarily the 
grantor family will go to harvest the trees in order to prove 
their title. The original grantor may tell a tenant to bring 
him the fruits or they may agree to share the fruits but the 
original landlord will not stop collecting his share because 
if he did it would indicate that a permanent grant had been 
made.
If two sons make their farm together and one son dies, 
then the remaining brother inherits the land. In a large 
compound, if all the brothers remain united, the land is 
inherited by the eldest surviving brother and then by the 
eldest son of all the brothers. In most families though, the 
land is divided among the sons on the death of the father. The 
division of land in this way has always been common. A brother 
of the deceased may exercise some nominal supervision to 
ensure a fair division and to settle disputes. Women do not 
inherit land or anything else from their husbands. If none of 
the sons are old enough to inherit the land when their father 
dies, the wife may farm the land on behalf of the children. 
Sons help on their father's farm, whatever their age, until 
the latter dies.
People do not sell land here. It can only be begged. A 
landlord can give land to a friend whenever he has more land 
than he can work but he can ask for the land back at any time.
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APPENDIX TWO: FAMILY INTERVIEWS.
During 1990, interviews were held with a number of 
families known to reflect a variety of social arrangements, 
resident in Adaboya, Bongo and Gowrie. The objective was to 
elicit information on social, legal and other issues of 
relevance to the study. The following is a brief summary of 
the information gathered on family arrangements.
Adi!bonofs House, Bongo.
Members: Adi'bono (widow, deodana), Akasali (second eldest 
son, caretaker), Uma (young sister).
Members living away: Abas (eldest son).
Section: Anafobisi.
After the death of her husband, Adi'bono remained on her 
husband's farm acting as the guardian of her children until 
they reached a mature age. The eldest son is now officially 
the landlord but he lives in the south where he is a caretaker
on a cocoa farm. In his absence, all decisions are taken by
Akasali, the second eldest son, in consultation with Adi'bono.
In addition to the compound land, Akasali has begged a 
small piece of land from a family friend in order to sow 
groundnuts. That farm is not planted every year. Each year 
they tell the landlord whether or not they intend to farm the 
land. He would not refuse to let them use it.
Three years ago, a small piece of the family's land at
Vea was pledged by the deceased father. The land could be
redeemed at any time.
Akasali has planted a lot of trees - mangoes, neem, 
avocado, paw paw, guava, baobab, tamahara. The right to the 
produce of these trees belongs to Akasali as it would with any 
trees planted by Adi'bono or his sister because, until his 
elder brother returns home, he is the landlord of the farm. 
Adi'bono sells the fruit in the market and buys whatever the 
family needs with the profits.
If, in the future he gets a surplus of building wood from 
his neem trees, Akasali will take some branches to sell in the 
market. Only a needy friend would be given branches for no 
charge. Self seeded trees on the farm include giya and 
sinsibi. All self seeded trees are owned by Akasali. Anyone 
can collect their fruits but during the rainy season he puts 
thorns around them to stop children gathering their fruit and 
in the process destroying his crops. Akasali trims his trees 
so they won't overshadow his crops and he plants peppers 
beneath the mango trees so the land is not wasted. He uproots 
seedlings if there is a risk of overcrowding.
Abugre's House, Bongo.
Members: Abugre.
Members living away: One brother and one son. 
Section: Anafobisi.
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Abugre lives alone in a small house in Bongo near the 
local administration buildings and a school. Her farm is very 
small because a part of her family's land was taken away by 
the Government for official buildings. Her family received no 
compensation for the acquisition. When her father died, Abugre 
stayed at home to look after her mother and to produce an heir 
for the farm because her brother had moved more or less 
permanently down south.
There a few self seeded trees on the farm including a 
kapok tree and a baobab. She would let anyone collect the 
leaves of her baobab but she takes sole possession of the 
fruit from her kapok tree.From October - November, Abugre 
sells the fruit of the kapok in the market.
Abugre's brother once planted a neem tree in front of the 
house but termites destroyed it.
Avalkoom's House, Gowrie.
Members: Francis (yi-dana), Francis' mother (deodana), Nvom 
(Francis' wife), Akake (sister to Francis), Maclean (eldest 
son of Akake), six children.
Members living away: Three brothers, two children.
Section: Abileobisi.
Francis is a teacher and a brother to the Chief of 
Gowrie. He holds family land around the compound and a small 
plot of irrigated land behind the Vea dam. Two years ago, a 
small piece of family land was lent out by Francis to his 
friend, Thomas Agongo. Thomas holds the land without payment 
of rent for an indefinite duration but Francis could demand to 
have the land back at any time. Before giving the land, 
Francis informed the family head whose approval was necessary. 
In 1989, Francis lent his irrigated land to a friend for one 
season. His friend paid the rent and rates due to ICOUR on his 
behalf.
Akake is Francis' elder sister. Because of her 
obligations to stay at home and help her mother, she has never 
had the opportunity to marry and leave the compound. Francis 
is her guardian and he, not her sons, will inherit all her 
property when she dies. In addition to helping on the compound 
land, Akake and her son, Maclean, hold individual plots of 
family land where they grow rice, keeping the produce for 
themselves. Francis could call back that land at any time. 
Akake also cultivates groundnuts on a piece of land she begged 
from a friend and she participates in a group farm at Adaboya 
through the DWM.
Crops grown on family land, excluding the upland rice 
grown by Akake and Maclean and excluding all vegetables, which 
are always shared between Nvom (Francis'wife) and Akake, 
belong solely to Francis but he would not sell any of those 
crops without first consulting Nvom.
There are several useful trees on the compound land 
including some self seeded coconut trees which Francis 
carefully weeds around. Anybody is entitled to pick their 
fruit for personal consumption. Only Francis could authorise
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wood cutting. Francis and Akake have planted some mangoes, 
teak and one guava tree on the compound land. On his rice farm 
he has planted some paw paw and leuceana trees to mark the 
boundaries of his farm. The mangoes and paw paws (the guava is 
not yet fruiting) belong exclusively to Francis and can be 
harvested only by the members of his household without his 
prior permission. Francis considers himself to be the owner of 
all trees planted on his land even those planted by others.
He purchased the mangoes from Bongo Agroforestry but the 
teak and guava seedlings were given to him free by ICOUR. All 
his newly planted seedlings are protected by mud walls. They 
are watered every three weeks and cow dung is applied about 
once a year. Bongo Agroforestry and ICOUR Agroforestry have 
been giving advice on tree planting.
In 1989, Akake helped the DWM to plant neem, mango and 
other trees around the dam. That involved building walls 
around each tree and daily watering. The local DWM have now 
started their own small nursery to plant more trees. Bongo 
Agroforestry has been advising them. Government has told them 
how good it is to plant trees. No plans have been made for the 
ownership of the trees and fruit around the dam. Mango trees 
planted by ICOUR can be harvested by anyone. Akake would like 
to plant some more mango, shea, dawa dawa and leuceana trees 
on the compound land. Nvom, however, is reluctant to plant any 
trees because she is not sure how to look after them and it is 
difficult to get water for them.
Maclean has contributed communal labour in a group tree 
planting exercise around the dam. It was organised by ICOUR 
about three years ago and the seedlings were provided by the 
Forestry Department. The trees belong to the whole village but 
only ICOUR or the Chief can authorise people to cut branches.
Azure's House, Bongo.
Members: Ayanga (yi-dana), Ayua (a brother), Anafo (a brother, 
son of Akarebo), Mba (eldest son of Ayanga), Akarebo (deo 
dana), Asinyaka (wife of Ayanga), Azanlerego and Akuntugebo 
(wives of Ayua), Asibi (Anafo's wife), Adango (Mba's wife), 
Ayewuni (Ayanga's daughter) and 16 children.
Members living away: Four adult males.
Section: Sa'abo. (Host section: Anafobisi.)
Azure's house lies on the main Bongo-Bolgatanga road 
about three kilometres from Bongo. The family's grandfathers 
migrated here and were given land to settle on as permanent 
tenants provided always they remain on good terms with the 
host section.
Ayanga is the family head and landlord. He is now too old 
to participate in farming except to supervise. His family 
possess a large compound farm as well as some land closer to 
Bongo. All the land has been divided between the brothers 
(living and deceased) of Ayanga. This means that Ayanga, Mba, 
and their wives and Ayewuni farm, store grain and eat together 
as do Anafo, his mother and his wife, and Ayua and his wives. 
In practice, all the members help each other with farming. 
None of the women make their own farms. Ayanga and Mba also
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farm a small piece of neighbouring land on loan from a friend.
When Ayanga dies, Ayua will become the next landlord and 
family head but Ayanga's land will pass to his three sons. Mba 
will act as caretaker of the land for his two brothers. 
Akarebo is the only surviving wife of Ayanga's father. Her 
eldest son is Anafo. She is in charge of all the crops which 
Anafo and his wife produce. Ayanga's daughter, Ayewuni, was 
married but when her husband died she opted to return to her 
father's house where she now helps him.
Mba and Anafo, with the help of the women, started tree 
planting a few years ago, encouraged by BRDP and Bongo 
Agroforestry. They planted five mangoes, six teak trees and 
twelve neem trees but only one of the teak trees and four of 
the neem trees have survived despite regular watering in the 
dry season, protection by mud walls and the application of 
manure. Termite attack seems to be the reason for the death of 
so many of the trees. They were all planted on the compound 
land and, had they begun to fruit, their produce would have 
been shared among all the family members with any surplus 
being sold in the market, the revenue being the property of 
Mba and Anafo despite the acknowledged principle that the 
ownership of the trees which they have planted vests in the 
landlord of the house. Self planted seedlings are carefully 
weeded around but many were recently destroyed by an 
accidental fire which spread to their land.
Asibi once participated in a group tree planting exercise 
about two years ago. The group planted a large number of teak 
trees along a near by valley under the leadership of Bongo 
Agroforestry. Each tree was protected by a mud wall and she 
helped to water them. Some of the trees have survived. They 
belong to Bongo Agroforestry.
Akiriba's House, Adaboya.
Members: Namobire (yi-dana), Adikbase (brother), Abosi
(deodana), Asampanbila, Akologo, Abadigrebuno (widows of 
Anamoo, a brother), Akobire and Atipogbilla (wives of 
Namobire), Adeyana (Adikbase's wife) and fifteen children. 
Members living away: None.
Section: Anafobisi. (Host section: Akutabuna.)
When Anamoo recently died his brothers, of the same 
mother, decided to continue living and farming together. This 
is a united household in which everything is held in common 
and all the members eat together, the women taking it in turn 
to cook. The Akiriba family are settler tenants on land 
belonging to the Akutabuna section. Their forefathers migrated 
to Adaboya many years ago. Members of the Akutabuno section 
still harvest the shea trees on the land given to Akiriba's 
family.
The family possesses a large amount of land around the 
compound and it also makes extensive farms in the bush. The 
land in the bush is held from year to year by courtesy of the 
landowners but should the family be unable to cultivate any of 
the land in one particular year, which is often the case, its 
right to cultivate the land in following years is not lost.
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There is no charge for the use of the land and it is not 
necessary for them to seek the prior permission of the 
landlord every year. Some of the bush land is owned by the 
Anafobisi section. In 1989, all the women made farms on land
they have begged from friends or relatives.
Namobire allows anyone to take dead wood or crop stalks 
from his farms including the compound farm. The women in this 
house only cook with wood.
Namobire would like to have some shea and dawa dawa trees 
for himself but he would not plant any on the compound land 
because that might prompt the landlord to come and seize the 
land and/or the trees. Namobire has planted approximately 50 
shea trees on some of his bush land. He's on good terms with 
the landowner who has not complained. The fruits of those 
trees belong to him and his wives but he's seen other people 
stealing them.
Last year, Namobire and Adikbase participated in group 
tree planting in the valley on one of their fields. They
planted mangoes, teak, eucalyptus etc. but all the trees died,
possibly due to termite attack. The group had been hoping to 
get fruit to share among its members.
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APPENDIX THREE: MAP OF FOREST RESERVES IN THE WESTERN REGION
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APPENDIX FOUR: MAP OF GHANA (1966) SHOWING THE APPROXIMATE
LOCATION OF BONGO♦
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APPENDIX FIVE: MONTHLY RAINFALL TOTALS AT BOLGATANGA
METEOROLOGICAL STATION, 1987-1989.
YEAR 
1 MONTH
1987 1988 1989 TOTAL MEAN
I JAN 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
I FEB 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0
MAR 38.4 00.2 52.7 91.3 30.4
APR 11.0 46.3 04.8 62.1 20.7
MAY 28.8 70.0 79.0 177.8 59.3
JUN 117.3 151.8 176.8 445.9 148.6
JUL 176.5 170.1 144.4 491.0 163.7
AUG 260.0 223.2 374.8 858.0 286.0
1 SEP 175.2 270.2 274.2 719.6 239.9
OCT 92.7 TRACE 79.6 172.3 57.4
NOV 00.0 47.2 00.0 47.2 15.7
DEC 00.0 00.0 44.4 44.4 14.8
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APPENDIX SIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.
On Forestry.
The following interviewees and respondents are thanked 
for their valuable assistance -
Departmental Head, IRNR, UST, Kumasi 
General Manager, A.G. Timbers
General Manager, Naja David Veneer and Plywood Ltd. 
Managing Director, African Timber and Plywood Co. 
Managing Director, Mim Timber Co. Ltd.
Mr. Adjei, Lands Commission
Mr. Anan, District Forestry Officer, Sefwi Wiawso
Mr. Appiah, Public Relations Officer, Gliksten (West
Africa)
Mr. Asante, District Forestry Officer, Juabeso-Bia
Mr. Attah, Timber Export Development Board
Mr. Bright, Secretariat of the Lands Commission, Sefwi
Wiawso
Dr. Chatchu, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources 
Mr. Faakye, Forestry Department, Juabeso-Bia 
Mr. Francois, Chief Conservator of Forests 
Mr. Kumii, Forest Manager, Mim Timber Co. Ltd.
Mr. Mensah, Area Manager, Mim Timber Co. Ltd.
Mr. Mintah, Member of the Royal Family of Bonsan 
Mr. Sarpong, Chief, Bonsu-Nkwanta 
Personnel Manager, John Bitar and Co. Ltd.
Professor Twufour, Forestry Commission
Regional Manager, Forest Products Inspection Bureau, 
Kumasi
Union Director, Ghana Timber Marketing Organisation
My thanks are also due to farmers in Juabeso-Bia District 
who answered my informal questionnaire.
Bongo.
In addition to the acknowledgements made at the beginning 
of this thesis, the following interviewees and respondents are 
thanked for the provision of information about activities in 
Bongo -
Bolgatanga Diocesan Development Officer 
Bongo Agroforestry - Project Staff 
CCFI - Project Leader
Department of Community Development - District Manager 
Department of Fire Services - Messrs. Atasinge, Gaisie 
and Yitah
Department of Social Welfare - District Manager 
DWM (Bongo Central) - Members
ICOUR Agroforestry - Project Manager and Nursery Manager 
Lands Commission - Regional Officers
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Mr. Abrahim, District Forestry Officer
Mr. Adango, Environmental Health Department
Mr. Adua, Department of Parks and Gardens
Mr. Alabadeck, Small Scale Agricultural Extension Support
Unit
Mr. Anafu, Rural Water Supply Unit, GWSC
Mr. Apua Kolga, District Organising Assistant of CDRs
Ms. Asakenongo, Bongo resident
Mr. Atise, District Leader of the Democratic Youth League
Ms. Azure, Leader of BRDP Health Component
Mr. Bening, District Administrative Officer
Mr. Bosumtwe, Town and Country Planning Department
Mr. Galuma, Department of Mobilisation
Ms. Gibbs, District Organiser of the 31st DWM
Mr. Gyima, District Organiser, Ministry of Agriculture
Mr. Osaka, Regional Officer, EPC
Mr. Otoo, Regional Forestry Officer
Mr. Puganso, Regional Director, Oxfam
Ms. Stamp, Oxfam, U.K.
Mr. Zemp, Bongo Agroforestry
General Advice.
For information concerning wildlife conservation, my 
thanks are due to the following interviewees -
Mr. Ankudey, Chief Game and Wildlife Officer 
Mr. Amposan, Game and Wildlife Officer, Bia National Park 
Mr. Derry, Technical Assistant, Game and Wildlife 
Officer, Bia National Park
Principal Game and Wildlife Officer, Mole National Park
For information about the EPC, my very special thanks are 
due to the following interviewees -
Professor Dorm Adzobu, Director of Programmes
Mr. Abrokwa-Ampadu, Principal Programme Officer
Mr. Seth Osafo, Legal Secretary
Mr. Klufio, Programme Officer
Mr. Ampadu-Agyei, Programme Officer
Mr. Allotey, Programme Officer
Mr. Iddrisu, Programme Officer
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